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Introduction
Jürgen Barkhoff and Joep Leerssen
National Stereotyping – Identity Politics – European Crises. As its title indicates, 
the papers in this volume seek to address and analyse long-term cultural and 
historic discourses on identity and othering in Europe in their impact on recent 
European politics. This link between discursive traditions and current affairs has 
not received much scholarly or political attention, although it became highly 
influential in the experience of the post-2008 European crises, many of which 
are either ongoing or at least latent, ready to be reactivated at any time. The con-
tributions to this volume examine how such crisis discourses were in many ways 
informed and structured by recourse to historically influential, deeply ingrained 
patterns of national and transnational ethnotyping and othering. Mostly in the 
service of an antagonistic identity politics of us versus them and demarcation 
and exclusion, politicians and opinion makers across Europe have revived, reac-
tivated, and instrumentalised divisive auto- and hetero-images of European 
nations and people, as well as narratives of cultural conflict that go back many 
centuries. This longue durée of established auto- and heteroimages, of divisive 
narratives and patterns of interpretation as well as their actualisation and appli-
cation in contemporary politics could be observed in many fields.
During the financial crisis since 2008 the bailout politics of the European 
Union and the International Monetary Fund for countries such as Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Ireland were regularly interpreted as the imposition of a 
protestant work and frugality ethic by Northern countries, led by a pastor’s 
daughter from the Prussian hinterland, on an undisciplined, self-indulgent or 
even lazy Catholic South.
In a similar line, the Ukraine conflict since 2013 has habitually been depicted 
in terms of a clash between Western forces of civilisation informed by Enlighten-
ment values and represented by the EU, and a non-civic East, naturally drawn to 
despotism and violence, represented by Russia, with the Ukraine in the middle.
The rise of authoritarian leadership and illiberal democracies in countries 
such as Hungary, Poland, Russia or Turkey was underpinned and fostered by 
a neo-nationalist identity politics that re-mobilised nativist sentiment with 
crude ethnotypes and nationalistic interpretations of the past. Such essential-
ising models of identity are supported by a rhetoric which argues the unique-
ness, if not superiority of one’s own nation, its cultural model and traditional 
value system and calls for its defence against threatening and dangerous 
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 outside influences such as liberalism, trans nationalism, migration or other 
forces of globalisation.
Similarly, the neo-nationalist, euro-sceptic and xenophobic populist move-
ments and parties which have been on the rise across Europe draw heavily on 
essentialising cultural identities and antagonistic ethnotypes.
In particular the rhetoric and politics of Brexit, which came to dominate Euro-
pean politics since the referendum in 2016, was fuelled by a nostalgic nation-
alist interpretation of past glory, exceptionalism and isolationist unilateralism.
Equally, the temporary opening of the European borders in 2015 with its 
substantial influx of refugees and migrants, the ensuing crisis and the subse-
quent problems of integration have been discursively framed predominantly 
as a loss of control and sovereignty and structured by crude juxtapositions of 
Self versus Other, a dynamics of inclusion and exclusion and projective mech-
anisms of scapegoating and fear mongering.
It is the contention of this book that the discursive processes at work here 
follow fixed patterns, have a great deal in common and need to be better 
understood. The underlying patterns and master narratives have a long history 
and draw on culturally constructed, but highly influential historical myths, 
cultural memories and identities, stereotypes of national characteristics, self-, 
hetero- and meta-images and processes of othering. Stereotyping and othering 
are enormously powerful, as they are anthropologically deeply rooted cogni-
tive and affective practices necessary to make sense of the world by reducing 
complexities, providing orientation and creating a sense of familiarity. Their 
connection with history and identity and the way in which they connect col-
lective and personal memory make them emotionally visceral, enable them 
to mobilise deep affects, link individual and collective experience and forge 
strong identifications. As a result they are both pervasive and influential, and 
paradoxically their very pervasiveness makes them appear ‘banal’ (in Michael 
Billig’s sense of the word),1 ambient, thus hiding their political potency in plain 
sight. Hence the need to analyse their presence, their historical roots, their rep-
resentational power and their discursive logic.
This volume presents the papers delivered by distinguished specialists from 
a variety of relevant disciplines and from all over Europe at a conference held 
in March 2017 at the Trinity Long Room Hub (the Arts & Humanities Research 
Institute of Trinity College Dublin). Its contributions investigate these cru-
cial cultural and historical dimensions behind recent European crises. They 
 interrogate the uses and abuses of stereotypes and narratives of othering in 
crisis discourse from fields as varied as history, historiography, cultural history, 
1 See Billig (1995).
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sociology, ethnology, imagology, stereotyping research, memory studies, media 
studies, identity studies, translation studies and literary analysis.
…
The two most relevant and important methodologies applied in this volume 
are those of Imagology and Critical Discourse Analysis. They are represented 
by two of their leading theore ticians and champions, Joep Leerssen and Ruth 
Wodak respectively, but also employed by many other contributors.
Imagology as a method of analysing discourses of national character and 
patterns of prejudice and stereotyping developed in the 1950s and 1960s 
within Comparative Literature, mainly in France, the Netherlands, Austria 
and  Germany; its emergence ran in tandem with Europe’s post-war reconcilia-
tion project. By  looking at representations of national character as prejudices, 
tropes and myths, it opened up their genesis, mechanisms, history and influ-
ences to  analysis, offering a critical alternative to that national essentialism and 
 ethnotyping, which had dominated the age of nationalism and of the two World 
Wars. Thus it was and still is a form of applied cultural studies in the service of 
the  European peace project. From its literary beginings, it has broadened out to 
the methods and theories of social psychology, prejudice research, media stud-
ies, mentality history, cultural memory studies and critical discourse analysis.
Focussing on the historical genesis and discursive structures and functions 
of auto- and heteroimages for identity discourses, imagology avoids an essen-
tialist reading of its results by carefully triangulating the dimensions of text, 
context and intertext: the rhetorical and narrative function of ethnotypes 
within the text; the historical-contextual analysis of the text’s production and 
reception history as situated in the ideological field and in the international 
relations of the given moment; and the provenance of the ethnotyes as tropes 
in their intertextual transmission, their constants and variables as discursive 
formulae. At each stage the internal logic and a priori assumptions of ethno-
types are critically deconstructed: the assumption of the nation’s homogeneity 
across regional, gender, age-group and class differentiations; the assumption of 
its fundamental different ness from other (equally homogenised) nations; the 
assumption of its invariant characterological permanence over time. Whereas 
the working corpus of imagology was originally limited to literary representa-
tions, other modes of cultural production and reproduction are now included, 
notably narrative in film and audiovisual media, journalism, political dis-
course, tourism, design and museum displays.2
2 See Leerssen (2000); Beller, Leerssen (2007); Leerssen (2016). 
4 Barkhoff and Leerssen
A number of general imagological insights into the dynamic of auto- and 
hetero-images are of particular relevance for this volume. The first is that 
the discourses of national character and ethnotyping are intrinsically geared 
towards exceptionalism, as they tend to emphasize difference and play down 
or overlook similarities, even though those are generally much more common. 
Leerssen calls the underlying fallacy of this discursive pattern “the a-priori 
denial of normalcy: the assumption that a nation is most characteristically 
itself in precisely those aspects in which it is most different from others.”3 
The second point is that the oppositional cultural and temperamental matrix 
between people or social groups is applied in stereotypical and invariant oppo-
sitions such as the one between a cool, cerebral north and a hot, passionate 
south, between a civically-minded west and a despotic east, between a dynam-
ically developing, societal centre and a tradition-bound, communitarian 
periphery. Such oppositions are geographically unspecific, and can be applied 
across and between continents, countries or regions as the case happens to fit 
a chosen frame and perspective. A given society or social group can be repre-
sented and temperamentally characterised, contingently, as western or east-
ern, as northern or southern, as central or peripheral, depending on the point 
of view. Other generic rhetorical markers that can be deployed to manipulate 
readers’ estimations of foreign characters are in the selective, opportunistic 
distribution of general human virtues such as familiality, honesty, hospitality, 
courage in adversity, and a work-ethic reliability. Attributing such virtues to 
members of any nation will serve to render the nation (thus represented by 
its virtuous members) more sympathetic; and since the distribution of such 
moral markers is a central element in the narrative, actantial configuration of 
role patterns, it determines the narrative configuration of national character-
isations. The underlying logic is that an individual of an exotic nationality is 
always perceived as representative of that nationality as a whole.
A final general insight is the pattern that that the valorisation of temper-
aments is strongly dependent on external political factors. Tensions and cri-
ses in international relations tend to trigger a surge in antagonistic national 
stereotyping, while during calmer and more stable political times shared val-
ues and attitudes are being foregrounded and temperamental differences are 
viewed in a more benign light. In many ways this last observation provides the 
rationale for this volume. Imagology as a method developed out of a desire to 
overcome the catastrophic legacies of European nationalism and fascism: it is 
of renewed relevance today at this historical juncture where neo-nationalisms 
and neo-right movements are gaining fresh virulence.
3 Leerssen (2016), p. 17.
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Critical Discourse Anaylsis (CDA) has proven to be equally important for 
the topics discussed in this book, as it approaches language as a social practice 
and focusses on the way power is mediated, enacted, reproduced or challenged 
through language and text. Rooted in the linguistic turn and Critical Theory 
and combining detailed and qualitative linguistic analysis of a wide array of 
text types and communicative situations and media with sociological and 
political macro-theories of societies, CDA offers a set of theoretical and ana-
lytical tools for the interdisciplinary interrogation of the relationship between 
textual and communicative discursive practices and social formations. CDA 
has a distinct engaged or even activist dimension, as its critical aim is to make 
hidden power structures and their underlying ideological assumptions and 
prepositions visible and in this way raise awareness about discursive power 
relations.4 Over the last 25 years the study of stereotyping, prejudice and dis-
crimination in ethnocentric, nationalist and racist discourse has become an 
increasingly important field within Critical Discourse Analysis. Ruth Wodak 
and her research group in particular have turned their attention to political 
rhetoric especially of neo-nationalism and new movements on the extreme 
right, anti semitism, xenophobia, identity politics and narratives of the past, 
the very issues taken up by this volume.5 For its analysis she and her collabora-
tors have developed a specific approach within CDA, the Discourse-Historical 
Approach DHA, which integrates elements of historiography, political science 
and sociology.6 Of equal importance for a number of contributions in this 
volume is the fact that Critical Discourse Analysis in recent years widened its 
scope to include a number of media and discursive fields that have an increas-
ing influence on public opinion and political positions around the issues at 
stake in this volume such as journalism, reality television, television more gen-
eral, film and also new social media.7
…
The contributions of this volume divide into five parts. Part 1 investigates how 
national histories and historiographies contributed to the identity politics of 
European countries and served their political objectives; Part 2 analyses the 
discursive and performative practices of the neo-nationalist and populist right; 
Part 3 discusses strategies of othering and of exclusion/inclusion between East 
4 See for example van Dijk (2001); Flowerdew, Richardson (2017). 
5 See for example Wodak (2017).
6 On DHA see Reisigl, Wodak (2009); Reisigl (2017). 
7 See section 5 of Flowerdew, Richardson (2017). 
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and West; Part 4 examines the role of media such as journalism, prime time 
TV and social media in disseminating, reinforcing and also countering stereo-
types; Part 5 describes how literary fiction critiques and counteracts processes 
of stereotyping and othering that have become prevalent during the economic 
crisis.
In Part 1 ‘Historiography and Identity Politics’ Stefan Berger examines the 
complex relationship between national historiographies and processes of 
national stereotyping. Drawing on a pan-European comparative project on 
national historiographies under his coordination, Berger presents five case 
studies from across Europe, which demonstrate how academic history-writing 
in the 20th century frequently relied on binary stereotypes (positive national 
auto-images and negative hetero-imagines). Professional historiography often 
legitimised self-serving politics by providing academic credentials to ingrained 
prejudices. This tendency outweighs attempts by academic historiography to 
critique or counteract such stereotypes. Berger looks at how British and Ger-
man historians fed into hate propaganda during World War I, how German 
Inter-war Volksgeschichte helped prepare the ground for racist expansionism 
during the Nazi-period, how the re-writing of national histories across Europe 
was instrumentalised for Cold War ideologies, and how Eastern European mas-
ter narratives were re-nationalised after the fall of Communism.
Zenonas Norkus and Aelita Ambrulevičiūtė pick up the topic of the influence 
of national historiography on recent foreign policy by presenting a case study 
on the link between Lithuanian national history and its political positions 
around the Ukraine crisis. They analyse how Lithuania’s very proactive stance 
on an Eastern expansion of EU and NATO, which contributed to the tensions 
in the region, was underpinned, legitimised and strengthened by recourse to 
its late-medieval and early-modern imperial past, when the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania was the dominant regional power in Eastern Europe. They demon-
strate how these identity narratives and memory discourses were carried by 
influential political figures in the re-established Republic of Lithuania, driving 
the country’s foreign policy with this vision of once and future grandeur as 
a predominant broker and promoter of democracy and Western values. That 
position revived old East-West antagonisms and not only antagonised Russia, 
but also annoyed other neighbouring states, especially Poland.
Daniel Carey traces and illustrates some historical aspects of British excep-
tionalism, which proved to be such a powerful force in the Brexit referendum 
and its aftermath. He discusses the sixteenth century English Reformation as 
the seedbed of continuing attitudes, leading to the anti-EU agenda to ‘take 
back control’ and assert sovereignty against foreign influences. Literary sources 
to complicate and counteract the exceptionalist narrative start with Daniel 
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Defoe’s The True-Born Englishman (1701), which already contests notions of 
national character by pointing to the enriching and heterogeneous influ-
ences of various invaders, refugees and migrants. Carey also detects related 
arguments for hybridity in Robinson Crusoe and goes on to demonstrate that 
already in the Renaissance a number of Shakespeare plays such as Richard II 
and Henry V similarly complicate and contest nationalist narratives. Carey’s 
reading argues that such historical and literary perspectives offer insight both 
into the forces that drive Brexit as well as the simplifications and fallacies that 
drive the debate.
In Part 2 ‘Identity Politics of the Neo-Right’ Karel Šima’s contribution offers 
a wide-ranging overview of the identitarian movement across Europe, its polit-
ical aims, underlying ideologies and forms of political activism since 2012. He 
analyses how the movement has, to great effect, copied the activist protest 
forms and identity politics of leftist social movements, appropriating them 
for their far-right political agenda. The movement successfully employs social 
media and political performance to appeal to a young generation and to maxi-
mise its visibility. Sima’s analysis demonstrates how the identitarian movement 
has embraced the concepts of metapolitics and cultural hegemony, borrowed 
from Gramsci, and sees culture and collective memory as their main battle-
ground. He shows how the movement has simultaneously adapted cultural ref-
erences both from pop culture and mainstream European conservatism, folk 
culture and ‘banal nationalism’ to appear youthful and energetic while at the 
same time projecting an image as conservative defenders of European values 
and traditions against the threatening forces of globalisation and liberalism.
Ruth Wodak analyses the discursive strategies of Austria’s extreme-right 
Freedom Party, the FPÖ, as a characteristic example of similar tendencies 
among other neo-nationalist, populist and xenophobic parties in Europe. She 
highlights in particular the construction and propagation of a highly norma-
tive and exclusivist nativist notion of nation and people, which is portrayed as 
constantly besieged, not only externally by migrants and transnational insti-
tutions such as the EU, but also internally by increasing diversity and gender 
politics. Her analysis shows how the FPÖ’s confrontational campaign style, 
partly by means of social media, uses continuous provocation and scandali-
sation with the aim to normalise and mainstream its radical positions. These 
tactics proved particularly successful during the short-lived coalition between 
the FPÖ and the Austrian Peoples Party, the ÖVP under Chancellor Kurz from 
December 2017 to May 2019.
In Part 3 ‘Strategies of Othering’ Hercules Millas investigates the highly ambiv-
alent attitudes in Greece and Turkey towards ‘the West’ and, as part of this, the 
antagonistic relationship between these two countries within the East-West 
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continuum. His point of departure are critical positions in Greece and Turkey 
towards the EU during the financial crisis and the refugee crisis respectively. 
He traces what he calls ‘Levantine Occidentalism’ in history and current affairs: 
an anti-Western discourse that is in part a reaction to long-standing Western 
Orientalism, but also serves manifest aims in current political and economical 
bargaining with the EU. Millas’ wide-ranging contribution focuses in particu-
lar on contradictions and unresolved ambivalences in Greek and Turkish posi-
tions towards the East, such as the fact that they both see themselves as part of 
Europe and have embraced, at various junctures, an agenda of Western-style 
modernisation, while at the same time rejecting European influences as alien 
and corrupting. Of particular interest for him is also the subsidiary East-West 
conflict between Greece and Turkey, which is as much cultural as it is political. 
Overall, the comparison of their respective positions makes a rich case study 
for shifting significations on the spectrum of auto- and hetero-images.
After clarifying in theoretical terms how the study of historical myth can be 
a fruitful approach within imagology, Zrinka Blažević takes the exposed posi-
tion of Croatia on the Balkan route during the refugee crisis as her point of 
departure to analyse the multiple uses, functions and meanings of the antemu-
rale Christianitatis myth in Croatia’s historical imagery and cultural memory. 
The heroic self-image of Croatians as guardians of Western civilisation and as 
a bulwark in the defence of Christendom against an Islamic threat has been 
a central part of Croatian identity narratives since the sixteenth century. 
While nineteenth-century Slavophilia furnished an alternative counter-myth 
(Croatia as a civilisational bridge or crossroads), the bulwark trope was reacti-
vated at various junctures both during Tito’s Yugoslavia and since 1990; today 
it is a cornerstone of anti-immigrant rhetoric in Croatian right-wing circles. 
Blažević’s analysis stresses the considerable symbolic and ideological potential 
of the myth as well as its polysemic and multimedial qualities.
In Part 4 ‘Stereotyping in the Media’ Luc van Doorslaer addresses the under-
representation of journalistic discourse in imagology and explores the poten-
tial of translation studies to analyse how journalism produces and distributes 
political and cultural stereotyping. Given the omnipresence of journalism in 
the media world and its enormous influence on public discourse this is an 
important field of further studies, especially as ‘default stereotyping’ and sim-
plistic binary dichotomies are becoming, as van Doorslaer demonstrates, more 
prevalent in journalism the less journalists are informed about the subject 
on which they write. The focus in translation studies on processes of inter-
cultural transfer and also of selecting, de-selecting, re-editing and rewriting 
offers great potential for better understanding stereotyping in journalism, as 
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these processes are also central to journalistic practice. He illustrates this with 
examples from sports journalism and the stereotypical representation of Ger-
many in the British and Turkish press; the contribution closes with a call for a 
more systematic investigation of this promising new interdisciplinary field of 
enquiry.
Wulf Kansteiner turns his attention to another highly influential medium, 
prime time television. He detects and describes processes of othering in Ger-
many’s longest running and most popular crime series, Tatort or Scene of the 
Crime, and in his analysis links these to prevalent attitudes during the so called 
refugee crisis of 2015. He discusses the constructions of alterity in a number of 
highly ambivalent instalments from the early 2000s which thematize issues 
of migration and the place of Jews in contemporary German society. Even as 
this critically acclaimed and socially engaged series intended to raise viewers’ 
awareness and compassion for the plights of migrants coming to Germany, it 
was predicated on a plot structure which requires victims and perpetrators, 
and is thus forced to cast migrants in one of these roles. The efforts to turn the 
crime series into a self-reflexive study of racism in German society are thus 
subverted by its genre conventions, and unintentionally xenophobic or antise-
mitic prejudices can be raised. Kansteiner in conclusion calls for a ‘mobility 
turn in memory studies and the politics of memory’, a new approach that val-
ues migration memories within the German host culture and beyond.
Social media are the new digital public sphere and as such prime opin-
ion-makers. Their influence in distributing, enforcing and amplifying national 
and other stereotypes can hardly be overestimated, but requires more detailed 
empirical analysis. Raúl Sanchez Prieto’s contribution presents and tests a prac-
tical, empirical text-linguistic approach. His corpus-based case study investi-
gates Facebook conversations about Spain during the financial crisis in six 
selected countries from Northern, Southern and Eastern Europe. His approach, 
which combines text-linguistics with sentiment analysis research, effectively 
identifies the presence, prevalence and actional nature of both positive and 
negative stereotypes.
The contributions in Part 5 ‘The economic crisis in literature’ discuss the 
potential of contemporary fiction to offer a critical counter-discourse to the 
financial crisis of 2008 and the austerity politics imposed as a consequence by 
the EU and the International Monetary Fund. Ana María Fraile considers the 
nuances of how fictional narrative can represent the economic, political, social 
and cultural effects of recent European upheavals. She discusses five Spanish 
crisis novels, published between 2012 to 2015, which show how the EU’s cri-
sis management during the economic crisis and its aftermath reactivated and 
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mobilised stereotypical constructs of the relationship between Spain and other 
European countries such as Holland and Germany. These novels reflect self- 
and hetero-images about Spain but also, most notably, meta-images, which 
reflect how a nation believes to be perceived by others. Fraile discusses how 
these texts employ satire and irony as well as a critical mobilisation of cultural 
memory. She argues that these novels go beyond mere critique and analysis 
and also offer a narrative ethics of resilience in times of crisis, which might 
contribute over time to overcoming ingrained stereotypes and offer more opti-
mistic perspectives of a common European citizenship. 
In a similar vein Aidan O’Malley examines three recent novels by the prom-
inent Irish author Paul Murray that constitute a humorous panorama of con-
temporary Ireland by charting the ascent and supposed death of the so-called 
Irish Tiger. With inward migration from Europe being a defining feature of the 
boom years that preceded the economic crisis, O’Malley demonstrates how 
these novels employ non-Irish European characters to dramatize the Irish iter-
ation of late capitalism. Stereotyping fundamentally renders reality fictional, 
and in Murray’s novels the reader witnesses how the stereotyping of European 
immigrants was essential to the operations of the phantasmagoric Celtic-Tiger 
Ireland; amongst other things, it translated them as exploitable. However, as 
this contribution also shows, the comic exaggerations employed in the satiri-
cal representation of this spectral dynamic in Murray’s most recent novel, The 
Mark and the Void, gesture back towards, and repeat, the stereotyping the novel 
is explicitly critiquing.
…
The conference on which this book is based was a flagship event of Trinity Col-
lege’s university-wide interdisciplinary research theme Identities in Transfor-
mation.8 This research theme, estab lished in 2013, is a collaborative platform 
for investigating shifting identities in Ireland, Europe and the world in a period 
of accelerating change. In doing this, it serves as a forum for public humanities 
and seeks to contribute to addressing urgent societal challenges of our time.
The conference was held in conjunction with the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Working Group of the Coimbra Group of European Universities. 
As a network of 41 leading European universities the Coimbra Group brings 
together perspectives and expertise from all over Europe. Its Social Sciences 
8 More information on the Identities in Transformation Research Theme can be found at 
https://www.tcd.ie/ trinitylongroomhub/themes/identities/.
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and Humanities Working Group investigates in particular questions of cul-
tural identities and memory cultures, of migration, integration and inclusion 
and related challenges facing Europe.9 The Research Theme and the Working 
Group provided rich and fruitful contexts for the investigation of the topics 
that this volume engages with.
…
The editors of this book wish to express their gratitude to the following: To 
the team of the Trinity Long Room Hub Arts & Humanities Research Institute, 
especially its then Director Jane Ohlmeyer and its Executive Director Caitriona 
Curtis, for their hospitality and organisational support, and the Trinity Long 
Room Hub Research Incentive Fund for generous financial support. To Dr Jon-
athan Johnston, whose perfect planning, great organisational skills and good 
humour ensured that everything went smoothly. To the Steering Committee of 
the Identities in Transformation Research Theme and the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Working Group of the Coimbra Group for their contributions to 
the concept and programme. And last, but by no means least, a very special and 
warm ‘Thank You’ to Dr Beate Schuler, member of the Provost’s  Council, great 
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CHAPTER 1
Confronting the Other/Perceiving the Self




This contribution deals with the relationship between national historiographies and 
national stereotypes in twentieth-century Europe. It argues that this relationship was 
extraordinarily diverse and complex and produced a range of different scenarios. After 
briefly recalling the role and function of stereotypes and after providing the briefest 
of introductions to national history writing, it presents five brief case studies. They 
are, first, the contributions of British and German historians to national stereotyping 
during the First World War. Secondly, the contribution recalls the stereotyping that fol-
lowed from the research of so-called Volksgeschichte in Germany during the interwar 
period. Thirdly, the need to nationalise territories in East-Central and Eastern Europe 
that had previously not belonged to the nation state gave rise to the formation of new 
national stereotypes after the end of the Second World War. Fourthly, the hyperna-
tionalism of the first half of the twentieth century threw a range of national historical 
master narratives into a severe crisis after 1945 and created the need to reframe those 
narratives in the post-Second World War world. The final case study deals with a sim-
ilar need to recast national historical master narratives after the end of the Cold War 
from the 1990s onwards.
1 Introduction
Standing on Gianicolo Hill overlooking Rome one is confronted with the mon-
ument to Giuseppe Garibaldi, unveiled in 1895. Garibaldi was, of course, one of 
the central heroes of the Risorgimento – an archetypal romantic figure fighting 
the cause of national unity and liberty not just in Italy but also in Latin America. 
He sits alongside a whole range of other romantic liberators of allegedly unfin-
ished or repressed nations in the pantheon of nineteenth-century national 
movements. The nation states they were striving for and that, in many cases, 
were eventually to emerge from history took great care to present their heroes, 
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their heroism and the heroic times they shaped in the best of lights in their 
museums, their monuments and their history books. This is certainly true for 
Garibaldi: the incredibly tall statue of Garibaldi on horseback on the Gianicolo 
depicts a victor – majestic and glorious, a true father of the nation. It recalls 
all the myths of the Risorgimento on which the official Italy thrived after its 
unification, even if it, by and large, ultimately failed to ‘make Italians’, at least 
before the First World War.1 Perhaps because the Italian national elites were 
struggling hard to ‘make Italians’, they were particularly wary of protecting 
their national myths and the stereotypical representation of historical events 
they entailed. Professional historians and historical writing were sometimes 
seen as a threat to those “beautiful legends”, as they were called by Giovanni 
Giolitti who closed the archives of the Risorgimento because he did not want 
historians to destroy those myths.2
This may seem an extreme case of an adverse relationship between national 
historiographies and national stereotypes in twentieth-century Europe, and in 
1 Massimo d’Azeglio, another pioneer of Italian unification is credited with saying: “We have 
made Italy. Now we have to make Italians.” See Hom (2013).
2 Cited in Laven (2006), p. 270. 
figure 1.1 Statue of Garibaldi on the Gianicolo hill in Rome
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fact, as I shall argue in this article, this relationship was extraordinarily diverse 
and complex and produced a range of different scenarios. After briefly recalling 
the role and function of stereotypes and after providing the briefest of intro-
ductions to national history writing, I will present five case studies in which 
the relationship between national stereotyping and perceptions of national 
history are particularly acute. They are, first, the contributions of British and 
German historians to national stereotyping during the First World War. Sec-
ondly, I will recall the stereotyping that followed from the research of so-called 
Volksgeschichte in Germany during the interwar period. Thirdly, the need to 
nationalise territories in East-Central and Eastern Europe that had previously 
not belonged to the nation state gave rise to the formation of new national 
stereotypes after the end of the Second World War. Fourthly, the hypernation-
alism of the first half of the twentieth century threw a range of national his-
torical master narratives into a severe crisis after 1945 and created the need 
to reframe those narratives in the post-Second World War world – with the 
help of several stereotypical images. My final case study will deal with a similar 
need to recast national historical master narratives after the end of the Cold 
War from the 1990s onwards. I will conclude with some remarks on the rela-
tionship between national stereotyping and national history writing.
2.  Some Preliminary Thoughts on Stereotypes and on 
National Histories
Katy Greenland has defined stereotypes as “probabilistic, generalised represen-
tations of any social group”.3 They play an important role in social cognition, as 
they allow people to categorize and thereby simplify the world around them. 
Their effects on perception, thought and behaviour is considerable. Bias and 
prejudice are an integral part of stereotyping leading to the frequent denigra-
tion of ‘others’. The more social groups suffer from anxiety about other groups, 
the more they will practice negative stereotyping. These stereotypes are often 
highly abstract, which helps to make their cores more durable, as they are very 
difficult to destabilise with specific counter-examples. At the level of abstrac-
tion at which stereotypes operate, specific examples can always be dismissed 
as the exception to the rule.
A close analysis of national histories leads to the conclusion that they are 
often characterised by positive auto-stereotypes and negative stereotypes 
3 Greenland (2000), p. 15. 
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about ‘others’, which can be both external and internal.4 Stereotypical ideas 
of ‘the other’ are due to deep insecurities about national identity. As Peter 
Fritzsche has argued:
The relationship between victimhood and violence is embedded in most 
national historiographies […]. [The national idea, S.B.] is first conjured 
up as being under threat. And it is this state of alarm that produces 
the energy to override competing identities, often violently. Violence is 
inscribed in the national narrative because the nation imagines itself first 
and foremost as a collective good that is incomplete and imperilled. In 
many ways, the national narrative must sustain itself by reproducing its 
own state of jeopardy. National histories tremble as a result.5
To take the example of Germany after unification of 1871, here national histo-
ries contributed to constructing a whole string of internal and external enemies 
in order to strengthen an altogether insecure national ‘we’ group that could 
not even produce a majority for unification in the first all-German parliament. 
Hence the Catholics and the Socialists were picked upon as two groups whose 
primary loyalty did not lie with the German fatherland, but rather with the Pope 
in Rome and with international socialism respectively. They were denounced 
as ‘fellows without a fatherland’ and the national ‘we’ group could define itself 
more strongly against those ‘out’ groups. Alongside the internal enemies, Ger-
man nationalism after 1871 had many external enemies, especially the so-called 
‘hereditary enemy ‘ of France, regarded as a country that wanted to weaken, 
dismember and humiliate Germany for many centuries. Britain was stereo-
typed as ‘perfidious Albion’ that was double-faced and could not be trusted. 
Its economistic mentality only looked for profit and was allegedly unable to 
produce any true culture (Kultur). Russia and many of the East European peo-
ples were denounced as Slavs, who allegedly were culturally much inferior to 
the Germans and whose civilisation depended partly on medieval German col-
onisation eastwards. Again, the external enemies also served the purpose of 
re-assuring an insecure German ‘we’ against its immediate surroundings.6
4 This observation is based on the European Science Foundation project about the writing of 
national histories in modern Europe which ran between 2003 and 2008 and involved more 
than 250 scholars from 29 European countries. It was the basis for a nine-volume ‘Writing the 
Nation’ series with Palgrave MacMillan, the last volume of which attempts a synthesis. See 
Berger with Conrad (2015). 
5 Peter Fritzsche, ‘National Narrative and Untimely Death’, keynote address to the final confer-
ence of the NHIST programme, Manchester, 23–25 October 2008.
6 This is discussed at length in Berger (2005a), chap. 4. 
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Historiography contributed significantly to re-enforcing such stereotypes, as 
history was one of the most important ingredients in shaping national master 
narratives. Despite the victory of ‘scientificity’ in nineteenth-century historical 
writing,7 historiographical nationalism was at its strongest arguably in the cen-
tury between the 1850s and the 1950s. When history became a Wissenschaft, 
it drew the lines more firmly to other disciplines, and, above all, to ‘amateur’ 
historical writing. The professionalisation and institutionalisation of historical 
writing, often state-driven, was accompanied by an exclusion of ‘the amateur’. 
It was now a particular method and long years of university study, in which this 
method was acquired, and then long years of apprentice ship as a professional 
historian in the archives and libraries ultimately ‘made’ the historian.8 Only 
where such state-driven professionalisation processes were weak, such as in 
Britain, did amateurs continue to play a bigger role in the history business.9 
Ultimately, however, professional historians everywhere claimed (very suc-
cessfully overall) that they were the only ones who could speak authoritatively 
about the past, but this claim did not prevent them from strong political com-
mitments, including a strong nationalist activism, both on behalf of nation 
states and on behalf of national movements seeking to create a nation-state.10 
Their scientificity went hand in hand with historiographical nationalism and 
was often strongly influenced by stereotypes of self and others. Historians did 
not prove immune to the general cognition processes of stereotyping.
In fact I would like to use the following five case studies to demonstrate that 
academic national history writing could and did transport national stereotypes 
more often than it questioned and destroyed them. It could do both, of course, 
but there are famous examples of the dangers of destroying those stereotypes – 
dangers to the historians’ career and sometimes life. Take the example of the 
young Gyula Szekfü in Hungary who was in the middle of the so-called Rákóczi 
controversy of 1913. Szekfü had published a book that demolished the national 
hero Francis II. Rákóczi and presented him as a rejected and bitter politician 
who, towards the end of his life, recognised his own failures. This interpretation 
was itself driven by the political sentiments of Szekfü, who was pro-Habsburg at 
the time. Yet the Hungarian nationalists criticised this interpretation viciously 
and almost destroyed the promising young career of the historian who would 
later become one of the most distinguished among his profession in Hungary.11 
7 See Feldner (2010).
8 See Porciani, Tollebeek (2012). 
9 See Levine (1986). 
10 For a range of case studies see Berger, Lorenz (2011). 
11 See Dénes (1976). I am grateful to Tibor Frank for pointing this out to me. 
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Or take the example of the German historian Emil Ludwig, who did not have 
a university position, but was so successful in his writing of political biogra-
phy that he could live extremely well as an independent author in the Weimar 
Republic. Amongst those biographies were strongly critical ones of Bismarck 
and of Wilhelm II. Especially the former was still a revered hero among most 
Germans, including most professional historians. The vitriolic attacks on Lud-
wig were unceasing and the National Socialists were to burn his books. By that 
time, however, he had already withdrawn to exile in Switzerland.12 As the cases 
of Szekfü and Ludwig demonstrate, it was easier to live with, condone and even 
promote stereotypes. As the following five case studies seek to demonstrate, 
this is precisely what they did, especially when they felt called upon to defend 
their respective nation states against others.
3  Historians as Purveyors of Stereotypes in Twentieth-Century 
Historiography
Our first case study relates to the historians’ agency in and around the First 
World War. British historians before 1914 were divided between those holding 
pro-German and those holding anti-German sentiments. Their positions were 
often based on stereotypes of what was the essence of the German nation: 
whereas the pro-German camp argued that the German Mensch was mod-
ern, progressive and educated (gebildet), the anti-German camp held that the 
 German was born with a Pickelhaube and was inherently militarist, aggressive 
and authoritarian. These traits were then often historicised, i.e. history became 
an argument to bolster particular stereotypes of Germany. At the outbreak of 
the First World War, many pro-German historians were hugely disappointed as 
their particular vision of what ‘the German’ was, seemed to be drowned out by 
their opponents’ vision of ‘the Hun’. British historians during the First World 
War repeatedly came out with stereotypical accusations of Prussianism and 
posited Prussian militarism against English liberty, i.e. they juxtaposed a neg-
ative stereotype of the other with a positive auto-stereotype.13 A particularly 
interesting and after 1918 influential position was taken by William Harbutt 
Dawson. Like many of his fellow pro-German historians he was deeply shocked 
by the nationalist pro-war sentiments in Germany, and he came up with an 
ingenious solution to the problem, i.e. the theory of the two Germanies. A 
12 See Ullrich (2005). 
13 See Wallace (1988). 
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long-standing divide had been going through Germany pitting the south 
against the north and the Rhineland against Prussia. Whereas Prussia and the 
North, Dawson conceded, had aggressive, militarist and antiliberal traits, the 
south was progressive, modern and the harbinger of a universalist humanis-
tic ideal of Bildung.14 Such stereotypes became the intellectual justification 
for a new positive perception of Weimar Germany: the positive Germany had 
allegedly defeated its negative other and now needed the support and friend-
ship of Britain again.
If we look at German historiography, it was strongly engulfed in the outbreak 
of hyper-nationalism at the beginning of the war, which engulfed almost all of 
the intellectuals in Germany.15 They again worked strongly with stereotypes, 
contrasting German discipline and Kultur with Western shallowness, Slav bar-
barity and French decadence. All of the tropes that were used in this negative 
stereotyping of the ‘enemy’ in the war had already been well established before 
1914. It was easy to fall back on them in war-time. Thus, for example, Gerhard 
von Schulze Gaevernitz, an economist well known also for his historical work, 
among other topics on the British historian and writer Thomas Carlyle, argued 
in 1915: “The Anglo-Saxon, in his highest form, is a man as hard as steel and of 
the toughest constitution, kalt wie Hundeschnauze, completely lacking in artis-
tic temperament, the type who aims to subordinate beauty and colour to bru-
tal numbers […].”16 Endless other examples could be cited. Friedrich Meinecke 
published a book justifying the German declaration of war and using crude 
stereotypes to contrast an allegedly higher German form of humanity with the 
humanity of the West which he identified with uniformity, egotism and degen-
eracy.17 Overall, most German historians backed the war effort right up to the 
end, and it is no surprise that many of them even peddled the ‘stab-in-the-
back’ myth after 1918 and supported an authoritarian redirection of German 
politics away from Weimar and its liberal foundations.
With our second example we stay with German historiography, as it saw the 
rise of so-called Volksgeschichte as a direct result of the lost war in the inter-
war period. Volksgeschichte was many things, but it essentially amounted to a 
racialisation and biologisation of history writing.18 The strong state-orientation 
of German historiography before 1914 was no longer seen as being sufficient to 
underpin a powerful sense of German national identity. Hence many younger 
14 See Berger (2001). 
15 See Von Ungern-Sternberg von Pürkel, von Ungern-Sternberg (1996)
16 Cited in Stibbe (2003), p. 249. See also, more generally, Stibbe (2001). 
17 See Meinecke (1915). 
18 See Oberkrome (1993); Lambert (1995); Schöttler (1997); Schulze, Oexle (2000). 
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historians turned to the people, the Volk, but not in a democratic political 
sense. Instead they constructed it in a racial, biological sense. In their attach-
ment to historiographical nationalism, proponents of Volksgeschichte stood on 
the same platform as their often older colleagues still attached to statism. Both 
camps lend their pens to the service of a revision of the Versailles Treaty in the 
interwar period.19 Race was undoubtedly a far more identitarian category than 
state, and the racial ideal, upheld by Volksgeschichte, incorporated a whole host 
of stereotypical ideas of self and other. Thus, there was, for example, the cen-
turies-old idea of the ‘civilising mission’ of the Germans in the East which was 
strongly related to the stereotype of the Slavs as not being capable of produc-
ing civilisation. This gave rise within Volksgeschichte to ideas about German 
‘cultural territory’ (Kulturboden): numerous German historians, including the 
young Werner Conze, began writing histories of the German settlements in the 
East hoping to deliver the proof of German cultural and often racial superiority 
vis-à-vis the Slav population in Eastern Europe. From there it was but a small 
step to German historians contributing to the infamous Generalplan Ost in the 
Second World War, which foresaw vast population moves and the settlement 
of Germans in Europe’s east, with the Slav population playing the role of de 
facto slaves to the German master race.20 Ostforschung used stereotypes to jus-
tify the cultural-racial expansion of Germans eastwards, but it was paralleled 
by Westforschung, which sought to justify the annexation of parts of the Low 
Countries into a greater Germany during the Second World War. Here, just as 
in Ostforschung, stereotypes played an influential role in structuring research 
agendas and underpinning historical analysis. Thus, Wolfgang Petri referred to 
common linguistic, cultural and ethnic characteristics of the Dutch and the 
Germans using well-known stereotypes about national character to bolster his 
historical interpretations.21
Our third case study looks at the recasting of national historical master 
narratives in many European nation states at the end of the Second World 
War.22 Stereotypes were once again crucial in allowing those narratives, many 
of which had been damaged in and by the war, to be revived after 1945. If we 
start with Germany, the defeated country had to reject almost everything that 
the National Socialists had stood for. The anti-fascism of the Communist Ger-
man Democratic Republic (GDR) legitimated itself in total contradistinction 
to National Socialist rule. Yet underneath the anti-fascist gloss, sometimes 
19 See Harvey (2003), chap. 6. 
20 See Heim, Aly (1991); Schönwalder (1992); Haar, Fahlbusch (2005). 
21 See Dietz, Gabel, Tiedau (2003). 
22 See Berger (2005b).
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very traditional notions of German history and stereotypical perceptions of 
Germanness continued in the GDR and were bolstered by its Marxist-Leninist 
historiography.23 All over Eastern Europe, the national histories together with 
the national stereotypes on which they rested were simply painted red, but 
they remained essentially unchanged beneath this coat of red paint, which 
over time, in many countries, showed severe signs of deterioration, making 
the older nationalist narratives and stereotypes re-appear from underneath. 
Stereotypical ideas about national peculiarity and heroic ideas of the nation 
were thus strongly coming back to the surface after the collapse of commu-
nism from the late 1980s onwards.24
In the capitalist Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) there was one very 
important ideological bridge that allowed many supporters of Nazism to 
cross over into the post-war camp of ‘the West’ and that ideological bridge 
was anti-Communism. From the perspective of many in the early FRG, if the 
National Socialists had been wrong about almost everything, they had been 
right in their anti-Communism. The Cold War confirmed this, and West Ger-
man historians could use ideas around the Asianness of Russia and the Soviet 
Union to posit it as a negative other to the idea of the occident (Abendland) 
that became popular again with some West German historians in the late 
1940s and 1950s. A good Germany, connected, above all, to the conservative 
military resistance to National Socialism associated with 20 July 1944 (almost 
all of those conservative military officers had excellent anti-Communist cre-
dentials), could be constructed against a stereotypical other – the one-dimen-
sional communist who, through the theory of totalitarianism, was connected 
to the ultimate evil, National Socialism. Christianity, antiquity and humanism 
were seen as the defining features of Europe, and the Soviet Union and much 
of Eastern Europe were decidedly not part of it. Democratic anti-Communism 
merged with traditional anti-Slav and anti-Russian prejudices, and, in coun-
tries such as the FRG, some historians harked back to older stereotypical ideas 
about German superiority vis-à-vis Eastern Europe.25
If we turn to Britain we find that some of the most traditional stereotypes 
about its national history are retained and recast in the post-war period. The 
existing liberal historical master narrative depicting Britain as the land of 
liberty, freedom and constitutionalism, the mother of parliaments and pro-
gressive, evolutionary change was adapted by left-of-centre historians who 
23 See Iggers (1989). 
24 See Antohi, Trencsényim, Apor (2008). 
25 See Schulze (1989), pp. 211f., 266ff. For Schnabel’s history writing more generally see Hert-
felder (1998). 
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extended these stereotypical definitions of Britishness to ‘the people’.26 Out 
of the ‘people’s war’ emerged a ‘people’s history’ that sought to extend British 
democracy and end its exclusivity in terms of class. The victory of the Labour 
Party in 1945 made it possible to build the ‘homes fit for heroes’ that had 
already been promised at the end of the First World War. The Labour govern-
ment started a new municipal housing scheme that was to create cheap and 
affordable housing for many of its working-class voters. It also institutionalised 
a revolutionary health service system for all citizens in the form of the National 
Health Service (NHS). The historians, or some of them, especially members of 
the Communist Party’s Historians Group,27 delivered the historical national 
master narratives that went with this political change, and they did so by 
adapting Britain’s very traditional national master narrative, often referred to 
as Whig history. It now got a little reddish coat to signal an inclusive rather 
than an exclusive Britain.
In post-war Italy, we find a very similar attempt to adapt what had been 
the dominant national historical master narrative to the situation after 1945. 
Ever since the second half of the nineteenth century the ‘beautiful myths’ of 
the Risorgimento had been the basis of Italian constructions of national iden-
tity. Fascism had also presented itself as the true inheritor of the Risorgimento 
as had anti-fascists, e.g. the brothers Roselli.28 In post-war Italy the Risorgi-
mento was re-loaded once more. The resistance now inherited the mantle of 
the  Risorgimento and became the key to continuing with positive national 
 histories rooted in stereotypical depictions of the era of Italian unification.29
While we can find the retention of traditional stereotypes in the recasting of 
national historical master narratives after 1945 in large parts of Europe, we can 
identify no such re-orientation on the Iberian peninsula, as the authoritarian 
right-wing dictatorships survived the end of fascism in Europe, despite the fact 
that they had strongly sympathised with fascism in the 1930s and 1940s. Here the 
occidentalist, Catholic, and familial stereotypes were still shaping the authori-
tarian historical narratives emanating from those countries until the 1980s.30
Our fifth and final case study considers the renationalisation of historical 
master narratives after the end of Communism. In post-Communist states 
we can observe that national historians harked back to positive auto-stereo-
types and negative othering – a story all-too familiar from the interwar period. 
Strong anti-Communism found expression in public history ventures such as 
26 See Berger (2014). 
27 See Kaye (1984); Schwartz (1982); Elliott, Hobsbawm (2010). 
28 See Morgan (1999). 
29 See Battente (2000/2001). 
30 See Seixas (1993). 
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Budapest’s House of Terror museum.31 Here the stereotypical Communist vil-
lain is typically not Hungarian but a foreigner. In the terribly divided historical 
culture of Ukraine, traditional stereotypes also to this very day and especially 
in the political crisis of recent years served the purpose of marking the respec-
tive ‘other’: the ‘Asian’ Russian and the Ukranian as Western dupe.32 Excluding 
Russians as Asians from the polity has also been a standard trope in many of 
the Baltic states. Estonian historians have been prominent in the Estonian rev-
olution of the late 1980s and early 1990s resurrecting ideas of national history 
and heritage from the interwar period.33 This went alongside the rediscovery 
of right-wing political leaders of the interwar period who have been re-inserted 
into the historical pantheons. This is true for István Tisa in Hungary,34 as well as 
for the anti-Semite Symon Petljura in the Ukraine.35 The Polish museum wars 
that have been raging for around two decades also testify to the impact of ste-
reotypes on the master narrative of a Catholic, nationalist and traditionalist 
Poland.
The growth of stereotypical images in historical master narratives cannot 
only be observed in post-Communist East European societies. It is equally true 
for separatist movements from western multinational states such as Scotland 
in the UK or Catalonia in Spain, or, indeed, Flanders in Belgium. The civic left-
wing nationalism in Scotland often prides itself in being primarily political, 
but it nevertheless constantly appeals to and mobilises the cultural heritage 
and the cultural roots of Scotland. A collection on Scottish history from 1992, 
aimed not just at an academic audience, starts: “Scotland’s history is import-
ant. It gives us as individuals and as members of Scottish society a vital sense of 
where we are and how we got here.”36 The Catalan National History Museum 
in Barcelona is full of positive auto-stereotypes about the country and its peo-
ple, whilst the rest of Spain is the absent ‘other’ in the museum. The Flemish 
nationalists around Bart de Wever, himself a trained historian, are champion-
ing an autonomous history of Flanders building on all the stereotypical Flem-
ish myths, whilst Henri Pirenne’s vision of a Belgium as a bridge between the 
Romanesque and Germanic cultures has long been out of print in Belgium.37
31 See Apor (2010). 
32 See Kuzio (2005). 
33 See Must (2010).
34 See Trencsényi, Apor (2008), p. 45. 
35 In May 2008, on a visit to the Ukranian national history museum in Kiev, the author was 
surprised to see such a positive depiction of Petljura.
36 Donnachie, Whatley (1992), p. 1.
37 I am grateful to Jo Tollebeek for pointing this out to me. 
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In recasting a wide variety of national histories after the end of the Cold War, 
stereotypes have often been used to depict an idealised norm, against which 
the national history is then measured. Take, for example, Germany’s ‘search for 
normality’ after reunification in 1990.38 Heinrich August Winkler’s attempt to 
provide the country with a new master narrative that is measured against the 
normative ideal of ‘the ‘West’ is a good example of this tendency.39 And con-
servative British historians have worked for some time to prepare the country 
for Brexit. Thus David Starkey, in his 2001 Medlicott lecture, already lamented 
a loss of identity and history inside the European Union: “maybe we have a 
future as a series of disparate regions of the European Union […]. But where a 
history – where an English history fits in […] a sense of England as a place that 
once existed, that once mattered, that once was glorious – I’m really not sure.”40 
The Brexit camp relied heavily in its campaign on positive auto-stereotypes 
regarding Britain and ‘its’ Commonwealth. Britain allegedly fought alone in the 
Second World War. Its dead, soldiers and civilians, it was often argued, did not 
die for Britain being subsumed in a European Union allegedly dominated by 
Germany. This type of argument strongly appealed to a very traditional nega-
tive stereotype of the German ‘other’ in post-Second World War Britain.
4 Conclusion
Scientific history can break stereotypes and it can rely on stereotypes. The sus-
ceptibility of historians to stereotypes is certainly crucial to the myth-making 
aspects of national histories that have been at the centre of attention in this 
article. As the above case studies have sought to demonstrate, time and again, 
throughout the twentieth century, national historians used narrative frames 
that were deeply indebted to stereotypes. The binary construction of positive 
auto-images with negative images of the ‘other’ contributed to the construc-
tion of national historical master narratives that owed much to stereotypes. 
If national histories have been an important part of constructions of national 
character, then stereotypes have been an essential ingredient of notions of 
national character. We have observed above that stereotypical images of the 
‘other’ were most strongly mobilised at times of conflict, including wars, inci-
dents of ethnic cleansing and post-war reconstruction periods.
38 See Berger (2003).
39 See Berger (2010b).
40 See Starkey (2001). 
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The above reflections are rather essayistic and impressionist, but if they are 
correct in assuming an important impact of stereotypes on grand historical 
narratives of nation, we need to examine this much more systematically. As 
Mark Knights has stated:
History and social psychology share interests in the social sphere, the arts 
of persuasion and the formation of attitudes. As a result, both disciplines 
are interested in the construction, manipulation, dissemination and evo-
lution of stereotypes and the prejudices on which they feed.41
We thus would need to examine the language of the historian with the tools 
from social psychology in order to arrive at a better understanding of how and 
with what purpose those stereotypes are manipulated and disseminated, and 
how they have evolved over time. Those teaching rhetoric in ancient Greece 
and Rome had already been well aware of the usefulness of negative stereotyp-
ing to put down an adversary. It is about time for the history of historiography 
to buckle down and examine historical narrative closely to find out about the 
subtle and not-so-subtle use of stereotypes in historical writing.
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CHAPTER 2
Claiming a Great Ancient Imperial Past as an 
Identity Element of a Small Modern Nation
The Case of Lithuania
Zenonas Norkus and Aelita Ambrulevičiūtė
 Abstract
Lithuanians are a typical East European modern nation, created by the Lithuanian 
nationalist movement which emerged in the late nineteenth century. Modern Lithu-
anian identity is ethnolinguistic, resembling national identities of other Baltic coun-
tries. Its distinctive feature is the narrative appropriation of the history of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania, which was a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional and multi-cultural 
empire which in 1569 merged with Poland in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 
Reminiscences of this great imperial past became an important source of inspiration 
for Lithuanian foreign policy after the accession of the country to the European Union 
in 2004. The makers of this policy conceived as Lithuania’s mission to ‘bring back’ to 
European civilization all former lands of ancient Lithuania. They used the Lithuanian 
presidency of the Council of the EU in 2013 to materialise these ideas, which became 
an important contribution to the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis. The contribution 
closes with the discussion of other impending crises related to the legacy of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the exploration of the role of national 
stereotypes and cultural identities to the outbreak of the recent European cri-
ses, by providing a case study of the influence of some distinctive features of 
modern Lithuanian national identity on the foreign policy of Lithuania as a 
member state of European Union (EU) since 2004.1 The list of recent Euro-
pean crises includes the unresolved Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in 2014 
1 This project has received funding from European Social Fund (project number 09.3.3-LMT-K-
712-01-0006) under grant agreement with the Research Council of Lithuania (LMTLT).
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in the wake of the Maidan revolution. The chain of events leading to these 
outcomes started in the 2013, when Lithuania became the first Baltic State to 
take the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half 
of that year.
We do not attempt to estimate the exact share of Lithuania’s responsibil-
ity for the emergence and ambiguous outcomes of this crisis. We will focus 
on only one specific question, which is relevant for this task: how to explain 
Lithuania’s zeal on behalf of an Eastern expansion of the EU and NATO and 
its intransigence against Russia, which is out of proportion with the size of its 
territory, population and economy? Even a glimpse at the map to find out Lith-
uania’s geographical location is sufficient to get the idea that a tough stance in 
relations with Russia does not promise much in terms of economic rational-
ity. However, Lithuania is no less an ardent supporter of the ‘Europeanisation’ 
and ‘Westernisation’ of Belarus, Moldova, Georgia than that of Ukraine. It con-
sciously takes the self-inflicted costs of this policy, aiming at minimisation of 
trade with Russia.
This paper provides ‘culturalist‘ or ‘identity-theoretic‘ arguments, explain-
ing post-communist Lithuania’s permanent challenging of Russia with specific 
features of its national identity, shaped by narratives of its ancient imperial 
grandeur. We will start with recalling some basic facts about the political his-
tory of Lithuania in the very brief first section and by introducing our working 
concepts. The second section zooms in on the contribution of the influential 
Lithuanian intellectual and opinion-maker Gintautas Beresnevičius, who 
made the most influential contribution to the elaboration and dissemination 
of Lithuania’s ‘imperialist‘ mythology. The third section provides an account 
of the influence of reminiscences of Lithuania’s medieval imperial greatness 
on Lithuania’s Eastern foreign policy making after its accession to the EU and 
NATO in 2004. The concluding section discusses the ambiguous achievements 
and predicaments of this policy, related to similar claims of Lithuania’s more 
powerful neighbours.
2 From Ancient to Modern Lithuania
Modern Lithuania is a typical East-European modern nation, created by the 
Lithuanian nationalist movement which emerged in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.2 Its leaders used the historical opportunity provided by the defeat of East 
2 See Hroch (1985).
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European empires in World War I to establish an independent Lithuanian 
national state in 1918. After two decades of independent development, the 
Republic of Lithuania was occupied and then annexed by the Soviet Union in 
1940, re-emerging as independent state after the dissolution of the occupier 
state. Actually, the breakup of the USSR was initiated by Lithuania, which pro-
claimed its independence on 11 March 1990, and was followed by most former 
Soviet republics only after the failure of the August coup in 1991.
Lithuania’s pioneering role in the dissolution of the USSR provides impres-
sive testimony to the national commitment of modern Lithuanians. In fact, 
national identity is the most important type of modern identity. “National 
identities do what collective identities do in general: they are stories that com-
bine a series of events in texts, songs and images which some people recognize 
as being part of their particular we, i.e. as a collective identity”.3 What is par-
ticular about national identities as specifically modern identities is that these 
“identity constructions have succeeded in imposing themselves as a hegemonic 
identity in a territorially bounded political community.”4 They provide these 
communities with vertical bonds of solidarity, across different social strata.
National communities may broadly vary in terms of the size of territory and 
population. Together with the bearers of hegemonic identities in neighbouring 
Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Finland), modern Lithuanians represent the 
type of small modern nations. In comparison with these neighbours, Lithua-
nian national identity stands out by the prominent role of narratives about the 
medieval polity known as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL), perceived by 
modern Lithuanians as their precursor state. Young Estonians, Finns and Lat-
vians read in their school textbooks stories about the Middle Ages, describing 
their ancestors as victims of foreign conquest and rule by more formidable 
neighbours. For Estonians and Latvians, these neighbours were Danes and Ger-
mans, and for Finns the Swedes. Most up-to-date versions of these textbooks 
contain the provision that this conquest pre-empted a much worse conquest 
by Russians and also enabled native peoples to join Western civilisation. Very 
differently, Lithuanian pupils learn history by reading stories describing them 
as the progeny of conquerors who created a huge medieval empire.5 We will 
argue that the reminiscences of this imperial greatness is an important driving 
force behind Lithuania’s eastward foreign policies.
3 Eder (2009), p. 432.
4 Eder (2009), p. 432.
5 For authoritative accounts representing the contemporary Lithuanian view of the history of 
GDL see Baronas et al. (2011); Gudavičius (1999); Kiaupa et al. (2000); Kiaupienė, Petrauskas 
(2009); Rowell (1994). See also Norkus (2018).
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3  The Making of Empire: Gintaras Beresnevičius’ Outline of 
Lithuania’s Neo‑Imperialist Foreign Policy Doctrine
In the early 2000s the work of the influential Lithuanian public intellectual Gin-
taras Beresnevičius (1961–2006) became an important source of inspiration for 
the forging of Lithuanian foreign policy. He was a leading Lithuanian scholar 
in religion studies, specialising in pre-Christian Baltic mythology – a kind of 
Lithuanian Mircea Eliade. These are titles in English of some of Beresnevičius’s 
works in religious studies: Heavens. The Idea of Post-Human Life in the Ancient 
Lithuanian Worldview (1990); Religious Reforms of Balts (1995); Cosmos and 
Sacral Places in the Religions of Lithuanians and Prussians (1998); Palemonas 
Node. the Peripheric Content of the Palemonas Tale (2003); Lithuanian Religion 
and Mythology (2004). He also published novels, poems, and numerous essays. 
In 2003, he published the book The Making of Empire (Imperijos darymas).6 It 
was an exploratory study of the prospects of Lithuanian foreign policy, pub-
lished on the eve of Lithuania joining the EU and NATO in the following year. 
It was commissioned by the Institute of International Relations and Political 
Science of Vilnius university, which is reputed to be the ‘think tank’ of the Lith-
uanian government.
In this study, Beresnevičius advanced a grandiose vision of the mission of 
Lithuania after joining the EU and NATO. He suggested to use these member-
ships as an opportunity for “the making of empire“, which is the title of his 
most famous book.7 According to Beresnevičius, this means becoming the 
bridgehead and vanguard of the eastward extension of the EU and NATO. 
More specifically, it means spearheading the export of democracy to the for-
mer republics of the USSR. “We have an opportunity to use the current sit-
uation to lay the foundation for our own geopolitical bloc, tectonic bloc, to 
restore the GDL.”8 Such a ‘restoration of the GDL’ would in this vision mean 
the creation of some kind of community of nations including not only states 
in the former territory of the GDL, but also Transcaucasian and even Central 
Asian countries, something distantly similar to the British Commonwealth 
of Nations. “We must enter the EU as a democratic empire, by acting in the 
spaces which possibly will exceed the territory of the EU itself.”9
Interestingly, the ancient Lithuanian empire was for Beresnevičius not syn-
onymous with the GDL. He adopted parahistorical theories about an active 
6 Beresnevičius (2003a).
7 Beresnevičius (2003a). 
8 Beresnevičius (2003a), p. 72. All translations by the authors. 
9 Beresnevičius (2003a), p. 7.
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participation of Baltic tribes in the events of ‘Barbarian invasions‘ or the Völk-
erwanderung during the period 200–600 A.D., with the collapse of the Western 
Roman empire as its most important world-historic outcome.10 Writing about 
ancient times he therefore avoids exact dates and prefers general descriptions, 
which anachronistically mix the events of the third to sixth centuries with 
those of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. In this way, the emergence of the 
GDL in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is represented as the continu-
ation of imperialist activities by the ethnic ancestors of modern Lithuanians 
during much earlier times. The following quotation may serve to provide an 
impression of his mesmerising style.
As the tillers always prevail in numbers, the ruling military nobility takes 
over their language and culture. If this culture is higher, than the higher 
culture is adopted, if it is lower, then the lower one is. This is what adapta-
tion means. Lithuanians in this respect behaved in exactly the same way 
as Norman, Gothic or Langobard dukes did. The difference is that they 
did not disappear, and they did not disappear because they had a unitary 
ethnic base, Ethnic Lithuania. If this ethnic base would have moved and 
arrived say to the lower Dnieper or the lower Volga, they would have dis-
appeared ruling somewhere in Kiev or Sarai on the very summit of their 
domination. Barbarians who have created Europe did finish their histo-
ries in such a way. Lithuanians are unique among barbarians who have 
participated in the migration of peoples in that they preserved their ties 
with their old fatherland, and therefore this base has survived.11
Surviving in their ancient motherland, Beresnevičius contends, Lithuanians 
remain the same ‘perennial Barbarians’ from Völkerwanderung times, which 
are flourishing only when they act according to their perennial imperial drive, 
being in their own element. Otherwise they perform acts of self-destruction or 
engage in criminal activities.
Obviously, such essentialist views have nothing in common with scholarly 
historical or social scientific analysis. However, Beresnevičius‘ aim is not to 
provide academic analysis, but to construct a political myth useful for the con-
temporary power elite of Lithuania in inspiring its citizens to bear the costs of 
playing the self-assumed role of vanguard of the Eastern expansion of NATO 
and the EU. In this role, Lithuania would challenge semi-authoritarian Russia. 
10 See Statkutė de Rosales (2004), Gedgaudas (1972).
11 Beresnevičius (2003a), p. 11f.
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In the struggle for this goal, Lithuania should work to decrease the geopolitical 
space which Moscow still tries to keep under its control.
Europe needs our empire, I think the US needs it too – both powers will 
not need much time to under stand this, and all their actions show that 
they understand. [...] With our help Ukraine and Belarus should cultur-
ally and politically immediately be integrated into Central Europe; this is 
the space of GDL; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia should be considered in 
exactly the same way. The next sphere is Central Asia, going right up to 
China.12
How (if at all) can this breath-taking vision be implemented practically? Are 
the resources of small Lithuania not too meagre? Obviously it cannot be imple-
mented by the methods used by ancient Lithuanian rulers. Practical measures 
proposed by Beresnevičius include, firstly, the creation of a Lithuanian Legion. 
This would be an elite military task force, which the military command of 
NATO would be free to employ in all ‘hot spots’ of the world. The beneficial 
side-effect of this measure would be the reduction of criminality in Lithuania. 
The legion “would absorb all potential criminals, depressed persons, addicts. If 
we have the Lithuanian legion, [...] then the dream of each adolescent school-
boy will not be to become a car thief or drug dealer, but a soldier“.13 Secondly, 
Beresnevičius proposed to establish a programme of stipends and grants for 
students, scholars and intellectuals from Belarus, Ukraine and other prospec-
tive members of the restored GDL.
While all this costs money, the costs would be comparatively small. All this 
is an investment into cultivating our ‘agents’ in these countries. All states 
which have such political interests and perceive them similarly, have sim-
ilar foundations and fellowship programs. They shape their image from 
the inside through future journalists, programmers,  statesmen.14
In competition with other powers eager to grow their own ‘fifth column’ in the 
former Soviet republics, Lithuania has two advantages. As a small state, it can-
not be perceived as a real threat (even by Russia). It also can exploit the memo-
ries of common victimhood, shared with populations of most Soviet republics.
12 Beresnevičius (2003a), p. 75.
13 Beresnevičius (2003a), p. 56.
14 Beresnevičius (2003a), p. 16f.
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The third proposal is at the same time the cheapest and the most difficult 
to implement. This is the change of the perception of emigration from Lithua-
nia. Since the restoration of independence, Lithuania’s population decreased 
from 3.7 million in 1989 to 3.5 million according to the general census in 2001, 
i.e. at the time when Beresnevičius announced his programme for the resto-
ration of the GDL. This decrease was also caused by mortality rates exceed-
ing birth rates since 1994, but emigration is the major cause. It continued also 
after Lithuania’s accession to the EU in 2004, sinking to 2.8 million in 2018. 
These demographic changes became a matter of common concern in Lithu-
ania around the year 2000. Advancing his programme of the “restoration of 
the GDL”, Beresnevičius made the bold proposal to re-frame the present emi-
gration as a continuation of a perennial trend since Völkerwanderung times, 
driving Lithuanian imperial expansion. Present-day Lithuanian emigrants 
should be considered as ‘colonists‘, spearheading the latest wave of Lithuania’s 
imperialist expansion.  Emigrant quarters in the cities of the advanced Western 
countries are  equivalents of the military colonies planted by the ancient Lith-
uanian rulers in Slavic lands.
We should not perceive emigration as a catastrophe, because the 
 contemporary world context and internal movement within the Euro-
pean Union universalize these problems. [...]. We should not impose on 
emigrants the self-consciousness of a ‘lost generation’ or a ‘broken thread’, 
because in this way we infuse into our diaspora the complex – to break 
away and not come back. The Jewish diaspora can set the example for our 
own diaspora, as far as Israel would not be a superpower with its territory.15
The ultimate aim of this new Lithuanian imperialism should be Lithuania 
becoming the leading power in the ‘new Europe’ – formerly communist East 
European countries, famously so designated by the US Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, who praised them for their greater willingness to participate 
in the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 as compared to older NATO members 
like Germany and France. According to Beresnevičius’ diagnosis, “old Europe”16 
is facing its “autumn”,17 displaying signs of weakness like “cowardly hearts, lack 
of education, economic hazards, cracks in genofond, exaggerated political cor-
rectness which civilisationally supresses ripening of new ideas”.18 The mission 
15 Beresnevičius (2003a), p. 17. 
16 Beresnevičius (2003a), p. 21, 67f., 
17 Beresnevičius (2003a), p 31, 55, 68,
18 Beresnevičius (2003a), p.31.
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of “new Europe”19 led by Lithuania, is to help to make this autumn a “calm 
golden autumn”20, providing (in the alliance with the US) “the perimeter of 
security”21 for a hundred years or more.
Perhaps for the first time during a very long time we are on the side of 
the powerful, becoming part of the largest power concentration. This is a 
historical chance which we have to use; it looks like in Star Wars: the Force 
is with you. I am not speaking tongue-in-cheek here. If the world is two-
sided, it is not bad to be on the proper side and to join it at the right time.22
Beresnevičius even plays with the idea of the imminent rise (or rather resto-
ration) of Lithuanian civilisation, discussing in detail its central symbols – the 
Rūpintojėlis (Pensive Christ) and the Vytis, an armour-clad knight on the back 
of a white horse, holding sword and shield. The Vytis (part of the the Lithuanian 
coat of arms) stands for Lithuania as empire, originally representing a pagan 
war god. Rūpintojėlis is the most popular figure in the Lithuanian religious folk 
woodwork. According to Beresnevičius, it stands for the promise of the original 
Lithuanian civilisation to solve the ecological problems of the modern world. 
This civilisation will be based on the use of renewable resources (wood, water, 
earth instead of stone, metal, oil), on the spoken word and on meditation.
4  In the Footsteps of the Grand Duchy: Lithuania’s Eastern Foreign 
Policy after the Accession to the EU and NATO
Beresnevičius’ dream of the creation or restoration of the Lithuanian civili-
sation may appeal only to a handful supporters of the neo-pagan movement 
Romuva, a religious New Age movement reviving the ancient religious prac-
tices of the Baltic tribes before their christianisation.23 However, his ideas 
about Lithuania’s membership of the EU and NATO as the chance for ‘making 
empire’ in the former territories of the GDL were embraced by an informal 
group of entrepreneurs, media moguls and high-ranking state officials of Lith-
uania known as valstybininkai (statesmen) among political observers.24 They 
19 Beresnevičius (2003a), p. 21.
20 Beresnevičius (2003a), p. 68.
21 Beresnevičius (2003a), p 31, 55. 
22 Beresnevičius (2003a), p. 71.
23 See Pranskevičiūtė, Aleknaitė (2014); Dundzila, Strmiska (2005).
24 See Genys (2011), pp. 64–90; Lėka (2015).
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were the driving force behind the removal of President Rolandas Paksas by 
impeachment in 2003–2004 after his unexpected victory against American 
Lithuanian Valdas Adamkus, who served his first term as President in 1998–
2003 and did run for second term in 2003.25 Ousting Paksas, they remained in 
firm control of Lithuania’s internal and foreign policy during the short period 
under acting President Artūras Paulauskas in April–July 2004 and during the 
second term of Adamkus in 2004–2009, who was re-elected after all in the new 
election following the removal of Paksas.
Among the valstybininkai, the two most influential figures were Raimundas 
Lopata (born 1965), who from 1998 to 2009 served as the director of the presti-
gious Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius Uni-
versity, and Albinas Januška (born 1960), described as the ‘grey eminence’ of 
Lithuanian politics in the confidential reports of Western diplomats in Vilnius, 
published by Wikileaks.26 Between 1993 and 2008 he served in various top posi-
tions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania and became chief advisor 
for Adamkus. Together with another influential member of the valstybininkai 
group, Mečys Laurinkus, who was the Head of the Lithuanian secret service, he 
masterminded the removal of Paksas via impeachment. At the same time, the 
Institute of International Relations and Political Science under Lopata estab-
lished itself as the main ‘think tank’ for the Lithuanian government.
Arguably, Januška and Lopata were the most influential makers of Lithu-
anian foreign policy from 2004 to 2009, forging the doctrine of Lithuania as 
the “regional centre” or “regional power”.27 In May 2000, during the meeting 
of the ministers of foreign affairs of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia a group of countries 
applying for membership in NATO was established. After it was joined by Croa-
tia, it was called “Vilnius 10” group. At this time, Lithuanian politicians felt that 
theirs was a very important country. They were eager to make permanent their 
self-assumed and self-perceived role as leader of the New (post-Communist) 
West – even if there were few (if any) neighbouring countries which recognised 
Lithuania in such a role. This aim was proclaimed by the acting President Pau-
lauskas in 2004,28 and then reasserted on numerous occasions by Adamkus:
25 See Norkus (2012), pp. 296–324.
26 See Lėka (2015).
27 For surveys of Lithuania’s foreign policy after accession to the EU see Baubinaite (2011); 
Jonavičius (2006); Kojala, Ivanauskas (2014); Lopata, Statkus (2005); Paulauskas (2005); 
Statkus, Paulauskas et al. (2006).
28 See Paulauskas (2004).
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Lithuania can and must be a centre of regional gravity. That should be 
our strategic orientation. This is ambitious, but we have historic, geo-
graphic and political preconditions to succeed. [...] I see Vilnius as a nat-
ural centre of the region, where political initiatives are being born and 
imple mented.29
The authors of this doctrine hoped to compensate for Lithuania’s rather mod-
est resources by the country’s special relations with the United States, profiling 
it as the most trustworthy state in the new Europe, deserving the role of the 
leading operator of US resources in the promotion of democracy in the for-
mer republics of the USSR. For this role, Lithuania’s status as a former Soviet 
republic would not be a liability but an asset, providing first-hand knowledge 
of local conditions and the trust of local elites thanks to a common past and 
similar cultural background. The country’s small size and apparent weakness 
would make its activities less conspicuous and suspicious both for opponents 
of the Western infiltration in these countries and for sceptics about the east-
ward enlargement of NATO and the EU in Western European countries.
Actually, there were two other former Soviet republics which became part 
of the “new Europe” in 2004: Estonia and Latvia. However, according to the 
assessment by Lithuania’s valstybininkai, it had a crucial competitive advan-
tage in the rivalry for the role of top operator and coordinator of the eastward 
promotion of democracy: the legacy of the GDL, which provided a special 
relation ship with Belarus and Ukraine, the most important targets for the pro-
motion of democracy.30 The Lithuanian elites were strengthened in their belief 
in the importance of shared memories of the Grand Duchy by the events of 
the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Between November 2004 and January 2005, 
the Orange Revolution was staged by supporters of the pro-Western presiden-
tial candidate Viktor Yushchenko, who refused to recognize his defeat, claim-
ing that the vote was rigged. Together with Poland’s President Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski, Adamkus was invited to mediate, playing an important role in 
persuading Yushchenko’s opponent Viktor Yanukovich to yield and to accept a 
repeat of the run-off vote, which brought victory to Yushchenko.
Soon Lopata could be delighted to see that Adamkus was so fascinated with 
the claimed role of Lithuania as regional power that he “started to identify 
himself with former rulers of Lithuania as their direct heir”.31 During the 2009 
millennial celebration of the first recorded mention of the name of Lithuania, 
29 Adamkus (2004b). See also Adamkus (2004a); Adamkus (2005). 
30 See Paulauskas (2005).
31 Jokubaitis, Lopata (2014), p. 272.
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which was attended by the heads of neighbouring states, he proclaimed: “Now, 
surrounded by honourable guests, I feel the same feelings, which were felt by 
the rulers of Lithuania in those times”.32 After visiting Lutsk, which is now a 
Ukrainian city, Adamkus made the following entry into his diary: “This is the 
city of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, here is the castle built by Liubartas, son 
of Gediminas, resembling Trakai castle. According to historian Alfredas Bum-
blauskas, I was the second ruler of Lithuania after Vytautas who visited the 
castle.”33
Following the suggestion of Beresnevičius, the architects of Lithuania’s for-
eign policy extended the interest sphere of the would-be regional power Lith-
uania far beyond the borders of the Grand Duchy. In Grand Duke Vytautas’s 
time, the GDL reached to the Black Sea. Claiming the role of regional power 
for contemporary Lithuania, its government extended its zone of responsibil-
ity for spreading the values of Western civilisation to Transcaucasia, acting as 
one of the most vociferous advocates of Georgia, which after the Rose Revo-
lution in Georgia in 2003 made the bid to become a member of the EU and 
NATO. Adamkus visited Armenia and Azerbaijan, airing Lithuania’s readiness 
to  participate in the resolution of the conflict between both countries.34
Discussing the long-term aims of small Lithuania’s bid to become a regional 
power in Eastern Europe, Lithuanian experts refer to the prospect of finally 
achieving security from Russia once Lithuania will be surrounded from all sides 
by member states of the EU and NATO, whose new pro-Western elites will be 
attached to Lithuania by the ties of gratitude to Lithuania for its co-sponsor-
ship.35 They seldom forget to add that Lithuania’s bid for the role as a regional 
power is no threat to Russia, because the only Lithuanian interest regarding 
Russia is to make it safe for democracy. Do then Lithuanian politicians mean 
that there is no ultimate security until the democratisation of Russia?
In fact, besides this manifest agenda about Russia there may also be a hid-
den agenda. This agenda is grounded in the widespread persuasion in Lithu-
ania that contemporary Russia cannot become a democratic country because 
it remains an empire. Any real democratisation in Russia would trigger 
empire-destroying centrifugal tendencies among the political forces in Rus-
sia᾿s regions that also seek autonomy and independence. Importantly, such 
forces can be expected to emerge not only in its ‘autonomous republics’ (where 
32 Cited according to Jokubaitis, Lopata (2014), p. 272.
33 Adamkus (2011), p. 312. 
34 See Kojala, Ivanauskas (2014).
35 See Jonavičius (2006); Statkus, Paulauskas (2006); Baubinaitė (2011); Kasčiūnas, Kojala 
(2013).
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they are already present), but also in the Russian core regions. This is the main 
lesson which was learned by the Lithuanian political elites from Russia᾿s two 
failures at democratisation in 1917 and 1991–1998.
The puzzling fact about the political geography of contemporary Lithuania 
is that it borders Russia not in the East, where its neighbour is Belarus, but 
in the West, where the Kaliningrad oblast is located, populated by nearly one 
million people and covering 15.100 square kilometres. Kaliningrad oblast is the 
part of Eastern Prussia given to the Soviet Union after the Second World War. 
Joseph Stalin may have toyed with the idea to merge the Soviet part of East 
Prussia with Soviet Lithuania, but then made it an oblast of the Russian Fed-
eration.36 Meanwhile, contemporary Lithuanians still designate these lands by 
the historical name of as ‘Minor Lithuania’, distinguishing it from ‘Major Lith-
uania’, the ethnically Lithuanian lands which were part of the GDL and then of 
the Russian empire. The first book in Lithuanian was printed in Königsberg in 
1547, and Minor Lithuania is the place where Kristijonas Donelaitis (1714–1780) 
lived and worked, revered as the author of the first classic Lithuanian language 
poem Metai (The Seasons). Therefore Lithuanian nationalists consider the 
Kaliningrad oblast as part of ‘historical Lithuania’, suggesting that Lithuania 
has special rights and responsibilities for this territory.37
After the dissolution of the USSR, the Kaliningrad oblast became a distant 
exclave of Russia. Its high level of militarisation only increased in the post- 
Soviet era, when many Russian military units, formerly located in the Baltic 
countries, were relocated to the Kalingrad oblast. Russia’s demand of military 
transit rights was one of the most difficult issues in the Lithuanian-Russian 
relations since the restoration of Lithuanian independence. When Poland and 
Lithuania tightened the control of their borders before joining the Schengen 
Area, this created additional new difficulties for Russians in Kaliningrad who 
wanted to enter the Russian mainland. The issue of Russian military transit 
through Lithuania was internationalised after Lithuania’s accession to NATO 
and the EU. It was resolved in the negotiations between Russia and the US, 
fostering the feeling of Lithuanian political elites of the political importance 
and mission of its country on the world stage.
However, many political thinkers in Lithuania, including Lopata, whose 
area of expertise is Kaliningrad Studies,38 consider the oblast’s present sta-
tus merely temporary, expecting a final resolution of the ‘Kaliningrad puzzle’ 
from the pending disintegration of Russia in the wake of its next democratic 
36 See Safronovas (2016). 
37 See Landsbergis (2003) for the most authoritative statement. See also Safronovas (2016).
38 See Lopata (2006). 
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revolution. Along with democratisation, this final solution will include its 
demilitarisation and ‘decolonisation’, meaning the separation of the Kalinin-
grad oblast from Russia and becoming the fourth Baltic State (and another 
member of the EU and NATO) along with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The 
emergence of this new state will provide a special bonus for Lithuania, because 
this new Baltic state is expected to gravitate to small and inoffensive Lithuania 
rather than to Poland and Germany, the other interested parties.
5  Conclusion: Fruits and Predicaments of the Lithuanian 
‘Restoration’ of the GDL
In 2013, Lithuania used its Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 
2013 as the long awaited opportunity to play the role of regional centre. One 
of its tasks in this role was to coordinate the completion of the negotiation 
process for the signing of the association agreement between Ukraine and the 
EU. A wave of protests called the “Euromaidan” movement was sparked by 
Ukraine’s President Yanukovich’s last minute refusal to sign this agreement at 
the 28–29 November 2013 EU summit in Vilnius. Thus the ongoing Ukrainian 
crisis started, including the violent removal of President Victor Yanukovych, 
the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the civil violence in Eastern Ukraine, esca-
lating into the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, and the exchange of sanctions 
and countersanctions between the EU and Russia. Lithuania’s role in this crisis 
remained very prominent, even after the end of its Presidency in 2014.
However, this activity peaked during the critical months until the final 
showdown in late February 2014. Between December 2013 and February 2014 all 
important Lithuanian politicians visited Kyiv, making speeches to encourage 
Euromaidan protesters and pressuring Ukrainian officials not to crack down 
on the increasingly violent demonstrators. Since Yanukovich’s removal by 
force, Lithuania remains among the most enthusiastic supporters of the new 
‘pro-European’ government, pleading for new sanctions against Russia and the 
arming of Ukraine’s military with modern Western weapons, enabling it to win 
a military victory against the Donbass separatists and the Russian army.
A more detailed assessment of the Lithuanian contribution to the victory 
of the opposition is not possible without access to confidential information, 
which will be open only to future historians. The Lithuanian government firmly 
denies the allegations of the Russian mass media that Lithuanian’s secret ser-
vice helped train the Ukrainian activists whose violent actions played a crucial 
role in breaking the resistance of government forces. These allegations may be 
false, but the credibility of Lithuanian denials is somewhat undermined by the 
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continuing refusal to admit that Lithuania (as well as Poland and Romania) 
from 2004 to 2006 hosted a secret US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) prison, 
where terrorist suspects were detained and interrogated. The existence of such 
prisons has been admitted by former top officials of other suspected countries.39
While the Maidan victory was a success of Lithuania’s ‘neo-imperial’ for-
eign policy, it was not an unambiguous success. Its side-effect was decreased 
 security for Lithuania because of increased exposure to the subsequent Rus-
sian  military build-up. During the last two years, Lithuania nearly doubled its 
military spending and re-introduced universal compulsory military service. A 
central topic of the Lithuanian media is the “Russian danger” and a possibly 
imminent military attack. The future might harbour new embarrassments, 
which are the topic of our concluding considerations, focusing on the  contested 
imperial legacy of the GDL.40 One of them is related to Lithuanian-Belarusian 
relations.
While Lithuanian historians tell the history of the Grand Duchy as that of 
the predecessor of the modern Lithuanian nation state, Russian historiogra-
phy describes the Grand Duchy as a Western Russian state. According to the 
most widespread Polish view, the Grand Duchy was at least since the late four-
teenth century a part of Poland’s history as an episode of its (uniquely peace-
ful) eastward expansion.41 The historiography of the newly independent state 
of Belarus is the latest participant in this contention.
Some Belarusian historians argue that the Grand Duchy was an ancient 
Belarusian state. According to the most radical version of this view the core 
of the GDL was an area called Black Rus’ with its centre in Novahrudak. The 
region’s nobility hired Baltic mercenaries to conquer neighbouring Slavonic 
and Baltic lands.42 A less radical version explains the emergence of the GDL in 
terms of a “political alliance”,43 or a “symbiosis” of both ethnic groups.44 Both 
versions refer to the use of the Slavic language, interpreted as “old Belarusian”, 
in the chancelery of the GDL, and claim that even if the rulers of the GDL were 
of non-Slavic origin, they were early and easily slavified.45 The only land to 
have escaped the intensified assimilation of Balts following the Belarusian con-
quest was Samogitia (Lower Lithuania) – the true predecessor of contemporary 
39 See e.g. Open Society Foundations (2013).
40 See also Lopata, Vinogradnaitė (2016); Nikžentaitis (2016).
41 See Halecki (1919–1920); Kolankowski (1930). 
42 See Ermalovič ([1989] 1991); ([1990] 2003); ([2000] 2003).
43 Kraŭcėvič ([1998] 2000), p. 141.
44 Nasevič (1993), p. 60; Saganovič (2001), p. 71f.
45 See e.g. Saganovič (2001), p. 76.
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Lithuania. To avoid confusion between contemporary Lithuanians and the 
early Grand Duchy’s metropolitan nation, which today call themselves “Belar-
usians” and were called Lithuanians in the Middle Ages, Belarussian historians 
propose that they go by different names: the latter should be called “Litvin” 
(литвин), the former “Lietuvis” (летувис).46
While the authoritarian regime of Alexander Lukashenko is currently sup-
pressing nationalist zeal, one of the side-effects of a possible future democra-
tisation of Belarus may well be a name-change for Lithuania (to “Litva”) and 
its inhabitants (to “Litvins”). This may well spark a dispute similar to the one 
between Greece and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (‘Northern 
Macedonia’) over its correct naming, an issue that caused a deadlock to Mace-
donia’s accession to the NATO and EU for so long. Additionally, the coming 
conflict over which country is ‘the true Lithuania’ also implies the resurrection 
of the “Vilnius question”, which poisoned Polish-Lithuanian relations during 
the interwar period. The famous British historian Norman Davies accepted the 
Belarusian view of the Grand Duchy’s history, expounding it in his bestseller 
Vanished Kingdoms.47 Davies was furiously denounced by Lithuania-based 
authors as a result.48
Another potential embarrassment involves Polish-Lithuanian relations. 
How can the breath-taking programme of the restoration of the GDL or mak-
ing Lithuania a “regional centre” be harmonised with similar aspirations of 
Poland? Nearly all monuments of Western European architecture in the ter-
ritory of contemporary Belarus and Ukraine, claimed as vestiges of a ‘Greater 
Lithuania’ in carefully documented, richly illustrated and widely sold books,49 
can be – and are – also claimed by Polish patriots as monuments of ‘Greater 
Poland’. Importantly, the Polish legacy in the former PLC is represented in 
Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine by large, well organised and politically active 
Polish minorities, which work to preserve this legacy and foster the relations 
with the homeland. Differently from Poland, contemporary Lithuania has no 
such powerful agency to assert its influence in the former GDL lands.
There are influential political forces in contemporary Poland pleading for 
the resuscitation of Józef Piłsudski’s interwar political project of Intermarium 
(Międzymorze) – a Poland-led federation, including not only new states on the 
territory of the former PLC, but also nearly all countries of post-communist 
46 See Kraŭcėvič (2003). For the response of Lithuanian historians see Bumblauskas (2008). 
47 See Davies (2012), pp. 229–308.
48 Baronas, Rowell (2015), p. 77.
49 See Bumblauskas (2005); Valionytė (2009); Valionytė (2009–2012). 
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“new Europe”.50 There is no clarity about its relationship to the existing EU. 
After the further eastern expansion of the EU, including not only Ukraine, but 
also Belarus, Intermarium may act as the bloc of nearly all new Eastern EU 
members, united not only against the resurrection of Russian imperialism, but 
also against German hegemony in the EU. However, it may also be conceived 
as an alternative to the EU, especially for the emergency case of its dissolution.
In Lithuania, 6.6% of its total population identify as Polish. This group is 
politically represented by the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian 
Families Alliance (EAPL-CFA), which won 8 seats (from a total of 141) in the 
election of the Lithuanian parliament in October 2016. Lithuania may aspire 
to play the role of regional centre, but the inadequacy of its real resources for 
this aim is displayed every time when it is censured by Poland’s government 
for violations of Polish minority rights. Although the situation of the Polish 
minority in Lithuania is demonstrably the best among all former Common-
wealth lands,51 varying Polish political forces harshly criticise Lithuania for 
what they perceive as infraction of the Polish minority rights by Lithuanian 
government.52
National identities and stereotypes continue in force in the enlarging Euro-
pean Union, influencing the foreign policy of its new members such as Luth-
uania, the case analysed here. The analysis demonstrates that accession to the 
EU or NATO does neither end independent foreign policy-making nor liberates 
it from the influence of nationalist myths and legacies. Quite the opposite: EU 
membership may be used by national political elites as a source of opportuni-
ties in the pursuit of their particular (and sometimes murky) agendas.
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CHAPTER 3
The Longue durée of Brexit
Politics, Literature and the British Past
Daniel Carey
 Abstract
The complex proposition posed by Brexit challenges us to reinvestigate British reflec-
tions on identity from an historical point of view. This contribution considers a range 
of precedents, beginning with the English Reformation before considering questions 
of sovereignty, separation, immigration and exceptionalism in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The claim is not that history straightforwardly facilitates an 
understanding of the fissures associated with Brexit, but rather that the present is 
ironised as much as it is explained by the past. We have much to learn not just from his-
tory but from works of poetry, fiction and drama that engage with historical concerns 
of identity and politics. The contribution looks first at Defoe’s poem The True-Born 
Englishman (1701) and aspects of Robinson Crusoe (1719), with their mixed-conceptions 
of identity, followed by attention to Shakespeare’s Richard II, Henry V, and the plot 
twists of Cymbeline, a romance predicated on separation from Roman authority. The 
contribution concludes with Churchill and the contradictions in British attitudes to 
Europe inherited by Theresa May and Boris Johnson, which promise to endure as the 
UK redefines its relationship to Ireland and Continental Europe.
The outcome of the UK referendum on whether to leave or remain in the 
 European Union has dominated politics in parliament and the country since 
the result of the vote was announced on the morning of the 24th of June 2016. 
The narrow margin of victory for the leave campaign (51.9%), the fact that two 
of the four constituent parts of the UK voted by majority to remain (Scotland 
and Northern Ireland), the overwhelming desire to stay in the EU registered 
across London (the dominant base of the population and economic centre of 
power) have ensured that the deep divisions apparent in the campaign have 
not disappeared. Indeed they are set to continue, not least because it is unclear 
what exactly people intended to vote for (contradicting Theresa May’s slogan 
‘Brexit means Brexit’), and whether political will can be permanently vested in 
such a transitory act. The resulting free-for-all of interpretation and struggles 
over a second referendum or ‘people’s vote’ on the outcome of negotiations 
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testify to this confused scenario. The stakes are so high because the vote did 
not, as in a general election, establish a government of a certain duration, but 
undid an entire set of longstanding relationships, while provoking anxious and 
unresolved issues of identity that will continue to confront the country for a 
generation or more.
The question that Brexit poses is at one level political but it remains, ulti-
mately, a conflict over identity. The identity problem in this context has two 
related strands – the internal dimension of how the future will play out for the 
component parts that make up an ostensibly United Kingdom, and the exter-
nal dimension as the UK negotiates a future alongside but no longer within the 
EU. The two dilemmas converge, of course, on the island of Ireland, where the 
shared border provides the key point of contact. But the larger confrontation 
is with the UK’s image of itself: is the narrative one of weakness or strength, 
reasserted sovereignty or isolation in an interconnected world?
This bewildering predicament has inevitably prompted a search for some 
perspective on these developments. This essay attempts to chart a longue 
durée of Brexit by considering historical precedent, returning initially to the 
English Reformation and religious difference before considering questions 
of sovereignty and the composition of the nation. The claim is not that the 
fissures associated with Brexit lend themselves to ready interpretation by 
mere recourse to history, but rather that the present is ironised as much as 
it is explained by the past. The search for analogy is therefore inspired by an 
attempt to gain perspective, not in order to simplify the current cataclysm or 
claim that it could have been readily predicted. We have much to learn not just 
from history but from works of poetry, fiction and drama of the same period 
that engage with historical concerns of identity and political form. Here I con-
sider various texts by Shakespeare and Defoe, which provide us with a crucial 
resource since they remain attuned, above all, to historical contradictions.The 
urgency associated with Brexit has given fresh relevance to inquiries into the 
emergence of concepts of Britain and Britishness.1 Historians concerned with 
this matter have explored the conditions of state formation, asking where and 
when did a sense of national identity (and destiny) arise. Or was it merely a fic-
tion imposed on a complex cultural topography, driven by political interests? 
Attempts have been made to wrest the narrative away from an English-centric 
1 Fintan O’Toole maintains that “Brexit is essentially an English phenomenon” (2018, p. xvi) 
and accordingly he largely elides Scotland and Wales from his discussion, but a satisfactory 
account must take into consideration the whole of the UK, not least given the voting pat-
terns which saw substantial numbers support the Leave campaign across the country (if not 
by a majority in Scotland and Northern Ireland). 
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account in favour of greater attention to the archipelago’s three kingdoms and 
the composite monarchy. The periodisation adopted in these analyses varies 
considerably. Some settle on the sixteenth century and the reign of Henry VIII 
as a decisive turn; others opt for the union of crowns under James VI and I; 
and others still emphasise the formal Act of Union in 1707.2 My discussion, 
inevitably selective in the primary sources it responds to, follows this pattern 
of seeking an early modern orientation on the dilemmas raised by reflection 
on Brexit. This is perhaps the longest of longues durées.3
1 The Break with Rome
Arguments in favour of Brexit have a complex genealogy, resonating in differ-
ent ways with historical antecedents. In terms of epochal developments based 
on severing a longstanding relationship with extra-national entities, the break 
with Rome in the context of the English Reformation in the sixteenth century 
stands out for a number of reasons.4 This historical moment represents, under 
the guise of religious identity, a dispute over sovereignty. Conversely, the pro-
Brexit position leads with sovereignty and the political while being under-
pinned, in many cases, by nationalist identity politics.
The resonances with the Reformation occur in conjunction with the ways in 
which the EU has continually been framed in public discourse as an external 
power branching across the Continent that requires but is resistant to reform. To 
change it from the inside as part of a process of negotiation remained an option, 
at least rhetorically, even for a Tory Prime Minister such as David Cameron. But 
his failure to achieve satisfactory results, along with the political momentum 
gained by the deeply Euro-sceptic wing of his party – strengthened by the poll-
ing success of UKIP and conservative defections – led him to succumb to pres-
sure for a referendum.5 For the radical collective in favour of leaving, reform of 
2 For accounts that begin in the Tudor period, see Bradshaw, Morrill (1996) and Bradshaw, 
Roberts (1998); for the era of James VI and I, see Mason (1994) and Kerrigan (2008). Mason 
(2004) complicates the picture between these two periods, describing Scottish interest in 
foregrounding an idea of Britain in the Tudor period; for the Act of Union, see Colley (1992) 
and Robertson (1995). For a study focusing on the early modern formation of English national 
identity, see Helgerson (1992).
3 See Black (2019) and Heuser (2019) for even earlier points of departure.
4 Cottret (2019) in his book on the Tudors describes this moment as “Un premier Brexit” (pp. 
173–189). 
5 See Shipman (2017) for a valuable account of the campaign.
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Europe was presented as an impossibility. Only the assertion of national sover-
eignty could overcome this enduring obstacle and reclaim politics.
The English Reformation represented the beginning of a long process of 
transformation with serious effects on international relations and the emer-
gence, over time, of a new and distinctive identity. In the present moment, 
much will depend, inevitably, on the economic and political strength of the EU 
from which the UK extracts itself, and the capacity of a rechristened United 
Kingdom to forge alliances (and trading relationships) of its own. The UK 
will not be withdrawing from NATO any time soon, of course, so the altered-
states scenario has real limitations, whatever it may mean for laws and regu-
latory frameworks. In this respect it is instructive to consider that although 
the English Reformation led to the creation of an Established Church, the 
difference between its rites and those of Rome was minimal. The theology 
may have been rethought but church service and governance remained rela-
tively unchanged.6 We may find in the case of Brexit an ideological transfor-
mation which affects very little of life on the ground. In fact, both historical 
instances of separation constitute assertions of power by a political elite, 
based on demonising an authority positioned as external. They may require 
and draw sustenance from popular discontent and widely-held perceptions of 
 intransigence and wastefulness, but they depend on the organised and well- 
financed management from the top. The new regime the UK ends up with will 
entail a different administrative and legal structure, just as the ecclesiastical 
apparatus was substituted in the time of Henry VIII. But ties with Europe will 
and must remain strong. The break in that sense will only ever be partial, an 
illusion as much as a reality.
The second point is perhaps more significant. The English Reformation left 
a divided country. Catholics – for our purposes we can call them ‘remainers’ 
– did not disappear as a voice or constituency, nor was the political nation 
suddenly eradicated of opponents and the country reassembled in ideologi-
cal purity and consensus. The retaliation against Protestants by Mary I, who 
reigned from 1553 to 1558, reinforced by her marriage to Philip of Spain in 1554, 
brought the durability of the English Reformation into question, but her short 
tenure gave way to Elizabeth I and a process of Protestant consolidation (her 
prospective Habsburg marriage alliances in particular would have complicated 
the position of course). This is a story of decades of efforts to deal with internal 
6 The establishment of a national church engendered a fraught history of dealing with the 
fallout from Dissenters (and in Scotland with a Presbyterian national church). The pro-Brexit 
position is no more coherent in that respect and is likely to fragment after an agreement is 
reached.
The Longue durée of Brexit 55
and external Catholic threats.7 In the seventeenth century a different struggle 
occurs in the context of the English Civil War over the form of the state and 
the role and power of the church, but the Restoration reinvigorated the threat 
of Catholicism once more. Only with the Glorious Revolution in 1688 is some-
thing like an enduring Protestant stamp placed on the country. I suspect that 
ensuing elections in the UK, leadership contests, and other political struggles 
will play out similar divides over Europe going forward. Partly this is due to the 
fact that the UK has no tradition of unity governments, favouring the winner-
take-all model. (The recent experience of coalition under the Tories and Lib-
eral Democrats did nothing to persuade the major parties that alliances of this 
kind were politically helpful, at least to the junior partner.)
The English Reformation was followed by an imperial moment associated 
with the Welsh Acts of Union of 1535 and 1542 and Henry VIII’s assertive rule 
in Ireland. But control of Ireland was, to put it mildly, imperfect, and proved 
an ongoing source of difficulty, exacerbated by religious difference (where the 
Old English and New English parted company over allegiance to Rome or to the 
Anglican faith). Rebellion in Ireland in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eigh-
teenth centuries and beyond, was often hinged on (inadequate) support from 
Continental allies. From this perspective, the assertion of UK sovereignty made 
in the referendum remains tragically naive about the implications for Ireland,8 
where the UK governs only the province of Ulster (reinforced by subsequent 
wrangling over the provision of an Irish backstop agreed in December 2017). The 
complex position is underscored by treaty commitments under the Good Friday 
Agreement and the Republic’s position as a member state of the EU. Ireland’s 
allies have in this new scenario proved, thus far, more resolute than in the past.
2 Sovereignty, Separation and Immigration
The desire for regained sovereignty lies at the heart of the Brexit aspiration for 
many of its supporters. Thus the great refrain has been to ‘take back’ control 
of laws and borders.9 The prospect of unencumbered legal control is bound 
up with the wish to gain freedom from the restraint of the European Court of 
7 For a classic study, see Dickens (1989); for a revisionist account, see Haigh (1993); for a recent 
major study Marshall (2017); see also essays on the development of the English Reformation 
in MacCulloch (2016).
8 On this question, see Connelly (2018).
9 See Heuser (2019). For valuable reflections on sovereignty in the era of globalisation, see 
Sassen (1996) and (2008). 
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Justice and the rule-making role of the European Commission and Parliament. 
At the same time, the sovereignty argument pays scant attention to the model 
of power sharing elaborated in regional assemblies and parliaments in the UK, 
and the whole history of sustained political effort and agitation that brought 
them into being. Scotland has scarcely figured in the discussion, despite the 
size of the vote there to remain, largely because its position raises no consti-
tutional questions. The Good Friday Agreement, by contrast, commits the UK 
and Irish governments to forms of shared sovereignty, a situation made less 
conspicuous by occupying shared space under the umbrella of the EU. The 
Scottish government’s attempt to insist on involvement in the decision over 
whether to trigger article 50 was swiftly rejected by the UK Supreme Court in 
January 2017.
Control of laws is one thing, but control of borders speaks to the desire to 
limit immigration, nullifying the principle of the free movement of peoples 
enshrined in the EU’s concept of itself and one of the so-called Four Freedoms. 
This is not to say that other European states have not struggled with this pros-
pect. Different analyses can be provided to explain the impulse in the UK, but 
a resurgent nativism is clearly part of the story (evident in the campaigning 
of UKIP for example). The conventional alignment of national identity with 
ethnicity across Europe (German, French, Spanish, Italian, etc.) deepens the 
problem. In this respect the UK has an advantage to the extent that the term 
‘Britain’ is more inclusive, encompassing the kingdoms (even if it does not 
enfranchise Northern Ireland).10
The concept of the UK as a separate and sovereign entity, a rule giver not a 
rule taker, ignores the fact that England has been headed in the past by plenty 
of ‘foreign’ monarchs. The House of Hanover is perhaps the best-known exam-
ple, given George I’s reputation for speaking limited English, at least at the out-
set of his reign. But among foreign sovereigns it is also worth remembering 
William III (1650–1702), i.e. the Prince of Orange and Dutch Stadholder, vic-
tor in the Glorious Revolution. His marriage to James II’s Protestant daughter, 
Mary, provided the basis for his intervention to claim the English crown and 
the invitation to form a joint monarchy in order to unseat James II. William 
ruled on his own after Mary’s death in 1694, and his ‘foreignness’ became an 
object of attack for opponents. The complaints focused on his position on 
standing armies and his absence in Holland in the summer of 1698, after the 
10 The official title of the country is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, hence the Democratic Unionist Party’s annoyance over the country’s branding in 
Olympic competitions as ‘Team GB’ (changing this to ‘Team UK’ was a manifesto pledge 
of their 2017 general election campaign).
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conclusion of the Nine Years’ War, where he executed treaties without parlia-
mentary authority and, a year later, doled out grants to friends for forfeited 
Irish lands. He was condemned in a verse attack under the title The Foreign-
ers, particularly directed against William’s favourites. This work famously 
 provoked an  anonymous response from Daniel Defoe in the form of The True-
Born Englishman (1701).
Defoe’s poem, pitched in a satirical vein, complicates the picture of the 
native and foreign to make a polemical point.11 Some of its arguments con-
tinue to resonate as a reply to the nativist understanding of ‘British’ or ‘English’ 
identity underpinning a certain strand of Brexit support.
The preface declares that the author is not Dutch, though some might sus-
pect him of being so – rather he is English and he urges his countrymen to 
“behave themselves better to Strangers, and to Governors also”.12 The signifi-
cance of 1688 might be reinterpreted in this context not so much as the asser-
tion of ‘liberty’ but rather as the renewed rejection of intrusion by a foreign 
power in the form of the Catholic Church and the papacy with the support of 
a Catholic monarch, even a legitimate one. Thus the preface complains that 
‘pretending’ Protestants have in fact “all along endeavour’d to reduce the Lib-
erties and Religion of this Nation into the Hands of King James and his Popish 
Powers”.13
But the theme for which the poem remains best known is its way of handling 
the ‘identity problem’ in contemporary politics. While meditating on English 
ingratitude towards William, Defoe considers the admixture of peoples that 
make up the category of the ‘English’, giving the lie to pronouncements about 
foreigners. Often invaded, England has found:
While ev’ry Nation that her Pow’rs reduc’d  
Their Languages and Manners soon Infus’d. 
From whose mixt Relicks our compounded Breed, 
Making a Race uncertain and unev’n,  
Deriv’d from all the Nations under Heav’n.14
He recites the arrival of the Romans with their mixed crew, followed by Jutes, 
Saxons, Danes, Scots, the Picts, the Irish and then the Normans. They “Blended 
with Britains, who before were here”, resulting in that ultimate hyphenated 
11 For a recent reading of the poem, see Borsing (2017), ch. 1. 
12 [Defoe] (2003), p. 83. 
13 [Defoe] (2003), p. 83. 
14 [Defoe] (2003), pp. 89f. (ll.169–74).
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identity, “Your Roman-Saxon-Danish-Norman English”.15 The Normans then 
transformed the country once again. Since that time the pattern has only 
accelerated:
Dutch, Walloons, Flemings, Irishmen, and Scots,  
Vaudois and Valtolins,16 and Hugonots,  
In good Queen Bess’s Charitable Reign,  
Suppli’d us with Three hundred thousand Men.17
The chronology is a little askew since the Huguenot emigration is a largely sev-
enteenth-century phenomenon in the context of the Revocation of the Edict 
of Nantes (1685). But the point in general is well-made (although not one that 
that Nigel Farage has absorbed despite his Huguenot heritage). The import-
ant thing is the poem’s emphasis on the fact that “from a Mixture of all Kinds 
began, / That Het’rogeneous Thing, An Englishman”:
For Englishmen to boast of Generation, 
Cancels their Knowledge, and lampoons the Nation.  
A True-Born Englishman’s a Contradiction,  
In Speech an Irony, in Fact a Fiction.18
Defoe’s Explanatory Preface to the ninth edition makes clear that he regarded 
this mixture as a national advantage, not a defect (indeed the Scots, Welsh and 
Irish suffer from being unmixed in his view).19 The poem’s argument might 
be considered specific to a particular political occasion, but there is evidence 
elsewhere in Defoe’s work of his interest in issues of identity and how they 
play out in a hybrid setting. His 1719 novel, Robinson Crusoe, is worth consid-
ering in this context. There is no more English and indeed resolutely Protes-
tant character in the history of fiction than Crusoe (a point that James Joyce 
remarked on critically).20 Yet we are told at the outset of the book that  Crusoe’s 
15 [Defoe] (2003), p. 90 (ll. 185, 194).
16 The Vaudois or Waldenses were a heretical group in Europe, especially Italy; the Valtolins 
were Protestants residing in Valtellina (Switzerland), who suffered a massacre by Catho-
lics in 1620.
17 [Defoe] (2003), p. 92 (ll. 259–62). 
18 [Defoe] (2003), pp. 94, 95 (ll. 334–5, 370–73). 
19 [Defoe] (2003), p. 79. For a wider reading of the theme, see Schmidgen (2013). 
20 Joyce commented in a lecture in March 1912 in Trieste: “All the Anglo-Saxon soul is in Crusoe: 
virile independence, unthinking cruelty, persistence, slow yet effective intelligence, sexual 
apathy, practical and well-balanced religiosity, calculating dourness.” Joyce (2000), p. 174.
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father was “a foreigner of Bremen” who settled in Hull. The original surname 
was Kreutznaer, he tells us, “but by the usual Corruption of Words in England, 
we are now called, nay, we call our selves, and write our name, Crusoe”.21 This 
aspect of the story is reasonably well remembered. On the deserted island, 
scene of his captivity, Crusoe seems intent above all on replicating an English 
way of life, rather than going native. In the midst of his isolation he advances 
in social standing, with a town house and a rural retreat, a bower and other 
appurtenances of an English lord or member of the gentry. Yet it is only at 
the end of the book that we learn from him some intriguing details about 
his time as young man in Brazil, following his escape from captivity in North 
Africa. There he established a tobacco plantation and – intending to shift to 
labour-intensive sugar production – he embarked on a mission to Africa to 
secure slaves. This fateful decision resulted in his shipwreck on the deserted 
Caribbean island where the main sequence of the novel occurs. After Cru-
soe’s recovery from the island following a residence of twenty-eight years, his 
fortune is restored to him and he contemplates returning to Brazil, where, he 
tells us, he had been previously naturalised. What restrains him is his new reli-
gious sensibility – a Protestant identity cultivated during his years of isolation 
through reading the Bible, engaging in prayer and conversation with God, and 
his later evangelising of Friday. He notes that when he formerly lived in Brazil, 
he “had made no Scruple of being openly of the Religion of the Country, all the 
while I was among them”. Now, however, Crusoe begins “to regret my having 
profess’d my self a Papist”.22 Despite these reservations, he still decides to con-
fer on the Priory of St. Augustine (which, over the course of his long absence, 
received a substantial portion of the proceeds from his plantation),23 a gift of 
500 moidores for the monastery and 373 to the poor, “desiring the good Padres 
Prayers for me”.24
We can, in short, recover an alternative narrative in the most English of 
sources that suggests a history of hybrid identities, less hostile to the intermix-
ing and integration suggested by the European project and rejected by some 
Brexit supporters.
21 Defoe (2007), p. 5. 
22 Defoe (2007), p. 241.
23 They use this for the “Benefit of the Poor, and for the Conversion of the Indians to the 
Catholick Faith”. The king’s third (of Crusoe’s half), meanwhile, “was it seems granted 
away to some other Monastery, or Religious House”. Defoe (2007), pp. 235, 236.
24 Defoe (2007), p. 242. It is evident that Crusoe’s business partner is Catholic, since Crusoe 
reports that this individual said many “Ave Marias to thank the Blessed Virgin that I was 
alive” when he hears from him; Defoe (2007), p. 239.
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3 English Exceptionalism
English or British exceptionalism – the sense that the country has a separate 
destiny, different from that of Europe – is deeply engrained. The Continent is 
an ‘elsewhere’ from which it is physically disconnected but also morally dis-
tinct. As Theresa May remarked in her speech in Florence on 22 September 
2017: “perhaps because of our history and geography, the European Union 
never felt to us like an integral part of our national story in the way it does to so 
many elsewhere in Europe.”25 The concept of the “sceptred isle”, a place apart 
with a privileged role and history conferred by geography, derives of course 
from Shakespeare’s Richard II. In his account of the attitudes of leading twen-
tieth-century British political figures to Europe, Hugo Young remarks:
The mythology of the scepter’d isle, the demi-paradise, bit deep into 
the consciousness of many who addressed the question, beginning with 
Churchill himself. The sacredness of England, whether or not corrupted 
into Britain, became a quality setting it, in some minds, for ever apart 
from Europe. Tampering with this blessed plot was seen for decades as 
a kind of sacrilege which, even if the sophisticates among the political 
class could accept it, the people would never tolerate.26
The passage in the play is worth looking at with care. As with so many famous 
speeches in Shakespeare its inherited meaning – that is, the way it is popularly 
understood – differs from its meaning in context.27 Here are the lines:
This royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle, 
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars, 
This other Eden, demi-paradise, 
This fortress built by nature for herself 
Against infection and the hand of war, 
This happy breed of men, this little world, 
This precious stone set in the silver sea, 
Which serves it in the office of a wall, 
Or as a moat defensive to a house, 
25 May (2017). The website with this speech also includes a text of the speech in German.
26 Young (1998), p. 1.
27 For an insightful reading, see Knapp (2002), chapter 3. 
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Against the envy of less happier lands, 
This blessèd plot, this earth, this realm, this England….28
No one would deny that this is stirring poetry, but who delivers the lines and 
in what set of circumstances? They come in Act II, scene i, from the Duke of 
Lancaster, John of Gaunt,29 uncle to Richard II and father of Henry Boling-
broke (Duke of Hereford). Henry has shortly before this point been sent into 
exile by Richard II to avoid a bloody conflict with Thomas Mowbray (Duke 
of Norfolk), whom the king also banishes. Although Richard shortens Boling-
broke’s term of exile on appeal from Gaunt, Gaunt knows he will not live to see 
his son’s return. Indeed the stage directions for the scene in which he delivers 
the memorable speech read: “Enter John of Gaunt sick”. The speech covers 31 
lines in total, and it begins in prophetic mode, directed against a bad king, 
foretelling, as Gaunt’s death approaches, that Richard cannot continue. In fact 
Gaunt imagines a country consuming itself, and the speech is really uttered as 
a lament, providing a narrative of English decline. Soon after the lines quoted 
above, the speech takes a troubled turn:
This land of such dear souls, this dear, dear land, 
Dear for her reputation through the world, 
Is now leased out – I die pronouncing it – 
Like to a tenement or pelting30 farm: 
England, bound in with the triumphant sea 
Whose rocky shore beats back the envious siege 
Of wat’ry Neptune, is now bound in with shame, 
With inky blots and rotten parchment bonds. 
That England that was wont to conquer others 
Hath made a shameful conquest of itself. 
Ah, would the scandal vanish with my life, 
How happy then were my ensuing death!31
28 Shakespeare (2016), 2.1. ll. 40–50.
29 Gaunt’s name derives from his birth in Ghent, at St. Bravo’s Abbey. His complex Continen-
tal ties include the fact that his mother was Philippa of Hainault (his father was Edward 
III) and he was named for John, duke of Brabant, an ally in the Low Countries of his 
father. Gaunt’s second marriage to the exiled daughter of the murdered Pedro I of Castile 
gave him a claim to the Castilian crown which he asserted, adopting the royal title of King 
of Castile and León. See Walker (2004).
30 Worthless, paltry.
31 Shakespeare (2016), 2.1.57–68.
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England has become a tax farm (confirmed in the prior scene, Act 1, scene iv, 
in fact, by Richard himself). It has lost its freedom, or sovereignty if you like, 
as a result of legal agreements that have bound it. The country, defensively 
sealed off by the sea, has paradoxically conquered itself. In short, the sense of 
England as something glorious is uttered in the midst of the fear of inevitable 
decline. Something of the recuperative desire among Brexiteers to resume a 
relationship with the commonwealth after the departure from Europe seems 
to echo in Gaunt’s lament.
Richard II includes the exile of two figures, Bolingbroke and Mowbray, as I 
mentioned. When Mowbray confronts this prospect, he delivers a rather strik-
ing speech about the implications he will confront in terms of language. The 
way he describes his fate is instructive for a number of reasons:
The language I have learnt these forty years, 
My native English, now I must forego, 
And now my tongue’s use is to me no more 
Than an unstringèd viol or a harp, 
Or like a cunning instrument cased up, 
Or, being open, put into his hands 
That knows no touch to tune the harmony. 
Within my mouth you have engaoled my tongue, 
Doubly portcullised with my teeth and lips, 
And dull unfeeling barren ignorance 
Is made my gaoler to attend on me. 
I am too old to fawn upon a nurse, 
Too far in years to be a pupil now. 
What is thy sentence then but speechless death, 
Which robs my tongue from breathing native breath?32
Perhaps one of the hidden stories of Brexit, consistent with the assertion of a 
‘global Britain, open for business’ as the solution to this political maneuver, is 
about the dominant position of the English language. For a traveller or exile 
in Shakespeare’s time (let alone Richard II’s), English was a language that 
would have done little to facilitate communication on the Continent. Indeed 
the purpose of travel was precisely to acquire knowledge of foreign tongues, 
especially French and Italian. If the English language did not now occupy a 
dominant position, would the outcome of the referendum on EU membership 
32 Shakespeare (2016), 1.3.153–67.
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have come out differently? Had it remained a minority language, forcing ‘Brit-
ons’ either to travel to acquire fluency or to study languages properly in school 
to gain proficiency, they might have remained more attuned to the European 
prospect.
The same thought returns us to a twist on Defoe’s poetic invocation of mix-
ture: English was not the only language spoken on the ‘sceptred isle’ either in 
his time or Shakespeare’s. For that matter, English itself is a combination of 
Anglo-Saxon, Latin and French, so it is a polyglot product. What is hybrid is 
sold as unitary. It is worth noting that in Richard II Bolingbroke responds to 
his exile as “enforcèd pilgrimage”, which his father regards as a foil that will set 
off “The precious jewel of thy home return”.33 Bolingbroke promises to remain 
“Though banished, yet a true-born Englishman”.34
In Shakespeare’s history cycle the triumphant moment comes in Henry V 
with its staging of the famous victory at Agincourt and the assertion of Henry’s 
dynastic claim to France. This play makes the composite nature of the monar-
chy more conspicuous, not least with the cameo of Macmorris with his stage 
Irish speech and famous query “What ish my nation?”, but more obviously with 
the comic presence of the Welsh, notably in the figure of Llewellyn (Fluellen), 
with whom Henry acknowledges kinship as descendant of a Welsh family him-
self.35 What is more, the play draws attention to the problem of the Scots. They 
will take any opportunity to stir up trouble and invade if the English dally in 
Continental wars. For this reason, some of the nobility and their forces must 
remain behind, leaving Henry outnumbered against the French, although of 
course he proves more glorious in victory over them as a result. At least the 
Scots merit respect in this regard; the other ‘nations’ of the realm are appropri-
ated as comic supporting parts in an English drama of self-realisation. This is 
so despite the fact that Ireland is promised to Princess Catherine of France as 
part of her enticement to marry the victorious English sovereign.36
Henry V turns on kinship registered as hostility in rival claims for patrimony. 
In the peace negotiations at the close of the play (Act V, scene ii) the king of 
France is addressed as brother and his wife as sister. Yet there is still an elab-
orate playing out of old opacities in the wooing scene between Henry and 
Catherine (his future Queen Consort) where neither has fluency in the other’s 
language. As Henry remarks – speaking prose, interestingly, in this scene: “It 
is as easy for me, Kate, to conquer the kingdom as to speak so much more 
33 Shakespeare (2016), 1.3.253, 256.
34 Shakespeare (2016), 1.3.272.
35 Shakespeare (2016), 4.7.89.
36 See Shakespeare (2016), 5.2.210.
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French. I shall never more move thee in French, unless it be to laugh at me”.37 
Most of this is set up to the disadvantage of Catherine, to English ears at least, 
though as part of the comic closure the scene is played affectionately rather 
than as rough wooing: “Your majesté ’ave faux French enough to deceive de 
most sage demoiselle dat is en France”.38 The paradox is that the audience must 
understand some French to get the joke. What Henry proposes is an alliance 
in which their hybrid prodigy will fight a common foe: “thou must therefore 
needs prove a good soldier-breeder: shall not thou and I, between Saint Denis 
and Saint George, compound a boy, half-French, half-English, that shall go to 
Constantinople and take the Turk by the beard?”39
The prospect of engaging in new adventures in conquest promises to knit 
together old oppositions. Something of the same hope, in a secularised vein, 
seems to inspire the questing for new trade deals in the post-Brexit agenda.
But the promised triumphs may be as vanishing as Henry’s glory. It is worth 
remembering how the next play in Shakespeare’s historical sequence (Henry 
VI) opens – with the funeral march for Henry V, his demise coming quickly 
after his celebrated victories. News of setbacks in France quickly mounts up, 
punctuated by a bold address from a messenger reporting on military mis-
fortunes in the country:
Awake, awake, English nobility! 
Let not sloth dim your honours new-begot! 
Cropped are the flower-de-luces in your arms; 
Of England’s coat, one half is cut away.40
The capacity of Shakespeare to offer us plots that allegorise the present is 
undoubtedly rich. Cymbeline, his historical romance of resistance in Roman 
Britain, represents a particularly noteworthy drama from this point of view. 
King Cymbeline is a vassal to Rome. His two sons having been stolen away 
in their childhood, he is left only with a beautiful daughter, Innogen. She suf-
fers at the hands of a plotting step-mother, Cymbeline’s queen, who seeks to 
wed Innogen to her loathsome son Cloten, despite the fact that she has already 
married Posthumus Leonatus (without her father’s consent). Disputes with 
Rome provide an important backdrop to the romance action. Cymbeline 
refuses to pay the tribute he owes to Rome, rejecting the appeals of the Roman 
37 Shakespeare (2016), 5.2.166–8.
38 Shakespeare (2016), 5.2.194–5.
39 Shakespeare (2016), 5.2.183–6.
40 Shakespeare (2016), 1.1.78–81.
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ambassador who invokes the prospect of a new invasion in retaliation. Some 
complicated plot twists lead Innogen to Milford Haven, where it transpires that 
her lost brothers have been raised (in ignorance of their true paternity). Their 
courage shines forth as they fight against the Roman forces. Innogen, disguised 
as a boy, Fidele, is held by the Romans, who have been joined by her husband. 
The Britons overcome their opponents, and Cymbeline contemplates execut-
ing his adversaries, but he pauses when Fidele comes to his attention. Romance 
resolution ensues, with Cymbeline’s valiant sons restored to him, and Innogen 
to her Posthumus, allowing comedy to be rescued from tragedy.
And what of the Romans? Cymbeline makes peace with them, blaming his 
decision to refuse their demands on his late queen (who dies acknowledging 
her plots against him and Innogen). The king remarks:
Although the victor, we submit to Caesar, 
And to the Roman empire, promising  
To pay our wonted tribute, from the which 
We were dissuaded by our wicked Queen.41
Thus the political situation, in spite of all the intricate skirmishing, ends up 
where it began. Will this, one wonders, prove to be the case with the UK’s 
ostensible departure from the EU? Representatives of the Remain campaign 
must hope for the predictive power of the Soothsayer’s speech, the penulti-
mate one in the play. He states:
For the Roman eagle 
From south to west on wing soaring aloft 
Lessened herself, and in the beams o’th’ sun 
So vanished; which foreshadowed our princely eagle, 
Th’imperial Caesar, should again unite 
His favour with the radiant Cymbeline.42
Cymbeline himself endorses this conclusion in the final lines, proclaiming: 
“Let / A Roman and a British ensign wave / Friendly together”,43 before propos-
ing a march through London. The balance that Constance Jordan finds in the 
ending of Cymbeline: “At the play’s conclusion Britain remains a vassal state 
of Rome, but she retains the fundamental liberties she would have were she 
41 Shakespeare (2017), 5.5.459–62.
42 Shakespeare (2017), 5.5.469–74.
43 Shakespeare (2017), 5.5.478–80.
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independent of Rome,”44 might express the hopes of Remainers or those who 
seek the softest of Brexits with as close an alliance with the EU as possible. 
Advocates for Brexit, meanwhile, harp on about the vassal state position of 
Britain in the EU and, in their more extreme moments, insist on withholding 
the £39 billion divorce bill, refusing this ‘tribute’ to a foreign overlord.
4 Coda: Churchillian Contradictions
The contradictions in British identity and the relationship to Europe have per-
sisted over time, constituting an ongoing legacy. The aftermath of World War 
II and the efforts to create lasting peace through economic cooperation deep-
ened the conflict over separateness or integration for British politicians rather 
than resolving it. Winston Churchill embodied these contradictory impulses. 
He remains an important figure since, as Boris Johnson remarks in a self- 
serving biography, “thrusting young Tories – and especially males – will regard 
Winston Churchill as a sort of divinity.”45 Yet Johnson is forced to acknowledge 
that Churchill also occupies this deified role in a European context, as “one of 
the presiding divinities of the European Union”.46 Churchill articulated a view 
in favour of a United States of Europe as early as 1930 and endorsed it again in 
a speech in Zurich in September 1946 supporting the creation of what became 
the Council of Europe.47 Yet Johnson is right to suggest this is not the whole 
of the story. Hugo Young, from a very different political perspective, affirms 
that “most of Churchill’s blueprints, however, placed Britain/England outside 
the European construct.”48 The country would somehow stand apart while 
encouraging European integration,49 moving in an orbit determined by com-
mitments to the Empire and Commonwealth, and a vision, as Churchill saw 
44 Jordan (1997), p. 69. For a valuable study of the play, see King (2005). 
45 Johnson (2014), p. 31.
46 Johnson (2014), p. 290.
47 For Churchill’s supportive speeches and contributions to the Council, see archived 
sources on the Council website https://www.coe.int/en/web/documents-records-ari-
chives-information/winston-churchill-and-the-ce. 
48 Young (1998), p. 13. 
49 In a speech to the Commons (as leader of the opposition) on 27 June 1950, Churchill 
stated: “I cannot conceive that Britain would be an ordinary member of a Federal Union 
limited to Europe in any period which can at present be foreseen […]. Although a hard-
and-fast concrete federal constitution for Europe is not within the scope of practical 
affairs, we should help, sponsor and aid in every possible way the movement towards 
European unity. We should seek steadfastly for means to become intimately associated 
with it.” Quoted in Johnson (2014), p. 293.
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it, of the English speaking peoples in alliance (including, above all, the US). 
Britain’s role as a world power would continue.
In these discussions, Ireland remained vestigial. During the referendum 
campaign the country was equally ignored. Northern Ireland and scope for 
a return to violence in the event of a hard border scarcely figured in public 
debate (Tony Blair and John Major gave a joint address in Derry two weeks 
before the vote, warning against a Leave outcome and appealing to the unde-
cided, but their advice was ignored). The blithe dismissal of this concern by 
many advocates of Brexit is a shocking reminder of the low priority attached 
to Irish concerns.
What of Churchill himself? As a liberal he supported Home Rule, writing in 
1911 that
It must always be a guiding star of British statesmanship not only to fed-
erate the Empire, but to draw nearer in bonds of friendship and associ-
ation to the United States. The road to the unity of the English-speaking 
races is no doubt a long one, and we cannot see the end of it. But it is an 
open road, and an Irish parliament, loyal to the Crown, and free to make 
the best of the Emerald Isle, is assuredly the first milestone upon it.50
This invocation draws attention to the line of thinking developed in Churchill’s 
four-volume History of the English-Speaking Peoples (1956–58). Ireland does 
not feature in any prominent way in the history, which is noteworthy in itself, 
but the country does intrude in the nineteenth-century narrative. Recounting 
the struggles for Home Rule, he remarks that “it must not be supposed that the 
Irish picture can be seen from Britain entirely in black and white.”51 Describing 
from earlier in the century the cause of Daniel O’Connell and Catholic Eman-
cipation, Churchill notes a speech in the House of Lords by Wellington (whose 
Irish origins he points out) and the stark words Wellington spoke in relation to 
the potential for civil war:
I am one of those who have probably passed a longer period of my life 
engaged in war than most men, and principally in civil war; and I must 
say this, that if I could avoid by any sacrifice whatever even one month of 
civil war in the country to which I was attached I would sacrifice my life 
in order to do it.52
50 Quoted in Roberts (2018), p. 163.
51 Churchill (1956–58), vol. 4, p. 270. 
52 Churchill (1956–58), vol. 4, p. 30.
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The warnings about Ireland are there, in other words, even in Tory sources. 
Churchill ended his history on a note of uncertainty:
Here is set out a long story of the English-Speaking Peoples. They are now 
to become Allies in terrible but victorious wars. And that is not the end. 
Another phase looms before us, in which alliance will once more be 
tested and in which its formidable virtues may be to preserve Peace and 
Freedom. The future is unknowable, but the past should give us hope. Nor 
should we now seek to define precisely the exact terms of ultimate union.53
Brexiteers have lost contact with the post-war inspiration to unify Europe, 
opposing the strategy of creating supranational institutions in order to inter-
lock the fate of nations in the European continent.54 Meanwhile, they look 
to old alliances, largely Anglophone in the first instance – with America and 
the Commonwealth (i.e. English-speaking peoples) – to mitigate the conse-
quences of departure.
Taking an early modern perspective on the longue durée of Brexit reveals not 
only the durability of a sense of separateness but also the tensions and inconsis-
tencies within it. When Linda Colley reviewed the emergence of a British iden-
tity in her 1992 book Britons. Forging the Nation 1707–1837, she observed that the 
driving forces leading to this artificial construct (protracted war with France; 
Protestant religious difference; and the fight to retain and expand an empire) 
had disappeared in the late twentieth-century moment in which she wrote: not 
only in the loss of overseas territories but in Protestant religious attachments. 
She saw the appearance of more assertive forms of Welsh, Scottish and even 
English nationalism as responses to “a broader loss of national, in the sense of 
British, identity”. In a remark that now reads as prophesy, she com mented:
Indeed, now that it is part of the European Economic Community, 
Great Britain can no longer comfortably define itself against the Euro-
pean powers at all. Whether it likes it or not, it is fast becoming part of 
an increasingly federal Europe, though the agonies of British politicians 
and voters of all partisan persuasions so plainly experienced in coming to 
terms with Brussels and its dictates show just how rooted the perception 
of Continental Europe as the Other still is.55
53 Churchill (1956–58), vol. 4, p. 304.
54 For an account, see O’Rourke (2019). 
55 Colley (1992), p. 6. 
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CHAPTER 4
From Identity Politics to the Identitarian 
Movement
The Europeanisation of Cultural Stereotypes?
Karel Šima
 Abstract
The motivation behind this contribution is to explain how the concept of identity got 
from the emancipatory context of identity politics to the conservative revolutionary 
context of nationalistic, xenophobic, far-right movements of the Generation Identity. 
On one hand the notion of identity was mobilised to challenge the dominant oppres-
sive power relations by the marginal social groups based mainly on distinctiveness of 
ethnicity, race, gender etc. On the other hand, recent crises in Europe brought to the 
fore the far-right youth movements that posed the defence of identity as their main 
motto. The aim of this contribution is to analyse cultural references within the dis-
courses and performances of the pan-European identitarian movement in order to 
understand their mechanisms of instrumentalising national, ethnic, as well as local 
and European cultural characteristics and values. This case study is of relevance as it 
not only shows cultural representations behind specific social movements reacting to 
recent European crises, but also explains the processes by which they are being ‘euro-
peanised’ into pan-European cultural and political discourses.
1 Introduction
On 27 August 2016 fifteen activists from a German identitarian group climbed 
the iconic Brandenburg Gate in Berlin and put up banners reading “Secure 
borders – secure future” [“Sichere Grenzen – sichere Zukunft”] and “Protect Bor-
ders! Save lives!” [“Grenzen schützen! Leben retten!”]. This demonstration took 
place near government buildings on a day when they were open to the public. 
In their performance, witnessed by a large audience, these activists presented 
a political agenda based on the image of an enemy from outside and gained 
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significant coverage in regional as well as national media.1 More than one year 
later, on the 500th anniversary of Luther’s famous posting of the ninety-five 
theses in Wittenberg, these activists put on a “street theatre show” in front of 
a Berlin church, where one of them dressed as Martin Luther nailed a poster 
with five theses against the protestant church of Germany to the door. They 
criticised the church for selling “modern indulgences” in the form of refugee 
aid and for betraying its ideals and earning “billions” for destroying Europe. 
These performers also unfurled a banner featuring a picture of Luther with an 
identitarian logo on his forehead and emblazoned with one of his quotations: 
“Hypocrisy has ample wages, but truth goes a-begging” (“Für Heuchelei gibt’s 
Geld genug, Wahrheit geht betteln”). This event was completely overlooked by 
the media, and photos and a corresponding statement were only published on 
the Facebook page of Berlin’s identitarian group.2 These two demonstrations 
illustrate the paradoxes of this relatively recent ‘movement’ that has, on one 
hand, gained substantial media coverage, but on the other consists of small, 
locally marginal groups of activists that possess few resources. Identitarians 
play with national symbols and stereotypes, while at the same time reacting 
to overarching European agendas. They raise controversial political questions, 
but instead of engaging in political debate they counter the establishment by 
mixing cultural references. They communicate their agenda through social 
media, dressing up their traditionalist and mostly conservative political ideas 
in an attractive visual style. They combine the political instruments of leftist 
social movements with far-right ideology.
There is not much new about this self-declared pan-European identitar-
ian ‘movement’,3 except its clever strategy of exploiting its own paradoxes in 
an attempt to shift the mainstream public discourse towards the far right. Its 
strategy is based on the French New Rights ideology, which places culture at 
the centre of political struggle. Therefore, identitarians refuse to use classic 
political instruments, and instead, in their struggle for cultural hegemony, 
recycle and put to innovative use cultural references that reflect European and 
national hetero- and autostereotypes and thus frame national and European 
political debates with their ideology. Following this idea, I will first show how 
1 See ‘Rechte “Identitäre Bewegung” besetzt Brandenburger Tor’ (2016). 
2 All identitarian Facebook pages were banned during the first half of 2018. The author has 
archived copies of these pages. 
3 Fabian Virchow persuasively argues that this activist current is neither ‘identitarian’ nor a 
‘movement’. Although I use the term ‘identitarian’ in this paper, I put ‘movement’ in quota-
tion marks in keeping with Virchow’s interpretation. When mentioning particular national 
identitarian organisations, I refer to them by the name they use. See Virchow (2015), p. 186. 
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and why the concept of identity moved from the context of identity politics 
to become the key political driver in the identitarian ‘movement’. Then I will 
shortly summarize the identitarian current that has been surging through 
Europe since 2012, before introducing its key ideological pillars and showing 
how identitarians put them into practice in their public cultural performances. 
In the conclusion I will consider the differences between different European 
identitarian groups and shortly reflect on this “movement’s” perspectives.
2  From Identity and Identity Politics to Identitarian Counterattack
Social scientists and humanities scholars have long debated the concept of 
identity; in the 1990s the scholarly discourse on identity became so widespread 
and was used in so many different contexts, often with vague conceptual jus-
tifications, that some authors saw no value in further developing identity the-
ories and instead suggested using other more precise and analytically robust 
concepts. For example, Brubaker and Cooper differentiate between identity 
as a category of analysis and as a category of practice.4 While they oppose the 
analytical power of the concept, they acknowledge that identity in practice 
should be studied in the process of its reification. Thus, the key question is, 
how and in which circumstances can the concept of identity become a cate-
gory of social, political, and cultural practice? Along these lines, I will explore 
the identitarian ‘movement’ as a specific mutation of identity politics.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, when identity ceased to be taken for 
granted, several forms of modern identity politics that revolved around con-
cepts of nation, state, or class emerged. They replaced what Calhoun calls 
“the all-encompassing identity schemes” of the premodern era.5 In the 1950s 
and 1960s in Western Europe and the USA identity politics began to focus on 
improving the lives of ethnic and sexual minorities. Even though the public 
discourse had changed and legal changes officially improved their status, they 
remained marginalised groups. At this time, the push for equal civil rights for 
these marginalised groups began to revolve around each group’s specific ‘way 
of life.’ Thus, a new identity politics emerged that sought recognition of differ-
ences. As a result of this shift, identity politics was adopted by some new social 
movements (NSMs), as these activist groups were later labelled.6
4 See Brubaker, Cooper (2000).
5 Calhoun (1994), p. 11. 
6 For a reflection of the concept of identity in NSM research, see, e. g., Scott, Benford, Snow 
(1994).
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In the 1960s the term ‘identity’ had so thoroughly permeated the public 
discourse that Robert Coles complained that it had become “the purest of 
clichés”.7 Hand in hand with the establishment of this term within academic 
discourse, identity became a category of practice. The term ‘identity politics’ 
emerged in the 1970s, when several NSMs grew into visible political forces 
providing radical critiques of the existing order. In the 1970s and 1980s activ-
ists promoting women’s liberation, gay liberation, environmentalism, animal 
rights, the anti-nuclear movement, African-American civil rights, and other 
similar movements succeeded in achieving recognition and legitimacy for 
their agendas within the broader political discourse through various protest 
practises. The New Left’s success in the 1990s (in Britain, the USA and Ger-
many, for example) thrust identity politics into the political mainstream and 
resulted in the gradual creation of an organisational and funding infrastruc-
ture. Simon Bornschier notes that this success story has not only its winners 
but also its losers. What he calls “cultural modernisation” has largely bene-
fited “sociocultural specialists”, who work in “client-interactive environments” 
with a high degree of cultural diversity.8 In opposition to them stand those 
who oppose cosmopolitan values and defend the traditionalist monocultural 
conception of community. In the 1990s, however, leftist and liberal academics 
began to criticize the New Left’s turn towards identity politics. Scholars such 
as Eric Hobsbawm and Richard Rorty warned that the Left’s focus on identity 
would amount to a loss of its electorate and pave the way for dangerous pop-
ulist politicians.9 A new wave of criticism has emerged following the financial 
and migration crises of recent years, when liberals have been shocked by the 
gains of populist right-wing political entrepreneurs.10 Identity politics is now 
facing an identitarian counterattack.
3  The Identitarian Wave in a Time of Crisis and Its Roots in  
Far-Right Politics
The official kick off of the European identitarian ‘movement’ that initiated 
the Generation Identity brand internationally was a local protest held on 20 
October 2012 in Poitier, France. Several dozen activists occupied a mosque 
under construction, unfurling black-and-yellow banners that read “Generation 
7 Gleason (1983), p. 913.
8 Bornschier (2018), p. 8.
9 See Hobsbawm (1996); Rorty (1998).
10 For recent liberal criticism of identity politics see Lilla (2017).
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Identitaire 732” and featured the Greek lambda symbol.11 These activists had 
a well-established background in the Bloc Identitaire party that was founded 
in 2003 as a successor to Unité Radical, a far-right political group that was 
banned after a member attempted to kill the president. The French radical 
right already had a rich history of political activism behind it before this pro-
test. However, the Poitier demonstration featured several new twists. As Bruns, 
Glösel and Strobl point out, the four core elements of the international identi-
tarian ‘movement’ were on display here: youth, actionism, popular culture and 
corporate identity.12
The ‘movement’ promotes itself as a generational response to the crises of 
European civilisation. This clarification has helped it distinguish itself from 
other existing far-right groups and create an image of youthful authenticity. 
The follow-up to the Poitier demonstration is a simple black-and-white You-
Tube video titled Declaration de Guerre (A Declaration of War) featuring angry 
young men and women speaking about their wasted lives and clearly blaming 
an unnamed “you”.13
The actionist element lies in the way their angriness is expressed. The Poitier 
demonstration was an audacious, visually attractive protest that owed much to 
Greenpeace’s style; it was presumably designed to get media attention – from 
classic mass media to social media. Its brief message was deeply symbolic, 
referring to the Reconquista and the Battle of Tours (also known as the Bat-
tle of Poitier), where Charles Martel defeated a Muslim army of the Umayyad 
Caliphate in 732. The identitarians adopted a strategy involving visually strik-
ing, media-attractive forms of protest that are not based on the number of pro-
testers but on performative creativity and cultural references and stereotypes.
These activists frequently incorporate visual and textual pop-culture ref-
erences in their materials. The ‘movement’s’ main symbol is the Greek letter 
lambda, a symbol the Spartan army painted on its shields. This image, how-
ever, does not come from historical sources, but from 300, a popular comic 
book adapted into a Hollywood movie in 2006. Some of the “movement’s” 
videos, which are critical communication channels and mobilisation tools, 
borrow heavily from the film’s visual aesthetics, particularly in their depiction 
of excitement, courage and peril. Identitarians use pop culture and history to 
make their agenda accessible and attractive.
The identitarian ‘movement’ has also built up a ‘corporate identity’ as a new 
element in the far-right scene. The first demonstration in Poitier featured the 
11 For details, see Glösel, Strobl, Bruns (2014). 
12 Glösel, Strobl, Bruns (2014), p. 56.
13 See Génération Identitaire (2013). 
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basic components that identitarian groups from different countries still use 
today: the lambda symbol, the “generation identity” label, black-and-yellow 
graphics, and references to a modern-day ‘Reconquista’. Although groups act 
independently on the national level, their visual style is maintained across 
national borders. The ‘movement’ thus copies the strategy of multinational 
corporations, which build global brands that are adopted nationally. The iden-
titarian brand, however, emphasizes pan-European values and identity.
The ‘movement’s’ common ideological and ‘corporate’ framework cannot 
make up for the national differences rooted in the far-right political scenes 
of each country. Fabian Virchow even doubts whether the identitarians can 
even be called a movement at all, as they possess only some of the key charac-
teristics necessary for defining a group as a social movement.14 Therefore, he 
suggests identitarianism is a proto-movement with an open future. In recent 
years, the organisation of the ‘movement’ has stabilised: stable local groups 
are connected under the banner of a national group, which in some countries, 
such as Austria, has an overall leader. International cooperation, however, 
seems to be rare and occurs only on an ad hoc basis.
Now I shall examine the special features of identitarianism in different 
countries. I will start in France, the cradle of this ‘movement’. The French 
organisation Génération Identitaire draws its ideology from the French New 
Right (see the next section), a connection French identitarians heavily mar-
ket. It is also the national group that most resembles a youth political organ-
isation. In fact, it was established as the youth wing of Bloc Identitaire at a 
time when this political group had ambitions of entering party politics. How-
ever, the success of Marine Le Pen’s National Front that began in 2011 moved 
Bloc Identitaire away from party politics; it changed strategies and sought to 
become a political association with a broader impact on society. Through their 
Maison de l’Identité cultural and social centres and various media and publish-
ing activities,15 they attempted to influence a wider audience in a ‘grassroots’ 
style. In 2016 the name of the organisation was changed from Bloc Identitaire 
to Les Identitaires, but the Génération Identitaire youth group remained a vital 
part. Apart from online activism, the youth organisation also held an annual 
summer school focused not only on political education, but also on practical 
political work (journalism, video recording and processing, banner making, 
etc.) and sport (boxing, self-defence). The French identitarian organisation 
14 Virchow (2015), p. 186.
15 In March 2021 the youth organisation was dissolved by the French government on the 
grounds of inciting people to hatred and hostility. For the Les Idenititaires, see https://
www.les-identitaires.com/ [accessed 01.05.2019] and the websites of their regional groups.
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featured two attributes that distinguish it from other groups. Firstly, it prides 
itself in its role as the initiator of the international ‘movement’. Secondly, it 
accentuates national symbols and stereotypes, highlighting historical figures 
such as Saint Genevieve, the patron saint of Paris, and making references to 
foods linked to national autostereotypes.
In Germany the Poitier protest and video found relatively wide popularity 
in 2012. Several identitarian groups were quickly founded. The first medialised 
protest was held in Frankfurt’s municipal library during “Intercultural Week”; 
several activists in Guy Fawkes masks disrupted an event, blaring hardbass 
music, unfurling a banner with the identitarian logo and holding up a sign 
reading “bassing out multiculti” (“Multikulti wegbassen”).16 Since then identi-
tarian groups have organised several protest performances that have received 
some media attention. Although these groups present themselves as a centrally 
organised movement with chapters in each Bundesland and national leaders,17 
the overall organisational structure is fragmented and decentralised with some 
groups acting relatively independently, whereas others are inactive.
The Austrian identitarian movement has many links to the German one. The 
leading Austrian identitarian author, Markus Willinger, was born in Austria 
but studies in Stuttgart. He is author of the key German-language manifesto 
Die identitäre Generation: Eine Kriegserklärung an die 68er (Generation Iden-
tity: A Declaration of War Against the ‘68ers).18 Identitarians in both coun-
tries also draw from a shared far-right scene that produces journals such as 
Sezession, Neue Freiheit, and Blaue Narzisse. However, the Austrian identitari-
ans, when compared to their German counterparts, are more active and better 
organised. The earliest groups were established in university cities with strong 
links to right-wing student clubs.19 Martin Sellner, a student at the University 
of Vienna and member of the far-right Burschenschaft Olympia student group, 
is the most visible national identitarian leader on a global scale.20 He is the 
co-leader of the Austrian branch and has attracted the most media coverage by 
far. Austrian identitarians have succeeded not only in establishing a network of 
regional contact persons, but also in organising several regular events, includ-
ing annual conferences, summer courses and numerous protest perfor mances. 
So called “annual reports” and regular press reports contribute to building up 
their ‘corporate identity’.
16 Glösel, Strobl, Bruns (2014).
17 See their website https://www.identitaere-bewegung.de/ [accessed 24.03.2021]. 
18 See Willinger (2014).
19 See Speit (2016).
20 See Weidinger (2016), p. 82. 
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Although a Swiss-German identitarian branch was launched in 2014, it is 
mostly inactive. Its activities are limited to copying German materials and 
presenting them on the internet and Facebook pages. Similarly, Swiss-French 
identitarians are heavily dependent on Génération Identitaire.
In Scandinavia, where there is an active and visible far-right scene that has 
been strongly influenced by French identitarian writers, identitarian groups 
lack the corporate style of continental European branches; their links to Ger-
man and French identitarians are more virtual then real. As Benjamin Teitel-
baum argues, the shift towards identitarianism is a part of a broader trend 
within the Nordic far-right scene, which has experienced the declining popu-
larity of the skinhead subculture in favour of intellectualism and engagement 
in the culture wars.21 He describes identitarianism as one of the three new 
nationalist streams in Scandinavia that has gradually evolved since 2004 under 
the influence of the French New Right ideology. After establishing an umbrella 
organisation, the National League, Scandinavian identitarians succeeded in 
developing three online platforms with international influence. From 2006 
to 2015 the Motpol multiblog was highly popular among activists around 
Europe.22 Around the same time the Wikipedia-like platform  Metapedia fea-
turing  identitarian content was established and soon translated into a num-
ber of languages.23 The third platform was the Nordisk.nu site featuring varied 
content, including discussion fora and music, with a peak of 20000 registered 
users. With the exception of Nordisk.nu, these platforms still exist today; in 
general the Scandinavian far-right scene still has a significant impact on other 
European groups mainly via Arktos Media, which publishes seminal works of 
the New Right and other ideologies, as well as fiction, history, and philosophy 
books in English. On the other hand, the complete absence of the Generation 
Identity corporate identity in Scandinavia is surprising at the very least and 
could be the result of older far-right activists dominating the scene.
In southern Europe, only Italy has an active identitarian scene. Since 2012 
several Generazione Identitaria groups have been established; they draw heav-
ily from their high-profile Rome-based neo-fascist CasaPound forerunners 
and also have French inspiration. They have adopted the identitarian corpo-
rate identity including the main themes of Reconquista, ethno-pluralism, and 
support for youth sport. Their protest style includes using stickers to express 
political messages in public spaces. For example, in 2018 they affixed stickers 
reading “islamizzazione” (Islamisation) to stop signs in the centres of many 
21 See Teitelbaum (2017).
22 See https://motpol.nu/ [accessed 23.03.2021].
23 See https://en.metapedia.org [accessed 23.03.2021].
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Italian cities.24 This strategy resembles the culture jamming strategies of 
anti-consumerist movements inspired by the French Situationist International 
from 1960s onwards.
In 2017 several groups emerged in other western and southern European 
countries, such as the Belgian Generatie Identiteit and the Danish Identi-
taer. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, the identitarian group was officially 
launched in 2017 and started to be active in 2018 and there is a sign of identi-
tarian activities in Spain in Catalonia.
There is a clear distinction in the transfer of identitarianism to postso-
cialist countries. National branches in the Czech Republic and Slovenia have 
been in continuous existence since 2013, put on regular public performances, 
and possess their own, partly specific, styles. Both groups were established 
in regions bordering German-speaking countries and were inspired by their 
neighbours’ activist scenes. The Hungarian group’s beginnings date back to 
2014, but it started to be more active in 2016. In 2017 when the identitarian 
“Defend Europe” campaign gained international attention, several other East-
ern European branches attempted to organize independent actions. The Pol-
ish Pokolenie Tożsamości is not stable, but it took part in a Polish nationalist 
demonstration in 2017. A Serbian group also organised several protests and 
debates in 2017.
If we examine European identitarianism as a whole, several regional dis-
tinctions emerge. Firstly, identitarianism is clearly centred in France and Ger-
many, countries that have inspired the Scandinavian and Eastern European 
far-right scenes. Additionally, in these two countries, where immigration 
is a hotly debated topic, far-right politics in general have seen a resurgence. 
In France there is a strong traditional right-wing party that supports smaller 
groups. In Germany the far right has only moved away from the edge of legality 
in recent years with the establishment of anti-immigrant political parties and 
movements (AfD, Pegida). Identitarian metapolitics offers a promising strat-
egy in this country with strong anti-hate-speech legislation.
Secondly, postsocialist countries either have been influenced by the Ger-
man-language activist scene (Czech Republic, Slovenia) or have their own 
far-right political groups that are part of the political mainstream (Poland, 
Hungary). The lack of a still active generation of ‘68ers’ and weakened liberal 
political currents also weaken the image of the alleged enemy of the identitar-
ian ‘movement’ there.
24 For their own presentation of this campaign, see https://generazione-identitaria.com 
[accessed 24.03.2021].
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Thirdly, Scandinavia and southern European countries have strong domes-
tic far-right scenes, and identitarian groups there do not follow the identitar-
ian corporate style; thus, active groups in Spain and Sweden tend to follow 
more their own national traditions of far-right politics.
4 Ideology Performed
The ideological roots of the identitarians lie in GRECE, a New Right group 
founded in 1968, and the ideas of its founders, Alain Benoist and Guillaume 
Faye. Benoist summarised his longstanding criticism of liberal egalitarianism 
in an eclectic and sometimes contradictory essay titled On Identity that was 
first published in French in the GRECE journal Éléments.25 It was later trans-
lated into English, German, and Italian and reworked into the book Nous et les 
Autres. Problématique de l’identité.26
He starts by establishing identity as a distinct modern concept present in the 
academic discourses of psychology, sociology, and social anthropology. Draw-
ing from Charles Taylor’s communitarian approach to identity, among other 
things, he sketches a narrative of the modernist notion of identity  beginning 
with the eighteenth-century philosophy of individualism, Descartes’s ratio-
nalism, and Locke’s philosophy of free will. With the presumed crisis of 
Western nation-states, which had long been modern man’s main source of self- 
recognition, the need for an alternative base for identity-building had come. 
He refers to contemporary minority identity politics (giving examples of gay, 
African-American, and ethnic movements) without context ualising them in 
the identity politics of NSMs, and ascribes them a non-universalist position as 
opposed to the modernist liberal notion of group interests. In this way he pres-
ents them as victims of the modern universalist claim that identity is a private 
matter. This interpretation allows him to claim that inherited differences must 
be accepted and considered part of one’s identity: belonging to a group “will 
only determine [one’s identity] if belonging to a nation or to any other entity 
is the decisive criterion for one’s thoughts and actions”.27 Here Benoist openly 
shifts the function of identity. It is no longer a problem of modern society that 
should be studied or something that minority groups struggling for recogni-
tion should grasp; it is one’s cultural heritage that needs to be ‘accepted’ in the 
face of modern liberal universalism.
25 See Benoist (2004a).
26 See Benoist (2006).
27 Benoist (2004b), p. 42. 
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It should be noted that Benoist also criticizes essentialism, which overesti-
mates the stability of identity and overlooks its constantly changing nature. In 
a section on the pathology of identity he mentions that even if the presence 
of an enemy gives a group a social identity, it is only a negative identity and 
not an expression of identity in its own right. He also calls for identities to be 
constructed in a dialogic process, based on one’s relationship with the other; 
thus identities should not mutually exclude each other. Behind this call for 
dialogue, however, lies the ethno-pluralist approach of the New Right, which 
states that the unique traditions and cultures of nations and ethnic groups 
have to be kept separate in order to preserve them.28 Benoist’s concept, which 
was highly popular among nationalists around Europe, is formulated as a pos-
itive notion of difference and inconspicuously but tellingly leaves aside the 
need to separate different identity groups implicit in it.
If Benoist’s argumentation clearly demonstrates continuity with NSM iden-
tity politics, the strategy identitarians have built on these ideological grounds 
transforms this continuity into the performative context of specific cultural 
and historical stereotypes. An illustrative example is the “Defend Europe” 
motto around which various campaigns were organised. In 2017 a nine-min-
ute video was made using materials from different national identarian groups 
with the goal of unifying European identitarianism.29 It begins with march-
ing young people prominently displaying the identitarian symbol before a 
title card reading “Defend Europe” appears; it then focuses on different coun-
tries, showing national symbols and each branch’s activities. The German part 
starts with shots of the Niederwald Monument and the Hermann Monument, 
which commemorate the nineteenth-century unification of Germany and the 
pre-Christian Germanic victory over Romans, respectively. This is followed by 
an intertitle reading “European people are dying because we are tolerant to 
those who don’t respect our identity.” The rest of the clip portrays various man-
ifestations and public performances arranged by country. The final shot is of 
the Acropolis in Athens with the identitarian lambda flag in the foreground. A 
title card reading “United for our children” then appears.
The video presents a disparate mix of images––shots from tourism videos 
depicting nationalist memorials and amateur footage from youth demonstra-
tions. It combines alarmist rhetoric with symbols of national glory and the 
determination to defend them. Hence, it refers to both national and European 
popular memory, the source of the identity endangered by a vaguely presented 
28 See Rydgren (2007), p. 244.
29 See Spotlight700 (2017).
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enemy. While Benoist writes about ‘accepting’ and ‘considering’ one’s own 
identity, this presentation conjures up ideas of active “defence” against an 
external enemy.
This “defence” rhetoric has been put into action during numerous protests 
and performances around Europe, such as the Paris Pride March (Marche de 
la journée de la fierté Parisienne). Since the early 2000s, a group called Paris 
Pride (Fierté Paris) has organised, alongside identitarian groups from Paris, 
evening-time torch-lit marches around the feast day of Saint Genevieve (Janu-
ary 3) under the slogans “Defend Paris” or “Defence of Paris” (“Défendons Paris” 
or “Défence de Paris”).30 The defence rhetoric is also present in speeches made 
during this event, where speakers compare Saint Genevieve’s defence of Paris 
against Attila the Hun to the present goal of defending it against Islamists.
Other minor performances using similar rhetoric have also been organised, 
usually in the form of banner drops in public spaces. One example would be a 
demonstration held by Czech identitarians –– the unfurling of a banner read-
ing “Our people first” (“Naši lidé na prvním místě”) at the National Gallery in 
Prague in front of Ai Weiwei’s Law of the Journey, an installation consisting 
of a large inflatable boat and inflatable figures wearing life vests. A photo was 
published on the Czech identitarians’ webpage with the caption “Our politics 
is not based on hate towards others but love for our own kind” (“Naše politika 
nevychází z nenávisti k ostatním, ale z lásky ke svým”).31 This statement demon-
strates the paradox of the identitarian position: they claim they care just about 
“our” identity, but through performance they communicate symbolic messages 
of war against an internal and external enemy.
The identitarian campaign that has received the most international atten-
tion was the Defend Europe “mission”; its aim was to block search-and-rescue 
ships operated by NGOs in the Mediterranean. This “mission” was launched 
in spring 2017 with a fundraising campaign targeting American and European 
far-right supporters. Identitarian activists hired the C-Star, which departed 
from Djibouti; however, there were severe complications with finding a place 
to dock on European shores. For example, Northern Cyprus detained the ship’s 
crew over accusations of people smuggling. The activists finally began their 
30 It has been reported on mostly by far-right media in recent years as for example TV 
Libertés, Paris Vox, Novopress and French branches of Russian international media as 
Sputnik France and Russia Today France. See also the organizers’ clips on YouTube, e. g. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amk5Y7bRS6E [accessed 24.03.2021]. 
31 See Generace Identity (2017). 
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mission in late July 2017.32 When the ship needed to be refuelled, it was blocked 
repeatedly by NGOs, local citizens, and the Tunisian and Maltese authorities; 
it ended up finishing its “mission” after one week of patrolling the seas. While 
having no impact on the activities of NGOs, the activists claimed that they 
were “monitoring” the situation and “trolling” NGOs using megaphones and 
banners reading “No way, you will not make Europe home” and “Stop human 
trafficking”.33 Nevertheless, they proclaimed the “mission” to be an “undispu-
table and total success”.34
Although this campaign lacked the references to cultural or historical iden-
tity of earlier demonstrations, it exemplifies the strategy identitarians use to 
transform the performance style of the old identity politics to meet their pur-
poses. Since the early 1970s, Greenpeace has been conducting maritime block-
ades, most famously by the Rainbow Warrior. Hiring out a ship, however, did 
not help the identitarians make any practical changes, but it did gain them 
international publicity. Taking their cue from the protest culture of the estab-
lished environmental movement, they have adapted it to their political agenda, 
in the process gaining attention in the media as the battleground of the cul-
tural wars.
The ideological background of this strategy lies in the concept of meta-
politics that was developed within the French New Right and is based on the 
 Gramscian notion of cultural hegemony. As Benjamin Teitelbaum notes, when 
New Right authors studied their political opponents it brought them to the 
strategy of “pulling themselves and likeminded activists out from the margins 
of public life and injecting their message into the mainstream”.35 These the-
orists, referencing Gramsci, claim that political change must begin with cul-
tural struggle. In a 2011 manifesto Guillaume Faye writes that “social diffusion 
of ideas and cultural values for the sake of provoking profound, long-term, 
political transformation” is needed.36 While ideologues were debating these 
ideas in relative isolation in France in the 1970s and 1980s, during the 1990s the 
concepts of ethnopluralism and metapolitics spread widely among national-
ists throughout Europe. In the 2000s they were introduced to the identitarian 
‘movement’, including its youth organisations.
32 This campaign was widely covered by international and national media in Europe. For a 
summary produced by the antiracist and antixenophobic think-tank Hope Not Hate, see 
Mulhall (2017). 
33 Oppenheim (2017).
34 Defend Europe (2017).
35 Teitelbaum (2017), p. 42. 
36 Faye (2011), p. 272.
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Although preserving culture is a crucial goal for identitarians, there is sur-
prisingly little discussion about the definition of culture in identitarian ideo-
logical texts. Based on observations of identitarian performances, ‘culture’ 
could cover everyday culture, pop culture, traditional folk culture, collective 
memory, art, and even the humanities or scholarship in general. I will now 
present different examples of how European identitarian groups, in their pro-
tests and per formances, have addressed culture in its various forms.
Identitarians perceive the internet and public space as crucial arenas of 
metapolitics. They use references to everyday mainstream culture to present 
their agenda through cultural auto- and heterostereotypes. In the 2000s the 
French Bloc Identitaire used stereotypes about French food to play the anti-im-
migrant card. Their most medialised performance protest was the distribution 
of soup de cochon or soup identitaire (“pork soup” or “identity soup”) to home-
less people in areas in French cities with Muslim and Jewish populations in the 
2000s. These activities peaked with a highly controversial performance that 
was planned for Paris in 2010 and titled “pork sausage and booze party” (“apéro 
saucisson et pinard”), which was banned by local police after protests by vari-
ous local communities.37
The erection of a memorial to “the victims of multiculturalism and Islamic 
terror” (as it was presented in the right-wing media) in Berlin in 2017 was a 
public performance that referred to cultural memory in multiple ways.38 This 
 performance was part of the German identitarians’ new strategy of establish-
ing single-purpose campaigns linked to topical issues discussed in the public 
arena.39 On the first anniversary of the massacre on Berlin’s Breitscheidplatz, 
where a truck was driven into the Christmas market in December 2016, city 
authorities dedicated a monument to this event at the site of the attack. While 
a ceremonial unveiling was taking place on Breitscheidplatz, several identi-
tarians constructed a concrete monument in front of the Brandenburg Gate. 
Activists set five concrete blocks there inscribed with the slogans “To the vic-
tims of Islamist terror” (“Den Opfern Islamistischen Terrors”) and “No victim is 
forgotten” (“Kein Opfer ist vergessen”) and the names of European cities where 
terrorist attacks had been committed in recent years. After several hours the 
blocks were removed by the police as they were placed there illegally.40 This 
37 Mestre and Monnot (2010). 
38 Berger (2017). 
39 They establish specific websites with short statements and clips without open references 
to the identitarian ‘movement’. See e. g. https://www.identitaere-bewegung.de/projekte/
kein-opfer-ist-vergessen/ [accessed 24.03.2021].
40 ‘Identitäre Bewegung’ (2017).
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performance act made at least three cultural references. Firstly, the image of 
concrete blocks resembles the Holocaust memorial that was erected nearby in 
2005. Hence, identitarians linked Islamists with the denounced Nazi regime to 
legitimize their protest. Secondly, candles, photos, and flowers were laid out, 
making the monument resemble an authentic mourning site. The audience 
of this act was supposed to perceive the place as an authentic place of mem-
ory. Thirdly, it reflected the media debate about the inscription on the official 
monument at Breitscheidplatz, where the word Islamist was not included in 
the official inscription. By including this word in their inscription the iden-
titarians targeted the alleged hypocrisy of the authorities. Even though this 
performance touched upon many controversial issues, it gained only minor 
publicity in the local media.
Identitarians also react to current political issues popular in the media to 
support their own agenda. For instance, in 2018 a group of German identitari-
ans started a media campaign in reaction to the #MeToo campaign against sex-
ual assault and harassment. It was called the 120 Decibel movement with the 
subtitle “the real outcry”, a reference to the volume of pocket alarms used by 
women in danger, and calls upon women to speak about their experience with 
“imported violence”.41 In addition to producing a mobilisation video, campaign 
organizers have also disrupted a panel discussion about the #MeToo campaign 
at the Berlinale film festival and put on a street theatre performance titled 
“Dead Girls Don’t Lie” (“Tote Mädchen lügen nicht”) in front of the parliament 
in Schleswig-Holstein. This campaign links depictions of fear and vulnerability 
with the need for speaking out on violence against women, an idea borrowed 
from the #MeToo campaign to legitimize the exaggeration of immigrant vio-
lence and arouse xenophobia.
The Czech identitarian ‘movement’ has most prominently protested by 
recontextualising meaning in contemporary art. Apart from the protest in the 
National Gallery mentioned above, the Czech identitarian group also stepped 
into the public realm by conducting an “aesthetic intervention” in Prague in 
November 2016. The subject of their protest was controversial Czech artist 
David Černý’s sculpture in the courtyard of the Kafka Museum. Activists cov-
ered Černý’s fountain − featuring the statues of two men urinating on a map 
of the Czech Republic − with a tarp, wrapped it up in black-and-yellow tape, 
and spread political leaflets around it. A report on the group’s website refers to 
the fountain as “quasi-art that is vulgar and offends the Czech nation”.42 Even 
41 The campaign’s website has been deleted since then.
42 Generace Identity (2016). 
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though Černý is well known for his provocative artworks in public spaces that 
question Czech autostereotypes, this performance had little public impact.
The identitarians have also co-opted traditional folk culture events, most 
notably in Germany. In 2016 and 2017 identitarians from Harz snuck into the 
carnival parade in the town of Derenburg masked as Spartan warriors, holding 
shields marked with the lambda sign and pushing a figure dressed as Angela 
Merkel, who was dishonouring the German flag.43 Even though the president 
of the carnival association was outraged, the organizers did nothing to stop 
them. The president argued that the carnival is not meant to promote any 
political group or party; its main aim is “fun”.44 The identitarians countered on 
their Facebook page by claiming that political statements are present at vari-
ous German carnivals. A similar performance was organised by the identitar-
ian group from Schwaben in January 2018, when activists disrupted a parade, 
masked in burkas and carrying a banner reading “Women rights movement 
Burkaria 2022, equal in rights, self-determining, free” (“Frauenrechtsbewegung 
Burkaria 2022, gleichberechtigt, selbstbestimmend, frei”). Local police investi-
gated this act because some of the carnival participants complained about the 
content of the leaflet that identitarians had distributed. The group proclaimed 
their demonstration to be a great success and added that “carnival, as a hun-
dred-year-old custom, is perfectly suitable for holding up a mirror to society 
and its elites”.45 Through “mirroring” mainstream cultural practices identitar-
ian ideology is put into action and presented to a local public.
5  Conclusions: The Europeanisation of Far-Right Youth Culture?
Identity as a category of practice has undergone a strange shift in recent 
decades. Rooted in the academic discourse of the 1950s and 1960s, it became 
a key concept in the anti-establishment radical movements of the 1970s and 
1980s, which opposed the mainstream discourse by raising the self-conscious-
ness of marginalised groups. New Right ideologues observed the success of 
these NSMs in the 1990s and gradually adopted an ideological framework with 
which they could fight against NSMs’ agendas on the same field. In the 2000s 
these thinkers offered a solid ideological foundation for a new generation of 
far-right activists fighting against the liberal and universalist mainstream. 
From their political opponents the far right adopted culture as the main 
43 Freie-Heimat (2017).
44 Volkstimme.de (2017). 
45 Widemann (2018).
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political battleground, and it adapted the left’s forms of protest that attract 
public attention. Use of the internet and social media and cultural perfor-
mances have been established as the key instruments for promoting political 
agendas. As NSM strategies were accepted by the mainstream, they eventually 
made their way to the far right, where the original focus on universal rights 
and identity politics came under attack by the identitarian ‘movement’, which 
claims to defend the cultural identity of the majority.
The new far right in the West has marked ‘68ers’ as the main enemy for 
having disrupted the traditional value system. Although identitarians present 
themselves as a pan-European movement, this ‘enemy’ is not equally strong in 
all European countries. Identitarianism has been most successful in France and 
German-speaking countries, whereas in Scandinavia, southern Europe it has not 
caught on so well. In the United Kingdom the identitarian groups have mobilised 
new activists and gained public presence as late as 2018. Interesting borderline 
cases are the Czech Republic and Slovenia. This European divide was further 
exacerbated by mass immigration to France and Germany during the 2015 crisis. 
In southern Europe only Italian identitarians have successfully organised their 
own demonstrations. Consequently, it supports the thesis that the new far-right, 
which sees its enemy in migrants and ‘68ers’, has been the most successful in 
European core countries. Follow-up research, however, is still necessary.
As identitarians oppose the modern liberal paradigm of history because it 
contradicts memory (as formulated by Pierre Nora), the frame of reference in 
national, European, and regional memory and mythology plays a very import-
ant role. Identitarians have fought on the “battle ground of culture” by carefully 
mobilising historical and cultural stereotypes as part of cultural performances 
that are attractive to the mainstream media. Modern notions of history as the 
scientifically reconstructed knowledge of the past have taken a back seat to a 
highly selective process of forming a collective memory.
Thus, the far-right identitarian ‘movement’ just mirrors the strategies 
 initially developed by new social movements in their pursuit of identity poli-
tics and universal rights, which gives this proto-movement rather limited per-
spectives for the future. Even though identitarians have successfully addressed 
a specific section of the youth in some European countries, their role in shift-
ing the general public discourse towards a xenophobic and nationalist agenda 
has been rather insignificant in comparison to that of established far-right 
political parties, which have grown in popularity in Europe since the immigra-
tion and economic crises.
Furthermore in 2018 and 2019 state authorities in France, Austria and Ger-
many started to check the legality of identitarians´ organisations and activities. 
Their vigilant and guarded strategy helped them to defend their position, for 
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example in a legal dispute in Graz, Austria, where they were accused of crimi-
nal association and hate speech but found not guilty. Throughout the year 2018 
the Facebook and Instagram pages of identitarian groups in various countries 
were banned, which was followed by establishing new ones which were again 
banned. With this new repressive wave, the identitarian ‘movement’ seems to 
be neither weakened nor reinforced and remains a marginal but stable part of 
the far-right political scenes throughout Europe.46
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CHAPTER 5
Re/nationalising EU-rope
National Identities, Right-Wing Populism, and Border- and Body-Politics
Ruth Wodak
 Abstract
In almost every EU member state, and beyond, we are experiencing the rise of far-
right/right-wing populist parties, accompanied by a virulent (nativist) nationalism 
and related body and border politics. Not only are borders being closed and walls con-
structed, in order to keep specific groups of people (refugees and immigrants) out; 
the programs also contain many elements of a patriarchal, anachronistic gender and 
family politics. This contribution discusses such nationalistic body politics which has 
become visible in many election campaigns and in, for example, the notorious ‘head-
scarf debate’, the ‘Burkini debate’, and the debate about the so-called ‘unwillingness 
to integrate’. The contribution then proceeds to a qualitative case study on how the 
Austrian Freedom Party has recontextualised the discourse about ‘Volk’ and ‘Volk-
skörper’ in recent years, in order to advance its populist, xenophobic and gendered 
agenda and to normalise their far-right political positions. Using the Discourse-His-
torical Approach (DHA), it discusses the complex strategies with which the party has 
combined backstage and frontstage approaches in this struggle for a new discursive 
hegemony.
1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, the transformation of the former Eastern bloc, Germany’s 
reunification, the enlargement and deeper integration of the European Union, 
together with persistent debates on immigration, migration and flight, focused 
attention on issues of historical and cultural (local, regional and national) 
identities. In the Member States of the European Union, the propagation of a 
new European identity was accompanied by the emergence or re-emergence 
of fragmented and unstable national and ethnic identities. Seemingly estab-
lished collective, national identities became contested political terrain and 
the focus of political struggles. Research focusing on the constitutive role of 
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discourse – and particularly language – in the construction of national identi-
ties1 has drawn on the valuable contributions in historiography, sociology and 
political science.2
More recently, threats and crises of various kinds have re-invigorated discus-
sions of national or cultural identities across Europe. Thus, nationalism, once 
declared an obsolete force, especially after World War II and the establishment 
of the European Union, has obviously returned with renewed vigour. Nation-
alism nowadays must be perceived as a global phenomenon – we encounter 
passionate nationalist movements everywhere, in Africa, South-America, the 
Middle East, Southern Europe, and in the successor states of the former Soviet 
Union. Frequently, new nationalisms emerge, tied to religious beliefs such 
as Islamic nationalism. Indeed, it seems to be the case that – despite an ever 
more unified and globalised world –, more borders and walls emerge, defining 
nation states and protecting them from dangers both alleged and real.
Of course, it is important to emphasize that the idea of the nation also 
encompasses inclusiveness and solidarity; simultaneously, belonging to a 
nation is frequently defined through ethnic and even racist categories (rather 
than, e.g., legal citizenship), thus excluding ‘Others’ who do not possess these 
characteristics and are marginalised as outsiders, as strangers. In this way, our 
identities are inherently tied to subjective feelings of belonging, on the one 
hand; as well as to imposed nationalistic, religious, and ethnic categories, on 
the other. Identity, in this complex struggle over belonging, is never static and 
defined once and for all; identity and identities are dynamic, fluid and frag-
mented; they can be renegotiated, according to socio-political and situative 
contexts as well as to more global social change and ideologically informed 
categories. Therefore, the German sociologist Theodor W. Adorno famously 
claimed, “[i]dentity is the prototype of ideology”.3
Taking Adorno’s words on board, the manifold ways in which national iden-
tity and nationalism are functionalised nowadays by right-wing populist and 
far-right parties with the aim of, on the one hand, constructing the ‘real’ Hun-
garians, Austrians, Dutch, Finns or British and, on the other, of excluding all the 
‘Others’ who are considered as not belonging to the respective group, should be 
investigated. Delanty and Kumar rightly emphasize that “nationalism is pres-
ent in almost every aspect of political community and social arrangements. 
It pervades the global and local dimensions and can even take cosmopolitan 
1 See Boukala (2013); Sicurella (2016); Krzyżanowski (2010); Wodak et al. (2009); Wodak (2011); 
(2015a), (2015b), (2017), (2019a). 
2 See Gellner (1983); Anderson (1995); Haller et al. (1996); Rathkolb (2011); Billig (1995).
3 Adorno (1966), p. 151.
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forms”.4 The ‘real’ people are defined not by having obtained citizenship to 
a specific country (ius soli), but by having been born to parents who already 
belonged to the respective country, i.e., by nativist principles or ius sanguinis.5 
If push comes to shove, this can even be extended to a vaguely defined cultural 
or even linguistic ‘belonging’. Such opinions are held not only by the far-right; 
they are endorsed more and more strongly by mainstream parties who – out of 
fear of losing votes – accommodate such right-wing populist views. Because of 
continuous fear mongering related to debates about security and the protec-
tion of ‘our social welfare’ (social welfare chauvinism), the ground has shifted.6
With respect to Austrian national identities, these developments have been 
the subject of discourse-analytical studies in the tradition of critical theory, 
leading to the elaboration of an interdisciplinary framework that integrates a 
form of Critical Discourse Studies with approaches from the political sciences, 
historiography and sociology in the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA).7 
Although the framework was developed through studies related to Austria, 
the theoretical as well as the general analytical findings provide insight 
into widespread patterns of discursive nationalisation within other modern 
nation-states. Indeed, the DHA has since been widely acknowledged by the 
international scientific community and applied in studies of the discursive 
construction of national identities in numerous countries in Europe and South 
America, but also in Canada, the USA, Australia and China.8
The year 2015 offered a unique opportunity to continue previous research 
into the discursive construction of Austrian identity and in so doing update the 
underlying approach and framework. On the one hand, 2015 was a significant 
commemorative year for Austria – 20 years of EU membership, 70 years since 
the Declaration of Independence, 60 years since the State Treaty, 200 years 
since the Congress of Vienna, 650 years for the University of Vienna. On the 
other hand, it presented the opportunity to trace the discursive construction 
of Austrian identities in a longitudinal perspective by connecting to previous 
work focused on and using similar data in 1995 and 2005. The resulting perspec-
tive spans analyses from over 20 years within the same theoretical framework, 
making it both unique and innovative in the international field of research.9
Firstly, this contribution reviews the underlying assumptions about the 
discursive construction of national identities and discusses the concepts of 
4 Delanty, Kumar (2006), p. 3.
5 See Mudde (2007).
6 See Wodak (2015b).
7 See Wodak (2011); Wodak (2015a); Reisigl, Wodak (2009).
8 See for example Blackledge (2009); Ricento (2003). 
9 See De Cillia, Wodak, Rheindorf, Lehner (2020). 
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‘nation’ and ‘national identity’. Secondly, I briefly present the Discourse-Histor-
ical Approach, including recent conceptual and methodological adaptations. 
I then thirdly focus on the Austrian far-right populist party FPÖ, both back-
stage and frontstage, and its nationalist nativist ideologies; and elaborate some 
interdependences of extreme-right positioning on backstage and frontstage 
while deconstructing the visions of an Austrian nativist national identity.10
2 National Identity, Collective Memory, and Body Politics
Nations, following Anderson, are constructs represented in the minds, memo-
ries and social practices of nationalised subjects as sovereign and limited polit-
ical units.11 Nations, like all other communities that are larger than face-to-face 
groups, constitute what Anderson calls “imagined communities”. Nonethe-
less, they can function as very influential guiding ideas with sometimes grave 
and destructive consequences. Members of even the smallest nations do not 
know the majority of their fellow-citizens, do not meet, do not hear from one 
another. And yet they are convinced of belonging to a unique national com-
munity, not least because they largely read the same newspapers, watch the 
same TV programmes or listen to the same radio programs, etc. Nations are 
perceived as limited by boundaries and thereby cut off from the surrounding 
nations, because no nation identifies with humanity in its entirety.
We argue that such national identities – conceived as specific forms of 
social identities – are not in any biologist or culturalist sense essential or 
naturally given, but are discursively produced, reproduced, transformed and 
destructed by means of language and other semiotic systems. National iden-
tities are constructed, inter alia, by emphasising a common history, and thus 
through remembrance and memory. Maurice Halbwachs’ notion of “collective 
memory” denotes the selective recollection of past events which are thought 
to be important for the members of a specific community.12 This notion 
allows researchers to trace a connection between often abstract discourses on 
national identities, myths, symbols and rituals of everyday life,13 or popular 
culture, increasingly in the form of “banal nationalism”.14 Collective memory in 
Halbwachs’ sense maintains historical continuity by recalling specific elements 
10 Rheindorf, Wodak (2019).
11 See Anderson (1985), p. 15.
12 Halbwachs (1985). 
13 See Breuss, Liebhart, Pribersky (1995), p. 553.
14 Billig (1995).
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from the archive of historical memory. This concept is of particular interest for 
an analytical approach to the discursive construction of national identities, 
especially regarding the question of which events are selected for a “national 
history” and how they are narrativised by a nation’s representatives (e.g. the 
head of state), institutions (e.g. courts, schools), the media, and private citi-
zens in constructing a shared history, present and future.15 The fact that such 
history is constructed through discursive practices has been described as the 
“anthropological primacy” of language:
[…] language becomes the primary factor without which no recollection 
and no scientific trans position of this recollection is possible. The anthro-
pological primacy of language for the representation of past history thus 
gains an epistemological status, for it must be decided in language what 
in past history was necessitated by language and what was not. In anthro-
pological terms, any ‘history’ constitutes itself through oral and written 
communication between generations that live together and convey their 
own respective experiences to one another.16
Approaches in cultural studies and sociology emphasize the role everyday life 
and culture play in the construction of nations and national identities. Stuart 
Hall describes nations not only as political constructs, but also as “systems of 
cultural representations” that allow an imagined community to be interpreted 
in meaningful ways.17 People are not only citizens by law, they also partici-
pate in creating the imaginary of ‘their’ nation as represented in a common 
national culture. Through such self-representation – which has a counterpart 
in representations of other nations – the symbolic community of a nation is 
discursively constructed.
A national culture is a discourse, a way to construct meanings which 
influence and organize both our actions and our perceptions of our-
selves. National cultures construct identities by creating meanings of ‘the 
nation’, with which we can identify; these are contained in stories that are 
told about the nation, in memories which link its present to its past and 
in the perceptions of it that are constructed18
15 See Berger, Wodak (2018).
16 Koselleck (2002), p. 27.
17 Hall (1994), p. 200.
18 Hall (1994), p. 201.
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Beyond being simply part of culture, languages have often played a crucial 
role in the formation of modern nation states such as France, glossing over 
or actively repressing existing multilingualism through legislation, education 
and administrative practice. With respect to the construction of distinctive-
ness and homogeneity of national languages, language policy remains a key 
field of social and political action.
Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus provides a crucial perspective in the 
sense that national identities can be regarded as a sort of habitus, that is to 
say as a complex of common ideas, concepts or perception schemes, i.e. (a) 
related emotional attitudes intersubjectively shared within a specific group as 
well as (b) similar behavioural dispositions, which are (c) internalised through 
‘national’ or ‘nationalising’ socialisation.19 The national subject, in other words, 
is discursively produced. In the case of the Austrian nation, the ideas and sche-
mata in question refer to the imagined concept of the homo Austriacus (and 
the femina Austriaca), the ‘quintessential’ or ‘typical Austrian’.
In as much as the modern nation state is a territorial state and seeks to define 
its extension within clear-cut geographic borders, the discursive construction 
of national identities relates to notions of home, homeland or ‘Heimat’. What 
are constructed as ‘natural’ and ‘agricultural’ landscapes as well as the built 
environment thus constitute a type of national body that often supports iden-
tification, feelings of belonging and pride. Insofar as this body also always has 
a more or less extensive past, this dimension of national identity may relate 
closely to the shared past and may or may not be constructed as co-extensive 
with a national culture and/or language.
In terms of all of the above – national past, culture, language, body and 
self-representation – the discursive construction of national identities is 
always concomitant with the construction of difference/distinctiveness and 
uniqueness.20 In short, to be discursively constructed as Austrian may more 
or less strongly rely on contrast, even opposition to constructions of other 
national identities (e.g. German) with respect to, inter alia, the national narra-
tive, culture or language.
As internalised habitus as well as discursive construction, the reproduction 
and transformation of national identities is always also a question of power 
relations and hegemony. The constructivist perspective outlined above empha-
sizes that there is no such thing as the one and only national identity in an essen-
tialising sense, but rather that different identities are discursively constructed, 
19 See Bourdieu (1994).
20 See Hall (1994); Hall (1996); Wodak (2017).
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co-constructed and negotiated, according to specific socio-political and situ-
ational contexts, that is according to the social field, the situational setting of 
the discursive act and the topic being discussed. In other words, national iden-
tities are not completely consistent, stable and immutable. Rather, as already 
mentioned above, they are dynamic, fragile, fluid, and often incoherent. How-
ever, previous work has shown that the relations (of transfer and contradic-
tion) between identity constructions offered by political elites, the media and 
everyday discourses are not arbitrary or random but rather purposeful and 
contextually determined.
Border and body-politics are part of national identity politics and are now 
once again increasingly defined by the national language (the mother tongue), 
by ethnicity and culture, transcending the political borders of the nation 
state.21 Instead of cosmopolitanism, post-nationalism, a European citizenship 
and the common European language policies which promote multilingualism, 
we seem to be witnessing a re/inventing of traditional, parochial, closed nation 
states. Such tendencies have also been observed by Skendorovic who – while 
analysing the Swiss right-wing populist party’s (SVP) policies and history – con-
cludes that “the radical right’s conception of nationhood and national identity 
offers patterns of interpretation premised on the idea that sociocultural, polit-
ical, or historical groups are based on natural distinctions.”22 Griffin accord-
ingly concludes that the radical right “takes on highly culture-specific forms, 
largely because it draws on a nationalist myth whose contents are unique to 
each cultural tradition”.23 Obviously, the concept of ‘mother tongue’ relates to 
nativist body politics of viewing and conceptualising the nation as a body with 
the mother tongue symbolising the national language.24
Thus, in contrast to discursive and social constructivist approaches to 
nationalism elaborated above, ‘nation’ as defined by far-right populist parties 
is a limited and sovereign community that exists and persists through time 
and is tied to a specific territory (space), inherently and essentially constructed 
through an in/out (member/non-member) opposition and its out-groups. 
Access to national identity/membership is defined via heritage and ancestry, 
thus via ‘blood’.25 Such a notion of nation and nationalism is closely tied to 
concepts underlying racism; however, it is important to emphasize here that 
neither is racism necessarily nationalist, nor nationalism necessarily racist. For 
21 See Wodak (2015a); Rheindorf, Wodak (2018).
22 Skendorovic (2009), p. 18f.
23 Griffin (1999), p. 316. 
24 See Musolff (2010). 
25 See de Cleen (2012), p. 97.
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example, the connection to a territorial space must be perceived as a structural 
component of nationalism, but not of racism. While racism as ideology and 
practice depends on the arbitrary definition of groups and their fallaciously 
generalised negative characteristics, due to biological categories, nationalism 
need not. Nevertheless, the conceptual boundaries are certainly blurred.26
Four assumptions serve as foundations for this analysis:
1. Identities are always re/created in specific contexts. They are co-con-
structed in interactive relationships. They are usually fragmented, 
dynamic and changeable, but not mutually exclusive – everyone has 
multiple identities.
2. Identity construction always implies inclusionary and exclusionary pro-
cesses, i.e., defi nitions of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. Linguistic competence of the 
national language (the ‘mother tongue’) has acquired the status of a gate-
keeper in posing obstacles for migrants.
3. Identities that are individual and collective, national and transnational 
are also re/produced and manifested symbolically, in many genres, while 
drawing on a range of linguistic/pragmatic/rhetorical/narrative and 
argumentative resources.
4. Far-right populist nationalism inherently endorses an essentialised con-
cept of nationalism expressed in ever more restrictive (nativist) body 
politics (Kulturnation). Mainstream political parties accommodate more 
and more to essentialised national body politics to keep their electorate 
from voting for far-right parties and their values; in other words, far-right 
ideologies become normalised.
3 The Discourse‑Historical Approach
In my case study below, I adopt the discourse-historical approach (DHA). This 
approach provides a vehicle for looking at latent power dynamics and the 
range of potentials in agents, because it integrates and triangulates knowledge 
about historical, intertextual sources and the background of the social and 
political fields within which discursive events are embedded. Moreover, the 
DHA distinguishes between three dimensions which constitute textual mean-
ings and structures: the topics which are spoken/written about; the discursive 
strategies employed; and the linguistic means that are drawn upon to realize 
both topics and strategies.
26 See Reisigl, Wodak (2001); de Cleen (2012).
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The DHA is widely applied in research on identity politics, populism, dis-
criminatory rhetoric, and so forth, and allows the systematic relating of macro- 
and mezzo-levels of contextualisation to the micro-level analyses of texts. Such 
analyses consist primarily of two levels, an ‘entry-level analysis’ focusing on the 
thematic dimension of texts, and an ‘in-depth analysis’ which deconstructs the 
coherence and cohesion of texts in detail. The general aim of the entry-level 
thematic analysis is to map out the contents of the texts being analysed. The 
key analytical categories of thematic analyses are discourse topics, which, “con-
ceptually summarize the text, and specify its most important information”.27 
The in-depth analysis, on the other hand, is informed by the research questions 
and consists of the identification of the genre (e.g., TV interview, policy paper, 
election poster, political speech or homepage), analysis of the macro-structure 
of the respective text, the strategies of identity construction and of the argu-
mentation schemes, as well as of other means of linguistic realisation it uses.
‘Discourse’ is defined as follows, emphasising argumentation (i.e. people 
with different opinions, attitudes and ideologies speaking and arguing about 
the same macro-topic) and the distinction between ideology and discourse as 
constitutive factors from the outset:
[…] a cluster of context-dependent practices that are situated within spe-
cific fields of social action; socially constituted and socially  constitutive; 
related to a macro-topic; linked to the argumentation about validity 
claims such as truth and normative validity, involving several social 
actors who (may) have different points of view.28
In the DHA, two further concepts emerge as salient for analysing politically 
salient phenomena: first, ‘intertextuality’ refers to the linkage of all texts to 
other texts, both in the past and in the present. Such links can be established 
through continued reference to a topic or to its main actors; through reference 
to the same events as other texts; or through the reappearance of a text’s main 
arguments in another text as well as certain syntactic (grammatical) and also 
rhetorical schemes and other tropes. The second important process is labeled 
‘recontextualisation’. By taking an argument, a topic, a genre, or a discursive 
practice out of context and restating/realising it in a new context, we first 
observe the process of de-contextualisation, and then, when the respective 
27 Van Dijk (1991), p. 113
28 Reisigl, Wodak (2009), p. 89.
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element is implemented in a new context, of recontextualisation. The element 
then acquires a new meaning, because meanings are formed in use.
Conceptually, the empirical event under investigation is viewed as a phe-
nomenon that has discursive manifestations across four heuristic levels of 
context (see Table 5.1. below).29
4. Case Study: Recontextualising the ‘Volk’ and the ‘Volkskörper’
The core notions of the study, as in previous work, are
1. the interdiscursively related construction of the so-called Homo Austria-
cus/Homo Externus,
2. the narration and construction of a shared political past,
3. a shared culture,
4. a shared political present and future, and
5. the discursive construction of a “national body”.30
29 See Wodak (2011).
30 See for example Wodak et al. (2009).
table 5.1  Four-level Context-Model
1. The immediate text of the communicative event in question (a particular detailed 
transcript of talk; a specific newspaper article; a specific speech);
2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, 
genres and discourses (e.g. conversations with the same  participants in 
different settings);
3. The extra linguistic social (e.g. physical gestures, facial expressions, postures, 
etc.) and environmental (e.g. room size and layout) variables and institutional 
frames (e.g. latent or formal hierarchical structure, informal power relations in 
a friendship, cultural constraints and conventions, etc.) of a specific ‘context of 
situation’;
4. The broader socio-political and historical context which discursive practices  
are embedded in and related to (e.g., knowledge derived from ethnography,  
study of the relationships in, and aspects of, the broader social and  
cultural macro-environment over time that influence the text, talk and 
conversations).
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The integration of the first and fifth categories – the Homo Austriacus and 
the national body – characterise the discourse of the far- and extreme right in 
Austria, becoming the focal point of discursive practices and argumentative 
patterns, serving related constructions of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Such constructions 
emphasise national uniqueness and (inner) homogeneity and downplay het-
erogeneity and difference within the population. Simultaneously, they also 
focus on differences to members of other nations, often resorting to stereotyp-
ing and singularisation. Here, I present some extreme right elements within 
the far right. Indeed, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) must be distinguished 
from other far-right populist parties not only in some of its ideological posi-
tions, but in terms of its history and ties to National Socialism.31
The national body is constructed in terms of a nation’s territory, its ‘nat-
ural’ landscape as well as its built environment (e.g., architecture, sites and 
material art), its institutions (e.g., executive, legislative, judiciary) and its 
national ‘heroes’ (in, e.g., politics, the military, sports or arts). Previous studies 
have linked constructions of the national body to the symbols and practices of 
‘banal nationalism’ as identified by Michael Billig:32 Abstract and seemingly 
apolitical, naturalised figurations of the nation lend themselves particularly 
well to everyday nationalisms. At this point, the link between the national body 
(i.e., its salient constructions in banal nationalism) and the construction of a 
Homo Nationalis should be explored in more detail, in particular the  gender 
and body politics. It is here that the traditional extreme-right imaginary of 
the ‘Volk’, imagined as ideal male and female bodies, their roles and relation-
ships, is articulated most clearly. Below, I analyse continuities and changes of 
such extreme-right ideologies in the intertextual and interdiscursive relation-
ships across genres and publics, most prominently in popular culture which 
 recontextualises and propagates the far-right’s ideal subject. To do so, I also 
analyse some of the backstage and frontstage performances of the contempo-
rary far-right as well as the historical continuities with National Socialist rhet-
oric and imaginaries, while providing a cross-sectional analysis of the fields of 
politics (party politics, part-affiliated organisations and media) and popular 
culture (music).
31 Leading members of the party have been investigated for and convicted of activities such 
as denying the Holocaust, violating the Verbotsgesetz or Prohibition Act of 1947, which 
banned the Nazi Party and aimed to suppress any potential revival of Nazism. See e. g. 
Engel, Wodak (2013).
32 See Billig (1995).
106 Wodak
Thus, one can trace continuities not only historically but across fields, 
showing how far-right and extreme right positions are recontextualised from 
closed-door meetings (i.e. backstage politics) as well as unofficial handbooks 
and pamphlets to election campaigns (posters, speeches, TV debates, i.e. front-
stage politics) and ultimately normalised in popular culture. The advantage of 
such a cross-sectional approach is that it reveals the intertextual links between 
backstage and frontstage, i.e. the penetration of extreme-right ideology into 
everyday mainstream discourses as part of an ongoing process of normalisa-
tion. From the latter perspective, normalisation describes how ideologies are 
incorporated into the mainstream – not only of politics but of popular culture 
and other fields as well – through recontextualisations and resemiotisations, 
usually moving from backstage to frontstage, and across fields as well as genres.
4.1  The Far- and Extreme Right in Austria: Tracing the History of  
the FPÖ
The history of the FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) dates back to the 
years after World War II and the political situation  created by the four post-
war Allied Powers until the ‘Staatsvertrag’ (State Treaty) of 1955. Between 1945 
and 1955, the Allies supported the development of a bi-polar political scene by 
encouraging both the cooperation of socialist-democratic movements on the 
left and the formation of what would later evolve into the Social Democratic 
Party of Austria (SPÖ; Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs), and the merging 
figure 5.1 The normalisation of extreme-right ideology (adapted from Wodak 2019a, p.16)
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of various conservative and pro-clerical movements into the Austrian People’s 
Party (ÖVP; Österreichische Volkspartei). Simultaneously, the forerunner of the 
FPÖ, the Association of Independents (VdU; Verband der Unabhängigen) was 
formed by incorporating political movements comprised of “old Nazis, Ger-
man nationalists and a fair number of liberals”,33 who were deliberately pre-
vented from joining either of the two mainstream parties of the left and right.
In the 1949 parliamentary elections, the VdU won 12 per cent and soon 
called for “the abolition of all laws governing de-Nazification procedures”.34 
Their argument implied that the real victims were not those persecuted by 
the Nazi regime, but those who had profited by acquiring Jewish property and 
former members of the NSDAP. The VdU thus used a “grotesque conception of 
fascism […] to attack the de-Nazification policies of the government and to 
equate Nazism with other political systems”.35 Hence, the VdU allowed for a 
revival of Austrian pro-fascist sentiment and made it a significant element of 
the country’s political makeup for coming years.
Following an internal crisis of the VdU, the FPÖ was established in 1955/56 
“as a German nationalist party of the far right, in which former, seriously 
incriminated National Socialists took the leading functions”.36 Indeed, the first 
FPÖ leader, Anton Reintaller, had been a high-ranking member of the Austrian 
NSDAP and the SS, but also held the position of Minister of Agriculture in the 
fascist Austrian government of Seyß-Inquart in 1938. All this made the FPÖ the 
successor to the Austrian NSDAP in all but its name.37
When Friedrich Peter (another former SS member) took over the FPÖ in 
1958, the party’s agenda did not change significantly. However, throughout the 
1960s, the drive to moderate the FPÖ could be observed when both liberal and 
national views were given a voice. In 1970, the newly elected Chancellor Bruno 
Kreisky (SPÖ) formed a minority government with the support of the FPÖ 
and – to the dismay of many and in spite of strong opposition from within his 
own party – appointed four former NSDAP members to ministerial posts. This 
confirmed the FPÖ’s participation in mainstream Austrian politics, signalling 
“that the SPÖ, to gain power, could do business with former Nazis in a prag-
matic way”.38 In 1986, the FPÖ’s national convention witnessed a coup led by 
33 Schiedel, Neugebauer (2002), p. 16; see Rheindorf, Wodak (2019) for an extensive overview 
of the FPÖ’s history.
34 Manoschek (2002), p. 7.
35 Schiedel, Neugebauer (2002), p. 16.
36 Manoschek (2002), p. 6.
37 Manoschek (2002), p. 7.
38 Wodak et al. (1990), p. 290.
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Jörg Haider, who became the new chairman of the party. Haider’s rise marked 
the turn of the majority of the FPÖ to radical and nationalist/nativist views. 
Employing strongly antisemitic, anti-foreigner and revisionist slogans, Haider 
led the FPÖ to successful elections at all levels. In the national election of 1999, 
the FPÖ received 26.91% and, for the first time in its history, took second place. 
After relatively brief negotiations, the FPÖ signed a coalition agreement with 
the ÖVP (which had achieved third place) and entered the federal government 
in early 2000. This was the first time a far-right populist party came to power 
in an EU member state.
Although sanctions against the Austrian government were eventually intro-
duced by the 14 other EU member states, it was not this external pressure but 
the controversial performance of the ÖVP-FPÖ government which pushed 
the FPÖ into gradual decline. At the next parliamentary elections on 1 Octo-
ber 2006, the FPÖ (headed by Heinz-Christian Strache, a former confidante of 
Haider) and the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ, a splinter group headed by 
Haider) managed a combined 15.1%. Thus, after six years in government, the 
FPÖ returned to its oppositional role until the FPÖ again formed a coalition 
government with the ÖVP on 19 December 2017 after the national election on 
11 October 2017, where they achieved third place with 26% of the votes.
4.2 The Backstage: Programmatic Utterances and Party Programs39
No public figure represents extreme-right ideology within the FPÖ better than 
Johann Gudenus, former head of the FPÖ’s Vienna chapter and the FPÖ’s for-
mer party whip in parliament (2018–2019). Gudenus studied law in Vienna 
and Russian in Moscow, and completed an MA at the Diplomatic Academy 
of Vienna. He opposed the EU’s sanctions against Russia, and held a sceptical 
stance towards the EU. Gudenus (whose father was convicted of Holocaust 
denial) is well-known for his explicit racist, nativist, antisemitic and homopho-
bic utterances on the backstage of the party’s activities which have frequently 
been leaked to the press and caused multiple scandals.40
Addressing closed publics, Gudenus has often voiced extreme right positions 
in surprisingly explicit terms. This has included, for example, racial policies 
for the so-called ‘purity of Europe’: “Europe is the cradle of the white race. We 
demand a Europe-wide, coordinated policy for the family and reproduction, 
39 See Rheindorf, Wodak (2019) for more details of the FPÖ’s gender, identity and body 
 politics and its success in penetrating popular culture.
40 See Pollak (2015); Wodak (2019a). After the so-called ‘Ibiza-Scandal’, Gudenus was 
excluded from the FPÖ (see Wodak 2020 for details).
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including a commitment to the fact that Europe is white.”41 It also included 
defamation of political opponents with antisemitic slurs: “If you mix red and 
green together, you get yellow. And yellow is the colour of Judas, it is the colour 
of treachery.”42 And it included a clear denial of basic human rights (“Asylum 
is not a human right”),43 as well as homophobic, conspiracy theory-based pro-
jections of a doomed nation: “The powerful European lobby of homosexuals 
wants absolute equality for homosexuals and lesbians. It is hard to imagine 
where all this will lead.”44 Due to his former high-ranking position and frequent 
appearances in television debates and interviews, Gudenus’ more public per-
formances directly recontextualised backstage agenda into frontstage policies.
Gudenus’ utterances bear a strong similarity to the party-affiliated publi-
cation Für ein freies Österreich [For a Free Austria], written by Michael How-
anietz, a local FPÖ politician.45 Albeit not officially party doctrine, the book 
also closely mirrors the Handbuch freiheitlicher Politik [Handbook of FPÖ Poli-
tics], drafted by the party leadership to serve as an internal guideline for party 
 functionaries regarding key policy areas. The focus here is – just very briefly 
– on the former publication as it constitutes a less constrained articulation of 
far-right and extreme-right ideologies, free of the rhetorical limitations that 
even the FPÖ, as an established party, should follow according to post-war 
conventions.
As Für ein freies Österreich is accompanied by endorsing forewords written 
by then FPÖ’s chairman, Hans-Christian Strache, and current chairman, Nor-
bert Hofer who stood as candidate for Austrian President in 2016 and was min-
ister for infrastructure and transport in the coalition government (2018–2019), 
it is obvious that the party leadership agreed with the ideologies propagated in 
41 Tangente 3/2004, magazine of the FPÖ’s youth organisation “Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend” 
under chairman Johann Gudenus. This and all subsequent translations by Markus Rhein-
dorf and Ruth Wodak. See Rheindorf, Wodak (2019) for more examples, a comprehensive 
overview and in-depth analysis.
42 Johann Gudenus at a rally in 2011, reported by the FPÖ’s newspaper Neue Freie Zeitung, 
27.10.2011, p. 8. See report and analysis, available on-line at https://www.stopptdierechten.
at/2011/10/31/gudenus- und-die-farbe-des-judas/ [accessed 26.04.2019]. 
43 Johann Gudenus, press release on 19.12.2014, available online at www.ots.at/presse-
aussendung/OTS_20141219_OTS0076 [accessed 01.07.2017]. 
44 Johann Gudenus in a speech given in Moscow on 11 September 2014. See report in the 
weekly Profil, 13 September 2014, available on-line at https://www.profil.at/oesterreich/
fpoe-moskau-gudenus- eu-usa-nato-homosexuellenlobby-377959 [accessed 26.04.2019], 
and the interview with Johann Gudenus after his return from Moscow in the broadsheet 
Kurier, 19 September 2014 [accessed 26.04.2019]. 
45 See Rheindorf, Wodak (2019).
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this text. However, on frontstage (see below), these ideologies and statements 
are backgrounded. Indeed, after the Austrian national election on 15 October 
2017 and the establishment of a coalition government between Sebastian Kurz’ 
Neue ÖVP and the FPÖ, Hans-Christian Strache attempted to perform a soft 
version of the FPÖ’s programmatic  elements, via indirect and coded language 
as well as by denial of past explicit discriminatory utterances and propositions. 
However, this attempt frequently failed as the many breaches of taboos (in 
respect to Nazism, antisemitism, homophobia, and so forth) illustrate.46
In sum, the programmatic text (which has been extensively analysed else-
where)47 defines itself as a call for “an autonomous, independent country “, i.e. 
independent of transnational organisations, international law, international 
economy, the exchange of goods, which are all listed as ways in which Austria 
is being controlled by others.48 Significantly, the various argumentative strands 
of the book – all ultimately intended to save Austria from an alleged imma-
nent doom – are linked to the extreme-right’s ideologies and discursive con-
structions of the national body and related nativist body politics.49 In this way, 
the book calls for “an independent country that depends on its many existent 
strengths, its nature, its infrastructure and the productive power of its people”.50
In the apocalyptic worldview propagated throughout the book, migrants are 
perceived as a threat precisely because they allegedly possess stronger identi-
ties: Their “assault” or slow invasion to “demographically displace” the Austrian 
people makes the latter “a species on the brink of extinction”.51 The gravest 
threat to the nation, however, is identified in an imagined decaying national 
pride: Honour and loyalty to the community of the nation are the foundation 
for loyalty and faithfulness in the heterosexual relationship.52
In this way, the ultimate Feindbild emerges: women and men who have 
adopted new life styles and gender roles – integrating new family patterns, 
mobility, diversity, career, and shared child care. White male patriarchy is per-
ceived as being under threat, simultaneously endangered by the alleged inva-
sion of the so-called ‘cultural other’.
46 See Wodak (2018); Wodak (2019b).
47 See Rheindorf, Wodak (2019).
48 See Howanietz (2013), p. 6.
49 See e. g. Musolff (2010); Wodak (2015a).
50 Howanietz (2013), p. 7.
51 Howanietz (2013), p. 19f.
52 Howanietz (2013), p. 31. “Ehre” and “Treue”, the two concepts the book praises in this con-
text, formed the core of the SS motto “Meine Ehre heißt Treue”, which is banned under the 
Austrian Verbotsgesetz. See Engel, Wodak (2013).
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Comparing this inner weakness to the external threat identified as migrants, 
the book finally offers two alternative options for the future: The “true” Aus-
trian “Volk” will, the FPÖ argues, employing the typical and traditional racist 
discourse about parasites, either slowly degenerate and die off, “eaten from the 
inside like wasp larvae eat maggots”;53 or current developments will lead to 
a violent “civil war”,54 thus triggering fear and anxiety. The danger scenarios 
are manifold; uncertainty, fear, and anger are produced and reproduced, and 
fallacious arguments are provided as legitimation. The author clearly prefers 
the latter, arguing that like any conflict it would be “productive” and “awaken 
potential”.55 Either way, he concludes, “Europe will burn.”56
4.3 Frontstage: The Extreme Right in Election Campaigns
Since Heinz-Christian Strache took control of the FPÖ in 2005, frontstage activ-
ities of the party – particularly in election campaigns and social media – have 
seen an obvious and clear increase of banal nationalism: displaying the Aus-
trian flag, singing the national anthem, and showing an abundance of other 
symbols of national pride.
As argued by Forchtner et al., the manifold patterns of media communica-
tion and the clever and ubiquitous appropriation of media agenda and frames 
employed in the recent success of populist-right and extreme-right parties can-
not be dismissed or marginalised as a mere coin cidence.57 As Bos, van der Brug 
& de Vreese illustrate, successful far-right populist leaders have actually man-
aged to achieve a delicate balance between, on the one hand, appearing inno-
vative and anti-establishment, and, on the other, authoritative and  legitimate; 
thus they counter the élites but do not oppose the liberal democratic system 
per se.58 Frequently, this is achieved by scandalisation and the intentionally 
and continuously provoked dynamic of the so-called far-right populist perpe-
tuum mobile,59 or by what labels as “dramatisation”, i.e., “the need to generate 
tension in order to build up support for the party […] by denouncing the trage-
dies that would befall the community if it were to be deprived of its defenses”.60
53 Howanietz (2013), p. 117.
54 Howanietz (2013), p. 121.
55 Howanietz (2013), p. 113.
56 Howanietz (2013), p. 134.
57 See Forchtner et al. (2013).
58 See Bos, van der Brug, de Vreese (2011).
59 See Wodak (2013a); Wodak (2013b); Wodak (2015a), p. 19f; Wodak (2020), p. 25f.
60 Albertazzi (2007), p. 335.
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Scandalisation also implies manifold references to the allegedly charismatic 
leaders of such parties, who construct themselves as saviours, problem solv-
ers and crisis managers, which may lead voters to have more confidence in 
the effectiveness of the politics of the populist far-right. The way the tension 
between extraordinariness and being ‘one of us’, i.e., being ‘authentic’, was 
cleverly managed by former FPÖ leader Jörg Haider on front stage and further 
developed by his successor, HC Strache (as he was branded) in many different 
publics and genres,61 from TV interviews to snippets caught on video while 
dancing in a disco, from pamphlets and manifestos to posters and comic book-
lets, all of which are accessible on HC Strache’s homepage62 and disseminated 
via Facebook.63
Indeed, the FPÖ maintains its Web presence via the main party web page 
(www.fpoe.at) and a party-related think-tank (www.fpoe-bildungsinstitut.at). 
Members of the FPÖ also operate a blog called “Uncensored” (www.unzensuriert.
at)64 and an official YouTube channel (www.youtube.com/ Oesterreichzuerst) 
called “Austria First”, a name employed in many campaigns and major referenda 
undertaken by the party in both the 1990s and 2000s. The YouTube Channel 
utilizes a variety of genres, ranging from recordings of HC Strache’s speeches 
and interviews to his rap-songs (see below) and different election-campaign 
spots and short films. Before his exclusion from the FPÖ in November 2019, the 
party also managed the Web presence of its leader – via his Web page (www.
hc-strache.at) as well as channels on Facebook (www.facebook.com/HCStraa-
che?ref=mf) and Flickr (www.flickr.com/search/?q=strache&w=all) – after Strad-
che’s exclusion from the FPÖ, his homepage was closed down.
Following Alexander, the symbolic dimension of ‘doing politics’ must be 
understood as central to all efforts of a politician’s performance, in the media, 
at election rallies, in parliament, at press conferences, and so forth.65  Alexander 
61 See Forchtner et al. (2013); Wodak (2011) as well as Wodak, Forchtner (2018) for more 
details on the fic tional isation of politics.
62 See http://www.hcstrache.at/home/ [accessed 02.05.2017].
63 See Köhler, Wodak (2012); Wodak, Köhler (2010); Wodak (2013a); Wodak (2013b); Wodak 
(2020) for recent detailed studies and research on the FPÖ’s and HC Strache’s media 
 policies as well as on his downfall and exclusion from the FPÖ in November 2019.
64 The blog – there is now also a print edition – was initiated by Martin Graf, a member of 
a far-right fraternity and former third president of the Austrian parliament. According 
to the Austrian chamber of commerce. See http://www.wkoecg.at/Web/Ecg.aspx?FirS-
maID=0f68efff-25b9-46cd-9edd-b18a79a9b92d [accessed 22.10.2012], it is now managed 
by Walter Asperl, who was also Graf ’s office manager during his time in parliament as 
third president of the chamber.
65 See Alexander (2006); Forchtner et al. (2013); Wodak (2020), pp. 188–92.
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also argues that these performances must hook into the background culture, 
symbols, narratives and myths of the respective society to be successful. In 
other words: If such symbolic practices are supposed to resonate, they should 
draw on, and mobilize, a common cultural structure, via appeals to common 
knowledge of epistemic communities, to the endoxa by using presuppositions, 
insinuations and other pragmatic devices as well as specific argumentation 
schemes. As Tannen succinctly notes in her best-selling book The Argument 
Culture, “fitting ideas into a particular camp requires you to oversimplify them. 
Again, disinformation and distortion can result. Less knowledge is gained, not 
more. And time spent attacking an opponent or defending against attacks is 
not spent doing something else”.66 It is thus certainly legitimate to ask at this 
point what kind of specific performativity characterizes far-right populist pol-
iticians differently than politicians per se.
The form of the performance is only one – even if important – part of the 
specific far-right populist habitus. Form and content are necessarily linked to 
construct the specific political agenda. In such populist rhetoric, several ele-
ments are thus combined: specific topics which are addressed; specific ideol-
ogies which feed into and constitute utterances and performances; strategies 
of calculated ambivalence and provocation which are used to create and dees-
calate intentionally provoked scandals; and a continuous campaigning style, 
an overall antagonistic habitus which does not comply with hitherto conven-
tional rules of negotiation and compromise.67
The many positionings of HC Strache constructed a multi-faceted politi-
cians’ identity, oriented towards some and excluding others: as saviour of the 
Occident; as casual, smiling but also serious statesman; as fighter; as attractive 
young man; as extreme right-wing fraternity member with paramilitary experi-
ence; and as hero, revolutionary and superman, surrounded by loyal supporters, 
cheerleaders, body guards, and smiling young men and women.68 In this way, 
one could reiterate that Strache – like his predecessor Haider before him – had 
been a “man of all seasons”,69 adaptable to the needs and desires of ordinary 
people, bonding with them as well as representing them. The party, through all 
of this, had been metonymically identified with him and his agenda, consisting 
mainly of anti-immigration policies, anti-EU agenda and nativist nationalism 
as well as explicit insinuations of Nazi ideology and a revisionist conception of 
Austria’s (and Germany’s) history.
66 Tannen (1998), p. 289.
67 See Forchtner et al. (2013).
68 Analyzed in more detail in Wodak (2015a), pp. 136–141.
69 See Gingrich (2002). 
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In terms of national identity, the symbols which had been used by the Stra-
che-FPÖ are linked to deeply conservative constructions of the national body, 
e.g. rural landscapes, snow-covered mountain tops, traditional agriculture 
and farmers, religious symbols of Christianity. In many images and aspects, 
the respective texts and performances feature Strache himself enacting and 
employing these symbols (see Figure 5.1).
Since these are symbols of the nation rather than the party, their recontextu-
alisation and resemiotisation by the FPÖ continue to constitute a provocative 
appropriation linked to the FPÖ’s claim to be the only party to represent ‘the 
people’ and the nation or ‘Heimat’. Indeed, ever since Strache’s leadership one is 
confronted with a re-branding of the FPÖ as the “Soziale Heimatpartei”, the Social 
Homeland Party (a label it shares with the extreme-right NPD of Germany).
Two such provocations relate to Austria’s national anthem: firstly, publicly 
refusing to sing the amended national anthem (since 2011, the lyrics include 
“daughters” alongside “sons”), thus breaking the respective relevant law, and 
secondly, using an alternative anthem for their campaigns, titled “Immer wie-
der Österreich”. The lyrics of this song incorporate the well-known chorus of 
soccer fans at games of Austria’s national team – “Immer wieder, immer wie-
der, immer wieder Österreich” (“Time and again, time and again, time and again 
Austria”) – but also appeal to the “honesty, righteousness and loyalty” of all 
true Austrians and call on them to “pledge” their loyalty to “their country”. The 
accompanying video resemiotises the lyrics of the actual Austrian anthem and 
alludes to the aesthetics of Nazi era films such as Leni Riefenstahl’s work (see 
figure 5.2  Vilimsky (MEP), Strache, Gudenus and Kickl (Party Secretary)  brandishing the 
Austrian flag at the Großglockner peak (Austria’s highest mountain)
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Figure 5.2). Such discursive strategies of anthropomorphising, culturalising 
and ethnicising the national body go back many years. Indeed, the frontstage 
politics of the far-right in Austria are eminently culturalist and biologist.70
5 Conclusions
The dynamics of everyday performances frequently transcend careful analytic 
categorisations; boundaries between categories are blurred and flexible, open 
to change and to ever new socio-economic developments. In sum, when ana-
lysing far-right (or, indeed, left-wing) populist movements and their rhetoric, 
it is essential to recognize that their propaganda – realised as it is in many 
genres across relevant social domains – always combines and integrates form 
and  content, targets specific audiences and adapts to specific contexts. Only by 
doing so, are we able to deconstruct, understand and explain their messages, 
the resonance of their slogans and their electoral success.
In the body and social politics of such ideologies, the ‘national family’ 
must preserve the traditional paternalistic order of the sexes and maintain 
the nation’s body as white and pure. This draws on conservative and fascist 
imaginaries as extensively investigated by Musolff and Richardson in their 
research on the concept of the ‘Volk’ and the ‘Volkskörper’ across German and 
British nationalistic writing since the eighteenth century.71 In summary, the 
extreme-right’s salient construction of the national body and use of associated 
70 See Krzyżanowski, Wodak (2009); Wodak, Köhler (2010); Rheindorf, Wodak (2019).
71 See Musolff (2010); Richardson (2017). 
figure 5.3 Still from the FPÖ’s alternative anthem and election campaign video
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symbols shows a constant effort to mobilize feelings of national pride but 
equally of national emergency, of threat and danger, of the possible decay of 
the Western World.
Finally, it must be emphasised that the FPÖ as the only established party in 
Austria which has consistently provided a home for extreme-right positions 
is far from homogenous. The ideological positions articulated by its leading 
figures range from extreme-right and pan-German nationalism to toned-down 
positions, particularly on the frontstage. Indeed, the ability to alternate between 
‘strong’ and ‘soft’ performances according to context and audience is a defining 
characteristic of the contemporary far right in Austria. Both allusions to and 
encoded references to extreme-right and Nazi ideologies are thus part of the 
strategy of calculated ambivalence that ensures deniability. Closely related to 
these strategic performances are processes of normalisation, transcending and 
breaking taboos through recontextualisation and resemiotisation as aspects 
of extreme-right imaginaries, moving from backstage to frontstage and from 
party politics to the mainstream.
Such normalisation processes became highly evident in the Austrian 
national election 2017 where the Austrian People’s Party under its new leader 
Sebastian Kurz appropriated far-right agendas in respect to migration and 
asylum issues, thus normalising important elements of the FPÖ’s far-right 
program. This strategic, cleverly designed and marketised election campaign 
illustrates well how normalising procedures were employed in many genres 
and across social and political fields, on national, regional, and local levels.72 In 
addition, the governing ÖVP (in its coalitions with both the FPÖ until 2019 and 
with the Green Party since 2020) has implemented its own version of ‘mes-
sage control’73 which supports top-down normalisation: Each week, a specific 
topic is launched in a press conference and elaborated on for one week, until 
being replaced with a new agenda seven days later. For example, while dis-
content and strikes were contemplated against a new law allowing for 12-hour 
working days and 60-hour working weeks if employees voluntarily comply 
with their employer’s request (implemented with 1 September 2018), the gov-
ernment launched various news items about a ban of headscarves for Mus-
lim girls in kindergarten and pre-school. In this way, the government pleased 
their electorate with anti-Muslim and anti-immigration agendas, while being 
aware that the core electorate of the FPÖ would be enraged by such new labour 
laws, which were upsetting the post-war consensus of the social welfare state. 
72 See Wodak et al. (2020) for details.
73 John, Mittelstaedt (2018).
Re/nationalising EU-rope 117
The media have thus been kept busy debating ‘the headscarf ’, while being dis-
tracted from other relevant news stories.
As noted by Uitz74 of Orbán’s Hungary, parliamentary procedures are also 
frequently neglected since 2018. Discussion and consultations with experts, the 
opposition, and journalists seem to be out of the question in Kurz’s Austria75. 
In sum, it seems that the new Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) – in its streamlined 
trajectory to power (at least in the sense of leading coalition governments since 
2018) – has either ignored or quietly accepted some non-democratic practices, 
thus normalising the previously unsayable and unacceptable.
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CHAPTER 6
The Camp and the Home
Europe as Myth and Metaphor
Joep Leerssen
 Abstract
This contribution attempts to reduce the complexity of the manifold images of 
Europe’s position in the world with the help of the imagological method. It outlines 
an evolving and progressively more entangled dialectics as a successively shrinking 
‘Europe’ was opposed, either in negative or positive terms, to a growing lineage of Oth-
ers. The process takes us from a large and open-bordered Europe in Classical Antiq-
uity to a concentrated and more self-enclosed Northern-Eurozone Europe in its recent 
polarisation between postcolonial/post-totalitarian guilt and resurgent populist xeno-
phobia. Throughout this long and complex history, the classical notion of the House 
(oikos, domus) has continued to inform European self-images. For better or worse, 
Europe sees itself in terms of its fundamental domesticity.
1 Europe as Frame, Europe Framed
How do we frame Europe? It is a key insight in imagology that the image of a 
given ‘nation’ is always conceived in a discourse of contrast, even if that con-
trast is elided or left implicit. To observe that the French are frivolous or that 
the English have a stiff upper lip, means, implicitly or explicitly, to observe 
how this attribute renders them different from the non-French or non- English. 
Nations are most characteristically themselves (so the assumption goes) 
in precisely those aspects in which they are most noticeably different from 
other nations. For imagologists, this means that our analysis of ethnotypes will 
always involve an unpacking of the implied contradistinctions, and to estab-
lish what Others are used as a background against which the reputed ‘charac-
ter’ or ‘identity’ of a nation is silhouetted.1
1 On the theory and method of imagology, generally: Beller, Leerssen (2007); Dyserinck (2015); 
Leerssen (2016a) and the website www.imagologica.eu.
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If, then, an imagologist were to approach the vexed question of what con-
stitutes a European ‘identity’ (a topic which has attracted inordinate amounts 
of punditry: hundreds of books and essays which invariably begin with intense 
hand-wringing on the utter impossibility of defining Europe), his/her first 
reflex would be to unpack the implied contrast-frame: a ‘European identity’ 
as opposed to what, precisely? As opposed to America, or Asia, or Africa? The 
resulting European ethnotype would take on very different characteristics 
in each of these contrast-frames: Europe-as-opposed-to-America would be a 
continent of mixed feelings, ironies, ‘negative capability’ and a weary, disen-
chanted refinement as opposed to American vigour, brashness and energetic 
naiveté. (Examples: Major Calloway vs. Holly Martins in The Third Man; Hum-
bert Humbert vs. Lolita in Nabokov’s novel.) Europe as opposed to Asia evokes 
connotations of historical development and civil society vs. the unchanging 
presence of pre-civic traditionalism and a propensity towards ‘Oriental des-
potism’. Europe vs. Africa evokes different stereotypical frames again: self-im-
posed social order vs. the brute force of nature. And so ‘Europe’ can be framed, 
from case to case, as the continent of mixed feelings, civil society and social 
order; of Rembrandt and Captain Cook, Auschwitz and Chartres; scientific 
achievement and enervated decline; Augustine, Erasmus, Torquemada, Tolstoy, 
Mussolini and Derrida.
It is for that reason that the Imagology handbook, edited by Manfred Beller 
and myself,2 abstained from carrying an entry on, of all places, Europe. Ima-
gology offers profiles of ethnotypes from ‘Albanian’ to ‘Turkish’; it contains 
articles surveying eurocentric attitudes towards global regions from Africa to 
Polynesia. There is even an entry on ‘Ethnocentrism and eurocentrism’; but 
an article on ‘Europe’ as such is lacking. Europe is, as it were, the hole in that 
book’s donut. The omission was a deliberate one: Europe was, if anything, the 
implied contrast-frame against which all exoticisms listed in the book were 
silhouetted, and as such proved too complex, too shape-shifting, to be covered 
within the book’s scope.
I have attempted to remedy that hollow core at the centre of imagology in 
a subsequent book (in Dutch), which in free-floating essayistic form tried to 
come to terms with the shape-shifts in the European self-image.3 Following 
on from that attempt I will in the following pages try to systematize some ima-
gological insights and use them to throw light on the recent crises in Europe’s 
self-positioning in the world.
2 See Beller, Leerssen (2007). 
3 Leerssen (2016b). 
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2 Historical Others: A Multiplicity
The imagologist’s first reflex is to situate a given ethnotype in its implied con-
trast-frame: to set off a purported Identity against its implied Other. There is a 
curious correlation between the number of potential Others a given identity 
has and its hegemonic position in our discourse. The very fact that ‘Europe’ can 
be silhouetted against so many others is a sign of its central position in our dis-
cursive configuration of ethnotypes about the world (this is what made Europe 
the gravitational Black Hole at the galactic centre of the Imagology handbook.) 
Subaltern nationalities tend to have their ethnotype dominated by one over-
riding binary opposition. In the racial view of humankind à la Blumenbach, 
Black is defined vis-à-vis White; so is Red, or Yellow. But White has all three as 
its reservoir of potential Others. The Irish ethnotype tends to be wholly dom-
inated by its contrastive pairing with ‘English’; but Englishness can also be set 
off against Scottish, German, French etcetera.
The multiplicity of Others for an image of Europe is, then, a given which 
needs to be addressed and analysed. And so the imagologist’s first reflex calls 
forth the immediate necessity of applying the method’s second reflex: that of 
historicising.
Imagology is not a method in the social sciences but in the humanities, 
and as such its awareness of historical change is of categorical importance. 
Ethnotypes are part of a historical development and behind their short-term 
fixity and apparent rigidity we need to capture their long-term variability and 
changeability. The character-traits attributed to nations are presented to us as 
immutable anthropological fixities: Russians ‘just are’ predisposed to patient 
resignation, Italians are naturally ebullient, Swedes cerebral and introspec-
tive. But in practise the documentary evidence shows that for every stiff-up-
per-lipped English Phileas Fogg there is a violent, brawling Vin Jones, for every 
earthy French Gérard Depardieu there is a rigid, cartesian Michel Barnier, 
for every dreamy Irish Enya there is a tough-as-nails Bernadette Devlin, all of 
whom are considered equally ‘representative’ of their alleged ‘national char-
acter’. In historicising those contradictory variations – setting out their man-
ifestations in the documentary record along a time-line – we notice that the 
ethnotype available nowadays is the cumulative end result of a centuries-long 
historical dialectics, in which earlier ethnotypes, dominant in one period, had 
called forth their own contrary opposites. Much of the imagologist’s work con-
sists in analysing the superimposed strata of this ethnotypical sedimentation 
into the successive periods of its historical development.
I should point out in this context that the cultural history of ideas, unlike 
the social history of events, is cumulative rather than successive; it works by 
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accretion rather than replacement. Later ideas do not replace or oust older 
ideas, but are superadded on top of them. The old remains available under-
neath the new. The Beatles do not abolish Bach, nor does the recent ‘socio-
pathic murderer’ ethnotype of ‘nordic noir’ crime thrillers abolish the earlier 
Scandinavian ethnotypes of serene reasonableness (IKEA, Astrid Lindgren) or 
anguished moralism (Ingmar Bergman).
And so the question becomes: is it possible to discern a succession, a chronol-
ogy, in the variety of Others in the European self-image? Which came earlier, 
which later? If we study, historically, the discourse and cultural production of 
non-European hetero-images, silhouetting successive European auto-images, 
which ones have left older, more deeply-rooted but more occluded traces, 
which one more recent, visible, superficial ones?
3 Moveable Placenames
A final caveat. Over longer periods, the meanings of ethnic and geographical 
appellations shift. Although the Dutch ethnotype has remained fairly stable 
over the last centuries, the present-day country called The Netherlands is by 
no means co-extensive with its seventeenth-century or medieval forerunners. 
Belgium now has little in common with the part of Gaul described by Caesar as 
inhabited by the Belgae. And Europe has drastically shifted its (imagined) ter-
ritory and centre of gravity over the millennia. And so the variable geometries 
that we need to apply involve a changing territory changing its character and 
self-image through juxtaposition with a changing succession of Others. All of 
which left echoes and traces in subsequent history.
The resulting complexities are daunting but not insurmountable or over-
whelming: the self-profiling of something called ‘Europe’ is complex, but not 
chaotic or random. It is possible to discern successive paradigms. Naturally 
these are anything but homogenous in themselves and within them they carry 
both the residue of earlier discourse and the germinating anticipations of later 
developments; but that is almost a given for any historical period, and reali-
sation of this fact cannot justify a defeatist ‘non possumus’, as if all of history 
were just a heap of messed-up glop. Continental drift is not measured in miles 
per hour, not does it proceed at an even rate in a unilinear direction; but direc-
tionality there is nonetheless.
The Continental drift in the documentary records of Europe’s self-defining 
discourse, from Hesiod and Herodotus to the EU, can be mapped as a shrink-
ing territory around a shifting centre of gravity.
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4 Paradigms in Self-Perception
The aim of this contribution is not to give a full account but rather to indicate 
some defining paradigmatic moments in order to see what, of all this, carried 
over into the current discourse of crisis.
4.1 From Mediterranean Antiquity to Medieval Christendom
Very broadly, then,4 we can see a stage zero when Europe is almost undefined 
as an area adjoining the Old World, largely maritime, mythically anchored 
between the Lebanon and Crete, Troy and Ithaca (marked as such by the jour-
neys of Europa and Odysseus). The post-Herodotus Greeks invoke Persia as 
their contrast-frame, and face westward to a ‘European’ theatre of maritime 
communications between Gibraltar and the Black Sea. That Mediterranean 
footprint remains in force for the Roman Empire: Europe is bounded to the 
South by the Sahara, to the West by the Atlantic, to the East by the vast empires 
and deserts of Asia, to the North by the dank forests and chilly plains beyond the 
Alps. Alexander’s sortie towards the Indus and the Nile, Caesar’s to the Rhine 
and the Channel, extend but do not shift this concept of Europe, but Christian-
ity will use the biblical, Sons-of-Noah-derived contrast frame of the Three Con-
tinents (Europe, Asia Africa). This post-Roman sense of a European identity 
will maintain its presence longest in the primacy of Rome and Constantinople 
(not, significantly, Jerusalem) as the religious capitals of Christendom.
The Others for this Europe are twofold: the nomadic barbarians (Scyths, 
Goths) roaming over the trackless plains, and the despots ruling their distant 
Oriental Empires. Both tropes will maintain a very stubborn persistence over 
the following millennia, albeit overlaid by later shifts and inflections. The role 
of ‘nomadic hordes’ is played by the barbarians bringing down the Roman 
Empire: Goths, Vandals, then also by Huns, Turkic Tatars and Mongols (Attila, 
Genghis Khan, Timur) from Asia, and Saracens and Arabs bringing Islam from 
the Middle East. The spread of Islam robs Europe of its southern anchorage: all 
of the southern coast of the Mediterranean now becomes alien territory, the 
opposite of Europe; the Mediterranean becomes a moat rather than a pond. 
Leo Africanus is the last intellectual for whom that sea is still a connecting 
rather than a dividing presence.
Post-classical Europe defines itself in religious terms as Christendom, and 
its defining Other for centuries is Islam. At Sankt Gallen, Notker the Stammerer 
4 What follows in this section is a digest of Leerssen (2016b) and draws on the sources assem-
bled there.
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notes Charles Martel’s victory at Tours as one for the europenses – the first time 
that that word, ‘Europeans’, is used.5 Upon the completion of the reconquista, 
centuries later, the Spanish monarchy pursues its further expansion, signifi-
cantly, not in the Maghreb beyond the Gibraltar straits – that is now firmly 
alien territory – but in the transatlantic world beyond the Pillars of Hercules. 
By that time Islam, having been pushed back in the west, is surging in the east: 
just before the conquest of Granada by the reyes católicos (1492), Mehmet II 
conquers Constantinople (1453); the Ottomans by then are already established 
in the Balkans and will expand towards Hungary and the gates of Vienna. 
That continues to be perceived as a European crisis, from which the continent 
derives a sense of identity: Enea Silvio Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II) and 
Charles V repeatedly plead the cause of ‘Europe’ in the face of Ottoman expan-
sion. Piccolomini felt that the fall of Constantinople was qualitatively different 
from earlier confrontations with Islam, because it happened within the Euro-
pean ambit: “for in previous times we were wounded in Asia and Africa, that is: 
in alien lands; but now we have been shaken and stricken in Europe, that is to 
say in our fatherland, in our own home, in our residence”.6
4.2 Becoming Western
By the time of Leo Africanus and Pius II, Europe as a religious post-Roman 
empire is fracturing. The Great Schism has turned Rome and Constantinople 
into opposing rather than complementary centres. And it occurred, fatally, a 
mere century before the rise of the universities (Bologna, Salamanca, Paris, 
Oxford). While in Western Christendom, abbey schools developed into uni-
versities and monastic learning developed into scholastic learning (Abelard, 
Aquinas, Roger Bacon), that process remained without parallel in the monastic 
world of Orthodoxy. As a result, Western Europe by the later Middle Ages had 
developed a self-image that drew heavily on Latin classics and opposed its pur-
suit of learning to the stagnant East. The Italian Renaissance and Humanism 
5 Gesta Karoli Magni, I:17. 
6 Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Constantinopolitana clades, speech held at the Frankfurt Diet, 1454. 
In the original: “[…] retroactis namque temporibus in Asia atque in Affrica, hoc est in alie-
nis terris, vulnerati fuimus, nunc vero in Europa, id est in patria, in domo propria, in sede 
nostra percussi cesique sumus”. Pius continues that this conquest is much more grievous 
than previous incursions of the Turks into Greece, or the Tatars into the Don basin, or the 
Saracens into Spain. (“et licet dicat aliquis ante plurimos annos ex Asia Turchos in Greciam 
transivisse, Tartaros citra Thanaim in Europa consedisse, Sarracenos Herculeo mari traiecto 
Hispanie portionem occupasse; numquam tamen aut urbem aut locum amisimus in Europa, 
qui Constantinopoli possit equari.”). Pii II orationes (1755), vol. 1, p. 263f. Quoted in the source 
material for Helmrath (2007) and also Pius II (2006). 
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became defining elements in a European self-image, priding itself on its intel-
lectual curiosity. In the process, the Continent’s Eastern half drops out of the 
European image as stagnant and dominated by uncouth despots. Only the 
Catholic chivalries of Central Europe (the Teutonic Order, Poles, Hungarians, 
Croats) maintained a tenuous connection as the self-styled ‘bulwarks of Chris-
tendom’ against the ‘hordes of the East’.7 But the West is best. From the Pole 
Copernicus to the Italian Galilei to the Englishman Newton, the scientific rev-
olution is a Western affair, and ever more so; so is the growth of global colonial-
ism, which – move over, Marco Polo – uses the Atlantic as Europe’s sole path of 
access to the rest of the globe.
4.3 Becoming Northern
A further tectonic shift is introduced by the Reformation, which splits Western 
Christendom along a polarity soon construed as North vs. South – notwith-
standing the fact that Geneva lies well south of Lisieux and Cracow. Crucially, 
the spread of Lutheranism coincides with the rediscovery of Tacitus’s long-
lost tract Germania, and Luther is immediately framed as a latter-day Armin-
ius-the-Cheruscan, thwarting Roman hegemony North of the Danube and East 
of the Rhine.8 In addition, a classicist temperamental frame comes into univer-
sal use opposing the cool temperaments of the cold north (phlegmatic Dutch, 
melancholic Germans) against the sensuous temperaments of the hot south 
(sanguine Italians, choleric Spaniards). This overdetermination of tempera-
ment, religion and geography becomes a lasting, ingrained stereotype, even 
influencing Max Weber’s notions of a ‘Protestant work ethic’ motivating the 
rise of mercantilism and capitalism in North-Western Europe. The Enlighten-
ment will intensify a European notion of a ‘Republic of Learning’ which is, 
de facto, anchored in Northern Europe; even its French intellectual denizens 
(Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot) advocate the virtues of moderation and a crit-
ical spirit in opposition to Southern Others like absolutist Spain or the Papacy. 
Actual latitude and longitude have little to do with this: Geneva as Protestant 
bulwark is a metaphorically Northern city; an eastern despot like Catherine 
the Great is, by virtue of her intellectualism, her German birth and the cold 
climate of her realm, metaphorically classified as ‘northern’. And to the extent 
that scientific inquiry is also a eurocentric, ethnographic study of the ‘prim-
itive’ races of the rest of the world, the encounter with them runs through 
7 See Zrinka Blažević’s contribution to this book.
8 See Borchardt (1971); Krebs (2011); Leerssen (2016c). On the discourse of climate and tem-
perament underpinning North-South oppositions, the classical work is still Zacharasiewicz 
(1977).
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the colonial ports and the stock exchanges of the area Paris-London-Copen-
hagen-Frankfurt, now the centre of a core-Europe shrunk to the continent’s 
North-by-North West.
This core-Europe can identify itself against any number of Others: the 
ancient empires of Asia; Islam; the nomadic tribes of (sub-)Saharan Africa and 
central Asia, or the equally nomadic savages of the New World, encountered 
during the colonial expansion post-1492. In addition, it can also silhouette 
itself against the tyrannical Romance-language monarchies of Catholic South-
ern Europe9 and the backward, Islam-threatened, feudal polities of Orthodox 
Eastern Europe. Core-Europe is the final resting place of a semantic-geograph-
ical slippage that saw the continent’s imagined footprint shift and shrink from 
the Levantine Mediterranean to the West and then to the North; its centre of 
gravity moving from the Aegean by way of Rome across the Alps and towards 
the shores of the North Sea.
All the phases in that slippage process left a discursive repertoire of Other-
ing in their wake with accumulating variants, one layer being superimposed 
on other, older ones. In the nineteenth century, that entire repertoire received 
the final overlay of an anxiety about the further possible ‘westward course of 
Empire’ towards the US or across the oceans; a Spenglerian Untergang des 
Abendlandes. The concomitant self-image sees Europe as old, decadent, expe-
rienced but feeble, when facing the rise of younger, brasher societies elsewhere. 
America is ambivalently either Europe’s Western extension, further developing 
its self-attributions of free enterprise, individualism, and a inquisitive spirit, or 
else Europe’s Other, uncivilised, simplistic, reckless, more brawn than brain.10
4.4 Becoming Complex
After an anguished need to confront the guilt of colonial misrule, world wars 
and genocide, Eurocentrism has dwindled to a mere vestige of what it used 
to be. The EU defines itself as post-totalitarian and dedicated to avoiding the 
reckless mistakes of the past. Europe’s contemporary self-image is nothing if 
not a constant source of self-contradiction and anxiety. Other societies in the 
world are perceived as simple, one-dimensional, easily characterised; Europe, 
by contrast is felt to be complex, unintelligible, a maze lost in a labyrinth. 
Europe is also its own Other, with inner divisions, and the guilt of many blood-
stained centuries of world hegemony, culminating in the twentieth-century 
9 See Leerssen (2018), pp. 73–89.
10 I note only in passing the projection of this European anxiety on Asia, where ‘the awaken-
ing of China’ has been a constant fear factor since Napoleon, feeding into a ‘Yellow Peril’ 
discourse mixed with the old rejection of ‘Oriential despotism’.
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dictatorships. Paradoxically, Europe can draw on its guilty conscience to claim 
a moral superiority vis-à-vis nations like the US or Turkey whose chauvinistic 
self-celebration – and their lack of guilt vis-à-vis their own genocidal past – is 
criticised as a symptom of political immaturity.11 It is in this aporia that the EU 
was confronted with the double crisis of an influx of refugees and the rise of 
xenophobic, populist neo-nationalism. (See below, section 6)
5 How It Adds Up
What are the constants and the variables in this succession of self-contrasts 
against ever shifting Others? The most recent strata, self-doubt, a sense of 
historical guilt and a sense of being post-totalitarian (culturally expressed in 
cinematic productions such as Das Leben der Anderen, Il Meglio Gioventù) are 
to be found largely on the political left where they bolster a sense of cosmopol-
itanism and anti-xenophobia. The older strata in the self-image are lastingly 
powerful for the discourse of the European right and centre-right. The image 
of ‘Oriental despotism’ — applied as it may be to ancient Persia, the Ottoman 
Empire and its Turkish successor state, and Russia (Tsarist, Communist or 
Putinist) — has continued to allow for a European self-identification with the 
values of liberal democracy, and with the values of the Enlightenment. In spite 
of ongoing secularisation, Islam is still Europe’s most potent Other, particu-
larly so in those Central-European countries still invoking a bulwark function 
vis-à-vis the Middle East.
The combination of these two auto-images allows for a discourse that 
despite is self-contradictory nature continues to make for efficient rhetoric: 
the fact that the European moral heritage consists of a combination of ‘Judaeo- 
Christian’12 and ‘Enlightenment’ values. Strictly speaking, that is as problematic 
as saying that Europe is characterised by its Socialist and its Free-Enterprise 
traditions, yet so ingrained is the formula that the public’s habituation allows it 
to persist unchallenged. The two registers share, of course, the negative quality 
11 See Leerssen (2017). 
12 On the antecedents see Sebban (2012). On the contemporary political slogan see Molle 
(2019). The use of the term reached embarrassing depths when the German anti- 
immigration politician Horst Seehofer in March 2018 denounced Islam as being fun-
damentally alien to Germany with its ‘christlich-jüdisch’ historical imprint. Seehofer’s 
anti-Islamism (and the public’s preoccupation with that anti-Islamism) tended to draw 
attention away from the statement’s jaw-dropping tastelessness: historically character-
ising what is, after all, the Third Reich’s successor state by vaunting a claim to Jewish 
heritage for xenophobic purposes. See Bau (2018) and Vollmer (2018). 
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that both implicitly contrast Europe as a Western sphere to a despotic, Islamic 
Orient. Islam can be used as Europe’s contrast-frame both by those who reject 
it as un-Christian and by those who reject it as being illiberal.13
The north-south opposition feeds into contemporary austerity debates, 
particularly during the European debt crisis of 2009–12 where Mediterranean 
countries are opposed to a mistrustful northern Euro-zone dedicated to aus-
terity measures and suspecting the Southern partners of profligacy and lack of 
proper financial accountability.14
The current political debates in Europe align various opposing policies with 
conflicting visions of what Europe is; and as a result, any conflict in Europe 
takes on the intensity of a conflict of identity, an existential crisis, something 
‘the European project’ may not be able to survive.
6 Recent Others: A Swarm
Meanwhile Europe, post-1945, is being confronted by a new set of others: immi-
grants. These are an extremely diverse presence in the continent. They range 
from ex-colonial citizens (Algerian-born in France, West-Indies-, South-Asia- 
and Africa-born in the UK, Indonesia- and Surinam-born in The Netherlands) 
to immigrant labour (Italians, Greeks, Turks, Moroccans) attracted for mining 
or industrial employment in 1950s-70s Belgium, The Netherlands and Ger-
many. Since 1989, refugees have sought sanctuary in Europe from war zones, 
tyrannical regimes and calamitous hardship in the Middle East and Africa.
The people habitually grouped together as ‘immigrants’ have very few com-
mon denominators either as to their geographical origin, the historical forces 
that impelled their migration into Europe, or even the period of their arrival. 
Accordingly, they are framed in their non-territoriality as a roaming ‘swarm’ 
or a ‘horde’, without specific link to a home country (as was the case in tradi-
tional ethnotypes). Their very heterogeneity marks them solely in the negative 
aspect of their not being native-rooted Europeans, and as such they are framed 
very differently from other transients in the European landmass such as post-
1945 Displaced Persons (liberated from the dictatorships’ camps or driven from 
their homes by war or mass expulsions) or the modern-day tourists who are 
13 An added irony is that it is often illiberal populists who denounce Islam for falling short 
of liberal values such as women’s emancipation or acceptance of homosexuality. See Uit-
ermark, Mepschen, Duyvendak (2014).
14 See Sierp (2017). 
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now causing increasing friction in over-popular cities like Venice, Rome, Bar-
celona and Amsterdam.15
The generic non-characteristic as ‘non-European’ is remarkable because it 
overrides the usual contrast-frame as non-English, non-French etc. and thus, 
ironically, manifests an implicit European, rather than national, auto-image 
at work. It provokes unspecific and unfocused xenophobia, not linked to any 
specific character attributes or ethnotypes other than a perceived diminution 
of European authenticity and a tendency towards lawlessness and a disruptive 
effect on the fabric of society and the stability of the economy. This xenopho-
bia recalls that aimed at earlier non-territorial alterities, Jews and Roma (‘Gyp-
sies’): Others within, rather than outside, the territorial boundaries of Europe. 
Tourists, a more transient ‘swarm’, do not present a trans generational presence 
or a burden on economic resources (except in driving up real estate prices), 
and they are driven by a desire for entertainment rather than by dire necessity; 
but even so, they too are increasingly resented for their alienating impact and 
disruptive behaviour.
That contrast-frame, shared, in what must be the bitterest of irony, by hedo-
nistic tourists and traumatised refugees alike, alerts us to what is perhaps the 
oldest and most persistent contrast-frame of all in the European self-image: 
that of roaming nomads vs. a local, orderly and sedentary society.
7 Domesticity
Among the core pantheon of the Roman Dii consentes, the ruling city deities, 
was Vesta. No shape-shifting, philandering or foe-slaying myths are associated 
with her as they are with the other gods. Instead she is best known for being 
worshipped in the eternal household fire tended by the Vestal Virgins, one of 
the most enduring city cults of ancient Rome.16 Like her Greek analogue Hes-
tia, Vesta symbolizes both the domestication of fire as a tool of civilisation, 
and the principle of living in fire-centered houses, with a roof over one’s head, 
15 The pied noirs who moved to France after Algerian independence can be ambivalently 
categorised either as ‘intra-European Displaced Persons’ or as ‘extra-European foreigners 
from overseas’. Tourists are on the whole non-sedentary and (as individuals) a short-term 
presence; even where they acquire real estate as ‘expats’ (e. g. Britons in Spain) this is 
usually at an age when they do not start families in the country of arrival. They are also 
a mixed group consisting of Europeans and non-Europeans alike. Rich expats in places 
like London or Monte Carlo (Russian ‘oligarchs’ and Middle-Eastern ‘oil sheikhs’) are an 
ambivalently framed group.
16 See Goux (1983).
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a fireplace in the middle, and a threshold separating the inner sphere of clean-
liness from the mundanity of the world outside.17 Like Janus, the threshold 
deity (cf. Latin ianua, ‘doorway’), and the Lares and Penates, she was a goddess 
of domesticity and ordered stability, requiring only the dutiful observance of 
maintaining the hearth-fire in the house; as such her worship was private as 
much as public. Indeed the temple of Vesta, constructed on the plan of a tradi-
tional Roman domus, can be seen as the city’s very fireplace, turning the entire 
city metaphorically into a meta-house.
The domestic centrality of the fireplace, and its architectural location at the 
inner core of the house-dwelling (as its Latin name, focus, suggests) provide 
a potent auto-image against which all societies stood out as barbarians who 
cooked their food out of doors, under the open sky. Very deeply embedded in the 
European self-image lies its opposition to nomadism and camp-fires, its reliance 
on ordered stable domiciles with a tended fire at their centre and a roof over 
their head. Against this auto-image, anyone living in encampments with camp-
fires stands out as an alien – be he a Bedouin, a Gypsy, a nomad or a refugee.
The notion of domesticity may amount to an ‘absolute metaphor’ in Hans 
Blumenberg’s sense of the word. In Blumenberg’s view, certain metaphors are 
so ingrained and fundamental to our conceptualisation of the world that they 
are not just associative similes tagged on to our primary concepts, but rather 
intrinsic elements of our understanding.18 Seeing society as an extension of 
one’s household is such an absolute metaphor; the use of oikos (the Greek word 
for household) in terms like ‘ecology’ or ‘economy’ indicates this.19 Likewise 
the word ‘domestic’, derived from domus, ‘house, home’ is non-metaphorically, 
immediately, applied to whatever occurs within our own society as opposed to 
the world outside it.20
The conceptual opposition between an ordered world inside the walls and 
a violent, unruly wilderness outside, can be traced back as far as Heraclitus’s 
dictum that “We should protect the laws as if they were our city walls”.21
17 The classic theory on the demarcation clean-unclean remains Douglas (1966). 
18 The idea of an ‘absolute metaphor’ was outlined in Blumenberg (1960) and further elabo-
rated in Blumenberg (1979a) and Blumenberg (1979b). 
19 See Nagle (2006). On the oikos in economic thought from Aristotle to Marx see Booth 
(1993). 
20 There is a considerable body of reflection on ‘making oneself at home in the world’, e. g. 
Bollnow (1963). A recent, keen analysis of the home-affect is Duyvendak (2017). 
21 Kahn (1979), p. 59 (nr. LXV). Kahn comments p. 179 that Heraclitus elsewhere com-
pares violence and lawlessness (hybris) to a house on fire. This underscores the parallel 
between two oppositions: on the one hand between order and chaos, and on the other 
hand between inner sphere and outside. For a political elaboration of this idea, see Eijs-
bouts (1993) and Leerssen (1999).
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Europe as domesticity: on closer scrutiny, examples turn out to suffuse the 
European discourse of self-identification and othering over long periods. Prior 
to the crisis of 1452 (to recall Pius II’s qualification of Europe as ‘our own home, 
our residence’), Giraldus Cambrensis, writing in 1188 in his Topographia Hiber-
nica, had already activated the contrast-frame when evoking the savage lack of 
civility of the native Irish as being, almost literally, ‘beyond the pale’. The Irish 
are, as he puts it,
forest-dwellers, and inhospitable; a people living off beasts and like 
beasts; a people that still adheres to the most primitive way of pastoral 
living. For as humanity progresses from the forests to the arable fields, 
and towards village life and civil society, this people is too lazy for agricul-
ture and is heedless of material comfort; and they positively dislike the 
rules and legalities of civil intercourse; thus they have been unable and 
unwilling to abandon their traditional life of forests and pasture.22
The stadialism is unmistakable: proper, regulated society is organised in cities 
and villages, subject to the rule of law, and with a reliable, industrious subsis-
tence in the form of agriculture and trade. The hand-to-mouth life of nomads 
falls below this standard, roams around in territorially unmarked forests, and 
is closer to the life of animals than to that of proper humans. Concomitantly, 
the Irish have no regulated family life: “They pay no tithes or harvest sacrifices, 
they do not celebrate marriage, they shun no unchastity and neglect to visit 
God’s church with the necessary respect.”23
8 Family Values
Any reader will, upon reflection, realize that the xenophobic Othering of 
migrants will invariably frame them as unattached single males. The notori-
ous ‘Breaking Point’ poster that fed the British Brexit campaigns showed long 
waiting crowds of migrants at a border crossing point in Slovenia, glaring omi-
nously at the British electorate in their intent to approach Britain by way of 
Europe;24 and the salient characteristic that they had in common was that they 
were an aggregate of single, male individuals. This, of course, is a character-
istic also of any invading army: women and children rarely form the front-
line of attacking storm troopers. A very deep-seated schematisation in such 
22 Giraldus Cambrensis (1982), p. 162f.
23 Giraldus Cambrensis (1982), p. 166.
24 See Morrison (2016). 
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representation is that the threatened domestic space is familial, inhabited 
by wives and children, and the invaders are violent hordes of males. As the 
Marseillaise has it: “Entendez-vous, dans les campagnes, / mugir ces féroces 
soldats? / Ils viennent jusque dans nos bras égorger nos fils, nos compagnes.”25
Thus, the hordes of untrustworthy single males were implicitly aligned with 
an invading army and implicitly opposed to an English domesticity exempli-
fied, in that precise period, by the familial and social harmony of that decade’s 
exemplification of domestic Englishness, Downton Abbey – an Englishman’s 
home which is, quite literally, a castle, as well as a feel-good comfort zone for 
the viewers.
Conversely, any representation that evinced sympathy for the plight-driven 
migrant would evoke them as being, indeed, familial: couples with children, 
driven from their home by féroces soldats and as such deserving shelter and 
sympathy. As evocative as the picture of the waiting male crowds was that of 
the drowned toddler washed up on a Greek beach. A counter example of a 
policy of welcoming and sheltering refugees was the Canadian one, which was 
invariably framed, also in the accompanying press coverage, as welcoming ref-
ugee families.26
9 Securing the Perimeter
How do we frame Europe? The contemporary crisis discourse draws on a very 
long-standing image of Europe’s Others as nomads, be they Wild Irish, Mongols 
or Tatars, Saracens, Bedouins or Arabs (or native Americans and Australians, 
later on). Their telling characteristic is, almost tautologically, that they have 
no houses. Without fixed indoor fireplace at the inner core of their dwelling, 
they live in moveable tents or conveyances and their fireplaces are typically 
outside, under the open sky. Camp fires as opposed to hearths. Aimless, plun-
dering mobility rather than ordered, sedentary existence within domestic or 
city walls. The implied European self-image draws on the notion of an ordered 
household, whose thresholds must keep the polluting dangers from the out-
side world at bay and maintain the inner order, which is domestic both in the 
25 “In our lands can you hear those fell soldiers howl? / They come to cut the throats, even in 
our embrace, of our children and our women.” [Transl. J. L.].
26 Compare the website of the Canadian Council for Refugees, ccrweb.ca/en/psr-toolkit/
other-useful-info-family-reunification; any google search for ‘Canada refugee family’ will 
bear out the point.
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sense that it draws on the house-metaphor and on the notion of the family as 
its rightful occupant.
Europe in its early-twentyfirst-century crisis has two borders with its newly 
emerging Other. One is physical: it consists of non-domestic spaces of tran-
sient occupancy: ‘supermodern’ non-lieux (in Augé’s sense)27 such as airports, 
motorway rest areas, tourist campsites; and – most disturbing of all – refugee 
and immigration detention camps, those spaces identified by Giorgio Agamben 
as being outside the state’s proper governance and in a “State of Exception”.28
Europe’s other border with the outside world is mental, and now domi-
nated by a manipulative discourse weaponising deeply-ingrained ‘absolute 
metaphors’ like home and family for the purpose of xenophobic rhetoric. To 
understand that rhetoric properly, the mere analysis of ethnotypes proves to 
be insufficient, and may almost collapse into the demonstration that the dis-
course of Othering Others is ethnocentric – a vapid pleonasm if there ever 
was one. How that discourse functions involves the instrumentalisation and 
skewed distribution of absolute metaphors of a moral nature – where ‘moral’, 
in the root sense (as derived from the Latin mores), refers both to a set of accus-
tomed, ingrained behavioural patterns and to a value-system ration alising 
those patterns by means of value judgements. Nationalism post-1989 may well 
take the form of the nation’s moral monopolisation of something as cute and 
uncontentious as ‘family values’ – trivial, banal entertainments like Downton 
Abbey and The Great British Bake-Off accompanying, and covertly justifying, 
the logic of Brexit.
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CHAPTER 7
The EU and the East-West Paradox
The Case of Greece and Turkey
Hercules Millas
 Abstract
In both Greece and Turkey anti-western discourse is widespread. On the one hand 
both societies perceive themselves as European, but at the same time they criticize 
the ‘West’ as religiously or culturally different from ‘us’, being prejudiced against ‘us’, 
siding with our rivals, as hypocritical, cruel or imperialist. These stereotypes have real 
or imaginary historical dimensions, but they also relate to recent political controver-
sies. While the rationalisations of these images are not identical in the two countries, 
the contradictory end results are quite similar. While they criticize the West, neither 
the Greeks nor the Turks associate themselves with the ‘East’ or any ‘eastern’ coun-
try. When all these ambiguities are taken into consideration one may conclude that 
the anti-West/Europe discourse is used as a political means to voice complaints and 
demands: ‘You do not accept a cut on our debt’, or ‘You do not accept us in the EU’. 
These are accusations that show the ‘self ’ as a victim. They also show a national iden-
tity in anguish: ‘We are being treated unjustly, humiliated, etc’. This discourse also 
operates indirectly as a means of comparison with the ‘developed Western’ countries, 
stating ones own moral and cultural superiority.
On January 9, 2017 the president of Turkey R. T. Erdoğan accused the ‘West’ of 
being hypocritical. In his speech to a group of Turkish governors in Ankara he 
said that even if one leaves aside some negative practices of the West such as 
“their inhuman treatment towards the refugees and their lack of sensitivity 
when children, women and old people were killed”,1 still the hypocrisy is seen 
when one considers how the West reacts when a terrorist action takes place in 
the West and how it remains indifferent when a similar action takes place in 
Turkey. He also inferred that the ‘West’ is against Turkey.
Accusations against the ‘West’ are common in Greece, too, especially after 
the economic crisis of 2010. The president of Greece Prokopis Pavlopoulos, 
1 Erdogan (2017). All translations from Turkish and Greek sources are by the author. 
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for example, in 2013 called the agreement with the EU and IMF which aimed 
at coping with the economic crisis in Greece “a dishonourable pitchfork to 
which the government gave in”.2 The Union of Judges and Public Prosecutors 
in February 2016 unanimously declared that “the Greeks should stop being the 
economic guinea pigs of Europe”.3 Vassiliki Thanou, the head of the Supreme 
Court sent a letter to her counterparts in the European Union in July 2015 stat-
ing that the Greek people are not responsible for the state debt, but rather 
the EU governments and the IMF, and that the creditors “should not seek the 
extermination of the debtor.”4
However, when such Turkish and Greek accusations are put side by side a 
paradox comes into view. In an article in a Greek blog titled The hypocrisy of the 
West should end the EU and the USA are criticised for not taking a clear stand 
against R.T. Erdoğan’s authoritarian policies of the last few years. So the ‘West’ 
is seen as hypocritical for not being pro-Turkey in Turkey; but it is seen as hypo-
critical for being pro-Turkey in Greece.5 That Greece is ‘the spoiled child of the 
West’ because they are seen as the heirs of Ancient Greece is an old and estab-
lished term in Turkey; in stark contrast to Greek perceptions of anti-Greek bias 
in the ‘West’. In other words, both sides perceive the ‘West’ as unjustly siding 
with ‘our opponent’ – but for different and contradictory reasons.
When national discourses and ethnotypes are studied comparatively they 
may prove to exhibit remarkable similarities between sharply distinguished 
groups. Conversely, ‘universal’ traits turn out to be asymmetrically ascribed 
across borders or between groups. In what follows, I will try to present some 
peculiarities of Greek and Turkish ‘Occidentalism’, i.e., the way the so-called 
‘West’ is understood in both countries’ use of images, stereotypes and 
contradictions.
1 Anti-Westernism in Numbers and in Meaning
Opinion polls show that in both Greece and Turkey anti-western feelings 
run high. According to the Pew Research Center findings, in 2014 the top six 
countries that are critical of the US are Egypt (85%), Jordan (85%), Turkey 
(73%), Russia (%71), Palestine (66%) and Greece (63%). Pakistan and Lebanon 
2 See Kroustalli (2017). The declaration was made in September 2013, before Pavlopoulos was 
elected president. 
3 ΤοVima (2016). 
4 Iefimerida (2015).
5 See Voria.gr (2016).
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follow.6 Two aspects are of interest: a) Turkey and Greece are allies of the US in 
NATO, but still they emerge as top opponents; b) Among the top eight ‘critics’ 
are only Muslim and Orthodox Christian countries or populations. Conversely, 
among the top eight ‘US fans’ – the Philippines, Israel, South Korea, Kenya, El 
Salvador, Italy, Ghana and Vietnam – there are no Muslim or Orthodox Chris-
tian countries.
According to the Greek Palmos Analysis’ opinion poll, at the end of 2016 
84% of Greeks believe that the EU is moving in the wrong direction and only 
half of the participants of this survey are in favour of staying within the EU.7 
An opinion poll in Turkey 2015 showed that the wish to join the EU among 
the Turks – which in 2005 was of the order of 70% – during the last four years 
decreased to a low of 20–35%.8 According to a more recent opinion survey 
in Turkey 68% of Turks want to terminate the negotiations for the country’s 
entrance to the EU, believing that the westerners are not “sincere” (82%) and 
do not want Turkey entering the EU because “the Turks are Muslims” (60%). 
They also believe that western discourse related to Turkey is “hum iliating”.9
These complaints go beyond criticising the doings of the ‘West’ and of the 
‘westerners’; their actions are presented as being motivated by ill intentions 
and/or the problematic ‘character’ of the ‘West’. Disagreement thus moves into 
the emotional, even phobic register of temperamental ill-will imputed to a 
‘West’ perceived as unjustly biased ‘against us’.10
In the few examples referred to above, for example, the anti-west utterances 
impute the West to be inhuman and insensitive when facing the unhappiness 
of the world; the West is hypocritical, has a wicked ‘character’, imposes dishon-
ourable sanctions on ‘us’, has turned ‘us’ to guinea pigs, the policy of the West 
signals our ‘extermination’. These allegations and the words in which they are 
couched show that the grievances are part of a group opposition rather than 
a policy disagreement. The conflict is sparked by the incompatibility between 
these groups’ different ethical values, perceptions of justice, opposing world-
views and dissimilar cultures.
In Greece and in Turkey the ‘West’ features in many historical narratives, 
in politics, in textbooks, the media, literary texts, the arts and even in books 
for children. There is a substantial bibliography related to negative Western 
6 See Question 15a of the Pew Global Studies survey 2014 (2014). This favourability distribu-
tion shifted slightly following the election of Donald Trump as US-President.
7 Palmos Analysis (2016).
8 See Haber 3 (2015).
9 Internet Haber (2016). 
10 For ‘our image’ vis-à-vis of ‘how the Other sees Us’ (i. e., meta-image) see Leerssen (2016). 
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images of the East;11 such orientalism is encountered both in Greece and in 
Turkey. But the image of the West in these countries – Levantine Occiden-
talism – deserves closer study.12 I will give some limited samples to show the 
range of this anti-western discourse. The discourse itself involves the follow-
ing imputations and characterisations, digested here from the various sources 
listed in the bibliography:
 – The West is a monolithic, uniform, homogeneous entity which can be 
subsumed under this singular appellation;
 – The West has no specific geographic boundary; it may be the EU, the 
USA, Europe in general, the western Europe of the Renaissance and the 
Industrial Revolution, and may or may not include the Balkans;
 – It is religiously different. Among Greek orthodox spectants it is seen as 
Catholic and Protestant, among Turkish Muslims as Christian. These 
religious differences are imagined in a historical context, too. Greeks 
recall the Great Schism of 1054, Turks the wars between the Ottomans 
and the Europeans. Both ‘remember’ the crusades.
 – Besides the religious difference, there is an adversarial perception of the 
West as pursuing either its national interests as great powers, or economic 
exploitation as colonial hegemons.
 – As such, the West may be suspected of being in league with other, 
unspecified enemies.
 – The West is prejudiced against ‘us’ and harbouring negative stereotypes 
of ‘us’: Turks feel they are perceived as uncivilised, Greeks feel they are 
perceived as lazy and as unworthy descendants of a glorious ancestry.13
 – Temperamentally, the self-interest of the ruthless and cynical West is 
opposed to the positive characterisation reserved for the ‘We’-group: 
humane, hospitable, righteous, sensible, honest, honourable.
2 The Historical Dimension: The Case of Greece
The East-West issue plays an important part in both Greek and Turkish histo-
riography. In the Greek’s case the East-West controversy became a major issue 
11 See Said (1994), which is well known, especially in Turkey. Also see Todorova (2009) where 
the perception in the Balkans is discussed. 
12 See, for example Carrier (1995) and Buruma, Margalit (2005). 
13 On these meta-images – how the Other sees us –, see Millas (2001); Millas (2005a); Millas 
(2005b).
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during the years of the Greek War of Independence of 1821–29.14 The revolution-
aries, mostly diaspora intellectuals based in various cities of Western Europe 
and influenced by the ideals of the French Revolution, promoted the ‘western’ 
ideas. Conservative Greeks, mostly close to the patriarchate of Constantino-
ple and living within the Ottoman state, anathematised these Enlightenment 
modernizers, such as Paris-based Adamantios Korais (1748–1833), and advised 
prudent adherence to ‘paternal ideals’ as opposed to Western innovation.15
With the establishment of the modern Greek nation-state (1830) a modus 
vivendi was accomplished between the two sides of this controversy.16 The 
republican discourse was silenced and a Holy Alliance (between the throne 
and the altar) was secured. A straightforward national myth dominated 
nineteenth-century historiography: The Greeks, descendants of the glorious 
ancient Hellenes, had after many centuries under Ottoman rule thrown of the 
tyrannical ‘Turkish yoke’ and regained their independence. Greek-Orthodox 
Christianity, the basic belief of most of the Greek cultural community, was dex-
terously integrated into the ancient heritage. Spiridon Zambelios coined the 
concept of ‘Helleno-Christianity’ in the mid-nineteenth century to express this 
national harmony, and religion was thus ‘ethnicised’ during this nation-build-
ing phase. Greekness was closely associated with religion, and in particular 
with the Greek Orthodox Church and its legacy. Thus the two historicist reper-
toires, secular Antiquity and the Orthodox Christian heritage, have coexisted 
in an oblique West-East polarity until the present day.
In recent decades a number of researchers emphasising the contribution 
of the Greek Orthodox Church seem to have reproduced the old opposition 
between East and West and between believers and unbelievers. This reli-
gion-related movement in Greece is known as ‘New Orthodoxy’. The following 
quotation from G. Metallinos, a well-educated historian and priest, can serve 
as an illustration. I have added some clarifying comments.
The Romaic world [the Greeks, Ρωμιοσύνη, HM], with its Orthodox char-
acter and as the heir of Hellenism, had always been irksome to Frank-
ish Europe […]. The West had a permanent aim: the destruction of the 
Romaic civilization. The Frankish attempt in 1204 [to capture Constan-
tinople, HM] failed, as it failed to Latinize the Orthodox East. The blow 
of 1453 [the capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans, HM] was not 
strong enough to kill the Romaic world either. During the years of slavery 
14 See Millas (2008).
15 See Dimaras (1985).
16 For this and the following see Grigoriadis (2013). 
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[Ottoman rule, HM] all the westerners, i.e., those tied to the Pope and the 
Protestants, the missionaries and all the western political propaganda 
were defeated. So Romiosini could experience its resurrection again. […] 
The political aim of Europe [i.e. non-Orthodox Europe, HM] was not only 
the partition of the Ottoman Empire but also to obstruct the expectation 
that it would give way to a renewed Greek and Orthodox empire.17
The same author represents Western Enlightenment and related ideas as for-
eign ideals that did not normally develop within Greek society and were con-
trary to the Greek tradition. He also asserts that the Western Powers (England, 
France, Holland etc.) eventually sided with the Turks, seeking their own self-in-
terests and not helping Greece.18
Hristos Yiannaras is probably the most well-known representative of the 
New-Orthodoxy movement. According to him the East and the West have 
always been two different worlds. Unlike the East, the West is materialist and 
selfishly individualist and has strayed from true Christianity. “Actually, in the 
West we have anti-Christianity and hatred for the Greeks”.19 The Western world 
is hedonistic, corrupt, guilty of barbarities like the Inquisition, Auschwitz, 
Hiro shima, and more recently the massacres of Serbs. The West is hypocritical 
and on the side of the enemy of Greece, namely Turkey; conversely, the Ortho-
dox ‘personality’ of the Greeks is superior to the West.20
In Greece the political spectrum accommodates anti-western groups 
besides the New-Orthodoxy. The extreme right-wing Hrisi Avgi (Golden Dawn) 
which has eighteen deputies in parliament (out of a total of 300 members) 
is one of them. Their opposition to the ‘West’ is not based on religion but on 
political and racial considerations. Still, there is an indirect relation with the 
New-Orthodoxy as it is apparent from their references to its theoreticians such 
as Yiannaras and Metallinos.21 On the official website of Hrisi Avgi, for exam-
ple, in an article related to the ideology of this movement, we read that the 
West always fought the Greeks by means of Jews:
As the professor of philosophy Hristos Yiannaras says […] the Jews (like 
Marx, Freud, Einstein, Kafka, Steinberg, Woody Allen, Claude Lévi-
17 Metallinos (1988), p. 175. For the metaphorical ‘resurrection’ of the Greek nation-state, 
alluded to in this passage, see Millas (2006), pp. 47–60. 
18 See Metallinos (1988), pp. 151, 94.
19 Hristos Yiannaras as quoted by Heraclides (2001), p. 84. 
20 See Heraclides (2001), p. 86f.
21 For a critical presentation of Yiannaras see Heraclides (2001). 
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Strauss, etc.) were the spokesmen of the civilization of Western Europe 
but actually they did not create any original thinking. They only copied 
whatever the Greeks have accomplished and thus they promoted the 
Jews. Instead of Plato they created the Jewish philosopher Aristobulus 
of Alexandria who claimed that Plato had read the text of Moses; instead 
of Kant, the new-kantianist Hermann Cohen; instead of Epicurus, Marx; 
instead of Constantin Carathéodory, Einstein, etc. So Greece says that it 
belongs to the West, but the West plans its extinction.22
The communist and socialist Left often uses an anti-western discourse based 
on ideological principles couched in Marxist terminology.23 The ‘West’ (USA 
and EU) is generally perceived as a capitalist and imperialist block. Thus we 
find this statement on the official website of the Greek Communist Party KKE:
The jihadists are powers that were supported and armed by the USA, 
NATO and the EU in order to implement their plans in Iraq, Syria and 
Libya and today they are used as a pretext for new interventions and wars 
[…]. The Greek people must fight so that Greece is not part of NATO and 
other similar organisations which cause the bloodshed of nations in the 
interest of capital.24
Syriza followers use a less strident wording but the attitude is not much dif-
ferent. On the website of Syriza in an article on the island of Zakinthos titled 
The heart-breaking nightfall of the West we read evaluations such as these in 
relation to the Arabic Spring and the refugee crisis:
From the beginning the West showed first its foolishness and then its cru-
elty. Naturally, this is not the first time that the West shows its cruelty. 
In 1939 when 937 Jew refugees ran away from Hitler and were going up 
and down in the Atlantic neither USA nor Canada accepted them. […] 
And now the civilised EU which claims that it has abolished its  borders, 
22 Karaiskos (2016). 
23 The left in Greece is presently composed of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) with 15 
deputies in parliament, and Syriza (Radical Left Coalition) which is in power at present 
with 145 deputies. There are about ten small leftist groups, which participate in the gen-
eral elections but are not represented in parliament. All together the left composes 41% 
of the parliament and about half of the electoral public.
24 Katsaros (2014). Official declaration of KKE on 25.9.2014, in connection with the declara-
tion of the Greek Ministry Foreign Affairs on fighting the Islamic State. 
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 re-imposes them in the cruellest way. […] The cynical arrangement 
between the EU and the regime of T. Erdoğan on the issue of the refugees 
is an example of the neo-colonialist policy of the EU. […] Often the West-
ern type of haughtiness haunts the so-called backward Arabs.25
Again, critiques of the ‘West’ go beyond the denunciation of actual or imag-
ined misdeeds, but explain those with an intrinsic ‘character’, the unchanging 
essence of the ‘West’. The West was in the past as it is now, and new misdeeds 
are reiterations of older ones. Accusations of this kind are commonplaces 
among many followers of the left ideology.
3 The Historical Dimension: The Case of Turkey
The ‘East-West issue’ – as the relations of Turkey and the Turks with the ‘West’ 
are called: Doğu-Batı sorunsalı – dominates all aspects (historical, social, cul-
tural) of Turkish society over the last two hundred years. The ‘East-West issue’ 
crops up in any major social topic; largely because the most vital social changes 
were initiated, caused or influenced by the country’s relations to the ‘West’.
Starting from the time of Sultans Selim III (1761–1808) and especially Mah-
mut II (1785–1839) the Ottoman Empire initiated a series of reforms of ‘West-
ernisation’ (later known as Batılılaşma).26 The modernisation of the state in 
order to cope with the ‘West’ had appeared as a necessity after a series of mili-
tary defeats against the European powers. The changes were many and covered 
various fields.27 Selim created a new treasury, opened a navigation school and 
attended to printing and to the circulation of Western translations. Mahmut 
was much more radical. He abolished the Janissary Corps in 1826, establishing 
a western type Ottoman Army. In 1831 he founded an official gazette, Takvim-i 
Vekayi (Calendar of Events), the first newspaper to be published in the Otto-
man-Turkish language. Instead of a vizier, a prime-ministerial office was estab-
lished, and a new bureaucracy appeared with western-type ministers. New 
schools, mostly military academies were established. Young Turks were sent 
to Europe for studies.
Those innovations, however, were limited. The state aimed at benefitting 
from Europe’s scientific knowledge insofar as this could be done without trans-
planting European culture into the empire. In 1839 the Tanzimat era started 
25 Karaiskos, Thanasis (2016).
26 See Zürcher (2004).
27 See Hanioğlu (2008), pp. 55–108.
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establishing equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. These reforms 
known as Hatt-ı Humayun were reaffirmed in 1856 and rendered necessary 
because of Muslim reluctance to grant equality to the non-Muslim millets, i.e. 
to the citizens of the Empire. At this point a class bifurcation became clear: 
The Westernisation process became a movement of the cities and of the elite 
of the Muslim population. From dresses to everyday life a western way started 
to be accepted in the Empire by the Muslim elite population. However, at 
the popular level, in the agrarian and mostly Anatolian section of society the 
reforms met with reservations.
The most important counter voice was that of the former bureaucrats 
labelled as the Young Ottomans. They criticised Tanzimat as ‘capitulation to 
the European dictates.’ Established as a secret society in 1865 by a group of 
intellectuals such as Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi and Ziya Pasha, the Young 
Ottomans agreed that a new constitutional government should continue to be 
somehow rooted in Islam, emphasising “the continuing and essential validity 
of Islam as the basis of the Ottoman political culture.”28 The acceptance of 
Western laws instead of the Sharia was considered tyranny, and the example of 
Europe should be limited to scientific and industrial progress.29
This dualism of modernisation and westernisation versus local, national 
and Islamic tradition started a struggle that is still not resolved. About forty 
years after the Young Ottomans, another reformist group, the Young Turks, 
triggered a revolution in 1908, the beginning of a Constitutional Era. With the 
Young Turks, nationalism emerged among Turks and Ottoman Muslims. This 
nationalism was fanned by the Balkan Wars (1912–14), the First World War 
(which ended in defeat for the Ottoman State), a post-1919 invasion by Entente 
powers, and a War of Independence (1919–22). During these developments the 
negative image of the West evolved further.
On the surface, the ambiguity vis-à-vis the ‘West’ as what to take and what 
to refuse seemed to continue unabated. Ziya Gökalp, for example, the theore-
tician on ideological matters both of the Young-Turks and of the Kemalist new 
Turkish Republic, repeated the formula: the technology of the West should 
be adopted, while at the same time protecting and strengthening the nation’s 
characteristics.30 In fact, Gökalp in 1918 made a clear distinction between 
culture and civilisation (hars and medeniyet). Civilisation is what the upper 
classes share worldwide; culture is what characterizes each group of people 
28 Bora (2002), p. 253.
29 The Westernisation debates were very complex and full of ideological nuances. See, for 
example, Bora (2002). Here I limit myself to a broad outline.
30 See Gökalp (1990).
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separately, and what secures the existence of the nation.31 According to Gökalp 
the culture of a nation is of greater importance since it preserves its identity, 
its values and its character. He was very much in favour of the preservation of 
what he saw as genuine Turkish-Islamic culture. In essence this attitude, as 
articulated by the Young Turks and Gökalp, has remained in force until our 
days. The official Turkish position was and still is that Turkey is to be part of 
the West, but naturally preserving what it sees as its Turkish national identity.
However, an important ideological change vis-à-vis the ‘West’ occurred with 
the rise of Turkish nationalism starting in the year 1910. This change, which 
assigned new negative characteristics to the ‘West’, was not actually noticed 
and adequately understood because it was seen and internalised as a given 
reality rather than as an attitude or image. Apart from being advanced, rich, 
strong, cultivated, different and a probable threat the West started to be asso-
ciated with negative ethical characteristics; this was a new phenomenon. This 
change is best seen in the development of the Turkish novel. Until 1910 the 
leading novelists of the Ottoman period aimed their criticism not at the ‘West’ 
itself, but only at the Turks and Muslims who imitated and tried to look like 
westerners. There is, however, a sudden change after 1910 around the time 
when the nationalist Young-Turks came to power. A new generation of writ-
ers appeared, presenting a new image of the westerners: negative personal-
ities such as violent and dishonest men or shameless women seducing and 
betraying the Turkish characters. The dishonest and expansionist ‘West’ as 
a whole came to be presented as the cause of many national sufferings and 
as a threat to Turkey. That was the message of hundreds of literary texts of 
this kind.32
Naturally the Turkish novel and Turkish literature overall does not con-
sist only of this kind of stories. The general perception of the West, however, 
remained that of a political enemy (among nationalists), a moral threat (among 
Islamists) or a colonial/imperial hegemon (among the Left). The East-West 
metaphor governed it all. The ‘West’ is spiritually unsound, it is individualistic 
and selfish, modern but corrupted, indulgently permissive to the detriment 
of sound ethical traditions and values. The belief that the technology of the 
West is needed, but that its culture is noxious continues to be widely heard. 
The following illustrative examples are from two recent articles, published in 
the Turkish media, the first condemning the West, the second analysing the 
situation:
31 See Ünüvar (2002), pp. 28–35.
32 See Millas (2001); Millas (2005a); Millas (2005b). 
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There is no doubt that the modern version of anti-westernism is expressed 
as anti-Americanism […]. This is so because the USA is the leader of the 
West. […] The reason of the anti-western movement is the expansionist 
policy of the West that continues from the oldest times of history until 
today […]. The west has double standards […] and has a negative image 
of Islam.33
The perception of the West has completely deteriorated lately in Tur-
key. A great section of the people believes that the West is a demon that 
has collaborated with the powers that tried the coup d’état [on 15 July 
2016, HM] and that wants to break the country apart. The West is seen as 
a single homogeneous body and as a source of ills. As a consequence the 
people do not want to listen to any criticism that comes from the West, 
even if this is justified. On the other hand the number of those who want 
new alliances with any power apart from the West is increasing.34
4 Contradictions and Elisions
There are various contradictions and elisions in the Greek and Turkish posi-
tions vis-à-vis the West and/or Europe:
1. Both claim that they are part of Europe. Especially many Greeks believe 
Europe without Greece is an oxymoron since even the name of the con-
tinent is Greek and the ‘spirit’ of modern Europe is based on the revival 
of Ancient Greece through the Renaissance. In Turkey the official and 
widely supported view is that the Turks have become part of the history 
of Europe since the time of Sultan Mehmet II (1432–81) and Sultan Süley-
man (1494–1566), and that they have always been in touch with the devel-
opments of the West. However, when the Greeks and Turks use the terms 
‘Europe’ and ‘West’ they also mean a number of countries in the west 
which are different from them. Europe is spoken of both as an extension 
of, and as an opposition to their own national identity.
2. The geographic use of the word ‘West’ raises the anticipation of its ant-
onym East. But while denouncing the West, neither Greeks nor Turks 
associate themselves with the ‘East’ or any ‘eastern’ country. Indeed they 
would reject, sometimes indignantly so, a characterisation as ‘oriental’. 
Turks resist being associated with Iran and other (Arabic) ‘eastern’ coun-
33 Altun (2017).
34 Coşkun (2016).
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tries. Greeks by the same token refuse to be associated with an ‘eastern’ 
country like Turkey, whom in fact they are intransigently set against. Thus 
the very idea of an ‘East versus West’ discourse collapses in on itself. For 
Greece, Turkey is East and Italy is West. For Turkey, Greece is West and 
Syria and Iran are East. Neither considers itself Eastern. While both coun-
tries see a West and an East, they do not see themselves as belonging to 
either of these two categories. Where do they belong, then? An accept-
able answer would be that they see themselves to be simply ‘anti-West-
erners’. Or both, but separately, at the centre of the world.
3. There is a subsidiary East-West conflict between Greece and Turkey. 
Greeks believe that they are ‘Europeans’ when they compare themselves 
with ‘eastern’ Turkey; and Turks perceive Greece to be part of a ‘European 
conspiracy’ when they envisage future threats from ‘western powers’. This 
ambiguity exists even though Greece and Turkey are allies within NATO. 
Thus both countries, both positioned against both West and East, are also 
positioned against each other within an East-West context.
4. There is an unresolved ambivalence concerning the pros and cons of 
Europe. Turkish reforms starting from the early nineteenth century 
were initiated under the banner of ‘westernisation’, but simultaneously 
triggering anxiety at the baleful influence of European ‘culture’ and life-
style. Greece, too, followed ‘western’ political models and ‘way of life’, 
but to a considerable extent also stressing the importance of preserv-
ing the national character of Greek society. Is it desirable or is it harm-
ful to be like the West and Europe? The question remains unresolved. 
The West is supposed to be against ‘our culture’, but it is still followed 
and imitated.
5. There is an unresolved ambivalence concerning the political and military 
relationship with the ‘West’. Both in Greece and in Turkey it is widely 
believed that the ‘West’ is favouring the Other, ‘our enemy’, Turkey and 
Greece, respectively. Greeks accuse the West of selfishly reneging on its 
duty to stand by its ally, Turks accuse the West of anti-Islamist favourit-
ism for Greece.
6. Both sides explain and justify their anti-Western/anti-European positions 
with a recourse to history. The problem with the historical argument is 
that, while the examples of past enmity are real, they are selectively cho-
sen and partially presented. Instances of European support are passed 
over in silence, such as the European support for the Greek War of Inde-
pendence in the 1820s, French and Italian neutrality in support of the 
Turkish War of Independence in 1923 and NATO support against the USSR 
in the Cold War. Instead, history is skewed to blame the Other.
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7. The negative aspects of the ‘West’ are raised or dropped as suits the 
occasion. When bilateral relations are harmonious, the past and the 
‘character’ of the Other are shown in a positive light, or neutrally. When 
problems occur the accusatory repertoire is re-activated. These ups and 
downs are themselves ‘explained’ by ‘history’ too: a historical ‘friendship’ 
or an ‘enmity’ is recalled according to the needs of the moment. The 
‘character’ of Europe reflects the political attitudes of the moment. The 
image of Europe was positive during the years 2002–2008 in Turkey but 
turned negative later; and likewise the Greeks suddenly remembered the 
‘hypocrisy’ of the West and of the Germans when they were asked to pay 
back state loans.
8. The discourse is often at variance with actual events. The theme that the 
‘West’ is against Turkey because of Christian prejudices of the Christians 
vis-à-vis Muslims was formulated at a time when Muslims in the Middle 
East were involved in fierce internecine and religiously motivated strife. 
This intra-Islamic clash is much more cruel and bloody than anything that 
is denounced in the relationship between the so-called East and West. 
Similarly, tensions between Sunni and Alevite Muslims within Turkey are 
much more pronounced than any real or imagined East-West controversy.
5 Assessment and Analysis
All these contradictions signal the necessity not to take the anti-European 
discourse at its face value. The terms ‘West’ and ‘Europe’ do not have definite 
meanings, are volatile and emotive terms, understood differently by different 
people in Greece and Turkey; and their meanings change in time, too, con-
tingently. They serve a purpose, though, and that is why they exist. The most 
common use of these terms is to blame the Other: to a power that is seen as an 
enemy, as a rival, as a threat.
The terms ‘Europe’ and ‘West’ are preferred to specific names of countries 
by virtue of their very vagueness. A term that evokes a large number of oppo-
nents suggests, on the one hand, that the adversary is mighty, while, on the 
other hand, ‘we’ too can stand up to them. Rhetorically, ‘Europe is against us’ is 
more effective than ‘Germany is against us’. The use of a vague term like ‘West’ 
is also a diplomatic way to state complaints and accusations indirectly and 
without escalating a controversy with a specific country or group of countries. 
‘Westerners are hypocrites’ is more allowable than ‘the French are hypocrites.’
The terms Europe and the West recall and reactivate the past. They remind 
‘us’ of our old historical enemies (be they real or constructed), and remind the 
Other of his ancient guilt such as the colonial past, and frame the present in 
The EU and the East-West Paradox 155
the cognitive comfort zone of century-long stereotypes and prejudices, dating 
back to old religious conflicts.
This discourse has all the hallmarks of classical nationalist ideology and 
argumentation: It is xenophobic, proclaims one’s own moral superiority over 
inferior foreigners, frames modern relations in the putatively timeless essence 
of eternal national characters, and imputes, by an act of projection, whatever 
enmity is involved wholly to the Other’s malice.
When all these contradictions and ambiguities are taken into consider-
ation, one may be tempted to conclude that the anti-Western/anti-European 
discourse is used tactically as a political rhetoric: to voice complaints and 
demands. ‘You do not accept a cut on our debt’, or ‘You do not accept us in the 
EU’. Such accusations bespeak a victimised self-image and a national identity 
in anguish: ‘We are being treated unjustly, humiliated’, etc. Used opportunis-
tically, either to demand ‘understanding’ and ‘compassion’ for ‘our shortcom-
ings’ and some other times to ask for help, this rhetoric operates as a defense 
mechanism against criticism – saying ‘but you have done worse things’ – and 
as a justification for demands – saying ‘you owe something to us; you have to 
make amends.’ All anti-Western discourses indirectly and eventually express a 
request.
There is also another way to account for this aggrieved sense of Eastern 
victimhood. In the less developed (industrialised and democratisedised) 
countries outside North-Western Europe, capitalism was introduced as an 
‘imported’ foreign phenomenon. Anti-capitalist reactions, which in Western 
Europe found outlets in the form of Romanticism and socialism, could in 
South-Eastern Europe take the form of resistance against a foreign, ‘Western/
European’ way of life. Indeed all anti-Western criticism is characterised by nos-
talgic conservatism and an emphasis on wholesome home-grown traditions. 
Anti-Western discourse in Greece and Turkey corresponds – by analogy – to 
the conservative (anti-capitalist) discourse of the industrialised countries of 
the nineteenth century.
This ‘Eastern reaction’ to modernism is reflected in the different socialist 
discourses, too. In the ‘West’ the fight for socialism is expressed as an anti-cap-
italist movement; in Greece and Turkey this reaction is mostly directed against 
‘imperialism’. In other words, what in the ‘West’ is experienced as class griev-
ances is voiced in Greece and Turkey as anti-Western grievances.
6 How to Cope with National Images
Anti-western nationalism is somehow different from the original nationalism 
of the west. First, it is late by two or three centuries. Second, the modernisation 
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process in countries that invoke it is less advanced than in the early nationalist 
countries. This economic difference creates the self-image of being non-West-
ern (and non-Eastern as well) and having a Balkan and maybe a Near-eastern 
identity; or an identity associated with a non-Western religious tradition such 
as Islam and Orthodoxy.
Differences in religion and culture do not in themselves create the tension. 
The tension is created by rising nationalism and the attendant antagonism 
between Self and Other. In Greece and Turkey, anti-western discourse is almost 
always associated with emerging or current nationalist ideals.
Naturally (and fortunately) not all Greeks and Turks share the same ideas 
and attitudes. One encounters firmly pro-European views and critiques of 
phobic nationalism. To interpret anti-westernism in an essentialist manner 
as a ‘clash of civilisations’ and to underestimate its ideological (nationalist) 
nature may operate as self-fulfilling prophecy: The beliefs and the perceptions 
may turn into real actions and situations.
Apart from our image of the Other, the image that we have of the Other’s 
image vis-à-vis us is of paramount importance in the case of mutual antag-
onisms as with Greeks and Turks. They are very keen to see how the Other 
sees them; and they develop a new image: the meta-image of how the Other 
sees them.35 This image at present is negative. The Greeks believe that ‘West-
erners’ consider them lazy, extravagant, easy going and worse: unworthy and 
insufficiently civilised descendants of their ancient ancestors. Turks also think 
that the image of the Europeans about them is very negative: Easterners, aliens 
to European values and culture, historically and religiously associated with 
despotism and terrorism. Such meta-images are deeply hostile to the Other 
while imputing that same hostility to the Other; it cannot but be detrimental 
to the relations between nations. To control accusatory discourses and to rec-
ognize whatever is good in the Other would be a more helpful and constructive 
approach for all parties concerned.
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CHAPTER 8
The Image of the Wall
The Antemurale Christianitatis Myth from an Imagological Perspective
Zrinka Blažević
 Abstract
The interpretative focus of this contribution is on the antemurale Christianitatis myth, 
which is one of the most durable historical myth-symbol complexes typical for the 
heterotopic cultures of the European periphery. Its first part highlights the epistemo-
logical status and imago-generative quality of historical myths within the theoretical 
framework of historical imagology. In the second part, the analysis focusses on the 
multiple uses, functions and meanings of this antemurale Christianitatis myth within 
Croatian culture over a long historical period. Special attention is paid to detecting 
how it simultaneously functions both as a rich repository of auto- and hetero-images 
as indispensable means for symbolic construction of collective identities and as a vital 
part of Croatian social imagery and cultural memory. Together with its structural and 
functional features, the modalities of intertextual, interdiscursive and intermedial cir-
culation of the antemurale Christianitatis myth are also examined. In this way, light is 
shed on the extraordinarily high ideological and political potential of the antemurale 
Christianitatis myth which could be reactivated at any time, for example as a conse-
quence of migration pressures on the Balkan route.
1 Introduction
These days, when the American president puts all his efforts into building an 
“impenetrable, physical, tall, powerful, beautiful wall” along the US-Mexican 
border,1 and the eastern borders of the Schengen area have been protected by 
metal fences and razor wire, the image of the wall ceases to be a pure historical 
reminiscence of chivalric medieval times or a sentimental cultural reference 
1 As a Republican presidential nominee, Donald Trump described his proposed wall along 
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to the legendary Pink Floyd album. It is no wonder that the image of the wall 
gains its currency in Croatia, one of the newer EU members and one of the 
most exposed countries on the Balkan refugee route, since it is one of the most 
vital elements of the antemurale Christiantitatis myth, which has played an 
indispensable role in the historical imagery and cultural memory of Croatia.2 
This paper will therefore scrutinize more closely this mythical-symbolic com-
plex from the imagological perspective.
Regrettably, literary imagology has not focused enough analytical attention 
on historical and political myths despite their decisive role in the construction 
of the self-image of communities.3 Recent imagological research on historical 
mythology of the European nations is mostly concerned with the structural 
elements of the mythical narratives, such as historical and allegorical mythical 
figures, the characteristics of their medial representations and the functions of 
myths within the national memory.4
2 The Functioning of Historical Myth
For the purpose of this analysis, I will outline a provisional theoretical and 
methodological scheme for the research of historical myths. As a heuristic plat-
form profoundly suitable for scrutinising complex imagemes such as historical 
myths, I would propose a framework of historical imagology which operates 
with a broader concept of image. The image is defined as an interferential con-
figuration of mental images, textual and non-textual representations and prac-
tice patterns which are constituted within a certain socio-historical context. 
Seen from the perspective of that subtle dialectics of structure and agency or 
objectification and embodiment, an image could appear as a constitutive part 
both of collectively disposable cultural imagery and individual experience of 
the world. Accordingly, images can be understood not only as cognitive and 
perceptive products of the human brain or various kinds of visual represen-
tations, but also as formative elements of all cultural imaginaries, i.e. systems 
2 This fact was recognised during the 1990’s by the most prominent Croatian philosophers and 
sociologists who extensively wrote about the antemurale myth (See e.g. Paić (1997), Žanić 
(1999)). Surprisingly enough, the antemurale Christianitatis myth has not attracted any inter-
est of Croatian historians, not to mention imago logists, although it may be an inexhaustible 
source both for the historical and imagological research.
3 For a brief overview on the research of myths in literary history and historiography see Beller 
(2007), pp. 373−376. 
4 See Beller (2007), p. 375.
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of signs and/or thoughts with ideological, axiological and affective potentials 
which represent imaginational possibilities of a culture in a certain period.5
The proposed conceptualisation is in many aspects congruent with the 
theory of political myth recently launched by the Italian philosopher  Chiara 
Bottici. Accentuating praxeological and phenomenological approaches as 
foundations for her theoretical conceptualisation, Bottici defines political 
myth as a complex narrative which coagulates and produces significance 
shared by the group by virtue of addressing the specific political conditions 
in which the group operates.6 Although political myth shares many structural 
and functional features both with historical narratives and other kind of myths 
(natural, religious, foundational myths etc.), Bottici argues that it can be treated 
as a specific category thanks to its inherent capability to inspire and prompt 
political action.7 This capability of political myth is possible due to its ability 
to generate imaginary significations which Bottici, following the theory of the 
social imaginary by French philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis, regards as an 
indispensable element for the constitution and functioning of each society.8
Inspired by the theoretical presumptions of Hans Blumenberg, Bottici 
deems political myth not a final product, but a process of continual reworking 
5 For a more detailed account see Blažević (2012), pp. 105f.
6 See Bottici (2007), p. 180.
7 See Bottici (2007), p. 216.
8 Beside his inspiring influence on the philosophy of political myths, Cornelius Castoriadis’s 
work has many possible incentives for imagological research as well. According to his quite 
radical imagocentric theory, social imagery itself possesses an ontological priority vis-a-vis 
both reality and society: “The social world is, in every instance, constituted and articulated 
as a function of such a system of significations, and these significations exist, once they have 
been constituted, in the mode of what we called the actual imaginary (or the imagined). 
It is only relative to these significations that we can understand the ‘choice’ of symbolism 
made by every society, and in particular the choice of its institutional symbolism, as well as 
the ends to which it subordinates ‘functionality’. Incontestably caught up in the constraints 
of the real and the rational, always inserted in a historical continuum and, consequently, 
codetermined by what was already there and cannot be freely manipulated, the production 
of these significations cannot be exhaustibly reduced to one of these factors or to all of them 
together. This cannot be done because none of these factors can fill the role of these sig-
nifications, none can ‘answer’ the questions that they ‘answer’. […] In the same way, every 
society defines and develops an image of the natural world, of the universe in which it lives, 
attempting in every instance to make of it a signifying whole, in which a place has to be made 
not only for the natural objects and beings important for the life of the collectivity, but also 
for the collectivity itself, establishing, finally, a certain ‘world-order’. This image, this more or 
less structured vision of the whole of available human experience, makes use in each case 
of the rational lines of what is given, but arranges them according to and subordinates them 
to significations which themselves do not belong to the rational order (nor, moreover, to a 
positive irrational order) but to the imaginary.” Castoriadis (1997), p. 146 and 149.
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of the basic narrative core of mythologem, which is endowed with cognitive, 
practical and aesthetical dimensions.9 In order to provide functional cognitive 
schemata for mapping the social world by reducing the complexity of social 
life, as well as to mobilize people for social action, political myths are usually 
represented in a dramatic form, evoking a kind of pathos.10
According to Bottici, important features of political myths are their posi-
tional character, multimedial appropriateness and condensational power. In 
other words, they are always constructed from the standpoint of the present 
and they are appropriate for representation in various media: textual, visual, 
audio and performative ones.11 Thanks to the ubiquity of potential medial 
conveyors of political myths under the contemporary conditions of globalised 
spectacle, they can cause “the primacy effect” more easily than ever.12 In addi-
tion to this, as Christopher G. Flood has convincingly demonstrated, political 
myths are endowed with a condensational power which refers to their capacity 
to condense things into a few images or “icons”.13 For all these reasons, political 
myths are able to incite practical understanding which, recursively, strength-
ens their persuasive potential and, subsequently, their mobilising effect.14
9 In his famous work Arbeit am Mythos, Hans Blumenberg develops a processual approach 
to myths. In short, his main proposition is that a basic narrative core of the myth, a 
mythologem, must change over time to be appropriated by different requirements and 
exigencies in order to answer a need for significance. See Blumenberg (1979).
10 See Bottici (2007), p. 181.
11 Bottici (2007), p. 214.
12 Christopher G. Flood launched the term in order to stress that a person’s earliest per-
ceptions of a phenomenon function as a powerful basis for generalisations, categorisa-
tions and expectations that are not easily or adequately revised in the light of subsequent 
observations. The “primacy effect” is a distinguishing feature of political myths primar-
ily due to their emotional appeal which leads to a narrowing of attention, with a conse-
quent reduction of categories used for the interpretation of the phenomenon. For a more 
detailed account see Flood (2002), pp. 86f. 
13 In his insightful analysis of structural and functional features of political myths, Flood 
points to the specific ability of images to evoke mythical stories. According to Flood, they 
do so in the following manner: a) by depicting particular, identified historical actors in 
particular, identified situations; b) by depicting particular, identified persons in stock, 
hypothetical, or imaginary situations; c) by depicting unidentified persons representa-
tive of a group in particular, identified, historical situations; d) by depicting unidentified, 
representative persons in stock, hypothetical or imaginary situations; e) by depicting alle-
gorical figures or supernatural entities in identified historical situations; and f) by depict-
ing allegorical or supernatural figures in stock, hypothetical or imaginary situations. See 
Flood (2002), pp. 167f. 
14 On practical understanding, which refers to the implicit, intuitive and embodied knowl-
edge, as one of the key concepts of practice theory, see Schatzki (2001), pp. 10−18.
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As constitutive parts of a social imaginary, which Bottici, again following 
Cornelius Castoriadis, conceptualizes as a symbolic network of imaginary sig-
nifications which provide social meanings, political myths might obtain both 
legitimising and critical functions.15 In this sense, political myths are similar 
to ideology viewed as a “a set of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify 
ends and means of organised social action, and specifically political action, 
irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild 
a given social order.”16 However, the impact of political myths is in many cases 
superior to those of ideology thanks to the pathos evoked by their emotional 
and affective quality which makes them more appropriate means for politi-
cal mobilisation.17 Finally, by virtue of their inherently plural nature which 
enables multiple identitary recognitions and juxtapositions, political myths 
are indispensable vehicles for constructing both individual and collective 
political and cultural identities.18 Or, as Chiara Bottici succinctly formulates, 
“as narrative which can coagulate and provide significance, political myth uni-
fies all the various elements that constitute common identity which comes 
to be recognised and accepted by a plurality of living, acting and narrating 
bodies.”19
3 The antemurale Christianitatis Myth in History
Although at first glance the antemurale Christianitatis myth belongs to the 
category of historical or even cultural myths, thanks to its inherent structural 
and functional characteristics it can also be regarded as a political myth par 
excellence. According to the distinction between these two categories made 
by Bottici, political myth, unlike historical with which it shares narrative form, 
has to be received as a drama which makes its moral explicit in order to prompt 
15 See Bottici (2007), pp. 225f.
16 Flood (2002), p. 13.
17 See Bottici (2007), p. 196.
18 Bottici warns that every attempt to scrutinize the complex issue of identitary recogni-
tions and juxtapositions must necessarily take into account the following relations: the 
relation of the singular human being with himself or herself; relations of different singu-
lar human beings with each other; relations between the same singular human beings 
with themselves in time, as well as the relations between them and a tertium (i. e. nation, 
gender or another social group) and even the relation of this tertium with itself. See Bot-
tici (2007), p. 235.
19 Bottici (2007), p. 243.
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political action.20 Since the antemurale Christianitatis myth has been one of 
the key factors of the Croatian “identitary battles” for almost half of a millenni-
um,21 its political connotations and mobilising power are more than obvious. 
Therefore, the following imagological analysis of the antemurale Christianita-
tis myth will be situated among the proposed theoretical coordinates which 
seem appropriate enough to examine its cognitive and explanatory values.
The metaphor of “the bulwark of Christendom” was a flattering epithet for 
the French defenders of Edessa which had been coined in the twelfth century 
by Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153), a fervid preacher of the Second Crusade. 
It became a fairly widespread syntagm in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
when Ottoman incursions reached their peak. It originated in the prophecies 
of the Old Testament, i.e. in the Book of Praise, where the prophet Isaiah envis-
aged the destruction of Moab,22 and has been an indispensable element of 
the rhetoric of the Crusades. Therefore, it could easily be adapted to the cir-
cumstances of the Ottoman threat within the early modern European  political 
imaginary, which was deeply imbued with religious symbolism.
In order to symbolically compensate for the military efforts in defending 
Christianity as well as to exculpate themselves for not providing sufficient 
material assistance, European secular holders of power attributed this fash-
ionable nickname to Croatia, Hungary and Poland, which were situated on the 
first line of the anti-Ottoman defence. Soon the nickname developed into a 
powerful element of these countries’ self-description and a potent mytholo-
gem which abundantly fuelled their respective national mythomoteurs. 23
As far as the Croatian historical imagery is concerned, the first mention of 
the antemurale Christianitatis title was linked to the sacral and moral author-
ity of Pope Leo X (1475−1521). After hearing a report on anti-Ottoman battles 
in Croatia submitted by the Tragurian bishop Thomas Niger, the pope in the 
consistory held on 12 of December 1519 allegedly named Croatia “scudum solid-
issimus et antemurale Christianitatis” i.e. “the strongest shield and bulwark of 
20 See Bottici (2007), p. 216.
21 Žanić (2003), p. 161.
22 See Isaiah 26.2.
23 The nickname of bulwark and shield of Christianity were attributed to Hungary and Cro-
atia for the first time by the Hungarian kings Vladislaus I (1424−1444) and Vladislaus II 
(1456−1516) Jagiellon in the second half of the fifteenth century. Afterwards it was used 
by Maximilian I (1459−1519) and Ferdinand I (1503−1564) of Habsburg to accentuate 
the importance of Croatian lands for defending the eastern borders of the Holy Roman 
Empire. In Poland the motif of antemurale Christianitatis was especially popularised 
during the seventeenth century by the authors of Polish Sarmatism (e. g. Wespazjan 
Kochowski in his Polish Psalmody published in 1695). See Žanić (2003), pp. 164f.
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Christendom”.24 Although not corroborated by historical evidence, this fancy 
metaphor was rapidly appropriated by numerous Croatian humanists and dip-
lomats such as Count Bernardin and Krsto Frankopan.25 They used it mainly 
as a powerful tool for legitimising the claiming of military subsidy from the 
Roman popes and Habsburg Emperors during the first half of the sixteenth 
century.26
In addition, during the early modern period the antemurale mythologem 
was simultaneously integrated into the elite political discourse and turned into 
an indispensable element of the chivalric and heroic self-image of the Croatian 
nobility.27 In order to enhance its mobilising value and emulative potential, it 
was hypostatised in the heroic figure of Nikola Šubić Zrinski (1508–1566), the 
“Croatian Leonidas”. He was a famous Croatian viceroy and nobleman who was 
murdered as a martyr while defending the fortress of Szygetvár from the copi-
ous Ottoman army led by the sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (1494−1566) 
in 1566.28
24 Šanjek (1993), pp. 351f.
25 Count Bernardin Frankopan (1453−1529) delivered his “Speech for Croatia” in Latin lan-
guage at the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire on 19 November 1522 in Nürnberg, while his 
son Krsto (1472−1527) addressed his memorandum on Croatia, dated 1 July 1523, to Pope 
Adrian VI (1459–1523). 
26 E. g. the fragment of Krsto Frankopan’s memorandum addressed to Adrian VI: “There is 
no word which can describe how crudely and under worst penances our people were 
treated under the most cruel Turkish yoke and violence. Holy Father, in Croatia can be 
seen children who are slaughtered in front of their parents’ eyes and men in front of eyes 
of their wives. Wives are dishonoured, virgins raped, sacred places and priests desecrated. 
Holy Father! Croatia is a bulwark and shield of Christendom, especially of border prov-
inces such as Carinthia, Carniola, Istria, Friuli and Italy. If Croatia – God forbid – would 
be occupied, all of the above mentioned torments would endanger its neighbouring 
provinces and there would be a clear and open way for the Turks.” Gligo (1983), p. 356. 
 [Translations by the author].
27 For a seventeenth century example of the literary construction of the heroic Croatian 
self-image see Blažević (2010), pp. 35−42.
28 The siege of Szygetvár was first described by Ferenc Črnko, a scribe and chamberlain of 
Nikola Šubić Zrinski, who was an eyewitness of that battle. After the fall of Szygetvár, 
Črnko was captured by the Turks, but he was eventually bought out by Nikola’s son Juraj. 
Under his influence, Črnko wrote a literary chronicle on the battle of Szygetvár in Cro-
atian, which was translated into Latin by Slovenian writer Samuel Budina in 1568 and 
thus became a pretext for the later works dealing with this famous episode. The siege 
of Szygetvár was especially popularised in the seventeenth century by Nikola Zrinski’s 
great-grandson Nikola VII (1620−1664), the author of the famous epos Adriai tengernek 
Syrenaia (published in Hungarian in 1651), which was subsequently translated into Cro-
atian and published by his brother Petar IV (1621−1671) under the title Adrianskoga mora 
sirena in 1660. They might be considered the founders of the Nikola Šubić Zrinski myth 
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During the period of the Croatian national movement in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the antemurale Christianitatis myth encountered a significant modifica-
tion in order to adapt to the new political circumstances and ideological needs. 
The role of the Croatians as traditional guardians of the Western civilisation 
was projected back to the thirteenth century when, according to the legend, 
the wild hordes of Tatars were defeated by the intrepid Croatian army in the 
field of Grobnik near the town of Rijeka in 1242.29 Together with the important 
“antiquation-effect”,30 which situates the Croatian bulwark function even in 
the pre-Ottoman times, the nineteenth-century version of the myth brought 
forth new enemies – the barbarous Tatars – who were symbolically identified 
with the Hungarians, the main political and ideological rivals of the Croats in 
that period.31
The rise of various Slavophile ideologies in the second half of the nine-
teenth century brought about a kind of antemurale counter-myth. It absorbed 
its ideological potential from the historical episode of the pan-Slavic Chris-
tianisation project by S. Cyril and Methodius which took place in the ninth 
century.32 In contrast to the impermeable and exclusionary character of the 
wall, the new myth envisaged Croatia as a permeable civilisational bridge or 
which simultaneously played an important role as a strategy of the noble representation 
of the family and as a cornerstone of the Croatian national identity and cultural memory. 
See Blažević, Coha (2007), pp. 137−164. On later appropriations and literary representa-
tions of the Zrinski myth in Croatian, Austrian and Hungarian cultures see Kovács (2015), 
pp. 83−100. 
29 Although the legendary battle of Grobnik between Tatars and Croats was first mentioned 
in the Chronicle published by Croatian historiographer Pavao Ritter Vitezović (1652−1713) 
in 1696, it became an indispensable part of Croatian national memory primarily thanks 
to the romanticist poem The field of Grobnik published by the poet Dimitrije Demeter 
(1811−1872) in the Croatian literary journal Kolo in 1842. For a synthetic overview see 
Rapacka (2002), pp. 70f.
30 See Stergar (2016), pp. 96–99.
31 See Rapacka (2002), p. 71.
32 The cult of S. Cyril (826/827869) and Methodius (before 815−885), known as the ‘apostles 
of the Slavs’, who translated the Bible into the Church Slavonic language and invented the 
Glagolitic and Cyrillic alphabet, has been abundantly documented in Croatia since the 
medieval period. However, it gained a new popularity in the nineteenth century when 
it was used as a legitimising idea for the political unity and cultural identity of the Slavs 
in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as well as an important factor of distinctive Slavic 
national ideologies, including the Croatian one. The main promotors of their cult in Croa-
tia were bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815−1905) and historian Franjo Rački (1828−1894). 
As an important nineteenth century Croatian mythomoteur, the cult of S. Cyril and Metho-
dius serves to promote and legitimize Yugophile ideas of South Slavic cultural, political 
and religious unity, but also functions as a proof of the national character of the universal 
Catholic church. For a more detailed account see Rapacka (2002), pp. 35−37.
168 Blažević
crossroads. In this way it enhanced the images of Croatia’s religious and cul-
tural heterogeneity and plurality not only as acceptable, but also as distinctive 
markers of its identity.33
In the course of the turbulent twentieth century, both versions of the Cro-
atian auto-mythologems lived on, confronting, intertwining but always con-
forming to the various ideological purposes and political needs. The classical 
variant of the antemurale myth was mainly nurtured and reproduced within 
the conservative and clerical political discourse,34 while its counter-myth 
retained its popularity predominantly among leftist and Yugophile political 
circles.35 The most interesting example of the ideological adoption of the 
antemurale myth for the anti-Soviet political platform of Josip Broz Tito stems 
from the beginning of the 1950’s, when Yugoslavia was pompously proclaimed 
“a rock which defends the democratic West.”36 However, a more widespread 
antemurale metaphor during the socialist period included images of Yugosla-
via as “a bastion of self-managing socialism” and a “fortress of the brotherhood 
and unity.”37
As could be expected, the new revival of the antemurale myth with its entire 
symbolic repertoire has occurred under Tuđman’s regime during the 1990’s. 
Moreover, its ideological content was slightly modernised, so that the standard 
religious symbolism was enriched with a Huntingtonian dash of ‘civilisational 
clash’. Accordingly, faced with the military threat from Belgrade, the young and 
independent Republic of Croatia was again promoted to the bulwark of West-
ern Christianity, civilisation and democracy against the contemptible Eastern 
33 See Žanić (2003), p. 176f.
34 The most prominent propagators of the classical version of the antemurale myth were, 
among others, the bishop of Krk Antun Mahnič (1850−1920), the Jesuit philosopher and 
publicist Fran Bitnički (1875−1945) and the geographer Filip Lukas (1871−1958). After the 
Second World War, members of the Croatian radical political emigration revived the 
antemurale myth once again in order to mobilize Western countries against the new 
Yugoslav state. In 1953 they issued a postage stamp which iconographically represented 
the main elements of their revisionist political ideology: the Croatian historical coat-of-
arms, a portrait of cardinal Alojzije Stepinac, who was sentenced by the communist gov-
ernment, a map of Croatia in its maximised ‘natural’ borders and a baptistery of count 
Višeslav from the ninth century as a symbol of Croatian Christian identity, with the over-
arching title Antemurale Christianitatis – Pope Leo X 1519. For a more detailed account see 
Žanić (2003), pp. 184−187. 
35 This trend was especially reinforced after 1980 when Pope John Paul II declared S. Cyril 
and Methodius “co-patrons of Europe”. For a more detailed account see Žanić (2003), 189f.
36 Cited in Žanić (2003), p. 187. This statement was launched by Josip Broz Tito during his 
speech delivered in Slovenia in September 1952, in the middle of the so-called Trieste crisis.
37 Žanić (2003), p. 188.
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Orthodoxy, uncivilised Byzantinism and Communism. Interestingly enough, 
until 1993 and Tuđman’s break with his Muslim allies in Bosnia, and for reasons 
of political correctness, the preferred version was the ‘Grobnik version’ of the 
antemurale myth with the Tatars in the role of the inimical Other. After 1993, 
the ‘Grobnik version’ of the antemurale myth was mostly used in its archetypal 
Islamic variant epitomised in the heroic figure of Nikola Šubić Zrinski, whose 
name was given even to the state decoration of the Republic of Croatia insti-
tuted for “heroic deeds in the war” by Franjo Tuđman in 1995.38
After Tuđman’s death at the end of 1999 and the election victory of the 
Social Democratic Party in 2000, the antemurale myth and its bridge/cross-
roads counter-myth happily coexisted within the Croatian political discourse. 
Naturally, there has been a slight predomination of the one version or another 
depending on the conservative or liberal orientation of the currently ruling 
political establishment.39
4 Conclusion
As far as the classical antemurale myth is concerned, worth exploring are also 
its structural features and imago-generative mechanisms, which nurtured its 
ideological potency and political efficiency. Following Bottici’s classification, 
its most striking feature is certainly the mechanism of coagulation. It is simul-
taneously realised on different structural, functional and semiotic levels, which 
greatly enhance its imagological value. First of all, it rests on the bonding of the 
positive auto-image (i.e. Croats) and negative hetero-images (Tatars or Turks), 
as well as on the intertwining of the sacral and military semantic fields. They 
are epitomised in the figure of the athleta Christi, i.e. an exemplary national 
martyr and a hero who sacrifices his life in the battle against the enemies of 
Christianity.40 In addition to this, coagulation is realised in the form of the 
fusion of temporal horizons by constructing an imaginary analogy between 
the past and the present, which serves as a model for the future actions. At 
the most abstract level, there is the coagulation between the internal and the 
external. It produces a significant symbolic effect of including Croatia into the 
38 For a more detailed account see Žanić (2003), p. 190−193.
39 See Žanić (2003), pp. 194f.
40 The exemplary model of heroic martyrdom of the athleta Christi is that of Nikola Šubić 
Zrinski, who proudly refused Suleiman’s offer to surrender the fortress and personally 
led a breach from Szygetvár. For a detailed analysis of discursive constructions of heroic 
martyrdom of Nikola Šubić Zrinski see Blažević, Coha (2007), pp. 139−141. 
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Western and Christian civilisation while simultaneously excluding it from the 
barbaric and infidel East.
An imago-generative quality of the antemurale myth is additionally bol-
stered by two complementary modes. One is a strategy of symbolic condensa-
tion, which refers to the structural capacity of a myth to condense its content 
into few images or icons. Without any damage to its semantic or ideological 
potentials, the antemurale Christianitatis myth can thus be reduced to an archi-
tectural element or a sign like a bulwark, fortress and wall, or to a historical per-
son like Nikola Šubić Zrinski. Another one is a principle of symbolic extension 
by virtue of which particular persons, places or historical events might easily 
be generalised to designate entire nations, religions or civilisations, which is a 
basic strategy of construction of the Croatian national auto-image.
Furthermore, important features of the antemurale myth are its polysemic 
and multimedial qualities, which enable its highly successful intertextual, 
interdiscursive and intermedial circulation throughout its long historical 
duration. From the sixteenth century onwards, the antemurale myth has been 
articulated in various literary and documentary genres and visual arts and 
especially in nineteenth-century historical painting.41 A very convenient 
medium for reproducing the antemurale myth are musical works as well. Its 
most famous example is the monumental national opera Nikola Šubić Zrinjski 
composed by Ivan Zajc in 1876.42
41 The most representative example is certainly a painting entitled Antemurale Christiani-
tatis by Ferdinand Quiquerez (1845−1893), a Croatian painter of French origin, in 1892. It 
is an allegory of Croatia fighting against the Turks. Croatia is represented as a young and 
beautiful woman crowned by laurels. She holds a flaming sword in her right hand and the 
Croatian coat-of-arms pinned by arrows in her left. Croatia stands on the monumental 
staircase and fights against the Turks who invade from below, while behind her back the 
most famous representatives of the Western intellectual and cultural life peek fearfully: 
Rafael, Dante, Michelangelo, Galileo, Moliére and Shakespeare. In the background the 
contours of the St. Peter‘s Dome can be seen, which clearly illustrates Croatia‘s role in 
defending European civilisational values. 
42 The opera Nikola Šubić Zrinski (tragedy in three acts) composed by Ivan Zajc (1832−1914) 
after a libretto by Hugo Badalić (1851−1900) is doubtlessly the most popular Croatian 
musical work. From its premiere, which took place in the Croatian National Theatre in 
Zagreb in 1876, until the beginning of the 1990’s it was performed around 2000 times, 
which is the best proof of its popularity. The best known element of the opera is a song To 
battle, to battle set to lyrics by Franjo Marković. It is no surprise that the heroic martyrdom 
of the athleta Christi Nikola Šubić, which strikingly resembles samurai values, has been 
recognised in Japan as well. The song To battle, to battle was performed by a Japanese 
choir which numbered 1000 men, conducted by maestro Katsuaki Kozai in Tokyo in 2006. 
For a more detailed analysis of the imago-generative potential of the opera within the 
Croatian national culture see Marković (2014).
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By functioning as a rich repository of axiologically and affectively imbued 
auto- and hetero-images, the antemurale Christianitatis myth is certainly one 
of the most enduring cornerstones of Croatian national identity. Moreover, 
thanks to its compensatory function, the image of a small, but heroic nation 
situated at the very of edge of Europe with a God-given mission to defend the 
Western civilisational values still ranks very high in Croatian national mem-
ory. A very frightening proof of that statement provides the anti-immigration 
propaganda of Croatian right-wing, conservative and clerical circles which 
invigorates historical myths of the heroic battle of Croatian priests against 
the Ottoman threat within the recent political context of “soft Islamisation” 
allegedly caused by too liberal immigration politics of European states.43
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CHAPTER 9
Prime Time Nationalism
Patterns of Prejudice in tv Crime Fiction
Wulf Kansteiner
 Abstract
Media research has shown time and again that the narrative worlds of prime time tele-
vision have crafted powerful stereotypes of foreign recalcitrance and criminality. This 
contribution explores this dynamic through a case study of Germany’s most popular 
prime time television crime fiction series Tatort or Scene of the Crime. Prime time tele-
vision since the 1990s increasingly presented  sleek, emotionally manipulative stories of 
Turkish sexism, Polish slyness, Russian brutality, and Arabic terrorism, helping to estab-
lish them as widely shared social memories. It presents a narrative concoction all of its 
own, representing the liberal collective memory of the failure of multi-culturalism, and 
conveniently protecting the transnational liberal community from sharing the blame 
for the failed migration policies of the last decades. This contribution also explores an 
alternative: we need completely different media strategies to present images of people 
on the move and now living in our midst. Television prime time fiction and non-fiction 
should highlight the complexity and multi-causality of the migration experience, thus 
refraining from essentialising migrant profiles. Moreover, the media should reconstruct 
the challenges of migration from the moving people’s point of view, thus providing 
powerful vectors of identification for people currently not on the move.
Generals always prepare for the most recent war and politicians always man-
age the most recent migration crisis – or what they and their voters remember 
as the most recent crisis. In this way collective memories of migration play a 
decisive role in policy decisions and may prevent societies from developing 
appropriate responses to resettlement processes.
That was the case in Europe in the year 2016. An estimated 2.2 million peo-
ple arrived in the territory of the European Union during the so-called refugee 
crisis in 2015 and 2016 from Syria, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Eritrea and many other 
countries.1 That number represents merely 1.7% of the 130.9 million people 
1 See Conor (2017).
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forcefully displaced worldwide in those two years.2 Housing, feeding, and 
educating the two million hardly constitutes a serious financial or material 
challenge for the EU where, in 2016, 511 million people accumulated a com-
bined GDP of $16,4 trillion representing 21% of the global GDP.3 It would take 
a lot more refugees to overburden the resources of this area of extraordinary 
wealth. Moreover, in the long run, the refugees and their descendants are likely 
to become a demographic and financial asset rather than a burden to the EU.4 
We are clearly not dealing with a material problem but a problem of culture, 
mentalities, ethics – and memory. Some problems of misperception are short-
term memory problems. The citizens of the EU remember the financial crisis 
of 2007 accompanied by economic contraction (for the first time since 1945), 
increased material inequality, and modest decreases in standards of living in 
some member countries.5 That experience might have negatively influenced 
member societies’ willingness to welcome refugees into the EU. Other, more 
serious memory problems reflect long-term developments. Relevant segments 
of wealthy Northern European countries entertain decidedly negative views of 
the enduring consequences of post-WWII immigration events. They remem-
ber distinctly the labour migrations from Southern Europe in the 1960s and 
1970s and from Eastern Europe after 1990 and the influx of political asylum 
seekers since the 1990s as having harmed their societies.6 Again, these negative 
assessments have little to no basis in fact. For most economists, the migrations 
in question have had positive rather than negative financial effects on host 
societies, and crime statistics reveal that only a few specific immigrant groups 
exhibit a clearly elevated propensity to commit crimes.7 It is important to 
insist on these facts but that hardly suffices. Collective memories are not based 
in fact; they are based in stories, images, and feelings. Faced with incontrovert-
ible evidence to the contrary, populist politicians across Europe have insisted 
that they and their voters feel threatened by immigrants. Unfortunately, their 
feelings are difficult to change. Dealing with dysfunctional memories requires 
2 See UNHCR (2016); UNHCR (2017).
3 See World Bank (2017). 
4 See Kancs, Lecca (2017).
5 See Magalhaes (2015).
6 See Wilhelm (2017).
7 For a comprehensive assessment of the economic consequences of post World War II and 
post Cold War immigration in (West-) Germany see Spencer (1994); Klingst, Venohr (2017).
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effective memory analytics and memory interventions. We need new stories 
and feelings corresponding to the facts.8
The task of developing suitable memories and identities runs up against 
a veritable paradox. In principle, cultural memories and collective identities 
are fluid and malleable. Members of different collectives continuously rein-
vent themselves in symbolic and practical terms by differentiating individuals 
and groups that fall within their social contracts from those that fall outside 
of them or attain at best an ambivalent status. Plus, they constantly reshape 
the very nature of these contracts. For instance, scholars of nationalism have 
long abandoned the idea that cultural negotiations about the nation and its 
discontents unfold as stable processes and result in enduring notions of col-
lective identity. They prefer to imagine nations as highly contingent cultural 
and psychological phenomena involving a wide range of heterogeneous and 
contradictory com munications.9 At the same time, imagined communities 
and their invented traditions, including myths of national belonging, seem to 
have significant staying power even if they are blurry around the edges. Malle-
ability and persistence are not mutually exclusive characteristics in the politics 
of memory and identity. The figure of the migrant and stories about migra-
tion play a decisive role in Western post-colonial societies’ efforts to imagine 
themselves as sedentary, stable, advanced, civilised, and deservedly affluent. 
Unfortunately, refugees are subjected to these powerful fantasies of othering 
that come in many different flavors, from outright xenophobia to arrogant 
benevolence.10
The situation is analytically further complicated by the diversity of media 
arenas implicated in memory and identity negotiations. Nationally consti-
tuted, highly centralised, and transnationally networked old media landscapes 
like television co-mingle with social media environments with very different, 
multi-directional patterns of cultural communication and authorship and new 
forms of concentrated power over communication contents and structures 
(Hoskins 2018). Yet even if we focus on old media, which are our primary con-
cern in this article, the task of cultural analysis remains complicated. There is 
8 On the importance of debate and messaging in counteracting xenophobic political actors, 
see Lochocki (2018). In this context it is important to consider how European national 
and transnational government institutions and media companies narrate and remember 
Europe and the EU. See Spohn, Eder (2016) and especially Bondebjerg et al. (2017). It is also 
important to avoid the danger of dysfunctional banal Europeanisation; see Trenz (2016).
9 See Brubaker (1996). 
10 See Bauman (2016); Nail (2015).
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ample material available to craft a compelling, robust story about the negative 
impact of TV content on migration memories. Media research, for example, 
has shown time and again that the narrative worlds of prime time television 
feature powerful negative stereotypes of foreign recalcitrance and criminali-
ty.11 As prime time became ever more violent and crime-obsessed in the 1990s, 
hardly an evening went by in the big European TV markets without sleek, emo-
tionally manipulative stories of Turkish sexism, Polish slyness, Russian bru-
tality, and Arabic terrorism, followed by exceedingly repetitive late night talk 
shows echoing similar views and possibly establishing them as widely shared 
social memories.12 The story can be further elaborated by connecting key ele-
ments of popular culture to right wing radicalisation. Effectively enhanced by 
racist propaganda, compacted collective symbols of alterity may have found 
an eager audience among the voters of right-wing populist parties who tend 
to be “male, young(ish), of moderate educational achievement and concerned 
about immigrants and immigration”.13 This stream of repetitive media images 
and its social base might be the collective memory one is up against in an 
attempt to build a more inclusive society.
At the same time, the story is hardly that simple. First of all, TV content 
about foreigners and migration has often not been dominated by negative 
stereotyping. To name just one example, after 9/11 US commercial television 
networks featured a great deal of Arab bashing but also a similarly sustained 
series of programs about good Muslims living the American dream while 
victimised by US xenophobia.14 All of that raises the interesting question of 
how audiences react to the co-presence of positive and negative stereotyping 
and, more specifically, of how viewers respond to ironic representations of 
ethnic and racial prejudice designed to counteract bigotry.15 While it makes 
sense to assume that centralised cultural distribution systems like television 
offer important information about popular registers of collective identity, 
one should keep in mind that the carefully designed fantasies of national and 
ethnic belonging distributed via satellite and cable differ in form and content 
from the ways in which citizens think and feel about the burden and privi-
leges of group affiliation. After all, even after decades of TV research, we have 
11 On stereotyping of muslims after 9/11, see Morey, Yaqin (2011); Mertens, de Smaele (2016). 
12 See Kretzschmar (2002); Trebbe (2009); Goebel (2017).
13 Arzheimer (2017), p. 287. The storyline is consistent with hegemonic interpretations of 
right-wing electoral success across Europe, see for instance the analysis of the 2017 federal 
election in Germany in Spiegel online in Kwasnieski (2017).
14 See Asultany (2012).
15 See Keding, Struppert (2009).
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frustratingly little insight into TV reception processes, although we know for 
instance that identical media texts may have very different effects in differ-
ent settings.16 Similar questions and lacunae arise when one directs one’s 
analytical gaze at the assumed users of anti-migration memories, for exam-
ple, the supporters of right wing political parties in Europe. The voter profiles 
generated by electoral sociologists only reflect the relative affinity between 
social data and voting decisions and even these profiles might already have 
been subject to significant mainstreaming.17 Moreover and more importantly, 
relative statements about voting propensities obviously provide no basis for 
connecting problematic media coverage to specific political phenomenon, for 
example, by linking the electoral success of the right wing political parties to 
prejudicial TV programs possibly consumed by their voters.18
I apply two conceptual perspectives to analyse the prehistory of the media 
event refugee crisis. First, a structuralist point of view well suited to highlight 
the problematic dynamics of post-colonial othering pervasive in Europe’s 
mass media. This traditional approach captures layers and continuities of 
post-WWII and post-colonial xenophobia and racism, demonstrating that the 
cultural arena has never been a level playing field for new arrivals. Refugees 
never had a real chance of inserting themselves successfully into a cultural ter-
rain systematically stacked against them. In addition, I apply a memory stud-
ies vantage point that paints a more complicated picture. As the collectively 
constructed crisis unfolded, two different memory regimes have struggled for 
supremacy. On the one hand, there were conventionally antagonistically struc-
tured memories confirming a simplistic us vs. them divide easily captured by 
structural analysis. These nationalistic memories contributed to the rise of the 
radical right across Europe – although it is remarkable how successfully the 
professed nationalists crafted transnational political and memory networks 
across the continent. On the other hand, some segments of Europe’s societ-
ies deployed top-down cosmopolitan memories to frame the crisis within a 
humanitarian narrative trajectory tapping into human rights and Holocaust 
memories. Both approaches were successful in that they mobilised political 
actions, although hardly in any integrated fashion or with comparable degrees 
of sustainability. The countries following traditional antagonistic storylines 
far outnumbered the countries willing to give cosmopolitanism a try, as for 
example Sweden and Germany did. Moreover, in the end, neither memory 
regime succeeded in providing compelling long-term perspectives and policy 
16 Lind (2010); Gorton (2009). 
17 See Rooduijn (2016).
18 See Arzheimer (2018); Ellinas (2018).
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solutions. The antagonistic narrative collides with the simple fact that Europe 
is a site of irreversible, large-scale migration whereas the cosmopolitan utopia 
fails to provide practical guidelines for generous yet also clearly circumscribed 
immigration policies. As we will see, Europe needs a third memory culture that 
can extend welcome to many more refugees and help with the difficult task of 
developing ethics of material and legal equality.
With these notes of caution and conceptual contextualisation we now turn 
to a layer of media history, and arguably also a powerful source of collective 
memories of migration that predates the ‘refugee crisis’ by over a decade and 
thus represents exactly the kind of media fare the witnesses, bystanders, and 
protagonists of the ‘migration crisis’ of 2015/16 have consumed over the course 
of the last decades. Our case study concerns the 2003–2004 season of the Ger-
man TV series Scene of the Crime (Tatort), which is Germany’s Sunday evening 
prime time flagship program and whose 2003–2004 season featured 34 broad-
casts and a number of in-depth engagements with the topic of migration.
1 Whose Jungle Is It Anyway?
On October 26th, 2003, 6.5 million German TV viewers watched Berlin detec-
tives Ritter and Stark solve the murder of an illegal immigrant from Nigeria 
whose corpse had been dumped at the airport. Jungle Brothers (Dschungel-
brüder), as the program is provocatively entitled, does not spare any didactic 
efforts but suffers from a number of shortcomings.
Right at the start, Ritter delivers an impressive yet also improbable 
impromptu lecture about the pieces of West African jewellery found on the 
dead man. Further along in the investigation, the Berlin cops dutifully, albeit 
somewhat laconically, inform the viewers about poverty and corruption in a 
long list of West African countries, criticize the exploitation of illegal immi-
grants as a source of cheap labor, and acknowledge that the majority of Afri-
can immigrants, including people who have lived in Germany for most of their 
lives, have no chance to attain refugee status. In passing, Ritter and Stark also 
perfunctorily deplore racism in Germany. But the program does not show vivid 
instances of racism with the exception of the occasional use of the word darky 
(‘Bimbo’) by one of the shadier characters of the story as he addresses his 
illegal immigrant workers. The program offers theoretical information about 
xenophobia but does not render it tangible in any meaningful way.
Jungle Brothers has other weaknesses. Perhaps in an attempt at realism in 
the depiction of police–immigrant relations, the creators of the film have the 
detectives treat black witnesses and suspects with considerable arrogance and 
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distrust. Thus the very carriers of PC-consciousness in the story, whom regular 
TV viewers know as compassionate figures, are reinforcing the symbolic divide 
between Germans and others—notwithstanding the fact that some of the oth-
ers are German citizens.19 Moreover, in order to satisfy the requirements of 
prime time and in an effort to illustrate that immigrants are human beings just 
like the viewers in front of the screen, the director has all black actors deliver 
their lines in flawless German. Thus characters in the story with non-German 
backgrounds, including recent arrivals, display stunning linguistic capabili-
ties that simply do not reflect everyday life in multi-lingual German cities.20 
This feat of foreign language acquisition bestows a cyborgian quality on some 
immigrant figures, inadvertently turning them into a specially marked group 
of people within the narrative universe on the screen.
However, the most decisive flaw of Jungle Brothers concerns the depiction 
of the crime itself. In the first scene of the film, the refugee Koffi is murdered 
by the black father of his girlfriend. The father is a successful business tycoon 
who immigrated to Germany from Cameroon in the late 1960s. He now owns 
commercial property all over Berlin and moves in the highest circles of the city, 
where he is almost but not completely accepted as an equal by his urban jungle 
brothers. The father finds Koffi unacceptable as a son-in-law, offers him money 
if he promises to leave his daughter alone, and accidentally kills him in the 
fight that ensues after Koffi rejects the bribe. Thus, the first-generation black 
immigrant turns out to be the biggest bigot in the world of Jungle Brothers.
The brief look at the plot structure of Jungle Brothers already hints at a fun-
damental dilemma that lurks at the intersection of the genre crime show and 
the topic of migration. The director and screenwriter of Jungle Brothers, Lars 
Becker, certainly had the best of intentions. He himself is married to a woman 
of colour and planned to make viewers aware of the problems immigrants face 
in German society.21 But within in the current genre setting, a crime show about 
migration requires migrants in the roles of victims and/or perpetrators – in 
addition to a set of more or less heroic non-migrant detectives representing the 
host society. In this narrative terrain plot options are clearly limited and the cre-
ative staff will have to engage with migrant stereotypes in one way or another. 
That raises tough questions about how much (violent) racism one can responsi-
bly depict on the screen. The problems are exacerbated by Becker’s script. How 
does one turn foreigner-on-foreigner violence into a self-reflexive study of Ger-
man racism, especially if the viewers learn the identity of the murderer right 
19 See Wallnöfer (2003).
20 See Bonner Generalanzeiger (2003). 
21 See Gehrmann (2003). 
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after the opening credits? Finally, Becker faced even more of an uphill battle 
because Jungle Brothers is part of the prestigious series Scene of the Crime that 
restricted his aesthetic options. The German detective team Ritter and Stark 
were established prime time figures combining cool with conscience and leav-
ing little space for alternative heroes. Under these circumstances it is not sur-
prising that Becker did not succeed in subverting powerful prejudices. The film 
follows the conventional rules of the genre and validates the superior sceptical 
gaze of the enlightened German law-enforcement officers who bring to light 
the shady dealings and psychological hang-ups of ethnic minorities living in 
the German capital. Jungle Brothers thus sends a devastating message about 
German society that probably only partly reflect Becker’s political intentions: 
the integration of black immigrants in Germany is doomed to fail even under 
the best of circumstances. The immigrants might be economically successful 
and seemingly well-adjusted but the combination of traditional tribal preju-
dice, immigrant insecurities, and entrenched German racism may sooner or 
later turn them into dangerous xenophobes, especially if they successfully emu-
late German values.22 One can easily imagine that these kinds of stories, repro-
duced in the media on a daily basis, have dire effects. When they intersect with 
a fear of migration on the part of viewers and the arrival of real migrants, espe-
cially migrants perceived as poor and dark-skinned, the stories likely contrib-
ute to the collective construction of a ‘refugee crisis,’ especially if the perceived 
risks and fears of migration are not held in check by countervailing memories.
2 A Memorial to Whiteness
As an installment of the series Scene of the Crime (Tatort), Jungle Brothers is 
part of a venerable German media tradition. Scene of the Crime has been pro-
duced for over four decades and, by March 2021, had a record of 1161 original 
programs, not to mention tens of thousands or reruns.23 It might very well be 
the longest-running prime-time fiction program in the world. Yet while Tatort 
may rightfully lay claim to global significance in statistical terms and has been 
broadcast in over 50 countries, it remains a thoroughly German phenomenon 
that thrives in Germany’s peculiar cultural and media landscape.24 The 50-year 
history of Scene of the Crime comprises over seventy-five different investigative 
22 See Wallnöfer (2003); Bohn (2003a).
23 See Tatort-Fundus (2018a); Brück, Guder, Viehoff, Wehn (2003), pp. 159f.; Hickethier (1998), 
p. 237; tatort-fans.de (2021).
24 See Hamburger Abendblatt (2016).
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teams located in cities all across the Federal Republic. Each team represents 
a different region with its landmarks and cultural and linguistic peculiarities. 
Scene of the Crime renders Heimat both regionally specific and nationally 
recognizable.25 In this vein, Scene of the Crime has been a cultural vehicle of 
national integration in West, East, and unified Germany. Consequently, Scene 
of the Crime has a large, dedicated, multi-generational cult following that turns 
the broadcast of new installments into media events.26 These audiences expect 
entertainment and suspense but also social commentary. As a result, Scene of 
the Crime provides an important platform for political self-reflection with each 
investigation carefully calibrated to navigate, manipulate, and occasionally 
challenge the perceived limits of popular taste. In this way, Scene of the Crime 
presents interesting interpretations of the social and political status quo in 
Germany.27 Every important political issue has been addressed over the years, 
including East German and West German relations and unification, neo-Nazis 
and the Nazi past, feminism, social inequality, unemployment, abortion, xeno-
phobia, AIDS, religious sects, euthanasia, prostitution, migration, child labor 
and abuse, globalisation, and genocide. The people behind Scene of the Crime, 
including many first-rate directors, screenwriters, and actors, are very aware of 
the fact that they are managing a national label that offers them extraordinary 
career opportunities.28
There are other developments that have turned Scene of the Crime and simi-
lar programs into central sites of cultural memory. Germany’s media landscape 
changed decisively in the early 1990s when commercial stations, which had 
first been licensed in West Germany in 1984, started to match their public ser-
vice rivals in program diversity and audience appeal. The ensuing competition 
transformed television fare in Germany, especially during prime time, killing 
off a number of venerable public service series and formats.29 But crime dra-
mas in general and Scene of the Crime in particular have thrived in the new TV 
environment. Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, airtime for prime-
time cop shows increased more than fivefold.30 Scene of the Crime showings 
jumped from twelve broadcasts in 1989 to over thirty per year since 2002. There 
25 See Bollhöfer (2007); Mously (2007).
26 Some Crime Scene investigators have become celebrities – most notably Götz George aka 
Schimanski – and the introduction of new detectives is vigorously discussed in national 
tabloids and TV guides; on the Schimanski phenomenon see Harzenetter (1996). 
27 See Hißnauer, Scherer, Stockinger (2014). 
28 Tatort was for instance the springboard for Wolfgang Petersen’s career. He directed a number 
of episodes in the 1970s, including the famous Reifezeugnis of 1977; see Tatort-Fundus (2018b). 
29 See Krüger (2002). 
30 Wehn (2002), p. 7f., 194.
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is a simple explanation for this development. Crime dramas constitute one of 
the few reliable recipes for successful ratings in a crowded field of TV con-
tent providers. Scene of the Crime is again a case in point. The series no longer 
reaches audience shares of over 50 per cent, which was not unusual during the 
era of the public service monopoly of ARD and ZDF. But with an average of 8 
million viewers and 23 per cent market shares per prime time broadcast, Scene 
of the Crime has generally remained the most popular program of the prime-
time line-up on Sunday evening.31
At the precise moment when crime shows in general and Scene of the Crime 
in particular filled ever more airtime, unified Germany experienced increased 
immigration and a wave of right-wing violence against foreigners in the early 
1990s and, partly in response to these events, drastically curbed non-EU immi-
gration by negotiating a system of EU controls.32 Yet despite anti-immigra-
tion legislation prompted by popular xenophobic resentment, Germany relies 
on immigrant labor for its economic wellbeing and by 2020 the percentage 
of foreign citizens and people of so-called non-German background living in 
 Germany had risen to 13,9 % and 26 % respectively.33 In this heterogeneous 
group of approximately 21 million, three million people of Turkish descent 
represent the largest subsection and, until the events of 2015/16, were con-
sidered among the least well-integrated foreigners in Germany. As a result of 
recent developments, hierarchies of belonging are somewhat in flux in the 
Federal Republic although there have always been various cultural constructs 
of migrating Muslims that served as the symbolic antipodes of the constructs 
‘German’ and ‘European’ in post-Cold War Germany.34
German television has played an important role in the remapping of col-
lective national-ethnic identities after the fall of the Berlin Wall. A study from 
2007 revealed that 81 percent of the coverage about Muslims on the public 
stations ARD and ZDF presented Islam in an overwhelmingly negative light.35 
That figure neatly corresponds to the 83 percent of the German population 
who held decidedly unfavorable opinions about Islam at that point in time.36 
Both trends have continued unabated in the last ten years.37 However, while 
these statistics seem to speak a clear language, German television’s encounter 
31 See Tatort-Fundus (2018a).
32 See Geddes, Scholten (2016), p. 95.
33 See Statistisches Bundesamt (2021).
34 See Dietrich, Frindte (2017), p. 112.
35 See Hafez, Richter (2007). 
36 See Noelle, Petersen (2006).
37 See Focus-Online (2017); Hafez (2017). 
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with Islam has been quite complex. TV executives have tried to deal with 
the problem of racial prejudice by offering viewers a number of critically 
acclaimed programs calling into question ethnic stereotypes, especially 
regarding Turks. The programs include the docu-soap Die Özdags (WDR 2007–
8) and the award-winning sitcom Alle lieben Jimmy (RTL 2005–7).38 Scene of the 
Crime itself may serve as another, on first sight positive example. Between 1991 
and 2003, partly in response to the wave of xenophobic violence mentioned 
above, the topic of migration has been addressed, in greater or lesser detail, 
in almost 20 percent of all Scene of the Crime episodes.39 Thus German public 
television has tried to step up to the plate and media scholars have generally 
acknowledged these efforts,40 although, as we have seen above, engaging with 
the topic is not synonymous with effectively counteracting xenophobic sen-
timents. Consider in this context the first (!) German-Turkish detective, Cenk 
Batu, whom ARD Scene of the Crime executives sent on crime-fighting missions 
in the gritty urban setting of Hamburg from 2008 to 2012.41 Batu retired after 
only 6 episodes and the figure assumed a very ambivalent profile right from 
the start. Batu was the only undercover detective in Scene of the Crime. In that 
role he assumed the personae of Turkish criminals and Islamist terrorists, and, 
on his last case, went on a vigilante rampage. Consequently, especially on a 
visual level, Batu often performed rather deconstructed hegemonic cultural 
patterns of racial prejudice and Muslim migratory threats.42 Over half a cen-
tury, Scene of the Crime has remained a thoroughly racist narrative universe 
in which white detectives chase white, brown, and black criminals.43 Things 
are only changing slowly. The arrival of a small cohort of Turkish-German 
investigators represents the most important innovation in this regard. Since 
2013 the Hamburg crime team includes the Turkish-German detective Yal-
cin Gümer who, however, only provides support services to his macho boss 
Nick Tschiller played by famous, controversial, and equally macho German 
actor Till Schweiger. Since 2012 and 2017 respectively, the Dortmund and the 
Kiel team feature young female Turkish-German detectives who embrace 
(Kiel) or ignore ( Dortmund) their non-German heritage. Finally, since 2019, 
38 See Domaratius (2009). 
39 See Ortner (2007), p. 85; Buhl (2014), p. 76.
40 See Wellgraf (2008); Ortner (2007); Thiele (2005).
41 See Tatort-Fundus (2018c).
42 See Spielberger (2012). Similar problems arise with regard to the longest serving immi-
grant Scene-of-the-Crime detective, Munich’s Ivo Batic with Yugoslavian roots, who also 
suffers from an excess of Mediterranean temper; see Thiele (2005), p. 197.
43 See the gallery of white and predominantly male detectives at Tatort-Fundus (2018d).
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the Ugandan-German actress Florence Kasumba plays the Ugandan-German 
investigator Anais Schmitz who, in her first appearance on the screen, engages 
in an activity that breaks with Scene of the Crime etiquette because she phys-
ically attacks her female fellow investigator. As of 2021, roughly 10 percent of 
active investigators are no longer representative of the white, ethnic German 
mold. That is progress.44
Nevertheless, TV networks and critics have simply not paid enough atten-
tion to the problematic narrative and aesthetic strategies with which crime 
shows influence perceptions of foreigners and processes of social integration. 
Cop shows like Scene of the Crime focus on deviancy and symbolically adju-
dicate social behavior and in this fashion shape the everyday performance of 
collective memory. According to Jack Katz, crime shows are so successful and 
such a great source of historical analysis because they appeal to the audience’s 
strongest-felt positive and negative emotions. By watching crimes unfold on 
the screen, viewers collectively partake in a daily moral workout that reflects 
their passionate desire for safety and raises fundamental questions about the 
reproduction of social order.45 Thus popular television offers intriguing inter-
pretations of fundamental fears and hopes, especially with regard to the cul-
tural construction of others. After all, few topics are more emotionally and 
politically engaging than the question of who does and who does not belong to 
one’s society and how people aspiring to membership should conduct them-
selves. In this sense, the communications surrounding crime shows about 
migration touch upon the very essence of human self-consciousness.46 Put 
differently, the serial production of xenophobically structured programs is 
not just a likely risk in an innovation adverse genre setting like prime time 
crime, but should actually be recognized as one of the genre’s key functions at 
a time when positive collective self-images in the West appear to be inextrica-
bly linked to negative constructions of foreignness and migration. Needless to 
say, these imagined worlds come with a hefty price tag, first and foremost for 
migrants, but also for host societies.
3 Orientalising Crime
Lars Becker was not the only creative mind at ARD who used Scene of the 
Crime in the 2003–4 season to address the topic of migration. In August 2003 
44 See tatort-fans.de (2020).
45 See Katz (1987). 
46 See Rudolph (2007), pp. 49–51.
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screenwriter Harald Göckeritz and director Martin Weinhart tackled a partic-
ularly thorny issue when they explored the interdependence between illegal 
migration and the international black market for organ transplants. Their film 
focuses on the plight of migrants who have been smuggled into Germany under 
false pretences and are now pressured to serve as organ donors. The refugees 
have found temporary shelter in a dilapidated public-housing development in 
Ludwigshafen, where they are eyed with considerable suspicion by the author-
ities and left unprotected against assaults from an international organ trans-
plant mafia. Detectives Odenthal and Kopper take a close look at the migrants 
when a refugee headed for the housing development is found dead in a nearby 
gravel pit. The film quickly focuses on the anguish of a 12-year old Kurdish girl 
who survived persecution in Turkey and Iraq and now has to fend for herself 
because her brother, her only remaining relative, has not returned from a mis-
sion as an organ donor in Ukraine.47
Leyla, broadcast on 31 August 2003 to an audience of 6.9 million viewers, 
has self-critical potential. Göckeritz and Weinhart forgo any simple happy end. 
As the detectives are successfully wrapping up their investigation, the camera 
focuses on another helpless migrant on his way to yet another risky surgery 
abroad.48 In other compelling moments of the film, viewers get a palpable 
sense of the despair that makes parents of chronically sick children participate 
in a perfidious system of exchange in which the desperate exploit the poor. 
Last but not least, the script occasionally assumes the perspective of the refu-
gees, especially by offering a detailed account of the growing panic of 12-year-
old Leyla. But the figure of the girl also proves Göckeritz’ and Weinhart’s 
downfall. They string together scene after scene of Leyla mournfully inspect-
ing the empty mailbox, placing yet another unanswered call from a public 
phone booth, or patiently waiting by the window, illuminated by candlelight, 
with vaguely Middle Eastern music playing in background. The stereotypical 
spectacle of childlike innocence, flavored with a dash of exoticism, robs the 
character of complexity and agency, rendering Leyla and her peers defenseless 
against organ smugglers as well as self-indulgent projections of munificence 
on the part of the viewers. Leyla is a picture-perfect example of orientalism.49
Moreover, the implicit audience constructed in the televisual universe of 
the film, which is treated to the spectacle of exotic innocence and seemingly 
invited to identify with Leyla, is defined along narrow ethnic and linguistic 
47 See Frohn (2003). 
48 See Bohn (2003b).
49 A similar process of balkanisation occurs in Scene-of-the-Crime installments dealing with 
crimes linked to the wars in the former Yugoslavia; see Gladis (2016).
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lines that undercut empathetic engagement with the plight of the refugees. The 
team of investigators and medical support staff, i.e. the heroes of the film, only 
consists of white, middle-class German native speakers.50 This homogenous 
group of well-adjusted individuals enlightens the audience about a thriving 
international business of illegal organ transplants in China, Russia, Ukraine, 
India, Brazil, and the Czech Republic. Through their profile and their actions 
they draw a line in the sand, somewhere east of Berlin. After all, as Odenthal 
puts it succinctly on one occasion: “This is Germany.” Consequently, all perpe-
trators are clearly marked as outsiders. The leader of the smuggling enterprise 
is a stereotypically stoic Russian who kills people without the slightest hesita-
tion; the physician examining the refugees is an ethnic German who grew up 
in Siberia and still mutters Russian under her breath; the thug who is sent after 
the victims speaks with the thickest of Bavarian accents, marking him with a 
powerful sign of alterity according to the cultural codes of the German media.
There are two signs of ambivalence in the neat narrative world of Leyla. The 
first unpersuasive marker of hybridity is Leyla herself. After only two months in 
Germany she speaks excellent German. The second character caught between 
the lines is the social worker Marler, portrayed masterfully by veteran actor and 
Tatort-regular Jürgen Tarrach. Marler frequently helps the migrants with their 
everyday problems, but also advises them to accept the deals offered by the 
smugglers. When confronted by Odenthal and Kopper with the consequences 
of his corrupt dealings, Marler deeply regrets his actions and contemplates sui-
cide. But he remains the only wrinkle in the tidy national universe of Leyla.51 
Overall, the film depicts crimes committed by foreigners against foreigners 
with the former complaining about German laws that complicate their busi-
ness and about German welfare payments that drive up the prices for organ 
‘donations’. The viewers can hardly avoid the conclusion that more rules and 
more aggressive policing are needed in order to force the thugs and their vic-
tims to conduct their unappetising business elsewhere – without the benefit of 
German infrastructure and taxpayer support.
50 The picture is complicated by the fact that Tatort aficionados know Kopper to be of Ital-
ian-German descent (although that does not play a role in Leyla). In addition, the actress 
Ulrike Folkerts, who plays Odenthal, is widely known as one of a few openly gay German 
actresses.
51 See Bohn (2003b).
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4 Into the Holocaust Ghetto
In addressing the problems of multiculturalism in Western societies, the mak-
ers of Scene of the Crime are clearly handicapped. The crime-drama genre pro-
vides only limited opportunities to highlight the positive side of migration. 
A murder mystery needs a corpse, a murderer, and a compelling motive; a 
clash of cultures is an excellent plot structure that offers all of the above. In 
the 2003–2004 season that was clearly the case. Scene of the Crime addressed 
questions of migration and integration on a routine basis and each time the 
gripping storylines made a powerful case for cultural homogeneity. In fact, 
the message could not have been stated more bluntly: the West is better off 
if it does not get involved in the shady dealings, tribal tensions, and reaction-
ary values of migrant communities. None of the regretful deaths of migrants 
would have occurred – or at least would not have occurred on Western soil – if 
the foreigners had simply stayed put. Leyla und Jungle Brothers convey attrac-
tive and highly antagonistic memories of migration.
A closer look at the cross-section of crime dramas focusing on migrants and 
foreigners has revealed rather disappointing results. In each case, the murder 
is committed by a migrant/foreigner and national identity and mainstream 
values are affirmed in simplistic ways that offer few opportunities for self-re-
flection. The programs are obviously not dealing well with the multicultural 
challenges of the twenty-first century. Under the circumstances it might be 
helpful to broaden the scope of analysis and gain some comparative perspec-
tive. The topic of contemporary migrations seems to overtax the didactic skills 
and political imagination of the creative staff in charge of crime-drama produc-
tion. But perhaps screenwriters, directors, and TV executives are more astute in 
their representation of established and well-integrated minority communities 
like German Jewry. After all, Western culture has had a lot of opportunities to 
think about Jewish-Gentile relations and after 1945 these reflections have often 
taken a decidedly self-critical turn, especially in Germany. Moreover, in partic-
ular since the 1970s, television has played a particularly important and often 
constructive role in Holocaust education.52
On December 7th, 2003, over 7 million viewers watched an aesthetically and 
politically ambitious episode of Scene of the Crime that painted a critical and 
discouraging picture of Jewish–Gentile relations in contemporary Germany. 
The events in The Shochet (Der Schächter) are set into motion by a mentally 
52 See Shandler (1999); Kansteiner (2006); Kansteiner (2011).
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handicapped young man who, in a state of panic, cuts the throat of a homeless 
boy after having been threatened by the boy’s attack dog. The brother of the 
perpetrator covers up the crime by planting corpse and murder weapon in the 
house of a shochet, who is subsequently vilified in the press and relentlessly 
pursued by an antisemitic district attorney. The actual crime and the pursuit of 
the murderer are not center stage in the program. Instead, the veteran screen-
writer Fred Breinersdorfer offers a morality play about persistent antisemitic 
prejudice in the German provinces.53 The convoluted storyline, lacking sus-
pense and veracity but overflowing with didactic ambition, is delivered in care-
fully constructed, increasingly more disturbing images and combined with an 
evocative, highly symbolic soundtrack. The program begins with idyllic scenes 
of the shochet, the lead detective, and the handicapped man playing boule 
along the banks of Lake Constance. As the case unfolds, the viewers witness 
the repeated, aggressive interrogation of the shochet staged with Brechtian 
techniques in sterile early twentieth-century institutional architecture. Apart 
from the interrogations, the district attorney calmly and seemingly rationally 
invokes all kinds of antisemitic stereotypes, from greed to blood sacrifice, to 
bolster his case. Shortly before the climax of the story, director Jobst Oetzmann 
shifts aesthetic gears and replaces the distance-inducing alienation techniques 
with subjective camera angles and unsteady camera movements designed to 
make the viewers sense the rising panic that the shochet, a survivor of Tre-
blinka, experiences as he is once more victimised by German officials.54
The director of The Shochet develops a lot of cinematic ambition in an effort 
to induce empathy with the accused and instill properly anti-antisemitic val-
ues in his audience. But the program also contains a number of contradictory 
plot elements that insert an interesting level of narrative ambivalence and raise 
doubts about the philosemitic credentials of the lead detective and possibly the 
program as a whole.55 On the one hand, the proceedings against the shochet 
are always conducted according to the rule of law, despite the crude antise-
mitic slogans that the prosecutor delivers outside the courtroom. The lead 
detective and an impartial judge make sure that justice is done. So the fears 
of the shochet, especially his growing suspicion of his detective friend, appear 
increasingly paranoid. On the other hand, a strangely passive lead detective 
does not seem to resist the antisemitic onslaught as aggressively as one might 
expect. Moreover and most importantly, viewers are told several times over the 
course of the film that the shochet spent his childhood in Konstanz, became 
53 See Sauerwein (2003). 
54 See Heinen (2003).
55 See Gangloff (2003); Anders (2003).
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a well-respected member of the Strasbourg Jewish community after 1945, and 
only returned to Konstanz on a part-time basis in recent years because he had 
inherited a beautiful and valuable house on the shore of Lake Constance. Now 
that he is harassed by law enforcement, the shochet plans his illegal departure 
from Konstanz and permanent escape to France.
Thus Breinersdorfer invokes antisemitic stereotypes of wandering Jews with 
shifting loyalties in pursuit of material gain and illustrates how difficult it is to 
find one’s way out of the maze of philo- and antisemitic traditions that are a 
part of contemporary German culture. In this way, he and Oetzmann open up 
the film for a wide range of possible readings. Some viewers might have felt 
encouraged to reflect about their own latent fears of ethnic-cultural alterity and 
moments of disturbing transference (as Breinersdorfer and Oetzmann probably 
hoped they would). Others might have come to the conclusion that disengage-
ment seems like the best solution and that the local German-Jewish symbiosis 
should be ended before worse things happen. In fact, until the very last seconds 
of the show, the plot and the camerawork squarely point towards segregation 
and the benefits of ethnic homogeneity.56 Finally and most disturbingly, the 
ambivalences and performances of antisemitism might have prompted some 
members of the audience to revel quietly in antisemitic prejudice.57
Crime shows with Jewish and Holocaust subject matter convey stern warn-
ings about the need for political vigilance and ethnic tolerance, in the case 
of The Shochet cast into an ambitiously complex and self-reflexive TV story. 
Everybody involved in television, from producers to consumers, seems to rec-
ognize the Holocaust as a site of humility and earnest historical exploration. It 
is very possible, however, that decades of Holocaust memory work have simply 
resulted in the creation of narrowly circumscribed cultural ghettoes of cosmo-
politan self-reflexivity. The habitual, self-critical impetus noticeable in TV pro-
grams with Jewish subject matter does not seem to be transferred to televisual 
engagements with other contemporary problems of memory whose solutions 
depend on a similar combination of self-reflexive resolve and innovative zeal. 
In fact, from a structuralist perspective, the situation appears to be even more 
sinister. What if the belated, proudly performed critical engagements with the 
legacy of Nazism play an important role in the thoughtless reproduction of 
56 See Winter (2015).
57 There are good reasons to assume that a significant share of the audience might have 
indeed favored this last reading. In December 2003, a month before the broadcast of 
Der Schächter, a high-profile political scandal broke in Germany that revealed the per-
sistent anti-Semitic sentiments of conservative politicians and their voters. See Herzinger 
(2003); Kansteiner (2006), pp. 308–12.
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contemporary patterns of anti-migration prejudice? Does Holocaust memory 
facilitate contemporary racism and nationalism? Or have the rituals of Ger-
man Holocaust culture effectively curbed xenophobia, for instance by help-
ing to create the welcoming culture for refugees that briefly flourished in 
Germany in 2015–16? Is chancellor Merkel’s famous sentence “We’ll manage 
that” (“Wir schaffen das”) a concrete application of the ethical demands of 
Holocaust memory as suggested by the Holocaust survivor Ruth Klüger in her 
speech to the German parliament in January 2016?58 Maybe 2015 represents 
a brief, unusual moment in which collective memories of past mass crimes 
intersected with resettlement processes for the benefit of refugees? Either 
way, the brief look at the symbolic-ideological dynamics of the media world of 
primetime crime highlights the difficulties involved in any attempts to brush 
the genre against the grain and engage in a truly self-reflexive communication 
with the audience.
5 Levelling the Playing Field
The culture of prejudice, which is a constituent element of primetime TV, is not 
representative of all mainstream visual culture. German film and TV culture, 
for instance, features a long and very successful tradition of anti-xenophobic 
media stories exemplified by such different media texts as the documentaries 
of Hans Dieter Grabe from the 1980s,59 or the successful feature films of Fatih 
Akin produced since 1998.60 Even the annals of Scene of the Crime include an 
exemplary 1998 episode called Trapped (In der Falle), which effectively criti-
cizes the campaign of structural violence waged by the German state against 
Turkish immigrants.61 But, at the same time, the low profile, everyday cultural 
reproduction of structural racism and nationalism continues unabated.62
The above findings offer an opportunity to develop a systematic, structural 
critique of the crime drama with regard to its construction of alterity. The 
overwhelming presence and popularity of cop shows give rise to the suspicion 
that law and order programs have emerged as one of the primary cultural sites 
58 See Galaktionow (2016).
59 See Hißnauer (2009).
60 See Mackuth (2007); Rings (2016).
61 See Ortner (2007), pp. 139–160.
62 See for instance the two-part, high-profile 2020 sequel of Tatort entitled “In the family” 
(In der Familie) marking the 50th anniversary of the first Tatort broadcast, ARD 29.11.2020 
and 06.12.2020. The film presents a picture-perfect xenophobic story featuring an Italian 
immigrant forced by the Mafia to kill his German wife.
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of collective and national identity in a post-Cold-War era in which the media 
have sworn off the use of overtly nationalistic and xenophobic strategies of 
representation. In the absence of the kind of clear cut visual and narrative 
codes circulating at the height of colonialism, fascism, and communism, tele-
vision producers and their audiences in the West have settled on new mas-
ter scripts to regain stable Western, European, and national bearings. In this 
fashion, the crime drama has become a powerful contemporary master symbol 
whose language, metaphors, and narrative designs are well suited for boosting 
morale in the respective in-group at the expense of various symbolic others 
along shifting lines of demarcation. The crime drama has emerged as a site of 
troublesome historical disinformation and self-fulfilling analytical prophecies. 
In the course of constantly rewriting and symbolically adjudicating the history 
of ethnic relations in the West and beyond, popular TV shows provide view-
ers with powerful tools for the interpretation of contemporary debates about 
migration, which make them all the more likely to adopt nationalistic and rac-
ist points of view. All these factors explain why producing a truly enlightened 
crime drama about migration seems to require nothing short of subverting 
the essence of a genre thriving on passive-aggressive politics of exclusion and 
stereotyping.
In the current cultural context, educational campaigns engaging with the 
topic of migration face a number of obstacles. The fight against prejudice often 
seeks to criticize ethnic stereotypes by presenting them in an exaggerated 
form, the political effects of which are difficult to gauge (Wellgraf 2008, 39). 
Ironically, the exaggerations are linked to collectively constructed standards 
of veracity. Viewers expect from television a realistic engagement with con-
temporary issues, including realistic representations of the kinds of problems 
they assume exist as a result of migration. But the producers’ and viewers’ per-
ceptions of reality, which play an important role in successful communication 
via television, exist largely independent of the type of realism constructed in 
crime statistics, scholarly papers or other scientific data. In fact, prime time fic-
tion and non-fiction create their own standards of truth.63 The exploration of 
minority communities from the vantage point of law enforcement for instance 
creates a seemingly compelling causal link between migration and crime and 
in that respect systematically misrepresents the basic characteristics of actual 
crimes as well as the efficacy of law enforcement agencies.64 Needless to say, 
the actual conduct of migrants is less important for their perception by host 
communities than the characteristics attributed to migrants in the media.
63 See Enli (2015).
64 See Ortner (2007), p. 176.
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In the light of high stakes involved in this media feedback loop, it is useful 
to recall guidelines for the representation of migrants on TV developed by the 
media scholar Christina Ortner. Empathy with members of minority groups is 
more easily induced by TV stories that feature migrants as main protagonists, 
present events from the migrants’ point of view, and depict the private and 
professional complexities of their lives. All too often, even in shows designed 
to criticize xenophobic violence, camera and script linger on the non-migrant 
perspective in an attempt to understand and condemn anti-migrant senti-
ments. In addition, the cause of cross-ethnic peace and understanding is more 
successfully championed by TV programs that emphasize the heterogeneity of 
in-groups and out-groups and delineate generous criteria for membership in 
in-groups.65
An implementation of these guidelines might indeed result in politically 
more desirable television programming although the shows would transgress 
the limits of the genre and no longer meet the expectations of many audience 
members who take pleasure in watching upstanding white police officers solv-
ing the problems of a globalised world.66 Ortner’s well-intended cosmopoliti-
cal guidelines thus inadvertently highlight the structural dilemma inherent in 
televisual communication and the need for more radical cultural change. Any 
coverage of a politically sensitive and complex topic like migration, especially in 
prime time, will nolens volens convey the kind of messages that Roland Barthes 
has defined as myth, i.e. fairly simplistically structured, easily understood, and 
semantically over-determined arguments concerning the dangers or advan-
tages of diversity and migration that are difficult to replace by other, ethically, 
politically, and economically more suitable myths.67 Reforming myths about 
migration amounts to an uphill battle because the cultural terrain in which 
these negotiations take place does not constitute a level playing field. As Jür-
gen Link has shown, most collective symbols and metaphors, which have tra-
ditionally been used in discussions about difference and migration – and that 
are thus almost indispensable for effective mass-media communication about 
the topic – carry a clear bias against many forms of alterity. For instance, the 
moment any speaker deploys weather, body, house/home, or other territorial 
metaphors in the context of talk about migrants, the audience is encouraged 
to wonder about ways to stop the ‘flood’, close ‘leaks’ and ‘loopholes’, or prevent 
‘invasions’ and ‘injuries’. In this way foreigners are symbolically burdened with 
65 See Ortner (2007), pp. 37–46.
66 See Süss (1993), pp. 217, 223.
67 See Barthes (1972), p. 116.
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a wide range of negative outcomes, which are not counterbalanced by simi-
larly compelling and extensively used positive symbols.68
Obviously, well-meant cosmopolitan memories of migration are a useful 
point of departure but will not suffice. We need more radically innovative, ago-
nistically structured memories of mobility to bridge the gap between fact and 
perception and create political options for inclusivity.69 How can we better 
imagine the migration experiences of the past to help solve perceived migra-
tion crises today? How can we rethink the population movements of the world 
wars, the political migrations of the Cold War, and the labour migrations of the 
age of European affluence to shape the kind of memories that help us foster 
rather than derail integration processes? How can we lay the foundations for 
helpful memories of the war in Syria, the destruction of Iraqi society, the mis-
ery of continuous warfare in Afghanistan, and the climate migrations of the 
future in order to help migrants and their reluctant hosts craft a productive, 
sustainable life together?70
6  Memory Agonistics. Honouring the Refugee and Forgetting 
the Migrant
The interpretive feedback loop is all too real: the memory of past mobility, or 
lack thereof, does amount to a decisive factor in a given society’s ability to wel-
come newcomers as equals. If you conceive of yourself as being part of a tradi-
tion of people on the move, it is much easier to relate to people moving towards 
you. The plasticity of social memories is similarly real. The field of memory 
studies has proven time and again that what counts in the realm of collective 
remembrance is not what actually happened but what people feel and think 
happened. In this fashion, twentieth century culture has moved mountains. 
Without having had much help in terms of cultural precedents the mass media 
turned the most brutal and depressing chapters of World War II, Nazi rule, and 
forced migration into uplifting stories of heroism, innocence, victimhood, and 
justice accomplished.71 In a kind of secular reformation, the survivors of Aus-
chwitz became figures of public veneration in the arena of popular Holocaust 
memory.72 That example illustrates that the plasticity of collective memory 
68 See Link (1978), pp. 184–222; Link (2006); Link, Jäger (1993); Thiele (2005).
69 See Bull, Hansen (2016). 
70 For climate migration see Mayer (2016).
71 See Fogu, Kansteiner, Presner (2016).
72 See Shenker (2015). 
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defines an important ethical responsibility. As a society we are accountable for 
our memories and should choose wisely when it comes to remembering the 
events and stories that define our collective selves. Unfortunately, remember-
ing responsibly is a complicated affair leading invariably to a troublesome par-
adox. Migration is an excellent case in point. On the one hand, we should do 
all we can to remember the plight of people who have escaped hardship. They 
deserve our respect and empathy. A widely shared memory of their suffering 
and resolve is a precondition for justice and humanitarian action. On the other 
hand, migrants are not citizens. For instance, the word “migrant” is hardly a 
neutral term. By designating a person as deserving of special treatment, the 
word turns that person into a target of discrimination, pity, and arrogance. So 
we have to forget the migrant and the migrating experience to extend full-term 
membership in society to new arrivals. To sideline dysfunctional memories, 
Europe needs to embrace the figure of the refugee as memory icon and forget 
the migrant’s distinctiveness – all at the same time. How do we reconcile these 
two sound and seemingly diametrically opposed ethical principles?
Societies have different levels of tolerance for moving people and differ-
ent capabilities of integrating them after their arrival, among other reasons 
because they develop different memories of migration. In classic immigration 
societies like the US and Australia, the troublesome and shameful details of 
mass exodus and deportation from Europe were swiftly pushed aside by uplift-
ing stories of liberty and self-made prosperity at the expense of indigenous 
populations. Past suffering and dashed hopes were covered up by inauthen-
tic charades of ethnic folklore and fantasies of national unity, which in turn 
became a solid foundation for democracy and the rule of law.73 European soci-
eties handled the large population displacements caused by World War II in 
similar ways. All across Eastern Europe and Germany, refugees, displaced per-
sons, and the many ideologically uprooted sought coverage under fictions of 
ethnic homogeneity and political consensus. The forces of integration exerted 
a great deal of structural violence. Languages, heritage, political discontent, 
and many unwelcome memories disappeared in relentlessly selective invented 
traditions. The cultural violence designed to hide past enthusiasm for Nazism, 
extensive collaboration, and a great number of Nazi perpetrators also helped 
turn refugees into citizens. An impoverished and destroyed continent man-
aged to find homes for at least 15 million migrants, especially in West Germany, 
and in later years continued that tradition by welcoming millions of people 
eager to leave Communist Eastern Europe. Ironically, West Germany and many 
73 See Bedad (2005).
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of its neighbours meanwhile maintained the fiction that the countries were 
not immigration societies.74 For that purpose they invented new terms for peo-
ple on the move, including such creative designations as “belated re-settlers” 
(Spätaussiedler).75 The strategies intended to forget the stigma of migration 
worked wonders for the cause of integration but turned into memory liabilities 
when migrants from Southern Europe were encouraged to move to the North 
and did not receive similarly optimistic long-term perspectives and fanciful 
designations. One is tempted to conclude that the integration of the 15 mil-
lion succeeded because they were Germans and therefore naturally belonged 
to Germany, whereas the much smaller group of Southern European arrivals 
hailed from another culture and could not be integrated as easily. That expla-
nation underestimates the cultural distance between Königsberg and Bavaria 
and the cultural diversity among the expellees;76 the explanation also under-
estimates the importance of social scripts and social memory for processes 
of social integration. If the movement of Turks to West Germany in the 1960s 
had been designated as permanent, inevitable, and based on stories of long-
term German-Turkish economic collaboration, the descendants of Turkish 
immigrants would find themselves in a much different position in German 
society today.
Honouring the refugee and forgetting the migrant does not have to be a con-
tradiction. Cultural memories are never consistent; they are dynamic, multi- 
faceted, and contradictory. Official institutional memories of migration can 
celebrate the refugee while more fluid everyday media memories help decon-
struct the stark artificial divide between migrants and non-migrants. Now that 
the survivors of the Shoah are leaving the stage, the refugees should take their 
place. Having overcome war, human trafficking, and persistent prejudice, they 
deserve their own memorial sites and prominent didactic presence in schools, 
museums, and the media. Permanently inscribed in our cultural memories, 
the figure of the refugee could make sure that we remember their woes and 
accomplishments and strive to live up to the dictum of “never again!” So we are 
advocating here for a mobility turn in memory studies and the politics of mem-
ory, conceptualising moving people not as deficient vis-à-vis an allegedly static 
location from which they emerge (emigration) or to which they aspire (immi-
gration). Instead, the process of movement itself becomes the focus of analyt-
ical and narrative interest resulting in a wide spectrum of multi-directional 
memories reflecting a range of nomadic experiences and diasporic feelings that 
74 See Wilhelm (2017).
75 See Menzel, Engel (2014).
76 See Rock, Wolff (2002). 
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include such different perspectives as that of the exchange student and civil 
war refugee without obliterating the dissimilarities between them.77 Social and 
media scripts that acknowledge differences of opinion and interests regarding 
the movement of people while de-essentialising these differences could lay the 
foundation for agonistic memories of migration and agonistic debates about the 
privileges of affluent birth and the limits of human solidarity. What difference 
should this perspective make for prime time crime? A lot and very little. Tele-
vision is hardly at the cutting edge of twentyfirst century’s media technologies. 
Future memories of flight and migration will be negotiated in immersive gam-
ing and AI environments.78 But let’s pretend for a moment that we could rewrite 
media history. In Leyla and Jungle Brothers script and camera could for instance 
have stayed with the moving victims and moving perpetrators, rendering their 
decisions and behaviour complex, intriguing, and plausible. The detectives 
should have been much more diverse and sported a moving background easy 
to relate to. Itinerancy, deviancy and helplessness, on the one hand, and set-
tledness, integrity and power, on the other hand, should not have formed such 
a rigid semantic contrast. If more fluid stories of people movements had been 
widely spread in primetime crime at the beginning of the new millennium, per-
haps the welcoming culture of 2015/16 might have lasted just a little bit longer.
The scripts for better stories of movement can be found in the real world. 
Between 2013 and 2017, over 24% of newly hired police officers in Berlin hailed 
from a minority background, but the Scene-of the-Crime detectives serving 
in Berlin, who were hired in 2015, still exude settled whiteness.79 The tough-
est challenge in building new collective memories of movement remains the 
deconstruction of racism.80
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CHAPTER 10
Stereotyping by Default in Media Transfer
Luc van Doorslaer
 Abstract
This contribution looks at the added value that journalistic discourse and approaches 
from translation studies can offer to imagology. Translation studies nowadays is a dis-
cipline no longer dealing with interlingual transfer only, but also with intralingual as 
well as intercultural communication transfer and all changes involved in processes 
of rewriting and adaptation. A great deal of journalistic production is the result of 
such processes of rewriting and recontextualising. Journalistic translation research has 
paid attention to this by coining terms such as ‘transediting’ or ‘journalator’, indicating 
the overlap between the activities and the actors. Acts of recontextualising inevitably 
deal with the transfer of (national and cultural) images and stereotypes, as well as the 
conscious and unconscious changes involved. In modern media societies journalistic 
discourse is highly influential in producing and distributing national and cultural ste-
reotyping. Under certain circumstances stereotyping is likely to function by default 
in journalism, the so called ‘automaticity of stereotyping’. This phenomenon is illus-
trated with several examples from journalistic discourse. They are frequently found in 
sports journalism, but this contribution also offers examples from political journalism 
related to the presentation of Germany and Europe.
1 Introduction
One of the fascinating characteristics of imagology is its relative intangibility. 
Studying national and cultural images and ethnotypes could have the poten-
tial of being a discipline or subdiscipline. But as imagology lacks the necessary 
institutionalisation level, it cannot be considered a discipline or even subdisci-
pline. Sometimes it is called a “working method”1. However, I’m not aware of a 
general handbook of methodology specifically mentioning imagology. Though 
an imagological approach complies with the classical features of adopting a 
method (systematicity of investigation, a mode of procedure, etc.), it is never 
1 Leerssen (2016), p. 19.
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put at a similar level with methods such as discourse analysis, corpus gather-
ing, keystroke logging, eye tracking, interviews or surveys. Imagology rather 
functions as a selection principle, it is a lens through which the material is 
studied, a perspective functioning as a criterion for selecting the potentially 
relevant material. Such a lens can be adopted with the help of several methods. 
An imagological lens can be applied through text analysis or interviews, an 
imagologically based selection is possible with corpora or eye tracking. If ima-
gology is considered this way, the relatively recent extension of imagology to 
other than literary discourse may be considered a natural development.2 More 
in particular, this contribution elaborates on the added value that materials 
and approaches from journalistic discourse and translation studies could offer 
to imagology. Such a possible input will be illus trated with several examples.
2 The Potential Added Value of Journalism Studies
It is obvious that the huge amount of research on representation in journalism 
studies and the study of stereotypes have certain aspects in common.3 On the 
other hand imagology’s focus on the function of literary and cultural transfer 
in ethnotyping, in combination with its attention for diachrony, shows a much 
more specific object and approach. The origins of imagological research in lit-
erary studies have also contributed to an emphasis on the richness of literary 
discourse in this regard. Joep Leerssen has rightly stressed the importance of 
literary canonicity strengthening the perception of ethnotypes, thereby con-
sidering other text types, such as journalism, as “more ephemeral sources”.4 On 
the other hand, in our modern media world journalistic discourse is omnipres-
ent. Despite its undeniably ephemeral character, the feature of constant repe-
tition of certain (national and cultural) stereotypes in the media may achieve 
an effect similar to canonisation. Looking at it from this perspective, it might 
be worthwhile addressing the relative underrepresentation of journalistic dis-
course in imagology.
This underrepresentation is indeed relative, not absolute. Some studies have 
already shown the potential imagological relevance of journalistic sources. 
This is explicitly done by Corinne Fowler (2007) where she investigates the 
role of journalism in the development of British ideas about Afghanistan. The 
2 For instance in van Doorslaer (2010) or van Doorslaer (2012).
3 One example explicitly connecting representation with discourses of identity and Self-Other 
rhetoric is Le (2006). 
4 Leerssen (2007), p. 26.
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British news media coverage about the 2001 conflict relied on “heavily fiction-
alised and mythologised notions of Afghanistan”.5 Interestingly, Fowler shows 
how the journalists copied – and as such also confirmed – centuries-old cli-
chés that were transmitted through journalistic accounts and travel narratives.
Casting its net deep into the nineteenth century, the study investigates 
how British travellers and journalists continue to inherit the paranoias 
and prejudices of their nineteenth-century predecessors and why, in Brit-
ish imaginations, Afghans tend to remain warlike, medieval, murderous 
and unruly.6
It is no coincidence, particularly in historical research, that travellers and jour-
nalists are mentioned on equal footing. Travel writing and travel journalism 
form a productive mixed genre for clichés and national or cultural stereotyp-
ing, as they register otherness and explore “individual and national identity. 
[…] travel writing is almost invariably about Self and Other”.7 Lily Coenen’s 
study (2013) on the image of Spain in Dutch travel writing is an example show-
ing the development and variety of such image-building over a century of 
time, and how the authors were intertextually influenced by the readings of 
literary fiction and figures functioning as “floating signifiers”.8 Intertextuality 
is not only a feature of literary, but also of journalistic discourse. Discursive 
reflections of otherness, or at least the way otherness is perceived, is the heart 
of the matter of imagological research. Against this background it is also rel-
evant that Coenen stresses the interdependency of hetero- and auto-images: 
the changes in the perception of Spain were often related to a projection need 
of the Dutch authors.
This reminded me of similarities with a research project on ‘Literary Travel 
Journalism’ I conducted with students of a Master’s seminar at KU Leuven a 
few years ago. Though the results were never published because of the small 
scale of the project, they are interesting in this context. The students investi-
gated contemporary travel journalism about South Africa in Dutch-language 
sources, both from the Netherlands and Belgium (Flanders). The 16 examples 
in the corpus were all longer texts with literary characteristics. The analysis 
of the varying foci and topics showed that there was a considerable differ-
ence between the approach of the articles published in the Netherlands and 
5 Fowler (2007), p. 4.
6 Fowler (2007), p. 4f.
7 Coenen (2013), p. 8.
8 Coenen (2013), p. 177.
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in Flanders. The Dutch authors made use of much less historical facts and 
focused on modern post-apartheid South Africa. The Flemish authors, on the 
other hand, used a much more historicising and contrastive approach, refer-
ring to racial, social, political and linguistic conflicts in the so called Rainbow 
nation – the term coined by the South-African Archbishop Desmond Tutu. A 
hypothesis for further research could be: even within the same Dutch-language 
area, the auto-image of the travel author is more determining for the approach 
of the object than the hetero-image. In this case it would mean that the Flem-
ish authors, living in a country (Belgium) with a history (and sometimes pres-
ent) of frequent political tensions due to language issues, tend to project these 
contrastive categories on the description and explanation of other countries 
as well. Whereas the Dutch authors, living in an officially monolingual country 
much less determined by language issues, adopt a less contrasting approach. 
Or in alternative imagological terms: the chosen perspectives may tell us more 
about the spectant (the author representing the represented) than about the 
spected, the represented country that is the actual object of the article.
Although imagology up to now has primarily studied literary represen-
tation, more journalistic types of discourse such as travel writing — “a type 
of text or genre that has received much more attention than earlier and has 
moved from the periphery much closer to the centre of current academic dis-
course” — enable and facilitate a media-oriented extension of the research 
object.9 This would also reflect the crucial role mass media in modern soci-
eties have in the expression of cultural identities: “it is uncontested that radio 
and television […] have played a central role in the dissemination of national 
culture, national values and national stereotypes.”10
Moreover, there are interesting interdisciplinary connections possible 
between imagology and some of the journalism studies research on repre-
sentation and stereotyping. An example would be the research by Dominic 
Lasorsa and Jia Dai (2007) on (intentional or unintentional) default stereo-
typing as well as the “overabundance of nationality-related stereotypes” in the 
writing of deceptive news stories.11 According to their study, the less journalists 
are informed, the more they stereotype. Where gaps have to be filled in in jour-
nalistic production (a daily practice), it regularly happens that stereotypes are 
taken over from hear-say or from earlier news items.
9 Zacharasiewicz (2009), p. 26.
10 Göttlich (2007), p. 356.
11 Lasorsa, Dai (2007), p. 292.
Stereotyping by Default in Media Transfer  209
All these perspectives suggest that in the presence of a mass of potential 
facts, stereotyping tends to occur to streamline work and ease the per-
ceiver’s discrepancy between what is expected and observed. Unless a 
perceiver is able and motivated not to stereotype, stereotyping is likely to 
function by default, a process psychologists call automaticity.12
This phenomenon of the automaticity of stereotyping in journalism, as an 
element in the journalistic process of streamlining work and content in the 
chaos of facts, would deserve to be related to imagological insights such as the 
oppositionality of ethnotyping or the ways in which Self-Other oppositions are 
implied or invoked.13
3 The Potential Added Value of Translation Studies
One of the elements essentially linking up the previous examples from travel 
writing, literary travel journalism or the automaticity of stereotyping, is the 
determining position of the author. “One of the basic insights in image studies 
is that the mechanism of the representation of foreign nations can only be 
analysed properly if we take the attitude of the author into account.”14 Besides 
the elements of cross-fertilisation between imagology and translation studies 
already dealt with elsewhere,15 such as the descriptive and diachronic view-
points or the centrality of change and hybridity, indeed, also the role of the 
author in the discursive variation of representation is a fundamental common 
feature. A translator is undeniably a cultural mediator, “an informant who 
transfers cultural knowledge from a primary context to a secondary one”16 and 
who also authors a new text. The literary publishing world creates the illusion 
that we read Franz Kafka when we read ‘The Castle’ in English, but in reality 
‘The Castle’ is a text of which Kafka has not written one single word, but is 
a re-creation of the English translator. The illusion is based on the obsolete 
model that languages are equivalent structures as well as on the romantic con-
cepts of originality, the unique authority of the source text (‘original’) and the 
source text author.
12 Lasorsa, Dai (2007), p. 281. Italics in original article. 
13 Compare for instance with Leerssen (2016), p. 17.
14 Leerssen (s.d.).
15 See van Doorslaer, Flynn, Leerssen (2015), pp. 2–4.
16 Keller (2007), p. 357.
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Journalistic translation research over the past two decades has been a case 
in point showing that such a model does not correspond to modern reality 
any longer – if it ever really has before.17 Not only are languages never equiv-
alent structures, the daily practice of international journalism also illus-
trates both the ubiquity and the complexity of the multiplication of source 
texts and multi-authored journalistic texts.18 In such a complex writing and 
rewriting situation of text production, both intra- and interlingual, translation 
in the journalistic field not only disintegrates the status of the source text, it 
also problematizes the very concept of traditional authorship.19 It is no coin-
cidence that research on translation in journalism has led to the coinage of 
hybrid terms such as ‘transediting’20 or ‘journalator,’21 indicating the blurred 
borders between translating and (journalistic) authoring. In systemic terms, 
the rewriting, re-editing and recontextualising practices in journalism could 
be considered an example of “intrasystemic translations” within the journal-
istic system.22
Exactly this hybridity and complexity of the author status is also important 
from an imagological perspective with regard to the above mentioned atti-
tude of the author. Interlingual translation, and even more so intralingual and 
intersemiotic translation,23 offers the author-trans lator an extra filter in the 
rewriting or re-conveying of images. When translation is no longer tradition-
ally looked at in terms of non-change, but as an element in a chain of textual, 
contextual and intertextual change, it contributes to the diversification of ste-
reotyping as well.
The non-change paradigm has therefore been subverted by recognis-
ing the impossibility of total invariance or full equivalence not only in 
translation practice, but also and above all in the scholarly study of trans-
lation. […] Observations and descriptions of the reality of translation 
showed many practices and circumstances that were based on anything 
but non-change. The inevitability of translators’ choices, cultural context, 
ideological influences, role of agency and idiosyncrasy, multilingual pro-
17 See the overview articles Valdeón (2015) and Davier, Schäffner, van Doorslaer (2018).
18 See for instance Schäffner (2012).
19 Van Doorslaer (2010), p. 181f.
20 In Stetting (1989).
21 In van Doorslaer (2012).
22 D’hulst (2008), p. 85.
23 Three types of translation already distinguished in Jakobson (1959).
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cessing in newsrooms, travel and migration as translational phenomena, 
transfer of national and cultural images through translation – these are 
all examples of situations where translation is fundamentally involved in 
a (much more than interlingual) process of change. As change inevitably 
puts more emphasis on contrasts and dissimilarities, elements of differ-
ence have complemented the traditional focus on sameness.24
An example of this potential power of translation for the distribution of 
images is the discussion in China about the ‘correct’ dissemination of Chinese 
culture through English translations, including the question whether this can 
be executed better by English native translators or by native Chinese.25 The 
attitude of the author-translator is the heart of the matter in this discussion. 
This Chinese case of auto-image-building illustrates the use of translation for 
selecting and highlighting certain features, a well-known principle in the rhet-
oric of ethnotyping with the help of certain “characteristics presented as being 
meaningfully representative of the nation”.26 A notorious historical example 
illustrating the double-sidedness or power of translating mediators is that of 
La Malinche or Doña Marina, the (among other things) local interpreter of 
Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés.27
4 Journalistic Illustrations
Case studies explicitly dealing with journalistic discourse in translation can 
be found in several chapters of Interconnecting Translation Studies and Ima-
gology.28 Maria Cristina Caimotto studies news translation practices as well as 
projected self-images between the UK and Italy in the 1970s.29 Both Roberto 
Valdeón and Denise Filmer combine their analysis with the concept of framing. 
Valdeón’s case shows the combination of more modern and more traditional, 
negativised images about Spain in El País English Edition.30 Filmer criticizes 
the British journalists for framing Italy through reinforced stereotypes of 
24 Van Doorslaer (2018), p. 222.
25 See for instance Hu (2015).
26 Leerssen (2016), p. 17.
27 See for instance Keller (2007), p. 358 or Valdeón (2013).
28 Van Doorslaer, Flynn, Leerssen (2015).
29 See Caimotto (2015). 
30 See Valdeón (2015b).
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former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, using translation as “an ideological 
prop” to intensify certain news narratives.31
The fact that national categories are top-of-mind in journalistic categorisa-
tions, is nothing new in itself. Already Michael Billig extensively showed the 
ubiquity of “banal nationalism” in journalistic discourse.32 Not extreme, but 
daily signs of national identity are continuously “flagged in the media”:33 in the 
use of flags, us and them discourse on national grounds, national museums, 
the weather forecast presented on national maps, etc. Within the journalism 
sections, a leading exponent of the continuation and confirmation of banal 
nationalism is sports journalism: “the sporting pages repeat the commonplace 
stereotypes of nation, place and race”.34 An interesting study concentrating 
on exactly that topic, the national stereotyping in sports journalism, was con-
ducted by Maarten van Bever. Despite being a Master’s thesis, the investigation 
was very well focused and methodologically sound. Van Bever analysed three 
popular Dutch-language Belgian newspapers in the summer of 2008, particu-
larly focusing on national stereotyping during the European Football Champi-
onship played in Austria and Switzerland. The three countries with the highest 
number of stereotypes were the Netherlands, Germany and Spain. Whereas 
the neighbouring fans of the Netherlands were often presented as partying, 
loud, self-confident, sometimes arrogant (all existing stereotypes about the 
Dutch in Belgium), even more interesting were the references used for describ-
ing the finalists Spain and Germany, supposedly the two best teams of the tour-
nament. The representation of Spain stressed the technical aspects of their 
way of playing, the frivolous and tiki-taka features, but was also connected 
with emotionality as well as southern and relaxed characteristics. In the case 
of Germany however, several of the 81 stereotypes in the corpus referred to 
solidity, power, strength, Sturm und Drang, and no less than nine of them to a 
war context (e. g. Poland, nazis, Anschluss).
A more recent (unpublished) small-scale study has yielded similar results 
that can be related to national image-building. A Master student compared the 
use of typifying words of two teams that were coached by the Spanish-Catalan 
football coach Pep Guardiola. Although among football specialists it is gener-
ally accepted that the way of playing of both Barcelona and Bayern Munich 
in their Guardiola era was very similar, the corpus showed that terms such 
as ‘machine’ or ‘bulldozer’ were several times used for Bayern, but never for 
31 Filmer (2015), p. 272.
32 See Billig (1995).
33 Billig (1995), p. 119.
34 Billig (1995), p. 120.
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Barcelona. Lasorsa and Dai’s automaticity of stereotyping seems to be omni-
present in sports journalism.
The fact that Germany is an interesting example for imagological research, 
is in itself not new. Several chapters in Imagology Revisited thematised the 
image of Germany in America from a historical perspective, for instance.35 But 
the combination of popular press and sports has the potential to intensify and 
magnify simple images. Well-known was also the Euro 1996 organised in and 
by England, especially the semi-final between England and Germany. The cov-
erage of that match has been described “as the lowest point in British press 
coverage of football”36. The most famous and extensively discussed front page 
was that of the Daily Mirror (see fig. 10.1), featuring two English players wear-
ing helmets and the editor declaring the football war on Germany. Despite the 
newspaper announcing that the Euro 96 would be over for ‘Fritz’, two days later 
Germany eliminated England and went on to the final to become the Euro-
pean champions.
35 See Zacharasiewicz (2010).
36 Mark Christopher Watkin, cited in Belam (2008).
figure 10.1 
Front page of the Daily Mirror, 
24 June 1996
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Such “patriotic frenzy” over sports topics can become constitutive for the 
intensification and automaticity of stereotyping through the media.37 “A 
nation’s image, usually constructed in great part by and through the media, 
can become, over time, part of a national political culture.”38 Also Jonathan 
Grix and Chantal Lacroix (2006) have worked on the case of Germany and the 
way its image was (re)constructed by the British press after the Second World 
War. Although they distinguish eight different stereotypes, the one that is by 
far outnumbering all others is the war-related stereotype. Despite the ephem-
eral feature of media discourse, its massive presence as well as the repetitive 
character of the stereotypes can be very powerful in the distribution of clichés.
It is thus clear that the media plays a major role in shaping UK citi-
zens’ image of Germany. The school curriculum does not appear to have 
enough space and time to counter-balance the avalanche of stereotypical 
coverage of Germany and Germans on television or in the print media. 
Thus, the outmoded image of Germany presented in the media goes 
unchecked by any other source that may allow people the chance to cor-
rect or adjust their perception of Germany and Germans.39
This example illustrates again that the constant repetition of stereotypes is 
the media’s effective weapon that compensates its ephemerality and leads to 
effects that can be considered similar to canonicity. On top of that, because 
of the fast production and rapid distribution features of modern online and 
social media, the repetition is even multiplied.
Although sports coverage may intensify nationalistic and stereotyping ten-
dencies, it is certainly not the only media section making use of the strong 
emotional potential of simplified national images. Related to the focus on Ger-
many in this part would be examples of political media coverage such as the 
financial crisis in Greece or the political clashes between the Turkish Erdoğan 
regime and several Western European countries. In line with the football war 
references in the British tabloids, the reduction of Germany’s past to the nazi 
regime was frequently employed in the Greek and Turkish media. This is illus-
trated in fig. 10.2, dating from 2017, when Germany was harshly criticised in the 
Turkish press because of the cancellation of Turkish ministers’ election rallies 
in Germany.
37 Belam (2008).
38 Grix, Lacroix (2006), p. 373.
39 Grix, Lacroix (2006), p. 388.
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Journalistic discourse is a rewarding object of research for imagology, since 
some journalistic practices reinforce one-sidedness as an element of the auto-
maticity of stereotyping. The representation of Germany (or Germans) is 
a case in point. Out of the range of historically available national images, in 
European media it is for instance not the (eighteenth and nineteenth-century) 
land of poets and philosophers that is referred to. In topics with an economic 
or financial content, the industrial or technological power is often stressed, 
dating back to the end of the nineteenth century, the German Gründerzeit. 
But by far the most frequently used image relates to the period of the two 
world wars and the nazi regime in the 1930 and 40s. The reduction is obvious 
in temporal terms, as this period (if one includes WW I) covers less than three 
decades in a centuries-old history. Historical reduction and one-sidedness in 
image-building go hand in hand.
The effect of repetition in journalism is also reinforced by the use of dichot-
omous categories. An oppositional, occasionally black and white presentation 
belongs to the toolbox of every communicator who has to present a complex sit-
uation to a larger audience. But if such a simplified presentation is successful, it 
can become ingrained and difficult to correct at a later stage. An example is the 
figure 10.2  German Chancellor Angela Merkel presented as Hitler in the Turkish 
 newspaper Güneş
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division of Europe in two categories: Eastern vs. Western Europe, referring to the 
Cold War era and the Iron Curtain. It is a distinction that is frequently, almost 
automatically made in journalistic discourse. This is remarkable, taking into 
consideration that the Iron Curtain does not exist anymore for more than thirty 
years. Nevertheless it still seems to be the determining element for a simplified 
division of the European continent, including the connotations of East and 
West that also refer to Cold War commonplaces. A more nuanced, trans-dichot-
omous, but also fuzzier concept such as ‘Central Europe’ is hardly used. Central 
Europe does not have clear borders marked by an Iron Curtain, but is a term 
with a combination of historical, cultural and political content. A map illustrat-
ing this poly-interpretability is included in the Wikipedia page about Central 
Europe, referring to the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography as its source.40
40 Two emails sent to the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography asking for more informa-
tion about the map remained unanswered.
figure 10.3 Central Europe by political as well as cultural criteria
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Whereas political criteria would place Central Europe perfectly within the 
present political borders of Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland, cultural and historical criteria 
also include parts of several other countries, taking into account that these 
regions were part of the former German empire, the Austro-Hungarian monar-
chy or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Just like the Iron Curtain, these 
are historical situations that are no longer valid. It is mainly the fuzziness of 
the borders that makes the concept of Central Europe much less attractive for 
journalistic use than the bi-polarity of Eastern vs. Western Europe.
The choice for a specific presentation or framing is immediately related 
to the auto-image of Europe, a topic that was mainly elaborated in a Dutch- 
language book by Leerssen (2011). The oppositional pattern of Eastern vs. 
Western Europe relies on a relatively limited period during the twentieth cen-
tury on which basis European ethnotypes are constructed: “Eastern locations 
are often linked to despotic regimes, western ones to democratic values.”41 A 
counterforce to the East-West dichotomous presentation is for instance the 
Visegrád group, founded in 1991. It is a cultural and political alliance between 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Its name is based on his-
torical and cultural grounds, referring to a congress in the Middle Ages in the 
same location. Interestingly this collaboration starts from an idea of strength 
and collaboration of Central European states, which theoretically would have 
the potential of replacing an East-West narrative by a Centre-Periphery nar-
rative. At the beginning of 2018, the new conservative government of Austria 
explicitly mentioned the wish to collaborate more intensely with the Visegrád 
countries. Although this was mainly based on common ideas about migra-
tion policy, at the same time it was a symbolic challenge of the still dominant 
Iron Curtain division: a ‘western’ country showing its preference for collabo-
ration with ‘eastern’ partners. A nineteenth and twentieth century-based cul-
tural and political reality of Austro-Hungarian collaboration pushed aside the 
more recent Cold War division, with both of those periods having resorted to 
instances of ethnotyping.
Despite the stereotypical potential of bordering based on wind directions, 
the arbitrariness of such separations is also shown by other examples. In the 
north of Europe, the term ‘Central Europe’ is often used as part of a north-
south presentation, meaning the central part between north and south. And 
the Baltic Sea is called ‘Ostsee’ [Eastern Sea] in German, but ‘Läänemeri’ 
[Western Sea] in Estonian. Assigning intra-European ethnotypical character-
istics becomes almost a haphazard exercise in such cases.
41 Leerssen (2016), p. 18.
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5 Conclusions
Imagological research may sometimes be criticised for focusing on national 
or cultural essentialisms. Recently Leerssen42 has convincingly demonstrated 
why such views are misguiding.43 Although the nation-state is no longer a self- 
evident category in many scholarly disciplines, national and cultural ethnotyp-
ing are ubiquitous in other types of discourse. We have seen that in journalism, 
stereotyping can be an automaticity. National boundaries are sometimes used 
as tools to explain or demarcate phenomena that are older and more com-
plex. The border between the Netherlands and Belgium, for instance, is often 
described in the press as not only a state, but also a religious frontier: the prot-
estant North (the Netherlands) vs. the catholic South (Belgium). On this basis, 
ethnotypical differences of mentality between the Dutch and the Belgians are 
constructed and reinforced. But the state border between the two countries 
has never been the religious boundary. Approximately the south-eastern third 
of the Netherlands for centuries has been predominantly catholic, just like Bel-
gium. It shows that national – or in this case state –  borders are erroneously 
used as explanatory categories for phenomena that are older than the bound-
aries themselves.
The dominance of national categorisation for research, particularly for the 
selection of units of analysis or comparison, has been problematised in sev-
eral scholarly disciplines.44 However, in journalistic discourse the predomi-
nance of national units of analysis can become a default stereotyping practice 
when used for explanatory or structuring purposes. Every transfer of informa-
tion necessarily involves changes. That is the point where translation studies 
(studying both intra- and interlingual translation) shows an added value for 
imagological approaches. Journalistic text production is often a form of select-
ing, deselecting, re-editing and rewriting. These are already filters in an intra-
lingual setting, but even more so when interlingual transfer is added. Every 
translator, journalist or narrator has to select and de-select when transferring 
and recontextualising information, including information about national and 
cultural images. This gatekeeping function inevitably generates interesting 
material for an imagological approach.
42 Leerssen (2016), p. 28f.
43 Leerssen (2016), p. 28f.
44 See van Doorslaer (2017), p. 220f.
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CHAPTER 11
The Image of Spain in the Eyes of Austrian, 
Flemish, French, Italian, Polish and Bulgarian 
Facebook Users




The empirical analysis of Social Web comments and conversations as mostly intrana-
tional interactions prove to be a valuable tool for understanding how stereotypes on 
European nations are build up and spread. This contribution provides a working tool 
for evaluating battered national brands during the Eurozone crisis from a linguistic 
point of view. A text linguistic methodology based on pragmatics, particularly on text 
functions and text actions, is being proposed and used. It aims at revealing the purpose 
and text features of the text functions found in Facebook conversations about Spain. 
The corpus comprises online conversations posted on newspaper pages of two ‘North-
ern European’ countries that are not being affected by the crisis (Austria and Belgium), 
two ‘Southern European’ ones (Italy and France) and two ‘Eastern European’ countries 
that are not part of the Eurozone (Bulgaria and Poland).
1  National Stereotypes, Nation Branding, Social Media and Text 
Linguistics: An Unusual but Useful Connection
In the Humanities, the study of national stereotyping and othering patterns 
can be approached from different perspectives. In this contribution, I would 
like to present a specific one rooted mainly in text linguistics and pragmatics. 
The text linguistic, pragmatic and media linguistic approach presented here is 
intended to be a useful, practical and straightforward method for the empiri-
cal analysis of national stereotyping. In this respect, this paper’s main goal is 
to provide a working tool for evaluating national stereotypes on social media. 
Although the practicality of the proposed approach will be tested in a cor-
pus-based study of Northern, Southern and Eastern European Facebook con-
versations about Spain, it could also be applied to the study of other European 
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ethnotypes; for example, the characterisation of the Germans in the French 
press or of the Polish in Austrian internet forums.
In today’s globalised world of competing economies, national stereotypes 
can be a serious hindrance to companies and corporations perceived to be part 
of a specific nation. As Laamiri and Ouasti tellingly put it, “l’image de l’Autre 
est construite à travers un discours où le stéréotype règne en maître glorieux”;1 
national stereotypes are very hard to erase from a given society and need to be 
actively opposed.
This is one of the most important reasons countries engage in nation brand-
ing. In the case of Southern European countries experiencing economic diffi-
culties, the main objectives pursued by their nation branding strategies clearly 
involve “helping restore international credibility and investor confidence” and 
“reverse international ratings downgrades” by fighting negative ethno types 
with positive nation brand advertising.2 It therefore seems obvious that the 
cultural dimension of national stereotyping and the economic aspects of a 
nation brand are closely related.
Most studies on nation branding are conceptual, with empirical research 
being very limited.3 When empirical research is conducted, it is based on 
sociological description models, and takes the form of surveys, questionnaires 
or interviews on a given country’s reputation. A good example is the Pew 
Research Center report on the reputation of European countries at the peak 
of the euro crisis.4 In the particular case of Spain, several reports have been 
published in recent years by the Observatory on the Image of Spain, a working 
group established within the Spanish think tank Elcano Royal Institute. In this 
regard, the regular reports Barómetro de la Imagen de España, published once 
a year since 2012, are particularly relevant.5 This sociological approach can 
also be observed in an increasing number of mostly short studies concerned 
with the perception of a nation brand in the digital world.6 It seems that social 
media research is being incorporated into this sociological approach to nation 
branding and national stereotyping.
1 Laamiri, Ouasti (2001), p. 117.
2 Dinnie (2008), p. 17.
3 See Papadopoulos et al. (2016), p. 459.
4 See Kohut (2012).
5 See RI Elcano (2016).
6 E. g. Pizarro (2014) on the economic image of Spain on Twitter or Corvacho Manuel et al. 
(2014) on the reception of the campaign “I need Spain” on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, to 
quote only two well-known studies related to Spain.
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Linguistic studies on national stereotypes are not very common,7 but despite 
this we can distinguish several research streams.8 In this respect, most of the 
linguistic work has been conducted within the framework of two disciplines, 
Semantics and Critical Discourse Analysis. Ossenberg and Baur provide an 
insightful review of the most relevant literature on semantic and lexicographic 
stereotype research.9 Critical Discourse Analysis has produced very import-
ant work in this respect, particularly (but not only) following the publication 
of Prejudice in Discourse by Van Dijk (1984). In more recent times, the Vienna 
School of Critical Discourse Analysis developed by Ruth Wodak has been con-
cerned with identity construction and stereotyped images of the Other. As for 
text and media linguistics, despite the theoretical and empirical work by, for 
example, Dąbrowska,10 Pümpel-Mader,11 and others, text linguistic research on 
national stereotyping has been very scarce to date.
Against this background, it is no wonder that social media have been 
neglected in text linguistic research concerning national stereotyping. This is 
not the case with other linguistic subfields, such as Critical Discourse Analysis, 
where there is an ongoing discussion on how to approach social media data.12
However, as Facebook, Twitter and other social media sites are the new 
“digital public sphere”,13 the empirical analysis of social media comments and 
conversations as mostly intra national textual interactions could be vital for 
understanding how stereotypes on any particular European nation are built up 
and spread. Today, the perception of the other is shaped by the media only to 
a certain extent. Text linguists studying national stereotyping also need to con-
sider online comments: internet users increasingly form their opinions about 
other nations by reading and examining online content posted by other users, 
some of whom are veritable opinion-makers.
In the end, therefore, social media conversations about crisis nations may 
prove essential to the empirical study of national stereotyping. These nations 
should be aware of their image at a microscale, not least for improving and 
adapting their nation branding strategies.
7 See Quasthoff, Hallsteindóttir (2016), p. 347.
8 See Vilinbahova (2014) for an overview.
9 See Ossenberg, Baur (2016).
10 See Dąbrowska (1999).
11 See Pümpel-Mader (2010).
12 See Unger, Wodak, KhosraviNik (2016).
13 See Valtysson (2012), p. 77.
224 Sánchez Prieto
2  An Empirical Approach to Text Linguistic Opinion Mining for 
Detecting and Analysing National Stereotypes
The proposed approach builds on previous research on the communicative 
macrostructure, particularly on text actions. The description of the actions dis-
played in online conversations about a given nation will not simply reveal the 
textual intentions of the commenting user. Far more interesting in our case 
will be to ascertain which topics related to a given nation they comment on, 
and how the users elaborate on these topics and characterise this nation. This 
approach, which is a purely text linguistic one, will be adapted to incorporate 
polarity in the way this concept is understood in sentiment analysis research. 
An exploration of the collocational behaviour of terms that refer directly to the 
nation brand in the text actions will complete the analysis.
2.1 Text Actions and Sentiment Analysis
In line with Rothkegel,14 I consider text actions (or text acts) to be the main struc-
turing element in texts. Rothkegel’s theory of text action, which is based on pre-
vious work by Rehbein, Gülich, Brandt/Rosengren and other authors,15 describes 
the interaction between writer and reader as a thematic means of structuring a 
text. Rothkegel’s text actions are obviously modelled on Speech Act Theory.
However, contrary to speech acts and similarly to Geis’ Dynamic Speech 
Act Theory, text acts cannot be associated “with the use of particular linguis-
tic constructions”.16 They should instead be understood as communicative 
actions that constitute the text’s thematic structure.17
Of the different theoretical and practical approaches proposed for text acts,18 
Von der Lage-Müller’s “Handlungsmodell” may be the most suitable one for 
detecting and categorising text actions related to national stereotyping.19 This 
eminently descriptive model will be adapted here to suit our practical needs 
concerning social media comments about nations.
Three different hierarchical levels of internal organisation for text actions 
will be identified:
1. The sender’s overall textual intent is denoted by the main text action of a given 
text, which in our case will be ‘commenting on Spain (or any other nation)’.
14 See Rothkegel (1992), p. 675.
15 See Rehbein (1977); Gülich (1986); Brandt, Rosengren (1992).
16 Geis (1995), p. 12.
17 See Rothkegel (1984), pp. 240–242.
18 See Czachur (2007), pp. 66–77 for an overview.
19 See Von der Lage-Müller (1995), pp. 50–77. 
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2. The main text action is specified by secondary text actions that articulate 
the general topic of a textual unit of meaning. For example, ‘assessing 
the working ethos of the Spanish’ could be a secondary text action to the 
main one ‘commenting on Spain’.
3. Every secondary text action is effectively realised by an additional third 
level of text actions, which will be called ‘partial secondary text actions’. 
Continuing with our example on assessing the working ethos of the Span-
ish, an Austrian Facebook user could, for example, describe the Spanish 
as being either hard-working or lazy.
Similar approaches based on Von der Lage-Müller have been employed in 
recent studies on text lin guistics,20 but no serious attempt has so far been 
made to link text actions with sentiment analysis.
Sentiment analysis can be broadly defined as the “task of identifying 
 positive or negative opinions, emotions and evaluations”.21 Its main purpose is 
“to determine the contextual polarity of a given sentiment”.22
While computational linguistics in its attempt to automatically determine 
the sentiment contained in a text has done most of the research in this respect,23 
sentiment analysis can also be applied to other linguistic subfields. In fact, 
“polarity” is a common concept in imagology and contrastive literature.24
Sentiment analysis will be used here to determine the polarity of secondary 
text actions, which will be broken down into positive and negative partial ones. 
This method will allow us firstly to determine the national stereotypes social 
media users comment on, and, secondly, to establish the polarity of those com-
ments. Thus, in this paper national stereotypes will be detected and analysed 
in conjunction with the text actions they shape and their polarity.
In the particular case of Spain, the Sixth Report on the Image of Spain by the 
Royal Elcano Institute provides a useful list of national stereotypes,25 which 
can be readily adapted to our needs. Based on this list, 14 secondary text actions 
will be identified for our search. Four of them evaluate Spanish society, describ-
ing Spanish society and assessing the Spanish in terms of trustworthiness, 
amicability and tolerance. Another four are related to the Spanish economy, 
20 See, for example Schröder (2003); Janich (2005); Golonka (2009); Ortner (2014); Sánchez 
Prieto (2017).
21 Stock, Stock (2013), p. 435.
22 Hollander et al. (2016), p. 8.
23 See Taboada (2016) for an overview.
24 For example Leerssen (2007), p. 344.
25 RI Elcano (2016), p. 29.
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assessing the state of the Spanish economy, commenting on corruption, and 
assessing the working ethos of the Spanish and the affluence and material 
prosperity in Spain. Three more text actions assess Spanish politics, describing 
the Spanish political system and its political parties, commenting on regional 
nationalism, and another three are linked to other topics such as commenting 
on Spanish tourist destinations, Spanish culture, and other topics.
Since computational linguistics has been developing analytical tools for 
natural language processing for some time now, I was hoping to find a feasi-
ble method for automatically recognising and classifying text acts. A computer 
linguist carried out an evaluation of the performance of some of the existing 
speech act classifiers, respectively feeding the corresponding tools with one 
hundred randomly extracted French corpus comments on Spain. The same 
comments were also manually broken down into text actions. The accuracy 
obtained with these computational linguistic tools (Maximum Entropy Model, 
Support Vector Machines and Naïve Bayes classifiers) never exceeded 60%, 
and was far below the accuracy figures reported by the authors proposing or 
exploring the given tools. The accuracy of sentiment analysis tools such as Sen-
tiWordNet and Taboada’s Semantic Orientation Calculator was also considered 
insufficient for our descriptive needs,26 and they were hence discarded.
These disappointing results are consistent and may be due to the fact that 
the applicability of these tools is limited to the subject domains they were 
designed for.27 Besides, there is not always a clear relation between speech or 
text act and their morphosyntactic and semantic surface.
The lack of a suitable speech or text act classifier forced us to adopt a partly 
manual, partly automatic, procedure. Each corpus was automatically broken 
down into units of meaning by adding sentence boundaries to the compiled 
corpus with the help of Python Natural Language Toolkit. The automatic seg-
mentation was then manually revised and corrected. The units of meaning 
were then categorised into one of the secondary text actions considered, and 
their polarity determined.
2.2  Collocational Behaviour of Key Words Referring Directly to the 
Nation Brand
Studying the collocational behaviour of key words that refer directly to the 
nation brand could also shed some light on the use of national stereotypes on 
26 See Taboada (2011).
27 See Ortiz, Hernández (2013), p. 98.
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social media. Collocations are understood here as the recurrent co-occurrence 
of words; that is, the “tendency for words to occur together repeatedly”.28 The 
study of collocation patterns is widely used in Critical Discourse Analysis,29 
and may help reveal stereotyping schemes in a text linguistic study such as 
ours.
However, as large bodies of text are generally needed to obtain significant 
results, the study of collocational patterns may not be relevant for us.
3  Spain in the Eyes of Northern, Southern and Eastern European 
Facebook Users
3.1 Corpus Description
The practicality of the proposed analytical method has been tested in a cor-
pus-based study of Facebook conversations about Spain. Facebook is by far the 
most popular social media platform, and the third most visited site on the inter-
net.30 It is thus an ideal platform to extract information about what European 
internet users think about a given nation. Since reading news items on Spain 
clearly prompts people to comment on this nation and its citizens, the com-
piled corpus comprises Facebook conversations posted on the corresponding 
pages of different newspapers across Europe. I searched the Facebook page 
of each newspaper for stories containing the terms “Spain” and “Spanish” in 
the respective language over the period June to December 2016 (six months). 
Sports and show business news were not considered. All the comments in con-
versation threads in which Spain was their main topic were extracted. In other 
words, in order to meet the criteria for inclusion in the corpus, the comments 
had to appear in Spain-related threads published beneath Facebook posts 
about Spain.
For each country, one right- and one left-leaning newspaper with the high-
est circulation in each case were selected. This figure was provided by the 
national audit bureau of circulation: the Österreichische Auflagenkontrolle in 
Austria, the Centrum voor Informatie over de Media in Belgium, the Alliance 
pour les Chiffres de la Presse et des Médias in France, the Federazione Italiana 
Editori Giornali in Italy, and the Zwiazek Kontroli Dystrybucji Prasy in Poland. 
The Bulgarian figures were provided by the National Statistical Institute.
28 Saeed (2009), p. 60.
29 See Fairclough (2003), p. 131.
30 See http://www.alexa.com/topsites [accessed 20.02.2017].
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The selected newspapers are as follows:
 – For Austria: the centre-right Die Presse and the centre-left weekly Der 
Standard.
 – For Flanders: the centrist De Standaard and the centre-left De Morgen.
 – For France: the centre-right Le Figaro and the centre-left Le Monde.
 – For Italy: the centre-right Il Corriere della Sera and centre-left La Repubblica.
 – For Poland: the centre-right Rzeczpospolita (the largest daily in terms 
of circulation, Gazeta Wyborcza, had just two news items on Spain and 
very few comments) and the left-leaning weekly Polytika (there are no 
relevant centre-left or left daily newspapers in Poland).
 – For Bulgaria: the centre-right weekly Kapital and the centre-left daily 
Trud. Like all the other Bulgarian dailies, Trud is a hybrid tabloid, so the 
Bulgarian subcorpus is not fully comparable with the other ones.
This constitutes an appropriate selection of relevant newspapers from two 
Northern European countries (Flanders and Austria), two Southern Euro-
pean ones (Italy and France), and two Eastern European countries outside the 
 Eurozone (Poland and Bulgaria).
The number of tokens and total units of meaning in each subcorpus is stated 
in Table 11.1. The units of meaning coincide with the text actions. Despite the 
design of the corpus, it is striking that not even half the text actions refer to 
Spain.
table 11.1  Corpus description
Country Tokens Units of 
meaning (total)
Units of meaning 
referring to Spain
Austria 5948 398 140 (35.2%)
Flanders 4274 297 124 (41.8%)
France 29671 1393 571 (41%)
Italy 28672 1596 803 (50.3%)
Poland 1918 114 83 (72.8%)
Bulgaria 92 8 8 (100%)
Total 70575 3806 1729 (45.4%)
3.2 Text Actions in the Corpus: Results
The evaluation of the six sets of corpus data according to this description 
model sheds interesting light on the nature of the text actions referring to 
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table 11.2   Secondary text actions (STAs) assessing Spain in Northern, Southern and Eastern European 
comments
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Spain. Politics seems to be the most relevant topic for Austrian, Flemish, 
French and Bulgarian Facebook users involved in conversations about Spain 
(see Table 11.2). In contrast, secondary text actions (STAs) “describing other 
topics related to Spain” in the Italian and Polish subcorpora record the high-
est percentage. Tellingly, only Western Europeans are apparently interested 
in assessing the Spanish economy: 22–34% of all Spain-related STAs in the 
Austrian, Flemish, French and Italian subcorpora do so. As these results are 
only partially influenced by the range of news topics and news items posted 
by each newspaper on Facebook, these findings are very striking. The Spanish 
economic crisis does not appear to be a hot topic in Poland or Bulgaria, at least 
not on Facebook.
3.2.1 Assessing Spanish Society
The number of occurrences or number of secondary text actions assessing 
Spanish society is very low or non-existent in the Eastern European corpora 
and low in the Northern European ones. The results that can be extracted from 
the corpus (Table 11.3) are therefore only truly relevant in the case of the Italian 
and French datasets.
In the Austrian and Flemish corpora, Spanish society is described as 
being more traditional than modern: 77.7% of all Austrian partial secondary 
text actions (PSTAs) and 100% of all Flemish ones assessing Spanish society 
describe Spain as a traditional country. The French seem to have a completely 
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table 11.3   STAs and PSTAs assessing Spanish society in Northern, Southern and Eastern European 
comments about Spain
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different opinion in this respect: 50% of the partial secondary text actions have 
a positive polarity (that is, Spain is a modern country), while only 35% have a 
negative polarity. The Italians seem to be divided on this matter. The following 
Austrian example, which condemns bullfighting, is a telling example:
(1) “Spanien sollte lieber die tierquäler bestrafen, die stierkämpfe abschaf-
fen und die toten windhunde von den bäumen schneiden, auf denen die 
spanischen jäger sie am saisonende aufknüpfen” (A-STANDARD 52)31
The secondary text action “assessing the Spanish on trustworthiness” is 
designed to address the typical stereotype of the untrustworthiness and 
31 Examples are referenced with country abbreviation–name of the newspaper–Facebook 
comment number in each corpus.
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table 11.3   STAs and PSTAs assessing Spanish society in Northern, Southern and Eastern European 
comments about Spain (cont.)
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unreliability of the Spanish. This national stereotype seems to be deeply 
ingrained in Western Europe, particularly in Austria and Flanders, but also in 
France. At the other extreme, the Polish are the most positive ones about the 
Spanish. The Italian data should be viewed with caution, as three-quarters of 
these negative text actions are related to a single news item on a Spanish court 
decision finding a bus driver not guilty of negligent homicide after a coach 
crash in Spain involving Italian students. In the next example, a Facebook user 
is implicitly describing Spanish justice as untrustworthy:
(2) “La giustizia spagnola, peggiore della.nostra, se possibile […]” 
(I-CORRIERE 42)
Only the French and Italians assess the Spanish on friendliness and tolerance. 
In the French corpus, Spain is mostly seen as a friendly and tolerant nation, 
and in some cases is described as more so than France, as in these two units 
of meaning:
(3) “Je trouve que l’Espagne est un pays beaucoup plus tolérant avec l’ho-
mosexualité que la France. J’ai vécu à Madrid et personne ne m’a jamais 
insulté pour embrasser un garçon dans le métro où me balader main 
dans la main avec lui dans la rue de n’importe quel quartier. JAMAIS.” 
(F-LE MONDE 119)
In contrast, the percentage of partial secondary text actions in the Italian cor-
pus describing the Spanish as unfriendly and not to be trusted amounts to 
nearly 55% and 71%, respectively.
3.2.2 Assessing the Spanish Economy
About a quarter of all Western European text actions assess the Spanish econ-
omy. As the empirical data from Table 11.4 suggest, Spain is mostly perceived as 
a country in economic regression.
The secondary text action “assessing the shape of the Spanish economy” 
is the most important one in terms of occurrences in all relevant data sets. 
In their corpora, the Austrians, the Flemish and the French overwhelmingly 
describe the Spanish economy as particularly weak, as in (4):
(4) “Ein Land, in dem Arbeitslosigkeit, Schulden und sinkende Löhne 
einen Linksruck bringt […]” (A-PRESSE 46)
In the Italian corpus, a sizable percentage of partial text actions surprisingly 
describe the economic situation as strong (26%), or neither weak nor strong 
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table 11.4   STAs and PSTAs assessing the Spanish economy in Northern, Southern and Eastern 
European comments about Spain
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table 11.4   STAs and PSTAs assessing the Spanish economy in Northern, Southern and Eastern 
European comments about Spain (cont.)
(neutral, 15.5%). In most of these units of meaning, the Italian economic situ-
ation is compared to the Spanish one, as in (5):
(5) “senza governo crescono del 3,5 %. noi con il bomba, pdioti alfano e 
verdini, 0.00000000000000 periodico” (I-REPUBBLICA 331)
The working ethos of the Spanish is assessed in the Austrian, Flemish and 
French corpora. In all three, but especially in the Austrian and Flemish ones, 
the Spanish are mainly characterised as lazy.
Commenting on corruption in Spain is not as common as expected. When 
the Austrian, the Flemish, the French and the Italian Facebook users do com-
ment on corruption in the compiled corpus, they consider the Spanish to be 
corrupt in a clear majority of cases, as in (6):
(6) “Le plus grave c’’est que la corruption est completement normalisée 
dans la société espagnole.” (F-LE MONDE 636)
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This stereotype is thus still very much alive. In most of the STAs studied, Spain 
is seen as an impoverished country in decline. This has been the traditional 
view of Northern and Western Europeans towards Spain for decades, as in the 
following Flemish example:
(7) “Hij heeft, en nog, de Spanjaarden uitgemolken en de slechte resul-
taren zijn er, 22,8 % werklozen, 28,6 % vd bevolking is arm, 50 % vd jon-
geren hebben geen werk.” (BE-DM 4)
However, even Northern European Facebook users recognize that Spain is in 
the main a developed country, as in the following Flemish comment, where 
Brussels and Madrid are compared and the Belgian infrastructure deficits are 
acknowledged:
(8) “Waar wachten jullie nog op, Brussel en de Vlaamse rand, om net als 
rond Madrid vier con centrische ringwegen aan te leggen!” (BE-STAN 39)
3.2.3 Assessing Spanish Politics
Spanish politics is assessed in a high percentage of Western, Southern and 
Eastern European comments (see Table 11.5 for an overview and below for the 
discussion). This may be due to the fact that a good deal of Spain-related news 
posted on Facebook falls into the realm of politics.
Judging from the results, Spain is not considered a particularly stable democ-
racy by the Austrian, the Flemish, the French and the Polish. In contrast, the 
Italians overwhelmingly state that Spain is a stable democracy.
Most text actions referring to Spanish politics focus on Spanish political par-
ties. The vast majority of Northern and Southern European text actions reveal a 
negative polarity in this respect. The Austrians and the Flemish seem to be par-
ticularly sceptical about Spanish politicians, often even being hostile when they 
describe them as corrupt and damaging to the Spanish people, as in (9) and (10):
(9)“De man die Spanje kapotbespaarde, wordt nu de premier van een 
minderheidsregering […].” (BE-DM 32)
(10) “Sie [Die Spanier] sind empört über die Günstlingswirtschaft und 
Korruption in den beiden großen Volksparteien.” (A-PRESSE 45)
The Polish and Bulgarians have a much more positive opinion of Spanish poli-
ticians. In most cases, this is the result of comparing their own political system 
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table 11.5   STA sand PSTAs assessing Spanish politics in Northern, Southern and Eastern European 
comments about Spain
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with the Spanish one. A good example may be (11): a Bulgarian internet user 
thanks the Spanish minister of economic affairs for using plain language to 
talk about straightforward (economic) facts:
(11) “Най-после, някой да го каже на ‘ясен български’!” (BG-KAPITAL 1)
In the Flemish, French, Italian and Polish corpora, a significant number of text 
actions comment on the Catalan question and on regional nationalism. The 
French and the Italians seem to align themselves with Spanish constitutional-
ism rather than with regional nationalism. In contrast, the Flemish (as well as 
the Austrians) tend to welcome Catalan separatism (see example 12). The Pol-
ish react very differently and stress in their comments that they do not under-
stand Catalan separatism, as in (13), where all separatists are labelled “idiots”:
(12) “Catalonië onafhankelijk!” (BE-DM 4)
(13) “Debiły! Wszyscy separatyscy są debiłami” (PL- RZECZPOSPOLITA 15)
3.2.4 Assessing the Spanish on Other Topics
Spain is still seen as an attractive tourist destination. The positive polarity is 
high in the Austrian, Flemish and Polish text actions. It is, however, mainly 
negative in the French and Italian corpora. Only the Austrians, the French, the 
Italians and the Polish assess Spanish culture. The opinions expressed in the 
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table 11.5   STA sand PSTAs assessing Spanish politics in Northern, Southern and Eastern European 
comments about Spain (cont.)
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table 11.6   STAs and PSTAs assessing the Spanish on other topics in Northern, Southern and Eastern 
European comments about Spain
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French and Polish corpora are overwhelmingly positive, whereas in the Italian 
case they are mainly negative or neutral.
The last secondary text action, “commenting on other topics”, is extremely 
interesting. When commenting on other Spain-related topics, the Flemish and 
French appear to do so in a mainly positive manner, while the Polish adopt a 
neutral tone. The results for the Italian corpus are misleading, as over three 
quarters of the Italian partial secondary text actions are assessments of the 
Franco period (see Table 11.6 for more details).
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3.3 Collocations in the Corpus: Results
As expected, the results obtained by exploring the collocational patterns of the 
corpus comments are neither representative nor relevant. Lexical approaches 
are thus only of limited applicability if the data set is small. In our case, almost 
no collocates for the key term “Spain” could be found in the Austrian, Flemish, 
Polish and Bulgarian data sets. Table 11.7 shows the few collocates found in the 
French and Italian corpus by counting the co-occurrences with the key term 
“Spain”. The analysis has been carried out with the help of the Sketch Engine 
lexical corpus manager and analysis software.
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table 11.6   STAs and PSTAs assessing the Spanish on other topics in Northern, Southern and Eastern 
European comments about Spain (cont.)
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table 11.8    Top 10 key words (terms) of the subcorpora in Spain-related contexts (minimal 






















The extraction of the most common key words in the French and Italian cor-
pora, as shown in Table 11.8, reveals that most key words are related to Spanish 
politics. Very few of them are linked to the economic crisis (as French “sanc-
tionner” and “austérité”).
4 Conclusions
This paper has presented a practical text-linguistic approach to the analysis 
of national stereotypes on social media. Since lexical approaches are only of 
limited applicability with small data, the approach outlined here is rooted in 
text actions and sentiment analysis. It distinguishes three hierarchical levels 
of internal organisation for text actions: main text action (what or who are we 
talking about?), secondary text actions (which topics related to this object/
reality/person are we talking about?) and partial secondary text actions (how 
do we characterise this object/reality/ person in terms of polarity?).
The proposed approach has been tested in a corpus-based study of North-
ern, Southern and Eastern European Facebook conversations that include Aus-
trian, Flemish, French, Italian, Polish and Bulgarian comments about Spain. 
The thorough analysis of the Spain-related text actions in the six corpora has 
not revealed any surprising results. For the Austrian and the Flemish Spain is a 
rather traditional country in a heavy economic crisis and Spaniards and their 
politicians are not trustworthy and lazy. However, the Austrians do appreciate 
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the Spanish culture and for both the Austrians and the Flemish Spain seems 
to remain an attractive tourist destination. The French have a more positive 
opinion of Spain. For them, Spain is a modern country and the Spanish are 
friendly and tolerant. Nevertheless, they are not always trustworthy and Spain, 
which is not considered a particularly stable democracy, is in a deep economic 
crisis. Spanish culture is viewed in a positive light. The Italians are divided in 
their opinions about the Spanish regarding the modernity of the country and 
the friendliness of its population. For most Italian Facebook users the Spanish 
are not trustworthy and the economic situation in Spain is as bad as in Italy. 
They also have a rather negative view of Spain as a tourist destination. How-
ever, for them Spain is a stable democracy. The very few Polish and Bulgarian 
comments about Spain cast a rather positive light on Spain and the Spaniards 
as a people.
Despite its problems and limitations, the analytical method explained in 
this paper will hopefully enable linguists to break down conversational threads 
about a given nation into text actions, and so draw conclusions about the pres-
ence and actional nature of national stereotypes in text corpora.
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CHAPTER 12




After the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2008, the hegemony of the politics of finan-
cial debt was largely perceived in Southern Europe as an internal colonisation, with 
Germany as the leading economic power. According to this view, Southern Europe 
became the trial ground for neoliberal late capitalism. The unequal impact of the cri-
sis on the different European economies resulted in the unwelcome reactivation of old 
stereotypes that hinder the European process towards transnational economic, social 
and cultural convergence. This contribution considers fiction as a privileged space for 
the nuanced representation of the complexities characterising the current moment 
of European liquid modernity and presents the novel as an important arena for criti-
cal reflection. It discusses a selection of recently published novels from Spain, which, 
set in the aftermath of the construction boom and the unveiling of systemic corrup-
tion, register the multiple negative consequences of the European austerity policies 
and grapple with the resurfacing of the stereotypical constructs of national identities 
through humour, satire, and social and political critique. Among the authors consid-
ered are Almudena Grandes, Germán Gullón, Rafael Chirbes, Luis García Jambrina, 
and Belén Gopegui.
1 Introduction
Our era is perceived as one of uncertainty and precariousness, accentuated by 
the current global hegemony of neoliberal capitalism and its collateral effects, 
the crisis of national sovereignty, the unequal impact of globalisation, unequal 
access to instant electronic communication, un precedented migration flows, 
accelerating urbanisation, neo-colonialism, climate change, the overexploita-
tion of natural resources, market volatility and the subsequent polarisation of 
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wealth and society.1 The instability, turmoil and violence resulting from the 
coalescence of these develop ments prompts a re-evaluation of the Western 
ideology of modern progress, as European societies resort to different strate-
gies of resilience – from the emergence of extreme political parties on the right 
and the left, to the isolationism implicit in Brexit, and the reaction against asy-
lum policies. Unsurprisingly, the very different effects of the 2008 financial 
crisis on the various European economies has also caused the resurgence of 
dormant stereotypes of national identity.
Parallel to an increasing perception of vulnerability, the concept of resil-
ience has gained popularity in the West, to the extent that The Guardian 
proposed the term as the word of the year 2012.2 Though emerging from the 
realm of the natural sciences, the term has come to denote the capacity of 
nature and of humankind to withstand shocks by being able to adapt, renew 
and even thrive in the face of adversity and destructive conditions. In Spanish, 
the term resiliencia still rings as an Anglicism and is rarely used to talk about 
the strategies to overcome the consequences of the recent multi-layered crises 
caused by the financial crash of 2008. However, the successive conservative 
Governments led by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy of Partido Popular (22 Dec. 
2011–7 Jun. 2018) consistently resorted to the neoliberal discourse of resilience 
to encourage people in Spain to put up with the austerity policies that the IMF 
and ‘the Troika’ demanded.
A number of novels published recently in Spain testify both to the resilience 
of the Spanish people in times of economic, social, political and cultural turbu-
lence, and to the resilience of stereotypes. Taking fiction as a source of inquiry 
that may contribute to create an ‘imaginated discourse’,3 this essay offers to 
look at a selection of five recently published novels from Spain that create a 
narrative of endurance, struggle and hope in the face of the traumatic reality 
of the 2008 financial crisis by working with national stereotypes. La codicia de 
Guillermo de Orange (2013) by Germán Gullón, Bienvenida, Frau Merkel (2015) 
by Luis García-Jambrina, En la Orilla (2013) by Rafael Chirbes, Los besos en el 
1 Research for this paper has taken place within the framework of the research project 
 Narratives of Resilience: Intersectional Perspectives about Literature and Other Contemporary 
Cultural Representations (FFI2015-63895-C2-2-R), graciously funded by the Spanish Ministry 
of Economy and Competitiveness.
2 See Juniper (2011).
3 I follow Leerssen (2000), Leerssen (2007a), Leerssen (2007b) in the use of the term “imagi-
nated discourse” to refer to a discourse that is “concerned with the characterological expla-
nation of cultural difference,” articulating “a moral, collective-psychological motivation for 
given social or national features” Leerssen (2007a), p. 28, and relying “on imputations of 
national character, rather than on testable fact”, Leerssen (2007b), p. 342. 
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pan (2015) by Almudena Grandes and Belén Gopegui’s El comité de la noche 
(2014) were reviewed by the major national newspapers upon their publica-
tion, and were the object of interviews and discussions in radio and televi-
sion shows. However, to date, only Chirbes’ has been translated into English as 
On the Edge (2016). The authors considered are avowedly leftist intellectuals, 
whose fictions register via humour, irony, satire, and social and political cri-
tique the perception that the cleavage between Northern and Southern Euro-
pean countries has been accentuated, on the one hand, by the European and 
national economic policies during the crisis and, on the other, by the reactiva-
tion of discourses that rely on stereotypical constructs about national identi-
ties. Therefore, these novels capitalize on historical stereotypes that include 
self-images of Spanish identity, i.e., the characterological reputation that Span-
iards currently share of themselves, hetero-images, i.e., the opinion that others 
have about the Spanish purported character, and meta-images, a term used to 
refer to “how a nation believes it is perceived by others.”4 My aim is to ponder 
whether and how these fictional narratives offer an opportunity to study the 
role of stereotypes in engaging the collective imagination in the creation of a 
metanarrative that contributes to keep a positive sense of identity and dignity 
in the midst of crisis.
I propose to offer a brief survey of the key tropes and pervading stereotypical 
images of Spain used on and off in the course of history to refer to the Spanish 
national character both within Spain and internationally, before exploring the 
extent to which the proposed novels draw on this tradition in order to sanc-
tion, negate, mock, or extend it.
2 The Historical Construction of the Spanish Character
Spain’s image appears as a palimpsest of layered stereotypes of complex ori-
gins in the long European history, created as much by hetero-images, the gaze 
of non-nationals, as by the self-image cultivated within Spain. Lucena Giraldo 
classifies the stereotypes about Spain in three main categories that encompass 
the Spanish Black Legend, the Romantic image of Spain as an exotic coun-
try, and the re-evaluation of Spain’s image during the Democratic Transition 
period after 1975.5
4 Leerssen (2007b), p. 344.
5 See Giraldo (2006). 
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The Spanish Black Legend, a term coined by Julián Juderías at the beginning 
of the twentieth century,6 results from the (hetero-)images emerging from the 
convergence of religious and political developments. It has its roots as much in 
the Spain of the Inquisition, a champion of Catholicism against Protestantism, 
Judaism and the Islam in the Middle Ages, as in the perception of Spain as a 
cruel and despotic state involved in numerous conflicts of interests with other 
European and non-European powers after becoming an Empire in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries.7 Contributing to the Spanish Black Legend 
were John Foxe, Father Bartolomé de las Casas, and William of Orange, among 
others. The latter’s exaggerated accusations of “murder, arrogance, avarice, 
excessive territorial ambition, fanaticism, cruelty, brutality and lack of educa-
tion” in the Apology (1581) gained widespread credence,8 and these stereotypes 
about the Spanish character remained unchanged until the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.9
The change of dynasty in Spain in 1700 marks the transition to a romantic 
and Orientalised view of Spain in the nineteenth century. Whereas the French 
justify the invasion of Spain as an attempt to instil the Enlightenment ideals 
and liberate a vicious, lazy and devious people from tradition, clericalism and 
secular intolerance, the English embrace the romantic view of Spaniards as 
a brave, passionate people rising up in arms to defend their freedom against 
the French tyrants. They foster an exoticism that is enhanced by a focus on 
the legacy of Arab culture, the values of a pre-modern, pre-capitalist society, 
and the loyalties and spontaneity that are encapsulated in the bandits and 
Carmen types.
The twentieth century elaborates upon all these stereotypes, with the Span-
ish Civil War (1936–1939) triggering a neo-romantic image that blends the 
Black Legend with the idea of a free people in arms. The ensuing post-war 
period, marked by Francoist authoritarianism, National Catholicism, milita-
rism, and conservatism, congeals the image of Spain as archaic and isolated. In 
the 1960s the industry of tourism that helps to open the country to the outside 
world also revives the romantic stereotypes regarding Spain’s exceptionalism 
as a nation anchored in erstwhile values, passion, sex, fiesta and siesta. After 
the dictator’s death, Spain’s enthusiastic embrace of and inclusion in the Euro-
pean Union contributed to its ‘normalisation’ and modernisation. The view of 
Spain before the 2008 crisis was that of a successful country that had restored 
6 See Juderias (1914). 
7 See López de Abiada (2007), p. 243.
8 Dadson (2004), p. 144.
9 See López de Abiada (2007), p. 244.
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democracy in a model Transition from a 40-year-long dictatorship, performing 
what is known as the Spanish (economic) Miracle, while preserving a passion 
and  creativity that situate the country in the post-modern cultural arena, for 
example in Calatrava’s architecture or Almodovar’s films. However, after the 
crisis, this positive image was readily overturned in the political and media 
discourses both abroad and within, reverting to that of a misgoverned, ineffi-
cient and corrupt country that had lived above its means. Counteracting this 
negative stereotype, other voices emerged within Spain. In particular, the 15-M 
grassroots movement re-energised the image of a proud Spanish people rising 
against the tyranny of national and international politics in defence of their 
civil liberties.10 These bipolar perceptions constitute what Joep Leerssen terms 
“imagemes”, or deep structures generating a polarity of contrasting attributes.11 
They continue to the present to the extent that two contrasting images of 
Spain coexist.
3 Dealing with National Stereotypes in Spanish Crisis Novels
The novels selected for this study were published between 2013 and 2015, 
during the peak of the economic crash in Spain. Coeval with the crumbling 
of social prosperity and of Spain’s positive image, these novels engage in the 
revision and adaptation of stereotypes that prove resistant to change.
Germán Gullón’s La codicia de Guillermo de Orange (The Greed of William 
of Orange) capi talizes on the historical clash between Northern and Southern 
Europe, taking Holland and Spain as case studies.12 This confrontation, which 
is well documented by historians, is also well represented in literary works 
that testify to stereotypical tropes which seem to have resurfaced during the 
10 The Movimiento 15-M, also called Movimiento de los indignados, takes its name from the 
demonstrations of 15 May 2011 that took place all over Spain, originating a series of peace-
ful protests aiming to promote a participative democracy against the two-party system 
and its purported subservience to neoliberalism, banks and multinational corporations. 
Protesters also demanded to confront the alleged current crisis of the institutions that 
hampers the real division of powers and damages democracy. Along with the Arab Spring 
and the Greek protests, the 15-M Movement inspired the global Occupy Movement.
11 See Leerssen (2000) and Leerssen (2007a), pp. 29, 33.
12 Germán Gulllón is Emeritus Professor of Spanish Literature, as well as a writer and liter-
ary critic. He graduated from the University of Salamanca, got his PhD from Texas Uni-
versity and began his teaching career at the University of Pennsylvania. He became Chair 
of the Spanish and Classics Department at the University of California Davis, and the 
Director of the Cervantes Institute in Utrecht.
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current crisis.13 Similarly, the novel tracks the present-day philias and pho-
bias back to the enmities caused by historical imperialistic power games. In 
the novel, the revival of historical animosities in present-day Dutch politics 
concerns Richard Vaessens, an influential professor holding the Spanish Chair 
at Amsterdam University, who notes that “Willem van Oranje-Nassau’s ideas 
[…] are embedded in current Dutch culture, undoubtedly due to the crisis. 
[…] The stereotypes against the Spaniards help speculators, who are betting 
for the economies to crash in the Europe warmed by the Mediterranean sun.”14 
The book opens with the Dutch defeat against Spain in the final of the Soccer 
World Cup Championship in 2010, an event that enrages Joost van der Linden, 
who has a great hatred for all things Spanish. He owns a corporation called 
Orange, after the monarch and founding father of the Netherlands William of 
Orange, whose Apologia (1581) defends his right to rebel against what he con-
sidered the tyranny of Phillip II of Spain and Portugal (1556–1598). After the 
Dutch soccer defeat, Joost plans to offer as a Christmas gift to friends and good 
clients thousands of copies of the Apology in Dutch, German, and English. This 
is part of Joost’s strategy to make financial profit from an advertising campaign 
to discredit Spain, and further devalue its rating in the market. Joost tries to 
convince his associates Sloterdijk and Toorn that the Apology can serve their 
corporative interests, the same as it served the nationalist Dutch interests in 
the past: “It helped to spread the Spanish Black Legend, also fostered by the 
English, an effective weapon for the discredit of the Spanish Empire in the 
sixteenth century. Its publication will contribute to our corporation’s current 
13 See Zacharasiewicz (2010), pp. 24, 142–147, 468–502. An example of the stereotyping at 
work in the present construction of a cultural rupture between Northern and Southern 
Europe is the use of the pejorative term P.I.G.S. to allude to the economies of Portugal, 
Italy, Greece and Spain. Coined by the Financial Times and Barclays Capital in 2010, this 
derogatory acronym epitomizes the stereotypes held against Southern Europe by its 
Northern neighbours. Ireland also became associated with the term, either replacing 
Italy or changing the acronym to PIIGS. Sometimes a second G (PIGGS or PIIGGS), for 
Great Britain, was also added. As a counterpoint, there is a general perception in these 
Southern countries that Northern Europeans are self-right eous, interventionist, greedy 
peoples, lacking solidarity and empathy, and possessing a sense of unjustified moral 
superiority with respect to Southern Europeans, based on their greater economic devel-
opment. This state of affairs is humorously captured in Yanko Tsvetkov’s bestselling Atlas 
of Prejudice, where Germany appears from Spain’s point of view as “Cruella de Merkel”. 
Similarly, from Greece’s perspective, Central Europeans, and Germany in particular, 
are perceived, according to Tsvetkov’s map as “imperialists,” “freaks,” and “egoists.” See 
 Tsvetkov (2012), n.p.
14 Gullón (2013), p. 27. All the quotations from the novels are my translation into English, 
except for Chirbes’, for which I use Margaret Jull Costa’s translation.
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objective to shatter the confidence in the Spanish financial debt.”15 Jan, how-
ever, articulates his scruples, arguing that “it is the moment for the Germans 
and Dutch to show some solidarity after the glorious years following the adop-
tion of the Euro, when we got rich due to the rise of prices [in Spain].”16 Like 
William of Orange, who hired German mercenaries at his own expense to 
launch his insurrection against the Spaniards, Joost does not hesitate to black-
mail journalists and the Dutch university authorities, and to pay mercenaries 
to intimidate those who threaten to unveil their game. The Orange Corporation 
thrives by reviving the stereotype of the hedonist Spaniards who enjoy life too 
much – purportedly partying instead of working, dilapidating the European 
funding they received for decades and basking in corruption. This supports 
the conclusion that Spaniards deserve their fate because they’ve lived beyond 
their means.
Ellen, a Dutch graduate student majoring in Spanish, stands in stark con-
trast to these characters’ Hispano-phobia. Her research discloses Joost van der 
Linde’s financial conspiracy against Spain, simultaneously revealing his busi-
nesses’ strong roots in ultra-nationalism and racism towards Spaniards.
The novel reveals the media’s construction of an imaginated discourse that, 
in connivance with politicians and the economic powers, creates the cleavage 
between the North and the South of Europe in Holland. Wouda, for instance, 
remembers a political campaign around
the excessive contribution of Holland to the EU. It thrived on the voters’ 
ignorance, hiding from them that the beneficiaries of EU funding were 
actually the German and Dutch exporters, because if good roads were 
built in the South and East of Europe, our cheese and chemicals, and the 
German appliances would get there faster. You won’t hear complaints 
from Bosch, AEG, Siemens or Miele. We weren’t exactly any Pollyanna 
ourselves. Rather, we have a good eye for business.17
Eventually, it is the transnational Spanish-Dutch cooperation between aca-
demia, the press and the police that thwarts, at least momentarily, the finan-
cial and physical violence exerted by Joost van der Linden’s greed. Resistance 
to stereotypical images of Spain is achieved precisely by the same means that 
spreads the stereotypes, namely, the globalisation of information through elec-
tronic instant communication and fast travel.
15 Gullón (2013), pp. 15f. 
16 Gullón (2013), p. 16.
17 Gullón (2013), p. 69.
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Thus, Gullón’s text dwells on ingrained historical images containing com-
pounded contradictory polarities (imagemes) only to unveil the fallacy of the 
binary and to point towards the rejection of the meta-image. However, in the 
process of dispelling the negative heteroimage of Spain as – according to the 
text – created in Holland, the novel may be reinforcing a stereotypical hetero-
image of the Dutch for the Spanish reader of the novel.
If Gullón’s novel offers a critique of the Dutch for aggravating the precar-
ious financial situation of the Spanish economy so as to exact an economic 
benefit while punishing and humiliating the Spaniards, Luis García-Jambrina’s 
Bienvenida, Frau Merkel (2015) is a scathing self-critique in the Spanish literary 
tradition of el esperpento, the grotesque parody mastered by nineteenth-cen-
tury classic writer Ramón del Valle-Inclán.18 It also pays homage to the 1953 
classic film by Luis García Berlanga, Bienvenido, Mr. Marshall by recounting 
in the same humorous and satirical vein the frustrated efforts of a little town 
in La Mancha to be saved from economic collapse by the intervention of a 
foreign power. Whereas in Berlanga’s film the inhabitants of Villar del Río pin 
their hopes on the Marshall Plan which helped reconstruct Western Europe 
after World War II, but ignored a torn Spain equally distraught after its Civil 
War, in García-Jambrina’s novel salvation lies in the possibility of Germany, as 
the embodiment of the EU’s political and economic power, helping Villar del 
Campo out of its bankruptcy. Hit by the financial crisis, all the corruption and 
bad management of the previous decades come to the surface, and shatter the 
myth of the ‘Spanish miracle’ after the democratic transition of 1975. When the 
Mayor Germán García learns that Merkel is going to pass nearby on her way to 
a European summit to be held in Toledo, he convinces his neighbours to put 
up a farce and recreate their town as a model German village. Germán hovers 
between the heroic idealism of Don Quixote and the clever picaresque of the 
anti-hero Lázaro de Tormes, the two literary referents in the Spanish cultural 
imaginary.
The plan he concocts evokes the heteroimage of Germany in Spain: “If we 
manage to convince the German chancellor that we’re a truly austere, serious, 
disciplined and hard-working people, that is, just like them, I’m sure she will 
help us out of this crisis with some European recovery program, a sort of Merkel 
Plan for those of us who are truly determined to improve and change.”19 The 
18 Like Gullón, García-Jambrina studied Hispanic Philology at the University of Salamanca, 
where he currently teaches Spanish Literature. Besides his academic and critical work, he 
is the author of two collections of short stories and eight novels that combine historical 
and noir genres.
19 García-Jambrina (2015), p. 18.
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novel’s satire emerges from the dynamic tensions between the self-images and 
the heteroimages emanating from both the Spanish and the German protago-
nists. Thus, the Mayor’s emphasis on contrition and transformation in the way 
of carrying out business, shunning corrup tion and the dilapidation of public 
funds in unsustainable projects, is soon revealed as a devious manoeuver to 
proceed as usual, making easy money by literally selling an image that does 
not correspond with the reality it represents, but that actually could transform 
that reality. This becomes apparent in the Mayor’s words after proposing to 
convince Merkel they are just like the Germans: “Not to mention the publicity 
all this would bring; we’d be trending topic in Twitter and all the social media, 
we’d be all over the press, including the digital newspapers, and the TV and 
radio news would open with us. This would make foreign capital interested in 
investing in our town, and bankers would give us soft loans to refinance our 
debt if necessary.”20
Furthermore, the text extends the stingy satire to the Germans, represented 
by Petra, a German artist who resides in Spain. Petra articulates an imagi-
nated discourse by singling out the ‘typical’ characteristics of Spaniards and 
highlighting the stereotypical differences between Spain and Germany, con-
sequently portraying Spaniards as the Other of Germans. Focusing on the 
antithetical economic situation of both countries during the crisis, she finds a 
characterological explanation of cultural difference (and of the different eco-
nomic results) in religion, adopting a moral superiority that rejects contesta-
tion on the part of her interlocutor, as the following dialogue between Petra 
and the Mayor in the village’s church demonstrates:
“For starters, Catholics are profligate and luxury lovers: it suffices to look 
at that altarpiece”, she explained, pointing towards the altar, ”full with 
images and gilded figures, even in this little town, whereas us, the Luther-
ans are sober and thrifty. On the other hand, it’s evident that you, the 
Catholics, go through life sinning and getting in debt and then you fix it all 
with a confession. […] And if that were not enough, you take out of your 
sleeve that invention of the indulgence, so criticized by Luther, which is 
something like getting a loan so that you can continue getting into debt. 
This clearly demonstrates that Catholicism goes against the economic 
and fiscal health of a country, and if you don’t believe me, there’re  Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain itself, all of them Catholic countries.”
“And what about Greece?”
20 García-Jambrina (2015), p. 18.
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“The Greeks are even worse, as they pass for being Orthodox, and you 
see the result”, she added with a certain contempt.21
When Germán protests that most Spaniards are only nominally Catholic, 
Petra—in tune with the inflexibility and harshness that her name implies—
vehemently defends that that is typically Catholic: “as good Catholics you’re 
hypocrites; actually, it could be argued that that dissociation between believ-
ing and practicing is exclusively yours, as it hardly appears in other religions.”22 
Next, Petra resorts to bio-cultural essentialism to close the discussion:
As much as you deny or disguise it, Catholicism is something the Spanish 
people carry in their genes, your national DNA. You don’t have but to see 
how much they like festivities, which are religious for the most part, or 
the fact that he who lives carefree is called in Spanish a “vivalavirgen,” [or 
“long-live-the virgin”]. That explains that the Counter Reformation suc-
ceeded here, or that religion continues being a taboo, a sensitive issue if 
anyone dares to call it into question.23
The irony is that Petra makes a living out of the various official subsidies to 
culture and the arts offered by the Spanish administrations, which in turn 
may come from European funding, which implies, like in Gullón’s novel, that 
Northern Europeans also benefit from the money put into less economically 
buoyant Southern countries. Petra’s character is thus exposed as hypocritical, 
too, contradicting the clear-cut cultural line separating Southern and Northern 
Europeans that she drew in her imaginated discourse.
Drawing on the Spanish Black Legend, Rafael Chirbes’ En la orilla (2013) 
presents the Spanish character in a much grimmer light. Continuing with the 
theme at the core of his celebrated previous novel Crematorio (2007), Chirbes 
focuses on the consequences of the real estate bubble in Levante, and by exten-
sion, elsewhere in Spain. En la orilla won a number of relevant awards and has 
reached an international readership with its translation into English.24 The 
21 García-Jambrina (2015), p. 70.
22 García-Jambrina (2015), p. 70.
23 García-Jambrina (2015), pp. 70f.
24 Rafael Chirbes (27.06.1949–15.08.2015) is the author of four books of essays and ten nov-
els, including his trilogy dealing with postwar Spain (La larga marcha, La caída de Madrid 
and Los viejos amigos), and the Crisis novels Crematorio (2007), about the Spanish real 
estate bubble, and En la orilla (2013). Paris-Austerlitz was published posthumously in 
2016. His first novel, Mimoun (1988), was a finalist of the Herralde awards. In addition 
to the awards for En la orilla: Premio de la Crítica de narrativa castellana (2014), Premio 
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mood of decay, fear, frustration, anxiety, resentment and despair infuses the 
novel with a sense of hopelessness and the apocalyptic feeling of being at the 
end of time. The marjal, the lagoon ecosystem on the outskirts of Olba, a town 
near Alicante that has become a dumping ground for all kinds of toxic waste, 
becomes a metonymy for Spain, a despoiled nation, reeking with poverty, 
greed, prostitution, xenophobia, Islamophobia, immigration fears, terrorist 
threat, human traffick ing, violence, corruption, disillusion and betrayal.
The novel highlights the historical links between the current environmental 
decay and a corrosive immorality that seems to be inherent to the national 
character. Through Esteban, the septuagenarian protagonist who lives with his 
dog and his mute, disabled and terminally ill father, the text weaves a narrative 
of continuity between the callous repression of the post-civil war years and 
the present, bringing to the surface the connections between the destructive 
practices of those who won the war and their economic and social ascent in 
Spanish society. In the following excerpt, Esteban reminisces about the per-
secution and repression his Republican father tried to avoid after the war by, 
first, hiding in the reedbeds near the lagoon and later handing himself in to 
the authorities. The civil guard would chase him, and many others like him, 
“like animals, even burning down the vegetation. The crackle of the reedbeds 
burning and the sticky smell of the smoke suffocating the other marsh crea-
tures would reach as far as Olba. To make the fire spread more rapidly, they 
would pour gas on the reedbeds and the scrub, which were often small islands 
of floating vegetation.”25 Yet, destroying the natural environment where the 
villagers in hiding found refuge had the further purpose of creating allegiances 
and servitude on the part of those who were given strips of land from the 
drained lagoon. Consequently, those lands signify the foundational moment 
of present-day corruption:
It wasn’t all about repression though. There was a business aspect too. On 
the excuse that they had to hunt down those poor wretches, the authori-
ties encouraged the draining of the lagoons, promoted the idea of filling 
them in, giving swathes of swampy land to a few friends and ex-combat-
Nacional de Narrativa (2014), Premio Francisco Umbral al Libro del Año 2013 (2014), Pre-
mio Bienal de Novela Mario Vargas Llosa finalist, it was also considered best book of the 
year by the newspaper El País. Chirbes also won the German award SWR-Bestenliste for La 
larga marcha (1999), the book of the year Premio Cálamo for Los viejos amigos (2003) and 
again in 2007 for Crematorio, which also won Premio de la Crítica de narrativa castellana 
(2007), and Premio Dulce Chacón (2008).
25 Chirbes (2016), p. 82.
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ants, granting them authority to drain and cultivate it. Greed was enough 
of an incentive to mobilize the volunteers for the hunts. Properties like 
Dalmau and La Citrícola were born out of those re-distributions. […] La 
Citrícola was born out of the part of the lake handed over to Pallarés to be 
drained, another blue shirt who strutted about with a pistol in his shoul-
der holster,26 generally tyrannising the area until the late 1960s, when his 
legal heirs took over the estate, and while they – a sign of the times – 
have behaved rather more discreetly, they have been just as greedy, and 
all their dealings were wiped clean of the old ideological cobwebs: clean 
money without the packaging of patriotic speeches, proclamations or 
saber-rattling.27
Esteban himself realizes that immorality and greed have since then extended 
and infected almost everyone, himself included. At present, he faces eviction 
and jail after forging his father’s signature and investing all his money and pos-
sessions in a real estate company that has gone bankrupt after the outbreak 
of the housing bubble and whose owner has fled the country with the money. 
While he pretends in front of his friends that everything is fine, he determines 
to put an end to his father’s and his own life.
En la orilla has been acclaimed as the best novel on the Spanish economic 
crisis, and yet, it goes beyond the narrow scope of economics to ponder on a 
particular national brand of the banality of evil that results in further grim-
mer and more hopeless crises, if only because they are more difficult to fight, 
namely the moral crisis, the crisis of values, the institutional crisis, the crisis of 
the nation-state. Other crises, like the crisis of the Anthropocene, are rendered 
in an ambiguous, ironic way, like when Esteban reflects on the current concern 
about nature in contrast with the scarce interest in the crimes against human-
ity committed during and after the Civil War that remain unpunished:
now the great shrine of divinity is nature: impregnating water and mud 
with asphalt roofing felt, bituminous matter, glass fiber, carcinogenic 
asbestos, which is what Bernal Jr. did, seems far worse than the murders 
his father committed. If you throw a corpse into the sea, you’re doing the 
environment a favor, supplying food for the fish to nibble on with their 
26 The Blueshirts, or Camisas Azules in Spanish, were the paramilitary militia of the Falange 
political party, officially renamed Falange Militia in 1940 during Franco’s regime. The sym-
bolic blue colour of their uniforms sought to gain support among the Spanish blue-collar 
workers. 
27 Chirbes (2016), p. 82.
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small cold mouths. The sins of the gunmen – who turned ditches into 
graves and peppered the walls of cemeteries with bullets, who fed the 
fish out at sea – those were absolved by the Transition, because appar-
ently they were only venial sins, whereas the sins committed against the 
environment have no expiry date and no judge can absolve them. Let’s 
not deceive ourselves, man is nothing very special. In fact, there are so 
many of us that our governments don’t know what to do with us all […]. 
The sleight of hand that made man the center of the universe no longer 
convinces.28
Despite the negative tone of the novel, however, there is a sustained imagery in 
which the marsh can paradoxically act as a space of freedom, protection and 
regeneration, the same as carrion engenders life and beauty:
We live off what we kill. We live from killing, from what is served up to 
us dead: the inheritors consume the spoils of their predecessors, which 
nourish and strengthen them when it’s time to take flight. The more car-
rion they eat, the higher and more majestic the flight. And, of course, 
more elegant. And none of this is in any way at odds with the natural 
condition of the world.29
Yet, the marsh’s beauty appears at the end of the book as a mere mirage, and 
the text shuns the ideology of linear progress while reinforcing the idea of 
immobility and death through the imagery of dark colours and tombs: “The 
passing clouds reflected on the surface create an illusion of a world in con-
stant evolution, but which is, in fact, motionless, fixed as if in an old photo-
graph, whose sepia tones precisely match the rusty colors of the winter reeds, 
faced yellows and ochers and a brown so dark it’s almost black, and which 
forms sooty clumps, the melancholy tombs of giants.”30 Furthermore, the 
novel eschews any attempt at poetic justice by choosing Tomás Pedrós as the 
focaliser in its last pages. Pedrós, the crook who swindled Esteban out of his 
savings, has managed to escape and is ready to continue living the good life 
in his ‘exile’: “money has no homeland, just make sure you’ve got plenty of 
convertible euros or convertible dollars (is that what they call them?) in your 
handbag,”31 he says, and the doctrine he lives by seems to serve him well. Thus, 
28 Chirbes (2016), pp. 32f.
29 Chirbes (2016), p. 130.
30 Chirbes (2016), p. 389.
31 Chirbes (2016), p. 399.
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the myth of the pícaro or trickster figure devoid of any moral values but his 
own profit and survival, prevails.
In contrast with Chirbes’ ominous tone, Almudena Grandes portrays in Los 
besos en el pan (Kisses on the Bread) an urban middle class that after the shock 
of being hit by the economic crisis, actively struggles to pull itself up by their 
bootstraps, adopting resilience strategies in the face of the political corrup-
tion and austerity measures that have the country on the edge.32 An excerpt 
of the novel focusing on the scene that explains its title appeared in The New 
York Times on 13 December, 2017. The title alludes to the traditional gesture of 
kissing the bread as a sign of gratitude, even in the midst of misfortune, as the 
narrator of this polyvocal novel was taught to do as a child during the times of 
scarcity of the Spanish civil war and the post-war period. Grandes’ novel targets 
a Spanish audience that is well acquainted with the recent historical political 
and social developments in the country, readers who may identify with one 
or more of the myriad characters inhabiting the novel. The text draws on the 
myth of the heroic Spanish people rebelling against tyrants and  invading for-
eign powers, which in the novel’s historical juncture are global neoliberalism 
and its national and supranational defenders, the Spanish government and the 
‘troika’ formed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and 
the International Monetary Fund. Los besos en el pan highlights the various 
personal and collective strategies of survival developed by Spanish society 
to avoid succumbing to the crisis and its various nefarious manifestations – 
unemployment, evictions, divorces, etc.
A key buffer the text highlights is the family, which continues functioning as 
a nurturing and indispensable social structure when other institutional struc-
tures fail. The other interesting development involves social solidarity and the 
people’s capacity and willingness to join forces to contest, reverse and direct 
institutional decisions that affect their lives. Regarding the former, the novel 
establishes intergenerational links, highlighting the role of grandparents. They 
32 Almudena Grandes is the author of thirteen novels and two collections of short stories, 
among other works. She is an outspoken leftist intellectual and a well-known public fig-
ure in Spain. Like Chirbes, she graduated in History and her fiction reflects her interest in 
the postwar and the Transition periods, as well as their continuing effects on the quotid-
ian reality of present-day Spain. Her first novel, Las edades de Lulú (1989), won the award 
La Sonrisa Vertical and became a best-seller, translated into more than twenty languages. 
It was adapted to the screen in the homonymous film directed by Bigas Luna. Since then, 
she has received numerous literary awards and many of her novels have been turned into 
films and TV series. Among her most important awards are Premio José Manuel Lara and 
Premio del Gremio de Libreros de Madrid, for her novel El corazón helado (2007), and the 
Elena Poniatowska Award she received in Mexico for the novel Inés y la alegría (2010). In 
2020 she received the Jean Monnet Prize for European Literature.
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not only sustain their unemployed children and grandchildren with their 
care and usually meagre pensions, but act as the living memory of the Span-
ish people’s ordeals of the twentieth century, and the holders of the survival 
mechanisms necessary in times of crisis. The narrator establishes already in 
the prologue the importance of cultural memory, regretting – like Gullón’s and 
Chirbes’ characters – the political and social pact of forgetting at the founda-
tion of the Spanish Transition to democracy, which resulted in the apparent 
erasure from collective consciousness a history of sheer poverty, but also of the 
necessary audacity to confront adversity:
Thirty years ago, in Spain, children inherited poverty from their par-
ents, but also dignity, a way of being poor that was never undignified. 
We learned to never stop fighting for a better future, to never give up 
[…]. Later, they told us we had to forget, that […] to build a democracy it 
was essential to look forward, to pretend nothing had happened. And by 
forgetting the bad, we Spaniards also erased the good […], we lost touch 
with our tradition, with the values that now could help us overcome this 
new poverty. This deprivation has been foisted on us from the very heart 
of that Europe that was supposed to make us rich, and has stolen from us 
a treasure that cannot be bought with money. Today, this neighbourhood 
dwellers are not just broke; they are lost, stunned and confused, as disori-
ented as a spoiled child whose toys have been taken away. That child does 
not know how to make his voice heard, claim what was his, denounce the 
robbery or stop the thieves.
If our grandparents saw us, they would first double-up with laughter, 
then die of shame. For them, our economic slide would be a mere incon-
venience, not a crisis. Because Spaniards, who for centuries knew how to 
be poor with dignity, never knew how to be docile.
Never, until now.33
In tune with the narrator’s perspective, Martina offers her grandson her civil 
war and post-war experiences as a counterpoint to the current crisis, insisting 
that “one cannot just accept whatever, but must take the reins, refuse to accept 
all this ruin.”34
33 Grandes (2015), pp. 16f.
34 Grandes (2015), p. 41. Joaquín Estefanía provides a counterpoint to this image of grand-
parents in his recent book Abuelo, ¿cómo habéis consentido esto? (2017), drawing attention 
to the responsibility of the generation of elders for the mistakes that have led the country 
and the world to the current situation.
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The novel elaborates, therefore, upon the trope of the romantic image of 
Spaniards as proud and brave people, readily mobilising in defence of their 
values and freedoms, as it captures the shift from political apathy and disaf-
fection to active engagement in local politics in solidarity with the weakest 
members of the community, namely, the immigrants, battered women, the 
rapidly increasing number of families facing eviction, children in impover-
ished families, the elderly and the sick. Consequently, there is a focus on citi-
zen initiatives that both defy laws that are perceived as unjust and result in the 
emergence of Community Associations.
The public Health System, which Spaniards take great pride in, comes 
under scrutiny in this novel. In the midst of a Government campaign aiming 
to mobilize public opinion against civil servants so as to neutralize any oppo-
sition to lower their salaries, decimate their numbers, privatize public services 
in schools and hospitals, etc., the novel captures the atmosphere of popular 
struggle and resistance that materialised in the movements called ‘mareas’: 
“The Green Tide” in defence of Public Education, the “White Tide” in defence 
of the Public Health System and so on and so forth. In the novel, one of the 
doctors explains to an elderly patient of his why the hospital staff are prepar-
ing to protest against the Regional Government orders to shut it down. His 
words stress the cynicism of neoliberal policies that, in connivance with the 
private sector, are depleting the public treasury:
The Regional Government wants to close the clinic […]. They say that 
this hospital is obsolete, bullshit, that it isn’t profitable, bullshit, that this 
neighbourhood is overfunded, bullshit, that our work plan is not effi-
cient, lie upon lie upon lie […]. And what will they do then, those rascals? 
Demolish the building, build luxurious condos and make a fortune, as 
usual […].35
When the time comes for a demonstration, the whole neighbourhood shows 
up, including Venancio, the ultraconservative elderly man whose wife with Alz-
heimer Disease receives the daily visits of social workers and nurses at home.
Grandes’ novel touches upon many other current concerns – corruption, 
unemployment, immigration, gender crossing, homosexuality, gender violence, 
and the protection of children. Empathy, love and unity prevail against the 
backlash of the economic crisis. There is an awakening of the people, the rise 
35 Grandes (2015), p. 192f.
Resilient Stereotypes in Recent Crisis Novels from Spain 263
of solidarity and the realisation that people need to empower themselves by 
making their own politics, organising themselves as communities with agency.
Belén Gopegui’s El comité de la noche (The Night Committee) also connects 
the crisis to the strong emergence of grassroots activism directed to resist the 
Government’s alliance with neoliberal capitalist powers.36 Gopegui found the 
inspiration for the novel’s plot when she read the news published by Europa 
Press in 2012 about a multinational pharmaceutical corporation that intended 
to pay seventy euros per week to unemployed people who became blood 
donors. The commodification of human organs does not only make economic 
profit via the exploitation of the vulnerability of human beings. It also turns life 
into capital and divides humanity into those who can buy their own wellbeing 
and survival and those whose right to life and health is disregarded given their 
precarity, a term coined by Judith to convey the vulnerability artificially and 
differentially inflicted over human beings due to gender, class, race, ethnicity, 
sexuality, and other categories.37 Thus, Gopegui tackles head on two contem-
porary ethical problems or concerns, that of the creation of the subhuman and 
that of the ethical regulation of bio-technological human enhancement lead-
ing to a posthuman era. The Night Committee is a powerful critique of the gen-
eralisation of vulnerability caused by the connivance of national states with 
the neoliberal forces of late capitalism that thrive precisely on people’s precar-
iousness. Like Grandes’ Los besos en el pan, this novel takes resilience one step 
beyond individual malleability and resistance by countering “the authority of 
capital” with social democratic mobilisation.38
At the novel’s opening Álex, a young doctor who has been fired from her last 
job after the privatisation and closing of public hospitals and the shrinking of 
staff contracts and salaries in private clinics, returns to live with her parents. 
Jobless at thirty-three and a single mother after the separation from her hus-
band, she faces an existential crisis. Far from a drawback, this insight consti-
tutes a revelation that allows her to reinvent herself away from her personal 
36 The novel won the award Otra Mirada, Premios Cálamo 2014. Belén Gopegui studied Law 
at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and has worked for several newspapers. She is 
the author of thirteen novels, one play, several film scripts, among other works. She has 
won various national and international literary awards, among which, Premio Iberoamer-
icano de Primeras Novelas “Santiago del Nuevo Extremo” for her first novel, La escala de 
los mapas, VII Premio de Narrativa Española Dulce Chacón for Deseo de ser punk, and her 
novel La conquista del aire adapted to the screen by Gerardo Herrero as Las razones de mis 
amigos.
37 See Butler (2004); Butler (2009).
38 Gopegui (2014), p. 256.
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history and all the external circumstances that have determined it so far. Thus, 
Álex joins a group of transnational scope that aims to prevent global pharma-
ceutical corporations from convincing the EU to pass legislation for the lib-
eralisation of the blood trade. The vision of this semi-clandestine group is to 
build up a new world without necessarily pulling down the foundations of the 
current one, relying instead on bottom-up mutation and transformation: “If we 
began building up everything, communities, cooperatives, occupy movements, 
evicted proprieties, networks, new relations, if we could go on mutating, may 
be the war would not need to be bloody nor long nor devastate everything.”39 
However, for this vision to succeed, Álex and her group realize, the mutation 
has to entail the community and strategically take into account a politics of 
location.40 Like Grandes, Gopegui draws on the romantic image of the Span-
ish people as brave, ingenious and defiant, rising up against oppression and 
joining in solidarity against injustice. Gopegui, however, goes beyond Grandes’ 
portrayal by pointing at the transnational nature of the struggle. Thus, the 
social activism of the protagonists reaches European and global dimensions 
with the networks and interconnections they help establishing.
4 Conclusion
To conclude, this survey suggests that the Spanish authors in this limited selec-
tion render a view of the construction of a Spanish identity in the wake of 
the European crises that depends as much on the Spanish self-image as on 
their meta-image—i.e., the Spanish perception of how Spain is shaped by the 
gaze of other countries. This is the case in Gullón’s novel regarding the his-
torical stereotypes that prompt the plot about the rival relations between the 
Netherlands and Spain. Likewise, García-Jambrina’s novel playfully revels in 
the stereotypical images that Spaniards hold of Germany and of themselves, 
as well as in the images Spaniards think the Germans have of Spain. As both 
novels draw on the stereotypes about the Dutch and the Germans in Spain, 
they cement a static sense of national identity across time. Irony becomes a 
relevant strategy in this crisis juncture to mock established stereotypes, partic-
ularly in Gullón’s and Garcia-Jambrina’s novels. Furthermore, Garcia-Jambrina 
grounds his play with stereotypes about Spain, Germany and the EU in the 
Spanish literary and cinematic traditions by adopting Valle-Inclán’s esperpento 
39 Gopegui (2014), p. 58.
40 Gopegui (2014), p. 59.
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or penchant for exaggeration and the grotesque, the anti-hero attitudes of 
Don Quixote and Lázaro de Tormes, and by taking inspiration from Berlanga’s 
classic film Bienvenido, Mr. Marshall. In the process of alluding to the Spanish 
literary and cultural canons, cultural memory is mobilised in the creation of 
patterns of othering and selfhood. Chirbes, Grandes and Gopegui also dwell 
on historical remembrance and the layered historical assumptions about the 
Spanish character. Whereas Gullón, García-Jambrina and Chirbes underline 
for the most part aspects of the Spanish Black Legend, Grandes and Gopegui 
bring forward the more positive and romantic aspects of the construction of 
a Spanish identity, highlighting the passion, courage, and struggle against tyr-
anny and oppression. Gopegui and Gullón also add the important element 
of transnational collaboration and solidarity across social boundaries, ques-
tioning the distinction between nationalities and, as a result, the basis for the 
accretion of the various stereotypes.
Hence, the genre of the novel appears as an important space for reflection 
on the revival, reshaping and contestation of old stereotypes that offer not just 
a mirror to the current perception of a divided Europe, but a tool to build up 
resilience in times of crisis. These novels can be seen as an attempt to consti-
tute a narrative ethics that, on the one hand, may help redefine the notion of 
European citizenship, and on the other, create meaning and bonds that may 
reinstate the trans national European ideal emerging after World War II. All in 
all, these novels convey a sense of social resilience that draws on the unravel-
ling, revision and adaptation of stereotypes that prove themselves to be resil-
ient to the passing of time.
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CHAPTER 13
Virtually There
Spectral Ireland and European Stereotypes in the Novels of Paul Murray
Aidan O’Malley
 Abstract
Paul Murray’s three novels, An Evening of Long Goodbyes (2003), Skippy Dies (2010) and 
The Mark and the Void (2015), constitute a humorous panorama of contemporary Ire-
land as they chart the ascent and supposed death of the so-called Celtic Tiger. This is 
an Ireland that has unmoored itself from history and has replaced the dilapidated spir-
itual authority of the Catholic Church with the guidance offered by the invisible hand 
of the free market. When this Irish iteration of late neoliberal capitalism failed, the 
country found itself incapable of imagining any real alternative to it. This contribution 
illustrates how these novels employ non-Irish European characters to dramatize this 
process. During the boom years Ireland came to encounter Europe much more directly 
than before through inward migration, especially from parts of the continent that had 
not featured in earlier cultural and political constructions of Europe. Murray’s novels 
explore how the stereotyping of European immigrants was essential to the operations 
of the phantasmagoric Celtic-Tiger Ireland. However, as this essay also shows, the 
comic exaggerations employed in the satirical representation of this spectral dynamic 
in Murray’s most recent novel gesture back towards, and repeat, the stereotyping the 
novel is explicitly critiquing.
Set in the years of the so-called Celtic Tiger and the subsequent economic 
crash, Paul Murray’s three novels, An Evening of Long Goodbyes (2003), Skippy 
Dies (2010), and The Mark and the Void (2015) are, in many respects, ghost sto-
ries. Charles, the protagonist of An Evening of Long Goodbyes who compares 
himself to Hamlet, struggles to come to terms with his father’s death and 
tainted legacy; the students in Skippy Dies deal with the trauma of Skippy’s 
unexpected death by constructing a time machine to communicate with him; 
The Mark and the Void conjures up French thinkers such as Jean Baudrillard 
and Guy Debord to frame the materialization of zombie banks in the country. 
Recognisable and comically unreal, the spectral Ireland of these novels is a 
place in which other-worldly forms of reality are ending. In An Evening of Long 
Goodbyes Charles is cast out from a salubrious Dublin Garden of Eden, while 
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Skippy Dies charts, amongst other things, the declining spiritual authority of 
the Catholic Church; unable to compete with the hold that the free market has 
on the country, these superannuated modes of living are being supplanted by 
it—a process the novels present as a case of one form of virtual reality replac-
ing another. The illusory nature of this hegemonic economic ideology is the 
theme of The Mark and the Void, which is set in the immediate aftermath of the 
2008 global banking crisis and the collapse of the myth that property prices 
could only increase. However, as the novel registers, despite this painful unveil-
ing of the chimerical nature of capitalism, it is superseded by an even more 
unreal version of itself. In short, the Ireland of these novels marks an empti-
ness that struggles to register a semblance of presence that might transcend 
the constricted dogma of the unregulated free market.
1 Skippy Dies (2010)
As is well known, after decades of being the poorest country in Western 
Europe, the Irish economy took a turn towards unthought-of prosperity in 
the 1990s thanks to a combination of EU funding, a low corporate tax regime, 
and a well-educated, Anglophone and cheap labour force. Attracted by this, 
large international corporations, especially from hi-tech sectors such as infor-
mation technology and pharmaceuticals, pitched up in Ireland. Set in this 
moment, Murray’s most successful novel, Skippy Dies, portrays a country that, 
as a consequence of this massive economic adrenaline hit, has achieved Ste-
phen Dedalus’s ambition of awakening from the “nightmare” of history, and 
is now wallowing in the daydream of consumerism.1 Skippy Dies views the 
Celtic Tiger years from the perspective granted by an expensive Dublin Catho-
lic boarding school, Seabrook (modelled on Blackrock College, Murray’s alma 
mater), where the students absorb much of the world through the stereotypes 
that drive fantasy and combat computer games, television shows and films. 
Under these influences, they relate to the past in a lexicon drawn from the 
likes of Dungeons and Dragons – invariably referring to history as “days of Yore” 
– while US films about Vietnam provide the epithets with which they racially 
abuse the young Chinese man and woman working at their hangout, calling 
them “Gook”, “Gookette” and “Charlie”.2 But what the novel underlines is that 
the teenagers’ attitudes to the past are confused precisely because most of 
1 Joyce (1986), p. 28.
2 Murray (2010), pp. 40–43.
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the adults around them have even less appreciation of history. Many of the 
younger teachers are, or aspire to be, “kidults”, as one of that cohort notes – 
living out of time and as concerned as their students are with the latest shiny 
gadgets.3 The students’ parents’ emotional lives evince no signs of maturity; 
all that distinguishes them from the younger generations is the more elevated 
bracket of consumerism they operate in.
Dealing, as it does, in ‘futures’ not ‘pasts’, capitalism is inherently ahistori-
cal, and “[t]he Irish”, according to Halley, an American living in the Dublin of 
this novel, “are all about the future”.4 George O’Brien has suggested that the 
characters in this novel “stumble through a mismanaged and fragmented pres-
ent without the remotest idea of what difference their doing so will make to 
securing a future.”5 While it is the case that the school, like the society in which 
it is embedded, is fundamentally lost, it is perhaps more accurate to say that 
the novel portrays a community that can only imagine finding itself through 
immersion in the shrunken future promised by the free market.
“There’s a little banker inside all of us now”, was Murray’s diagnosis of the 
national psyche in a 2015 interview, and Costigan, Seabrook’s interim principal, 
sees it as his job to nurture and spread this virus.6 In spite of his excesses, he is 
less a comic grotesque than an embodiment of the worst aspects of boom-time 
Ireland: his glib conflation of ‘reality’ with ‘consumerism’ regur gitates the shib-
boleths of politicians and journalists that passed as indisputable wisdom for 
most of the two decades leading up to the 2008 crash. In common with them, 
Costigan sees himself as a moderniser, especially as he will be the first non-re-
ligious principal of the school, which was founded, and has been always been 
run, by an invented order of priests called the Paracletes. The spirituality of 
this community is evident in its name: ‘paraclete’ in Christian theology refers 
to “the Holy Spirit as advocate or counsellor”.7 Priests adhering to such a vision 
of their roles are “outmoded technology” to Costigan’s mind: too tied up in 
the past, and too non-materialistic to prepare the boys for careers in business, 
which has become the school’s raison d’être.8 For Costigan, education should 
be entirely focused on “[r]eality” and “objective, empirical truths.”9 These 
3 Murray (2010), p. 62.
4 Murray (2010), p. 82.
5 O’Brien (2012), pp. 183f. 
6 Coffey (2015).
7 Oxford English Dictionary. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/137308?redirectedFrom=paray-
clete#eid [accessed 28.10.2017].
8 Murray (2010), p. 94.
9 Murray (2010), p. 93.
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are just a couple of the empty platitudes that mould his self-serving debased 
utopian vision, about which he, notably, daydreams:
although the Paracletes may be gone, for all intents and purposes, their 
values live on. Maybe the men upholding them will wear a suit and tie 
instead of a dog collar; maybe they will carry a laptop instead of a Bible, 
and maybe ‘common business model’, not ‘God’, will be the name of the 
bridge they use to bring communities together. But although appearances 
may change, the values themselves remain the same – the Seabrook val-
ues of faith, decency, various others.10
Looking to frame this break with the past in terms of a continuity, this is adver-
tising jargon posing as a credo. History, religion and tradition are not to be 
jettisoned entirely; rather, they are valued exclusively as unique selling points. 
They are the intangibles that establish “a strong brand identity”, and, as Costi-
gan puts it, “[b]rands rule the world today. People like them. They trust them.”11
Importantly, Murray’s presentation of this battle for the school’s soul is 
nuanced, and never offers a black-and-white portrait. While the clichéd banal-
ity of Costigan’s mendacious and ultimately successful project is the main 
object of this satire, the priests are hardly advanced as a superior alternative. 
Father Green, a French teacher who has served on the African missions, is the 
most implacably hostile opponent of Costigan’s mercenary programme. The 
students, though, call him “Père Vert”, and his never-fully-articulated dark past 
points to the brutality and paedophilia that have irredeemably stained the his-
tory of the Catholic Church’s control of education in Ireland.12
The constraints imposed on Ireland by the Catholic Church have now been 
replaced with those of debt. The pervasiveness of capitalism – how it binds 
one’s affective life to economics – can be witnessed in how Halley tells her 
partner, Howard, that it is “simple economics” to get a mortgage and set foot 
on the so-called property ladder.13 But, as she is semi-consciously aware, she 
also views Howard’s assumption of this long-term, massive, debt as a sign of 
commitment to their relationship. Putting a monetary value on their future 
is an attempt to make it less indefinable, but, as they soon discover, this is a 
delusion. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have traced how the liberty prom-
ised by the free market is always a mirage, because it is based on creating a 
10 Murray (2010), pp. 607f. 
11 Murray (2010), p. 91.
12 Murray (2010), p. 70.
13 Murray (2010), p. 80.
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population of the “indebted” whose lives have “been put to work”. As such, it is 
an insidious, ubiquitous, system of control:
[b]eing in debt is becoming today the general condition of social life. […] 
Your subjectivity is configured on the foundation of debt. You survive by 
making debts, and you live under the weight of your responsibility for 
them. Debt controls you. […] Debt wields a moral power whose primary 
weapons are responsibility and guilt, which can quickly become objects 
of obsession. You are responsible for your debts and guilty for the difficul-
ties they create in your life.14
Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, Irish politicians, com-
mentators and journalists enjoined the country to get itself into as much debt 
as possible. Fuelled by an unholy alliance of unregulated banks, politicians 
and developers, Irish property prices sky-rocketed in the years leading up to 
the 2008 crash. These banks, as L.M. Cullen observed, “broke[] every rule in 
the canon of banking” with the result that Ireland was, along with Iceland, 
“the most extreme case of the widespread folly in the world banking system.”15 
The idea that property values might stop rising – that history had shown 
that this  bubble was unsustainable – had to be clamped down upon and rid-
iculed, for fear it might puncture the illusion that sustains capitalism: that it 
can unshackle itself from the past and create an entirely new future simply 
by repeating the same operations. Notoriously, in 2007 the then Irish Taoi-
seach, Bertie Ahern, dismissed the economist Morgan Kelly’s warnings that 
the overheated property market would collapse by wondering how he and 
other commentators who were “sitting on the sidelines, cribbing and moan-
ing”, “don’t commit suicide”.16 When the accuracy of Kelly’s prognos tica tions 
became  evident just a year later and Ireland underwent the worst economic 
crash experienced by a developed economy since the Great Depression, the 
moral power of debt that Hardt and Negri describe was recruited to deflect 
criticism of the ruinous ideological decisions made by successive Irish gov-
ernments: when the debts were suddenly called in, neoliberal politicians and 
14 Hardt, Negri (2012).
15 Cullen (2012), pp. 14f.
16 RTÉ (2007). As can be seen in this news report, Ahern subsequently apologised for taking 
suicide too lightly, but not for his repudiation of those experts who refused to join in the 
chorus boosting the economy.
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commentators worked to foster the view that blame for the meltdown must 
also be apportioned to the Irish people for having “partied” too hard.17
Before the 2008 crash, the future that these free-market ideologues imag-
ined was most fully embodied in the United States; as Halley notes in Skippy 
Dies, “an American accent was […] the Voice of Authority, and anything it said 
[is] treated as dispatches from the mother ship.”18 This reflects the perspective 
that was most clearly articulated in July 2000 by the then Tànaiste (Deputy 
Prime Minister) Mary Harney, who claimed that “[g]eographically we are closer 
to Berlin than Boston. Spiritually we are probably a lot closer to Boston than 
Berlin.”19 On one level, this is merely an Irish brand of the sort of right-wing 
populism that helped fuel Brexit: favouring the dream of American unregulated 
neoliberalism over the stereotype of European welfarism (which, in Ireland’s 
case, left it hugely exposed to the US sub-prime mortgage meltdown).20 How-
ever, phrasing this bias in terms of a spiritual inclination signalled, perhaps 
unwittingly, a sense of cultural rupture not just with the authority of the Roman 
Catholic Church, but also with an idea of Europe that played a key role in the 
development of the bourgeois Ireland Harney would have claimed to represent.
2 An Evening of Long Goodbyes (2003)
As is most fully articulated in the pages of The Bell journal (1940–54) and in 
the work of one of its editors, Seán O’Faoláin, many twentieth-century Irish 
writers and thinkers were disposed to construe an idealised Europe that always 
already stood in opposition to everything Irish: a place beyond the pulls of 
nationalism, where rational debate and artistic freedom flourished. Funda-
mentally existing as a symbol of the secular modernity that Ireland had yet to 
achieve, this spectral Europe embodied a style that dreary Ireland struggled 
to emulate, be it in terms of architecture, cuisine, fashion or, simply, a way of 
life. As such, this vision of Europe played a key aspirational role in the devel-
opment of middle-class Irish liberalism. Entry into the European Economic 
Community in 1973, and the increased interactions with European countries 
17 For instance, Brian Lenihan, the then Minister for Finance, argued that “we all partied” in 
a 2010 interview; Lenihan (2010).
18 Murray (2010), p. 82.
19 Harney (2000).
20 As the Nobel laureate economist, Paul Krugman, put it: “How did Ireland get into its cur-
rent bind? By being just like us [the US, A.O’M.], only more so.” Krugman (2009).
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that came with this, did little to disrupt this vision.21 Attitudes to Europe only 
began to change with the advent of Irish prosperity: it was then that proselytiz-
ers like Harney began to promote the idea that the country was more properly 
part of a neoliberal Anglosphere. This coincided with a considerable disrup-
tion of the stereotype of Europe: due to the numbers of Central and Eastern 
European citizens arriving in Ireland, it became increasingly difficult to see 
Europe exclusively as Western Europe.
European immigrants in Ireland feature prominently in An Evening of Long 
Goodbyes and The Mark and the Void. Murray’s first novel, An Evening of Long 
Goodbyes, tells the tale of Charles, a wastrel scion of a wealthy Irish family who 
is drinking his way through the family’s cellar. Since his father’s death, his moth-
er’s hospitalisation for alcoholism and his failed romance with Patsy Olé, he has 
cocooned himself inside the family estate, away from what he sees as the tainted 
modern world. He is literally living in a utopia, a no-place that is also a place of 
happiness: the family house is called Amaurot, which is the capital of Thomas 
More’s Utopia, and his surname, Hythloday, (literally the ‘speaker of nonsense’) 
nods to Utopia’s Ralph Hythloday, the discoverer of Utopia who refuses to con-
sider being an advisor to the monarch, as such proximity to government would 
endanger his ideals.22 Charles too remains aloof from any form of civic engage-
ment and, initially, very little of Celtic-Tiger Ireland impinges on his conscious-
ness, even if he has heard disturbing tales of the newly-rich circling vulture-like 
in the vicinity of his demesne: solicitors and bankers in expensive new cars 
offering fabulous sums for the sort of properties that would grant them a facade 
of aged respectability. However, his insulation from events beyond his walls is 
punctured when he discovers that he is a member of the ranks of the indebted: 
his father purchased Amaurot through an intricate series of dubious mortgages, 
the payments on which are now so overdue that the banks are threatening fore-
closure. Charles devises a hare-brained plan to swindle the family’s insurance 
by exploding a folly he was constructing in the gardens, and when this literally 
blows up in his face he is cast out from his gilded life.
While the fallen world beyond is harsh, it too seems to operate in a rather 
fabulous fashion. In particular, Charles discovers that the employment prac-
tices that underpin Ireland’s booming economy have little contact with the 
real lives of the workers. Interviewed for a job by the director of a company 
called ‘Sirius Recruitment’, Charles is engulfed in the bromides that constitute 
21 For an overview of the literary constructions of Europe in this period, see O’Malley (2020).
22 Noting that “the telephone company that threatens to buy out Amaurot from the dither-
ing, Hamlet-esque Charles and his Ophelia-like sister is named Telsinor”, Stephen Amidon 
felt that “Murray has a rookie’s weak ness for literary allusion”. Amidon (2004).
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the new economy: he would, for instance, not be so much an employee as “a 
Sirius partner”, because, as the director phrases it, “although I’m head of the 
company, I like to say that I’m working for you.”23 These inanities ultimately 
translate into a job straightening yule logs as they chug along a production 
line in a bread factory. There was, though, some truth in the director’s state-
ments, as it transpires that Charles is not employed by Sirius, “but by its sister 
company, Pobolny Arbitwo Recruitment.”24 In fact, he is one of the very few 
Irish workers on the factory floor: most of the rest are Latvians who are fun-
damentally indentured to Pobolny Arbitwo, which takes a large percentage of 
their meagre salaries for having furnished them with a job, and for items such 
as the barracks-style accommodation it provides. When, without any warning, 
the workers are told that they are to be laid off and replaced by robots, the 
everyday chicanery of the arrangement is laid bare: not only do many of the 
workers discover that, after all the deductions, their final salaries amount to 
precisely nothing, but they also learn that they are owed no redundancy pay-
ment, as they are still employed by the recruitment agency, which was leasing 
them to the factory. These are the ghosts operating the machinery of Celtic-Ti-
ger Ireland: fabricated companies, nested inside each other like matryoshka 
dolls, that render the idea of work itself fictitious and grant their immigrant 
employees little more than a wraithlike existence.
These were not, though, the first immigrants from Central and East-
ern Europe that Charles had encountered. In his Edenic persona, he regally 
described his housekeeper at Amaurot, “Mrs P”, as “the help. Bosnian, you 
know. Or is it Serbian? An absolute treasure, anyway. […] if there’s one good 
thing to come out of all this fuss in the Balkans, it’s the availability of quality 
staff”.25 Mrs P, it is later learnt, had not trained as a cook, but had been a lawyer 
in Yugoslavia, before the wars there ripped her family apart. She and her family, 
who are discovered living in the folly that he blew up, came from the Krajina, 
an area in Croatia bordering Bosnia that had a majority Serb population. And 
just as Hythloday points to Charles’s nonsensical, utopian character, their dif-
ficult, ‘unpronounceable’ surname – “Pribicevic” as the novel gives it – signals 
the end of a dream: Svetozar Pribičević was a politician who campaigned in 
the first half of the twentieth century for a Serbian and Croatian federal state. 
Murray, in other words, has given this family a very specific, hybrid, home and 
identity. Yet, despite these explicit details, everyone in the novel remains hazy 
about where exactly they are from – having no real knowledge of Yugoslavia 
23 Murray (2004) p. 223.
24 Murray (2004), p. 255.
25 Murray (2004), p. 6.
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and not feeling that it was worthwhile making the effort to know anything 
about the family’s background, they remain exotic Balkan ghosts. Tellingly, this 
was also true of a number  of contemporary reviews of the novel, which seem 
to have taken Charles (despite his clear fogginess) at his word, and granted the 
family a Bosnian origin.26 While that is inaccurate, it is, at least, geographically 
proximate; they are bizarrely “Kosovan” in Aisling Foster’s Irish Times review.27
Although most of the Irish characters absorb this family’s history as super-
ficially as they might a piece of horror or fantasy fiction, it strikes one of the 
more realistic notes in this metafictional comic novel. Amongst other things, 
the mock-nostalgic take on the advent of the Celtic Tiger in An Evening of Long 
Goodbyes is a pastiche of Irish ‘Big House’ literature. The ‘Big House’ was where 
the, generally but not exclusively, Anglo-Irish, Protestant ascendancy lived and 
controlled the lives of the, generally, impoverished Catholic peasant tenants 
who worked on their estates. ‘Big House’ literature utilises this potent physical 
symbol of the historical divides in Irish life, and while this genre has taken 
different forms, some of the most noted examples of it, such as Yeats’s ‘Coole 
Park 1929’ and Elizabeth Bowen’s novels, have evinced a nostalgic and elegiac 
vision of a world of culture and civilised living fading away in the face of a 
rising nationalist, Catholic, philistine middle class. Notably, the Hythlodays’ 
religion or cultural affiliation would appear to be unimportant in Celtic-Tiger 
Ireland. The novel plays with our assumptions that they are Anglo-Irish and 
Protestant – Charles dabbled for a year with Theology at Trinity College Dub-
lin, and his manners and attitudes are those associated with the pre-World War 
II British aristocracy – but this is by no means necessarily the case; his sister, 
Christabel, for instance, had been educated by nuns. Rather, the Hythlodays 
are merely aping the ‘Big House’ affectation of a cultural aloofness from the 
capitalism that has created the family’s wealth.
This mock-aristocratic attitude is given a supplementary Eastern European 
frame, as Chekhov’s The Cherry Orchard is a constant intertextual presence in 
the novel. Reviewing Frank McGuinness’s 1995 version of Uncle Vanya, Irving 
Wardle noted that “Chekhov over the past 20 years has become an honorary 
Irish author”,28 and the novel riffs on the by-now considerable theatrical tra-
dition established by dramatists such as McGuinness, Thomas Kilroy and, 
most notably, Brian Friel that links Chekhov’s world of gentle decline with 
Irish historical experience. However, despite the fact that the theme of The 
26 See, for instance, Fennelly (2003); Reyn (2004).
27 Foster (2003).
28 Wardle (1995). Reviewing the same production, John Keyes was driven to capitalise his 
frustration, declaring that “CHEKHOV IS NOT IRISH”. Keyes (1995).
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Cherry Orchard – the failure to save an estate – speaks to the family’s situation, 
and that the foregrounding of a classic of Russian literature might be thought 
to offer an oblique commentary on the ways in which immigrants from this 
region are stereotyped and treated in contemporary Ireland, Chekhov’s dra-
ma’s primary function in An Evening of Long Goodbyes is to place the world of 
the novel behind one more lens of fictionality. Everything and everyone in this 
novel is essentially mimicking or citing something else. If the protagonist’s lan-
guage, with its ‘gimlets’ and ‘Pongos’, has been learnt from P.G. Wodehouse, the 
plot of this novel is more indebted to Evelyn Waugh’s laconic unveiling of an 
Eden’s dark underbelly. Importantly, the Irishness of this world is also largely 
the product of literature: W.B. Yeats’s Celtic wistfulness and Oscar Wilde’s aris-
tocratic socialism are touchstones in the protagonist’s upbringing, and MacGil-
lycuddy, the all-knowing, if not entirely reliable, postman who organises fake 
deaths and new lives, has stepped from the pages of a Flann O’Brien novel (The 
Third Postman perhaps?). In short, the novel constantly vaunts its virtuality, 
the fact that it is all made up: although Charles likes to pretend that the fam-
ily’s wealth is an aristocratic inheritance, it actually derives from his father’s 
skill in concocting cosmetics—the whole edifice is literally built on makeup.
3 The Mark and the Void (2015)
“Idea for a novel” are the first words of The Mark and the Void, which is yet 
more emphatically a metafictional novel, even if it is peculiarly uncomfort-
able in that skin.29 It surveys the causes of Ireland’s economic collapse and, 
to a lesser degree, the wreckage it wrought, from the perspective of Claude 
Martingale, a Frenchman working in what he terms “shadow-banking” in the 
“shadow-place” that is Dublin’s International Financial Services Centre (IFSC).30 
Citing François Texier, the fictional French philosopher whose non-presence 
lies at the heart of this novel, Claude describes the IFSC as an archetypal vir-
tual location: it is “real without being actual, present without being there”.31 For 
Paul, a writer whose surname we never learn, the international anonymity of 
the IFSC – the fact that it could be anywhere and so “[b]eing here means not 
being here” – renders it the quintessential location of “modern life”.32 Inhab-
iting this liminal non-place makes Claude a prototypical twenty-first-century 
29 Murray (2016), p. 1.
30 Murray (2016), p. 23.
31 Murray (2016), p. 23.
32 Murray (2016), p. 15.
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Leopold Bloom, a contemporary Dublin Everyman. For this reason, Paul wants 
to model his next novel on Claude, and proposes shadowing him for a period to 
deepen his understanding of his life and work. But, as the reader knows from 
the second half of the novel’s first sentence – “we have a banker rob his own 
bank” – these literary intentions are simply window-dressing for a scam to infil-
trate and steal from Claude’s bank.33 Paul’s preposterous plan comes to nought 
because, as Claude points out to him, the bank has no actual, tangible, money 
on its premises; just as Paul’s heist is based on nothing more than a never-to-be 
novel, the substance of this bank is virtual, merely numbers flashing on com-
puter screens.
The intersection of business and aesthetics is a theme that runs through 
these three novels. Skippy Dies traces how, by stripping away values that might 
sustain art, a business culture delivers a world in which the quality of a piece 
of classical music is evaluated from its use in a Citroën car advertisement. An 
Evening of Long Goodbyes takes a sardonic look at a would-be alternative and 
socially-concerned theatre troupe and its ready embrace of sponsorship from 
a large telecommunications corporation that thinks having a little ‘edge’ might 
be beneficial to its image – a union that is greatly facilitated by their shared flu-
ency in vacuous non-speech. In The Mark and the Void Claude’s colleagues are 
surprisingly excited to have a novelist take an interest in their lives: faced with 
the virtuality and dullness of their work, they look to fiction to offer narratives 
that might make sense of their condition. Indeed, these bankers are some of 
the few characters in the novel who have any conviction about the usefulness 
of art and literature.
More generally, a deep disillusionment with literature can be detected in 
The Mark and the Void, a novel full of writers losing faith with writing. After 
his first book failed to launch him into literary stardom and its attendant 
financial advantages, Paul’s days are now spent either in lap-dancing clubs 
or concocting bizarre schemes for making a quick buck. In contrast, the 
literary sensation du jour, Bimal Banerjee, declares his intention to retreat 
from the world of letters in order to place himself beyond the reach of the 
marketplace. Disenchanted with philosophy, Texier turned to painting, and 
even though he refused to sell his paintings, they nonetheless made their 
way into the market, causing him to give up that art form as well. One of 
his most famous pieces, Le Marque et le Vide, ‘The Mark and the Void’, ends 
up on the wall of a successful Irish writer and his banker partner in Dublin. 
It is described as: “[w]ords upon words upon yet more words; hundreds of 
33 Murray (2016), p. 1.
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pages of text superimposed one on top of the other, rendering each other 
utterly illegible – creating instead a cascading darkness that seems to devour 
the very possibility of meaning.”34 In a not entirely dissimilar fashion, the 
palimpsestic, metafictional form of The Mark and the Void stresses its spectral 
nature: this is a novel that, in a deliberately perverse way, appears to be strug-
gling to unwrite itself as it unfolds.
This disquiet about the meaning of literature largely stems from the nov-
el’s insecurities about the necessity and possibility of fiction writers articu-
lating the operations of international finance. As this sector is fundamental 
to so much of contemporary life, the novel constantly argues for a fictional 
engagement with it. Yet, in the same moment, it raises doubts about the abil-
ity of fiction to communicate the hegemonic, incoherent, meaninglessness 
of the make-believe world of the free market; a universe where, for instance, 
the apparently huge wealth that was generated in the years of the Celtic Tiger 
could seemingly disappear overnight: “[t]he banking crisis”, in Banerjee’s suc-
cinct terms, “is unrepresentable”.35 Nonetheless, a considerable amount of The 
Mark and the Void is devoted to unveiling and explaining the magical thinking 
that characterises contemporary finance. In fact, as the novel’s fictional philos-
opher, Texier, points out, businesses have an essentially mythical basis:
what we call the corporation […] first appeared in Europe’s Middle Ages, 
signed into law by the Pope in AD 1250. It was conceived as a legal persona 
ficta – a ‘fictive person’ that had many of the attributes of a real person. 
It was capable of owning property, for example, of suing and being sued; 
at the same time, it was bodiless, invisible, free from human infirmity 
and the ravages of time. Conceived as such, the corporation was almost 
identical to contemporary ideas of angels. […] the corporation, an entity 
which we imagine as a uniquely secular creation, a paragon of reason and 
common sense, in fact began its life as an offshoot of a Christian myth.36
The priesthood who keep this flame alive is composed, for the most part, of 
young male bankers who are so immersed in the angelic, virtual, ever-present 
they cannot determine their desires for corporeal women until they have pho-
tographed them on their phones. History is only relevant to the extent that it 
presents them with a challenge to make more money for themselves and their 
fabulously wealthy clients in the future.
34 Murray (2016), p. 328.
35 Murray (2016), p. 331.
36 Murray (2016), p. 265.
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This arrogant ahistoricism is dictating the direction of Claude’s employers, 
the Bank of Torabundo, an investment bank that has survived the financial 
crisis thanks to the conservative approach of its CEO, Sir Colin, who avoided 
“toxic investments” as he “was deeply suspicious of complex derivatives”.37 Sur-
rounded by the wreckage of failed competitors, this prudence has transformed 
Torabundo into an important player, and it seeks to build on this standing by 
sacking Sir Colin and replacing him with Porter Blankly. He is spoken of as 
a financial demigod both by the bankers and by the financial press despite 
having been the guiding light at Danforth Blaue, “one of the biggest casualties 
of the crash” that “needed a fifty-billion rescue package from the US govern-
ment”.38 Living up to his name, the always off-stage Blankly issues occasional 
gnomic emails to his employees, who regard them as Delphic riddles they must 
decipher. In brief, he occupies the higher echelons of the seemingly untouch-
able pantheon of contemporary alchemists who seek to turn corporate and 
national losses into profits for themselves and their wealth-fund clients.39 
Claude, who does not entirely buy into this esoteric thinking, discovers how it 
operates when he is given the prestigious task of preparing a report for the Irish 
government on the largest failing bank in the country, the Royal Irish Bank. As 
he quickly realises, this is a completely unsustainable entity that never had 
any substance at the heart of its labyrinthine, fictional, accounts. However, his 
report advising that the bank get no more public money and be shut down is 
not what the government or his bank wanted to hear: their priority is to pro-
tect the bank’s wealthy international bondholders, which entails keeping the 
money flowing. Claude’s report is redacted, and the government presents it as 
an endorsement of its policy of pretending this persona ficta were alive. Thus, 
rather than as a result of inscrutable theorems devised by the enigmatic Rus-
sian mathematicians the bank employs, this contemporary financial alchem-
ical process is revealed to work in a much more mundane fashion: through 
massive misappropriations of public money this so-called zombie bank con-
tinues to generate profits for the super-rich.
Scandalously, this happened in Ireland on 29 September 2008, when the 
government decided to provide a 100% guarantee for the “deposits and debts” 
37 Murray (2016), p. 40.
38 Murray (2016), p. 41.
39 According to Murray, these characters are more congenial than real bankers: his research 
revealed “[t]he preposterous machinations of these people who we still think of as being 
sane and sober individuals. But they’re not. They’re basket cases [mad, A.O’M.]. The banks 
were full of basket cases, people who had lost any connection to their responsibilities as 
human beings.” Wallace (2015).
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of Ireland’s embattled banks, the most insolvent of which was Anglo-Irish 
Bank, which had been named the world’s best bank in 2006 by the still high-
ly-reputed international consultancy firm, Oliver Wyman.40 Agreed to by the 
then Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan, this guarantee, as Fintan O’Toole put 
it, maintained “the fiction that [Anglo-Irish] was a viable bank” by making Irish 
tax-payers responsible for all its debts.41 Like other noisy champions of deregu-
lated banking, Seán FitzPatrick, who had helmed Anglo-Irish into these rocks, 
turned to public money when the invisible hand of the market proved to be 
precisely non-existent. Identifiable versions of these events and characters are 
to be found in The Mark and the Void, and if it might seem “unfair, even impru-
dent to write of a dying, and potentially recognisable, minister for finance”,42 
as Eileen Battersby put it in her notoriously scathing review of this novel, it is 
also the case, more generally, that the representations of the personae fictae in 
this book are marked, in different ways, by a problematic shifting equilibrium 
between the realistic and the spectral.
If the masks fabricated here for some of the principle actors in Ireland’s 
actual crash are deliberately transparent, the fictionality of many of the other 
characters in this novel is accentuated. As in The Evening of Long Goodbyes, 
one way this artificiality is emphasised is through their names. Claude’s sur-
name, Martingale, wryly points both to his understated charac ter, as it signifies 
“a strap or set of straps […] used to prevent the horse from raising its head too 
high”, and to the fiction underlying his profession: it also names “a gambling 
system of continually doubling the stakes in the hope of an eventual win that 
must yield a net profit.”43
Other characters in this novel, though, manifest a more troubling form of 
virtual reality. The epigraph for section three of The Mark and the Void is the 
opening sentence of Guy Debord’s 1967 Society of the Spectacle, which, in many 
respects, sets the scene for the world of this novel: “[i]n societies where mod-
ern conditions of production prevail, all of life presents itself as an immense 
accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved away 
into a representation.”44 Stereotyping, which offers a debased, fictionalised, 
rendition of lived reality, provides a vocabulary for many of the characters in 
40 Murray-Brown, Dennis (2008). While this report has vanished from Oliver Wyman’s site, 
a copy can be found at Cotterill (2011).
41 O’Toole (2010), p. 208.
42 Battersby (2015).
43 Oxford English Dictionary. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/114453?rskey=4Z4brH&reE-
sult=1#eid [accessed 28.10.2017].
44 Murray (2016), p. 263.
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this novel and, thanks to the toxic masculinity that drives both places, com-
munication in the offices of Torabundo frequently echoes that which might be 
heard in the schoolyards of Skippy Dies. Claude is known as the “Crazy Frog” to 
his colleagues,45 and the fiction of national stereotyping appears to be a way in 
which these deracinated bankers try to ground each other and negotiate their 
bewildering virtual world. More importantly, the novel further suggests that 
this recourse to crude stereotypes plays a guiding role in the policies of these 
institutions. As he dispassionately explains the massive Ponzi swindle that his 
bank has perpetuated by getting the Irish public to shoulder its debts, Jurgen 
has no doubt that the Irish will take this calmly, as they “are at root a slave race” 
that “until very recently [had been] ruled by priests” and, as a result, “believe 
they are born in debt”.46 Just as the profits generated by the Celtic Tiger were 
indisputably international while the losses became entirely Irish, this German 
character illustrates how global capitalism is only superficially post-national.
Nowhere, though, is this more apparent than in the treatment of the Eastern 
European characters in The Mark and the Void. If, as Jurgen indicates, Ireland is 
now viewed as a subordinate European nation (one that is far from indulging 
in fantastical debates about which side of the Atlantic it belongs to), the novel 
constantly marginalises characters from the post-communist flank of the con-
tinent. At the periphery of the narrative we find mad Russian geniuses who live 
in cupboards, Bulgarian drug dealers, and “gaunt Slavs with chilly eyes”.47 Igor 
and Clizia, the two most important Eastern European characters, are noth-
ing more than stereotypes. Igor is a servile, grotesque heavy, who cannot even 
bear to look at the art on display in a café. And while Clizia is imbued with 
 considerably more dignity, she is ultimately a cipher: named after the nymph 
who transformed herself into a sunflower after the sun had rejected her, she is 
never anything more than a lap dancer and Paul’s long-suffering, loyal, wife. 
Crucially, she is from nowhere; or, rather, from an entirely invented state. 
Clizia, as Paul explains, is from “Ectovia. Used to be part of Makhtovia, then 
when Transvolga seceded from Makhtovia it became a subdistrict of Trans-
volga. Then it seceded from Transvolga, to become the Ectovian Free Demo-
cratic Republic.”48 While Transvolga exists as a region, neither Ectovia (which 
45 Murray (2010), p. 26f.
46 Murray (2016), p. 443.
47 Murray (2016), p. 246.
48 Murray (2016), p. 167. Although he is by far the more irredeemably stereotyped character, 
Igor is given an actual homeland. Reminiscing about his wife, yet again a stripper, who 
“must be fifteen now”, Igor reveals that he comes from the “Transnistrian Autonomous 
282 O’Malley
perhaps plays on the German echt ‘authentic’) nor Makhtovia (the German for 
power is Macht) can be located.49
Vesna Goldsworthy has documented how British popular fiction writers in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries regularly invented Balkan countries 
such as Ruritania to grant their tales an exotic, decidedly other and politically 
volatile, locale: “[a]mid the general embourgeoisement which […] made most 
of Europe appear too dull for romance, only the Balkans seemed to escape 
the ‘intrusion of civilised monotony’, as H.H. Munro (Saki) [put it]”.50 Through 
a reading of Malcolm Bradbury’s Rates of Exchange (1983), Kazuo Ishiguro’s 
The Unconsoled (1995) and Jim Crace’s Six (2003), Hywel Dix’s updated supple-
ment to Goldsworthy’s study found that while “the end of the Cold War, the 
expansion of a global economy and the prospect of an expanded European 
Union might have been expected to be accompanied by a shift in discursive 
representations of the cultures and societies of Eastern Europe”, this has not 
happened.51 Instead of “addressing the specificities of actually existing Eastern 
European societies”, these novels present “a series of Eastern European soci-
eties that are emptied of content”.52 In conspicuous contrast to the render-
ing of the Pribičević family in The Evening of Long Goodbyes, Clizia’s fictional 
background serves as nothing more than a stereotype of the worst excesses 
of the supposedly unimaginable (to a Western European) ethnic fragmen-
tation of the post-communist world. It casually describes a history that has 
brought about a set of literally meaningless states, presumably concocted from 
the stereotypical Eastern European propensity to reanimate ancient nation-
alisms, religious divides or other forms of authoritarianism. In other words, 
Clizia’s virtual homeland represents the belated forms of experience that Ire-
land – which has regularly been thought to have shared a history of ‘ethnic 
nationalism’ with Eastern Europe – has left in its wake in its journey towards 
the impalpability of the free market.53 No doubt The Mark and the Void wants 
Region” in the “former Soviet Union” – a disputed area in Moldova between Ukraine and 
the Dniester river. (p. 260).
49 Echoes might perhaps also be heard of Makhnovia, a stateless ‘Free Territory’ that sought 
to function as an anarchist society from 1918–21 in present-day Ukraine.
50 Goldsworthy (1998), p. 43. 
51 Dix (2015), p. 989.
52 Dix (2015), p. 989.
53 Hans Kohn, for instance, offered an influential, geographically-defined distinction 
between civic and ethnic nationalisms: if Western European nationalism was cast as 
civic, its Eastern counterpart was ethnic. This neat metaphorical arrangement was some-
what disrupted by the fact that Ireland was assigned to the ethnic camp. See Kohn (1945), 
pp. 329–34.
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to portray Clizia and the other Eastern European immigrants as the ultimate 
victims or embodiments of what Debord called the “[s]pectacular power” of 
global capitalism.54 However, their extremely stereotypical configurations not 
only frustrate this ambition, but also ineluctably throw into counterintuitively 
positive relief the chimeras of embourgeoisement and free-market stability in 
a crisis-ridden Ireland.
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